When analyzing the Middle East, one of the most dangerous attitudes is to simply label a country as being on one side or another. Iran is a Shia revolutionary state, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE are Sunni Gulf monarchies. Israel is Iran's primary security adversary, and the United States traditionally serves as the security guardian for the Gulf monarchies. On the surface, the dynamics appear clear: Iran versus anti-Iran, Shia versus Sunni, Persia versus Arab, revolutionary republic versus monarchy.
However, the reality of the Middle East is far more complex. The actions of the UAE exemplify how multifaceted and calculated today's Middle Eastern order is.
Recently, while denying UAE claims that Iranian forces attacked, Iran warned of "devastating retaliation" if military actions targeting Iranian ports and coasts were initiated from UAE territory. The UAE claimed to have intercepted missiles and drones from Iran and reported a fire at an oil facility in Fujairah, which Iran denied. The key point here is not just the dispute over facts. Iran, while asserting "we did not do it," simultaneously pressures the UAE by stating, "We will not tolerate you becoming a military base for the U.S. and Israel." This reflects Iran's strategic language: denial serves diplomatic purposes, while warnings are meant for deterrence.
The UAE's situation is even more complicated. While claiming to have been attacked, it refrains from direct military retaliation. This is not solely due to fear. The UAE is a small but wealthy nation. Dubai's finance, Abu Dhabi's energy, Fujairah's ports, advanced logistics, tourism, and international capital trust are crucial for national survival. A full-scale conflict with Iran could destabilize the UAE's core. Although Iran faces economic difficulties and international sanctions, it possesses missiles, drones, the Revolutionary Guard, and asymmetric naval capabilities. If the UAE retaliates once, Iran could respond with an even greater retaliation, which would simultaneously disrupt international insurance rates, shipping costs, port traffic, oil transport, and foreign investment sentiment. Therefore, the UAE's choice is to "express anger but avoid escalation." This is not submission but calculation.
At the center of this calculation are the Strait of Hormuz and Fujairah. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical artery for global energy flows. Iran controls the northern coastline, while the UAE operates ports and energy transport networks on the southern side. Fujairah serves as a strategic port that circumvents risks associated with the Strait of Hormuz, yet it remains within the range of Iranian missiles and drones. Geography dictates fate in the Middle East. From a South Korean perspective, the UAE appears as a gateway to the region, a hub of advanced cities and investment, but its territory faces the vast Persian state of Iran. The reason the UAE strongly opposes Iran yet does not cross the threshold into war lies here. Small powers in the Middle East do not survive solely through courage; they endure through a sense of balance.
At the root of the Iran-UAE relationship lies sectarian issues. Iran is a Shia revolutionary state. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has defined itself not merely as a nation-state but as a country with a revolutionary ideology. In contrast, the UAE and other Gulf monarchies are based on Sunni monarchical order. Iran positions itself as the center of a resistance axis against the West and Zionism, while the Gulf monarchies regard Iran as a "exporter of revolution that could destabilize their regimes." However, religion is merely a facade; the underlying issues are power and security. When Iran warns the UAE not to become a "nest for the U.S. and Zionists," it may sound like a religious condemnation, but the core message is a military warning. Iran fears that the UAE could become a hub for U.S. and Israeli intelligence, air defense, and naval operations.
Additionally, historical tensions between Persia and the Arabs complicate matters. Iran is a nation with memories of the ancient Persian Empire. Throughout its long history—from the Achaemenid, Sassanid, Safavid, Qajar, and Pahlavi dynasties to the Islamic Republic—Iran has viewed itself not as a peripheral nation in the Middle East but as the center of civilization. The UAE, a modern state that gained independence in 1971, has rapidly become a global hub through its strategies in finance, ports, energy, aviation, investment, and advanced cities. The deep civilizational state of Persia and the emerging commercial state of the Arabs face each other across the Persian Gulf. They cannot ignore each other, nor can they fully trust one another.
Another deep-seated issue is the dispute over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran seized these islands during the process of Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, and the UAE still views this as an occupation of its territory. These islands are not merely subjects of territorial disputes; they are strategic points that can monitor the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. For Iran, they represent a defensive line for the Persian Gulf, while for the UAE, they are an old thorn in its national security. Thus, the relationship between the UAE and Iran is not simply diplomatic; it intertwines cooperation and hostility, trade and security, religion and territory, history and reality.
This complexity is also evident in the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Both countries are Sunni Gulf monarchies that are wary of Iran. However, it is a misconception to view the UAE as a subordinate partner to Saudi Arabia. The recent UAE withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ dramatically illustrates this point. The UAE announced its departure from OPEC and OPEC+ on April 28, 2026, with the withdrawal taking effect on May 1. This marked a significant decision ending nearly 60 years of membership in OPEC. The UAE cited its long-term economic strategy, energy production capacity, and independent production policies as reasons for its exit.
This decision is not merely a shift in oil policy; it is a declaration of independence from the Saudi-centric Gulf energy order. Saudi Arabia has long been the de facto leader of OPEC, and its oil policies have set the standard for Gulf order. However, the UAE has grown its production capacity and has been dissatisfied with being constrained by OPEC's production quotas, despite its ability and willingness to sell more oil. From the UAE's perspective, to invest in future cities, artificial intelligence, defense, finance, space, and renewable energy, it needs to maximize current earnings. This has led to a clash between Saudi Arabia's long-term price management strategy and the UAE's market share expansion strategy.
Moreover, this withdrawal comes amid the backdrop of the Iran war and Gulf security instability. According to Reuters, the UAE has stated that it is reviewing its multilateral relationships following its OPEC exit but has drawn the line at planning further withdrawals. This indicates that the UAE is not merely leaving OPEC; it is recalculating existing frameworks that do not align with its national security and economic interests. If the UAE believes that traditional multilateral frameworks like the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, and OPEC are insufficient shields against Iranian military pressure, it will no longer entrust its national fate to formal alliances.
Thus, the UAE's OPEC exit carries three significant implications: first, a strategic differentiation from Saudi Arabia; second, a weakening of the OPEC-centered oil order; and third, an enhancement of the UAE's strategic autonomy. The UAE no longer wishes to remain a "wealthy small state in the Gulf." It aims to control its energy production, weave a multilayered network with the U.S., Israel, South Korea, India, China, and Europe, and establish itself as a logistics, finance, defense, and technology hub in the Middle East. It seeks to confront Iran while avoiding full-scale war, cooperate with Saudi Arabia without becoming dependent, and partner with the U.S. without complete reliance. This is the UAE's survival strategy.
In this context, the UAE is neither an ally of Iran nor an absolute enemy. It is not a younger sibling of Saudi Arabia, nor is it a rival that has split from Saudi Arabia. The UAE is a security partner of the U.S., but it is not a satellite state that follows only American orders. The UAE has normalized relations with Israel but has not abandoned its identity in the Arab and Islamic world. The UAE is one of the most pragmatic countries in today's Middle East, balancing principles, securing interests, diversifying risks, and seizing opportunities. It warns Iran not to "cross the line," asserts to Saudi Arabia that "we will determine our share," and proclaims to the world that "the gateway to the Middle East is us."
This is where the significance of the relationship between South Korea and the UAE grows. South Korea and the UAE are not merely trade partners. They share a strategic partnership that encompasses nuclear power, energy cooperation, defense industry collaboration, construction, infrastructure, finance, digital technology, content, artificial intelligence, and the space industry. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between South Korea and the UAE is a mechanism to institutionalize this relationship. The CEPA was signed on May 29, 2024, making the UAE the first Arab country to enter into a comprehensive economic agreement with South Korea. It encompasses not only tariff reductions but also a framework covering goods, services, investment, energy, supply chains, and digital cooperation. The South Korean Customs Service has also described the UAE CEPA as a means to expand market entry into the Middle East and enhance cooperation with resource-rich countries.
The UAE holds special significance for South Korea. First, it is a partner in energy security. South Korea relies heavily on energy imports, and instability in the Middle East can simultaneously pressure prices, industrial production, trade balances, and exchange rates. Cooperation with the UAE can extend beyond stable procurement of crude oil and gas to include hydrogen, renewable energy, nuclear power, and carbon reduction. Second, the UAE serves as a hub for South Korea's defense industry in the Middle East. Middle Eastern countries are keenly interested in modernizing their defense capabilities due to threats from Iranian missiles and drones, maritime security concerns, and urban air defense needs. South Korea can expand defense cooperation based on cost-effectiveness, delivery timelines, and technological reliability. Third, the UAE acts as a platform for South Korean companies to enter the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. From bases in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, South Korean firms can connect to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Egypt, India, and East Africa.
However, South Korea must not view the UAE merely as a "good market." The UAE is a land of opportunity but also a point of risk. Should Iran directly pressure the UAE, South Korean companies' construction sites, logistics networks, oil transport, financial transactions, and insurance costs could all be affected. As South Korea strengthens defense and energy cooperation with the UAE, Iran may perceive South Korea as part of the U.S., Israel, and Gulf camp. Therefore, South Korea's Middle East strategy should not become a simplistic diplomacy that leans toward one side. While deepening strategic cooperation with the UAE, it must also maintain diplomatic channels with Iran. It should leverage the competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE without getting entangled in the emotions of either side. While technological cooperation with Israel is necessary, the sentiments of the Arab and Islamic world must not be overlooked.
South Korea's direction with the UAE is clear. First, energy security cooperation should expand from a focus on crude oil imports to a joint strategy for future energy. Building on the successful experience of the Barakah nuclear power plant, the scope of cooperation should widen to include nuclear operation, maintenance, workforce training, small modular reactors, hydrogen production, carbon capture, and power grid stabilization. The UAE is an energy-producing country, while South Korea possesses energy technology and industrial manufacturing capabilities. Together, they could form a powerful combination in the Middle East's energy transition market.
Second, defense cooperation should evolve from mere arms sales to a collaborative security ecosystem. The threats faced by the UAE are not traditional tank warfare but include drones, missiles, maritime unmanned systems, cyberattacks, and terrorism targeting ports and refineries. South Korea has significant opportunities for cooperation in areas such as Cheongung, radar, air defense, naval vessels, unmanned systems, cybersecurity, and integrated command systems. However, South Korea should be cautious about expressions that may appear as an aggressive military alliance. It is essential to assist in strengthening the UAE's defensive capabilities without appearing as a war coalition directly targeting Iran.
Third, industrial cooperation utilizing the CEPA should be meticulously designed. Simply looking at the effects of tariff reductions is too narrow. The UAE serves as a logistics, finance, exhibition, certification, and investment platform in the Middle East. The South Korean government and private sector should create a joint support system to help small and medium-sized enterprises enter halal markets, Arabic-speaking markets, and African markets through the UAE. K-content, online gaming, healthcare, education, smart cities, security, food, beauty, construction materials, and green technologies should all be transformed into practical export platforms through the CEPA.
Fourth, preparations should be made for energy market volatility following the UAE's OPEC exit. If the UAE gains the freedom to expand production outside OPEC, there may be short-term expectations for increased supply. However, competition with Saudi Arabia, risks from the Iran war, instability in the Strait of Hormuz, and competition with U.S. shale could lead to significant fluctuations in oil prices. South Korea should strengthen long-term supply contracts, strategic reserves, joint storage facilities, crude oil and gas swaps, and emergency logistics route discussions with the UAE. Energy is about security, not just price. While it is important to buy when prices are low, ensuring uninterrupted supply during crises is even more crucial.
Fifth, South Korean diplomacy should read the new order in the Middle East through the UAE. The old Middle East structure centered around Saudi Arabia, with Iran as the opposing axis and the U.S. managing the situation, has become much more complex. The UAE is strengthening its independent course, Saudi Arabia is pursuing industrial transformation through Vision 2030, Qatar is leveraging mediation diplomacy and gas hegemony, Iran maintains asymmetric military power despite sanctions, and Israel has deeply integrated into the regional order through technology, intelligence, and military strength. In addition, China, India, Russia, Europe, and the U.S. are all involved with their respective interests. South Korea must focus on structures rather than emotions in this complex landscape.
Ultimately, the UAE's present reflects the future of the Middle East. It confronts Iran but does not sever ties. It cooperates with Saudi Arabia but does not become dependent. It leaves OPEC but does not disappear from the energy market. It partners with the U.S. while enhancing its autonomy. It collaborates with Israel but maintains its Arab identity. It broadens economic cooperation with South Korea while carrying the shadow of war risks. This is the UAE's intricate calculation.
South Korea must read this calculation with a clear mind. It is right to regard the UAE as a strategic partner. However, a strategic partnership is not merely about applause; it involves understanding the risks of the partner and protecting our national interests within those risks. The reasons the UAE does not retaliate directly despite being attacked by Iran, why it has withdrawn from the Saudi-centric OPEC order, and why it seeks to partner with Asian industrial nations through the CEPA all converge into one: a national strategy that pursues both survival and prosperity.
The Middle East may always appear as a sea of injustice, but beneath it flows a cold calculation. Iran seeks to expand its space through threats, Saudi Arabia maintains order through oil and religious authority, and the UAE aims to seize the future through capital, technology, and ports. South Korea must establish a practical strategy rather than sentimental diplomacy on this complex chessboard. It should deepen cooperation with the UAE while managing the Iran risk, maintain balance with Saudi Arabia, and leverage both the U.S. security network and the Asian economic network.
The UAE is not an ally of Iran, but it cannot completely make Iran an enemy. The UAE is a brother nation to Saudi Arabia, yet it does not wish to remain a subordinate partner. The UAE is a strategic partner of South Korea, but it is not a safe zone that South Korea can enter thoughtlessly. This contradiction and balance hold the truth of the Middle East. Truth lies in seeing complex structures rather than simple divisions, justice in understanding the survival calculations of small nations, and freedom in designing one's own path without being dragged into others' games.
What the UAE is doing now is precisely that. South Korea should do the same.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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