Prosecutors visited Samsung Electronics’ Pyeongtaek campus to inspect semiconductor processes and on-site security systems. Senior officials handling technology-leak investigations checked production lines and heard directly from workers, a notable shift. Technology crimes cannot be addressed with legal knowledge alone. Without understanding manufacturing steps and how data moves, investigators can struggle to identify evidence and measure damage. Even if overdue, the on-site approach is a necessary step.
But one point should be clear: preventing technology leaks cannot be solved by tougher investigations alone. Investigations are, by nature, after-the-fact responses that punish offenders once a case occurs. A technology leak, however, is often irreversible. The center of any response must be prevention, not only punishment. Investigations can deter; prevention can stop leaks. They are complementary roles, not substitutes, and policy should be redesigned with that division in mind.
The first pillar is stronger internal controls. In practice, many leaks come not from outside hacking but from insiders and partner networks. Information can slip out through job changes after retirement, joint research and contact points with subcontractors. Companies should tighten access controls, track data transfers and manage key personnel more precisely. That is a condition for survival, not a choice. Still, the cost and responsibility should not fall on companies alone. Because protecting technology is tied to national competitiveness, government institutional and financial support should accompany corporate efforts.
The second pillar is clearer rules for workforce mobility. In advanced industries, talent movement drives innovation, but it is also a major leak channel. Freedom to choose a job and protection of trade secrets can collide. This cannot be left to vague calls for “balance.” What is needed are concrete standards: noncompete periods should be limited and paired with fair compensation, and the scope of protected technology should be clearly defined. Without a legal line between lawful job changes and illegal leaks, neither companies nor investigators can make consistent judgments.
The third pillar is defining the state’s role. Technology leaks are no longer only a corporate problem. In core industries such as semiconductors, they are linked to national security. The government should set rules, provide intelligence and diplomatic capacity, and lead international cooperation. Companies should carry out responsibilities within those rules, and investigative agencies should punish violations. This triangular structure must function. The state cannot control everything, and companies cannot be left to shoulder all responsibility.
The fourth pillar is integrating the response system. Today, responses are spread across multiple ministries and agencies, with the industry ministry, prosecutors, police and intelligence services moving separately. That fragmentation can cut off information and slow action. A “control tower” should not mean an all-powerful command body. Its role should be limited to integrating domestic information, sharing it quickly and coordinating cooperation among agencies. It cannot directly block overseas crimes, but it can be decisive in improving the speed and efficiency of domestic responses.
The fifth pillar is international cooperation. The final destination of leaked technology is often overseas. Because the semiconductor industry operates in global supply chains, any single country’s response has limits. Countries that hold key technologies should strengthen investigative cooperation, information exchanges and legal response frameworks. Diplomacy is no longer separate from technology security; it is part of it.
Across these debates, the key principle is not a simple “balance,” but building a workable structure. Stronger protection can restrain innovation, while broader freedom can raise leak risks. That is why the system must set conditions and standards: what to protect, when to restrict, and who is responsible.
Semiconductors are not just another industry. They are a core national asset built on decades of accumulated technology and experience. Once leaked, they cannot be recovered, and the damage can last across generations. What is needed is not a cycle of reacting after each incident, but a system that makes leaks structurally difficult.
The prosecutors’ site visit is a starting point. The next step is to turn that start into institutions and a coherent framework. When investigations, companies, government and diplomacy each define their roles and connect them into one system, technology leaks can become a manageable threat. National competitiveness is built through design, not declarations.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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