OPINION: A compound crisis demands compound policy for Korean economy South Korea’s economy is sending mixed signals. Exports are at record highs and the stock market is approaching 5,000 points. At the same time, warning lights are flashing: a weaker won, renewed pressure on home prices and worsening youth employment. Some see the moment as an opening for a major shift; others warn of an economy cooling toward stagnation. In truth, opportunity and risk are advancing together — and that is the most difficult phase of all. The real challenge is no longer what to do, but how fast, in what order and by what method. Yet policy discussions still cling to a familiar sequence: stabilize first, secure growth engines next, then pursue structural reform. That linear roadmap no longer just simplifies reality; it distorts it. Such sequencing assumes a stable external environment, sufficient domestic trust and enough growth momentum to buy time. South Korea has lost all three. Globally, technology, security, energy and currencies are now entangled in constant competition, where delayed decisions can create years-long gaps. At home, widening divides in assets, income and generations are eroding social trust. Growth potential remains, but the room to postpone action under the excuse of “proper sequencing” has disappeared. In this context, saying “stability this year, takeoff next year, reform after that” is not a strategy. It sounds like postponement — and voters and markets no longer trust it. South Korea is not facing separate problems, but a compound crisis in which multiple risks move simultaneously. The country still needs to grow while already carrying the structural burdens of an advanced economy. Catch-up growth tasks and advanced-economy constraints are arriving at the same time. The exchange rate is not merely a foreign-exchange issue. It feeds inflation, raises household burdens, weakens consumption and shapes corporate investment decisions. Treating currency stability as a stand-alone task is unrealistic. Housing is no different. It is tied not only to assets, but also to labor mobility, youth employment, birth rates and demographics. Push housing off as a later “structural reform,” and youth and labor policies fail in practice. The same logic applies to AI and advanced industries. Technology cannot leap ahead while power grids, data infrastructure, permits and regulation remain bottlenecks. Talking about a technological takeoff while delaying structural change misreads the problem. These challenges are already moving together. Only policy remains trapped in an outdated timetable. What South Korea needs is not a more detailed timeline, but a package strategy that runs in parallel — one in which stability, takeoff and structural change reinforce one another. The objective is not to solve everything by 2026. It is to convince the public and markets that the country has entered a credible, irreversible path. Direction matters more than completion. Stability remains the starting point, but it can no longer be treated as a waiting phase. Uncertainty around exchange rates, prices, housing and finance must be reduced simultaneously. That requires more than technical adjustments; it demands a clear collective signal. The government, the central bank and public pension funds must clarify their roles and deliver a consistent message that these risks will not be neglected. The same is true for takeoff. Policy documents are filled with references to AI and advanced industries, but the issue is not technology itself — it is the conditions that allow it to function. Without addressing power supply, data access, permits, regulation and talent incentives together, “takeoff” remains a slogan. It is not a future phase; it is a present challenge that cannot begin without changing today’s structures. Structural change, meanwhile, is the hardest to postpone. Youth employment, labor mobility, regional gaps and demographic pressures are already unfolding. If direction and principles are not presented now, policy credibility will erode quickly. The task is not to overhaul every system immediately, but to lock in an unmistakable, irreversible direction. This is where governance becomes decisive. A package strategy that advances stability, takeoff and structural change simultaneously cannot be executed by any single ministry. It is not just a finance issue, nor can it be neatly divided among industry, land, labor or science ministries. With exchange rates and fiscal policy, industry and power, housing and jobs, technology and regulation all intertwined, coordination must run through the entire government — not as a collection of siloed policies. That makes the role of the Blue House — a national control tower centered on the president — critical. Setting priorities, resolving interagency conflicts and tying short-term stability to medium- and long-term transition fall squarely within presidential authority and responsibility. This is a test of governance, not paperwork. It is also where presidential leadership is judged most coldly. Leadership is revealed not by rhetoric, but by whether ministries move together, policy direction remains consistent and people feel change. Success restores trust quickly; failure leaves little room for excuses. South Korea’s economy is now at that test. If the president cannot take direct responsibility and bind the government together at a moment when stability, takeoff and structural change cannot be separated, even the most carefully designed policies will struggle to work. One more reality must be confronted: the nationwide local elections scheduled for June. They risk becoming a stronger variable than any economic policy now under discussion. The problem is not elections themselves, but the gravitational pull toward populism. Elections compress policy into short-term results and defer painful decisions. As campaigns near, consistency weakens — especially on sensitive issues such as exchange rates, housing, fees and fiscal policy. Officials begin to say “now is not the time.” Direction is verbally maintained, but execution slows. The public notices. A package strategy — which requires firmness, consistency and shared burden — is especially vulnerable. If momentum falters during the campaign, the damage will extend beyond policy failure to a deeper loss of trust. The question, then, is how to sustain a firm, consistent package strategy amid political pressure. First, policy must be elevated from campaign pledges to governing principles. Without a clear separation, policy will wobble. Stability, takeoff and structural change must be framed not as promises to specific groups, but as operating principles tied to national survival — and articulated even more clearly during the campaign. Second, the direction and baseline timeline should be institutionalized as much as possible. Laws, systems, medium-term plans and independent bodies can buffer policy from the electoral calendar. Not everything can be legislated, but the core direction must be embedded so it cannot swing entirely with politics. Third, results must be shown as in progress, not deferred to the future. Elections dislike uncertainty, but public anxiety grows when nothing seems to be happening. Visible shifts within 2026 are essential to demonstrate that the path is already changing. Finally, presidential leadership becomes even more crucial. As elections approach, ministries hesitate and risk avoidance grows. Only the president can hold the policy line. Without clear priorities and non-negotiable principles set from the top, the package strategy will unravel. Elections are unavoidable. Whether they consume policy is a matter of governance. In South Korea’s current situation, delaying hard decisions because of electoral pressure is not a political choice — it is a national risk. Calling for stability, takeoff and structural change at once does not mean ignoring elections. It means acknowledging that reality and still setting minimum governing standards that must not waver. Elections pass. Economic direction shapes the years that follow. South Korea’s economy is again at a crossroads: whether policy is pulled by the magnet of politics, or whether it holds its course above it. The consequences will be felt directly in people’s lives/ The author is an editorial writer for the Aju Business Daily. About the author ▷Former deputy business editor and Tokyo correspondent at JoongAng Ilbo ▷Former visiting professor at Seoul National University’s College of Engineering ▷Former chair professor of technology management at Hanyang University ▷Former head of Gyeonggi Science & Technology Promotion Agency ▷Currently a special professor at Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology’s AI Policy and Strategy Graduate School and a visiting professor at Gachon University ▷Currently editorial writer at Ajou Economy * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2026-01-21 07:27:33

OPINION: A Periodic Table war at play The world is already in a war — just not the kind most people picture. There are no gunshots, troop movements or televised front lines. Yet its outcome will shape industrial competitiveness and long-term national resilience. The battlefield is the periodic table. This “periodic table war” is the intensifying global competition for the elements that underpin modern industry and technology: copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite, rare earths, gallium, germanium, silver, aluminum — even uranium. These materials are essential to artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, the energy transition, carbon reduction and defense. They are no longer mere commodities; they are strategic assets. Prices for many of these elements have risen in recent years, but price is only the surface. The deeper shift lies in how governments and global companies now treat them — not as a cost line, but as the starting point of industrial strategy, a tool of diplomacy and an asset tied to national security. The periodic table is becoming a map for 21st-century industrial policy. Viewing this merely as a commodity supercycle or speculative spike misses the point. What is unfolding reflects five forces moving simultaneously and reinforcing one another: the AI boom, the shift to electric vehicles, the push toward net-zero, the institutionalization of ESG management and intensifying geopolitical competition. Their intersection is the periodic table. Oil defined the industrial order of the 20th century. Countries that secured stable oil supplies grew; finance, military power and diplomacy followed. The 21st century, however, is moving from an economy powered by combustion to one that generates, stores and computes with electricity. That transition depends not on a single resource, but on a wide array of elements — and on the ability to combine and control them. Artificial intelligence illustrates how physical this new competition has become. Hyperscale data centers consume electricity on the scale of small cities. Supplying that power reliably requires power plants, transmission lines, transformers, distribution equipment and cooling systems — all built from metals and critical elements. Copper is central to power transmission and distribution. Aluminum is essential for long-distance lines. Nickel and graphite are core materials for energy storage. Silver is used in high-efficiency power equipment and solar installations. Uranium, which underpins nuclear power, is being redefined as a “power element” supporting stable baseload electricity in the AI era. As data centers multiply, electricity demand surges. Renewables alone are unlikely to meet it, pushing countries to reconsider nuclear power — and with it, uranium and the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from conversion and enrichment to fuel fabrication. Rising uranium prices are therefore not mere speculation; they reflect a structural shift in how power systems are being rebuilt. The transition to electric vehicles raises the stakes further. Internal-combustion vehicles were largely a steel-and-aluminum industry. EVs are products of the periodic table. Without lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite and rare earths, not a single EV can operate. EVs also require a greater quantity — and variety — of minerals than gasoline-powered cars. More importantly, EV adoption is not simply replacing one type of vehicle with another. It is turning the transportation system into a vast electricity-storage network. Millions of EVs function simultaneously as vehicles and batteries, becoming part of the power system itself. As this structure takes hold, demand for key elements is unlikely to fade quickly and may rise cumulatively, making this a long-term, structural contest. The push toward net-zero reinforces the same trajectory. Wind and solar power, energy storage and the hydrogen economy are all metal-intensive. Solar requires silver and aluminum; wind relies on rare earths and massive steel structures; hydrogen depends on nickel and platinum-group metals. Cutting carbon, paradoxically, means consuming more metals. Carbon neutrality does not mean using fewer resources — it means digging deeper into the periodic table. These shifts are already visible in markets. A recent Financial Times feature titled “In search of the copper to connect the AI boom” noted that AI is fundamentally reshaping copper demand. Data centers require far more power than traditional facilities, and the grids that connect them need vast amounts of copper. The paper argued that copper is being elevated from an industrial metal to a strategic resource — the “blood vessels” of the digital economy. Citing International Energy Agency analysis, the report warned that planned mine output alone may be insufficient to meet a significant share of expected global copper demand by the mid-2030s. More troubling are supply constraints: new mines face years of delays from environmental rules, local opposition and permitting, while refining and processing remain concentrated in a handful of countries. In the AI era, competitiveness will depend not only on chip design or algorithms, but on secure access to copper itself. The same dynamic is evident at the London Metal Exchange, long seen as a neutral pricing venue. Increasingly, it has become a strategic arena where countries and global firms compete for deliverable inventory. When stocks of a metal fall sharply, or when firms of a particular nationality lock up supply, prices can spike — not due to speculation, but because material control confers power. The “nickel shock” on the LME in March 2022, which led to a trading halt and the unprecedented cancellation of contracts, exposed this vulnerability. As nickel grew in importance as a key EV battery material, market fragility became clear once refining and processing came under the influence of a single country. The lesson was unmistakable: core periodic-table elements are no longer just financial instruments; they are national strategic assets. China’s tightening of export controls and licensing for materials such as gallium, germanium and graphite follows the same logic. The objective is not merely to raise prices, but to make global advanced industries structurally sensitive to policy decisions in Beijing. These elements may appear minor individually, but in semiconductors, AI, communications and defense they are difficult to substitute. Even brief disruptions can halt production lines. Markets now price supply availability and political stability above cost alone U.S. and European industrial policies reflect the same shift. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act are not simply subsidy programs. They begin with a strategic question: which elements on the periodic table can be secured within allied blocs? Both signal a decisive return of the state to industrial competition. South Korea must confront its own reality. It is resource-poor. The greater risk, however, lies in treating this as a temporary price issue or a firm-level cost problem. Speaking about AI, semiconductors, EVs and batteries while neglecting elemental supply strategy would leave the industrial core exposed to external control. The country’s survival strategy is therefore clear. Competing to own mines is neither realistic nor efficient. Instead, South Korea should secure leadership in refining, processing, materials engineering and recycling. Even without extracting raw elements, it can master their industrialization. High-purity refining, next-generation materials design, urban mining and recycling align naturally with ESG principles and Korea’s manufacturing strengths. Finance and diplomacy form another pillar. Long-term offtake agreements — prearranged supply contracts — should be structured as national packages backed by sovereign credit. Such frameworks distribute political and currency risk beyond individual firms. This is not a war companies can fight alone; it is a test of state capacity. Demand management must also be treated as resource strategy. Improving energy efficiency in AI data centers, substituting materials in EV batteries and reducing metal intensity through software and design are all forms of “invisible” resource policy. In this contest, the winners will not be those that consume the most, but those that create the most value with the least material. The periodic table is no longer a classroom chart. It is an industrial strategy map, a diplomatic guide and a blueprint for national survival. The next era of competition will ask a simple but unforgiving question: Which box on the periodic table does your country take responsibility for? The world has already entered this periodic-table war — and time is short. About the author: ▷Former deputy business editor and Tokyo correspondent at JoongAng Ilbo ▷Former visiting professor at Seoul National University’s College of Engineering ▷Former chair professor of technology management at Hanyang University ▷Former head of the Gyeonggi Institute of Science & Technology Promotion ▷Visiting professor at Gachon University and Hoseo University ▷Columnist at Aju Business Daily * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2025-12-19 09:35:28

OPINION: Nvidia, Bitcoin and emergence of new economic order Global markets are increasingly dancing to the movements of Nvidia and Bitcoin. A surge in Nvidia’s share price now lifts trading floors from New York to Tokyo, Seoul, London and Frankfurt. When the chipmaker disappoints, the backlash ricochets across continents. Bitcoin produces similar tremors, swinging sharply on news of regulatory shifts or ETF flows. The pattern points to a deeper shift in modern capitalism: economic gravity is clustering around a small set of companies and assets rather than diffusing across sectors and national markets. Nvidia has become more than a semiconductor manufacturer; its GPUs power the AI boom and help set the tempo for data-center expansion, autonomous driving systems and cybersecurity tools. On Wall Street, analysts increasingly treat Nvidia as a barometer for the broader AI economy. Its valuation embodies the hopes — and sometimes the hype — around machine learning. This dynamic reflects the idea of “narrative economics,” popularized by Nobel laureate Robert Shiller, which holds that market stories often move prices as much as fundamentals do. Bitcoin, too, has evolved into a kind of real-time sentiment gauge for global finance. Despite its turbulence, it reacts instantly to geopolitical tensions and regulatory announcements, and in doing so has become a central reference point for risk appetite. The growing concentration of market influence in a handful of assets is not accidental. The structure of the digital economy favors early winners, and Nvidia has established itself as the essential supplier of AI hardware. The rise of passive ETFs intensifies this concentration by channeling ever-larger sums into the most successful names. Narrative-driven investing strengthens the trend. Nvidia has become shorthand for the AI story; Bitcoin represents a new monetary frontier. Both benefit from what economists call “platform lock-in,” where technologies become so widely adopted that rivals struggle to compete. The concentration creates clear vulnerabilities. Yet it also reveals a new economic architecture taking shape. The United States treats Nvidia’s ecosystem as a national security asset. Japan is leveraging global superstar stocks to revive its capital markets. South Korea, which is scrambling to secure GPU supplies, is still building governance frameworks to cope with market concentration risks. For mid-sized economies, the danger lies in sliding into technological dependence. South Korea will need to accelerate development of AI chips and data-center infrastructure if it wants to remain competitive. The gravitational pull of Nvidia and Bitcoin is not a market anomaly but a preview of the coming economic order. In this environment, strategic planning matters more than speed. South Korea will require an integrated national strategy — linking AI development, industrial policy and financial markets — to adapt to the next phase of global competition. The countries that thrive will be those that can shape, rather than simply react to, the new concentration of economic power. About the author -Former Deputy Editor of JoongAng Ilbo, Tokyo Correspondent -Former Visiting Professor at Seoul National University College of Engineering -Former Chair Professor of Technology Management at Hanyang University -Former Director of Gyeonggi Science and Technology Promotion Agency * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2025-11-25 08:49:59

South Korea Bets $100 Billion on AI: A Risky Gamble? SEOUL, September 26 (AJP) - South Korea's $100 Billion AI Bet: A Risky Gamble? The New York Times recently likened data centers to thermometers of the tech industry's health and symbols of the AI bubble. This duality highlights the contradictions of the AI era. Building a data center costs billions, requiring GPUs, cooling technology, power grids, and stable sites. Despite this, companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are increasing investments. Countries like Japan and Singapore are also competing to attract these centers. For investors, data centers are both indicators of the AI boom and potential bubbles. Amid this, South Korea's new government has announced a national strategy to become a top-three AI power, committing to secure 50,000 GPUs and invest 100 trillion won. This unprecedented move is not just political rhetoric but a significant resource allocation. The question is whether this will propel South Korea to new heights or lead to a bubble collapse. The government's bold focus on AI stems from three main reasons. First, traditional growth engines like semiconductors and automobiles no longer drive double-digit growth. With aging and low growth, AI appears as a key future growth candidate. Second, there's a sense of urgency in industrial competitiveness. The U.S. and China have made AI central to national security and dominance. The U.S. is reorganizing semiconductor supply chains, drawing South Korea in, while China is shifting its strategy to AI. South Korea fears becoming a subordinate state if it hesitates. Third, the Lee Jae-myung administration, emerging post-impeachment, needed a clear vision to unify society and drive governance. The 'AI powerhouse' slogan addresses both international tech competition and domestic growth challenges. This bold all-in strategy presents opportunities. It positions South Korea at the forefront of global AI competition. Infrastructure like GPUs and data centers are hard for latecomers to match. Early investment could recreate the semiconductor success. AI could revolutionize productivity in healthcare, administration, finance, manufacturing, and education, benefiting citizens. If small and medium enterprises can access national infrastructure affordably, they could leap forward, reducing reliance on large corporations. However, there are shadows. The sustainability of the 100 trillion won investment is questionable given South Korea's fiscal reality, with rising welfare costs and declining tax revenue. AI investment could become a political target, especially if a new administration takes over. The public-private partnership's uncertainty is another concern. Major companies like Samsung and SK are key to the AI strategy, but cooperation is challenging amid calls for chaebol reform. A special social consensus is needed for unified public-private efforts in AI. Energy is another issue. Data centers require stable power, but the government is hinting at phasing out nuclear energy, focusing on solar and wind. The gap between ideal goals and real demand is vast. Relying solely on renewables without transitional solutions is risky. External risks also loom. The U.S. seeks to control GPU and semiconductor supply chains through alliances, while China remains South Korea's largest trade partner. Leaning too much toward one side could lead to diplomatic burdens. The spread of AI regulations in Europe could pose new barriers for South Korean companies. In this context, a meeting on Sept. 22 in New York marked a turning point. President Lee Jae-myung met with Larry Fink, chairman of BlackRock, the world's largest asset manager. They discussed various cooperation plans, including AI and energy transition. BlackRock, managing over $10 trillion in assets, is a major player in global finance, focusing on sustainability and risk management. It is a significant investor in South Korea, holding stakes in companies like Samsung and Hyundai. The meeting suggests that South Korea's AI strategy could expand beyond domestic projects to global initiatives connected with international capital. BlackRock's risk management philosophy could help South Korea's all-in strategy gain international trust. However, challenges remain. The progressive Lee administration favors a big government approach, which could conflict with AI investment. Policy reversals are possible if political situations change. An AI fund involving private matching, policy finance, and pension funds is needed for continuity. The government plans to create a large national growth fund for high-tech industries. Relations with large corporations are also tricky. Progressive governments traditionally emphasize chaebol reform, but AI requires corporate participation. A political agreement for a public-private alliance in AI is essential. Energy policy must also be adjusted realistically. While expanding renewables is right, data centers need 24/7 stable power. Without a mix of traditional energy sources, the AI all-in could increase bubble risks. Foreign relations are another test. If South Korea appears aligned with the U.S. in AI, economic conflicts with China are inevitable. Cooperation with Japan should be framed as a global public good, and influence in ASEAN, India, and the Middle East should be expanded. The connection with BlackRock could be a practical foundation for this international expansion strategy. South Korea's AI all-in strategy is like a high-speed elevator for the country's future. Success could write a new growth story, but failure could lead to a significant fall. Everything depends on South Korea's approach. Securing fiscal sustainability, building public-private trust, achieving realistic energy transitions, and maintaining balance and expansion in diplomacy are crucial. As the BlackRock meeting showed, partnering with global capital and accumulating small successes could turn South Korea's all-in into a platform for new growth, not a risky gamble. BlackRock's Four Key Points in South Korea AI and digital transformation potential: South Korea's AI strategy and corporate investments in GPUs and digital infrastructure are future growth areas for global capital. Accelerated energy transition: Expanding renewables and a hydrogen-nuclear strategy align with BlackRock's ESG and green infrastructure investment philosophy. South Korea has the opportunity to grow as a Northeast Asian energy hub. Innovative corporate ecosystem: Global competitive 'national champion companies' like Samsung, SK, Hyundai, and POSCO offer stable, long-term returns through partnerships with BlackRock. Institutionalization of public-private cooperation: Potential for formalized collaboration between government and corporations. About Jaewon Kwak Former Deputy Editor of JoongAng Ilbo's Economic Department and Tokyo Correspondent Former Visiting Professor at Seoul National University and Hanyang University Former President of Gyeonggi Science and Technology Promotion Agency Current Visiting Professor at Gachon University and Hoseo University Current Editorial Director at Aju Business Daily * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2025-09-26 07:35:38