Journalist

Joo Jae-woo
  • OPINION: Is Iranian war part of Trumps broader strategy on China?
    OPINION: Is Iranian war part of Trump's broader strategy on China? SEOUL, March 9 (AJP) - The U.S. launched surprise airstrikes on Iran on Feb. 28, escalating tensions in the already volatile Middle East. Under the joint military operation with Israel, codenamed Epic Fury, strikes on military and strategic targets occurred as rounds of nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran in Geneva, Switzerland remained deadlocked. U.S. President Donald Trump is widely seen as unpredictable yet intensely transactional, prompting American think tanks and analysts to try to piece together his intentions and speculate on his next moves. The motivations behind the military operation remain unclear, though possible factors include the growing uncertainty of Trump's tariff policies following the Supreme Court's ruling against them, a deepening rivalry with China, and Russia's prolonged war in Ukraine, ahead of the upcoming midterm elections in early November. First of all, his tariff fight is likely to continue despite last month's U.S. Supreme Court ruling that Trump's unilateral tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were illegal. The court found that foreign drug inflows and the U.S. trade deficit did not meet the conditions of the IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act (NEA). However, Trump would still have a range of tools available to a U.S. president, such as Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address trade deficits; Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to protect domestic industry; Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to penalize unfair trade practices; Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose temporary trade barriers; and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to respond to discriminatory trade practices. The strike on Iran appears aimed at removing a source of instability in the Middle East. Israel's cooperation, along with the wave of anti-government protests inside Iran, may have signaled to Washington that conditions were ripe for action. Another possible calculation is that toppling Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's decades-long iron rule could weaken Iranian-backed armed groups such as Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah. Eliminating Iran's nuclear program may have been another driving factor, with the broader goal of stabilizing the region and helping bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The Trump administration had been negotiating both issues simultaneously, repeatedly saying that Ukraine talks were nearing a final agreement, even as nuclear talks with Iran had been stalled. Iran's international isolation, similar to Venezuela's, may have encouraged him to resort to the strike. Trump may have believed that fully dismantling Iran's nuclear facilities could prompt regime change and that any Iranian retaliation would have limited impact on the U.S., while also potentially creating momentum for peace negotiations in Ukraine. The ripple effects were already being felt across Europe. On March 2, French President Emmanuel Macron announced plans to expand France's nuclear weapons program and offer a nuclear umbrella to European allies, a move aimed at strengthening NATO's collective defense. The announcement echoed a demand Trump had pushed since his first term, that Europe do more to defend itself, and aligned with his broader strategy of transferring the burden of Ukraine's security onto NATO and its members. If Ukraine and Iran are brought under control, Trump would have more room to pursue what may be his longer-term goal, i.e., containing China, a challenge that, as then-vice president-elect JD Vance said at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, could take 40 years or more. The U.S. midterms will be another test of Trump's strategy, though he appears cautiously confident. Last year, Trump secured investment pledges totaling US$8.4 trillion from domestic and foreign companies and is now pressing to make good on those commitments. Even capturing just 10 percent of that, roughly $840 billion to $1 trillion, would deliver a significant economic boost. Bringing the wars in Ukraine and Iran to a close could further strengthen the U.S. economy by helping to stabilize global markets. Even if Trump loses, U.S. policy toward China is unlikely to change, given that both parties in Congress take a hardline stance. This is one reason the midterms may not decisively affect his broader China strategy. Meanwhile, Trump has taken a conspicuously silent approach on Taiwan. Unlike during his first term or the Biden administration when Washington weighed in carefully on Taiwan-related developments, he has not mentioned the island since returning to office. This may signal that, with budgets for Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy already in place, there is less need to highlight the issue publicly. Beginning in the second half of 2021, the White House, CIA, and Pentagon warned Congress of a scenario in which Chinese President Xi Jinping could invade Taiwan in 2027. These warnings helped secure funding through the 2023, 2024, and 2025 National Defense Authorization Acts. Congress has steadily built up its financial commitment to Taiwan across successive defense bills. The 2023 NDAA authorized up to $10 billion in military aid through 2027, with annual loans of up to $2 billion and a dedicated regional stockpile of defense materials capped at $100 million. The following year's NDAA allocated $895 billion for Taiwan support, and Congress separately approved $300 million in military supplies and training. The fiscal 2025 NDAA added another $300 million for security cooperation and unlocked up to $1.5 billion in Pentagon stockpile transfers. Indo-Pacific funding has been also secured across successive defense bills. The 2023 NDAA kicked off with $11.5 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, followed by $14.7 billion in 2024 and $9.9 billion in 2025. Additional funds covered $12.5 billion for Guam facilities, $17.5 billion for regional military infrastructure, and $25 billion for ships, aircraft, and munitions. Trump has also refrained from publicly pressuring allies to increase direct cost-sharing payments, focusing instead on pushing them to raise defense budgets, a move that could translate into more purchases of U.S.-made weapons. Investment pledges have taken priority over cost-sharing demands, with the reasoning that the investment amounts are far larger and that Trump already secured his cost-sharing goals during his first term. Within this strategic framework, North Korea does not appear to be a priority for him. While some had anticipated a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong‑un during Trump’s planned visit to China in late March, that prospect now seems nearly impossible. Trump is unlikely to risk a repeat of the 2019 Hanoi photo-op, as major obstacles remain unchanged: Washington continues to demand complete, irreversible denuclearization, a condition Pyongyang is unlikely to accept. North Korea would likely be unsettled by the U.S. striking Iran during negotiations. With little common ground on denuclearization, neither side has reason to pursue a summit that would go nowhere. Meaningful talks with Pyongyang would likely become feasible only after the war in Ukraine ends, a scenario that would compel North Korea to make new strategic choices for its own survival. As for South Korea, Trump's main concerns have centered on the swift implementation of investment pledges and the "discriminatory" treatment of American companies here. Some of the friction, however, stems from U.S. misunderstanding of South Korea's domestic business landscape, so resolving it will require candor and direct engagement. * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2026-03-09 11:26:30
  • North Korea-U.S. Summit without denuclearization: a Korea passing
    North Korea-U.S. Summit without denuclearization: a 'Korea passing' When South Korea’s new Democratic Party president took office in June, his administration moved quickly to explore the possibility of a summit between North Korea and the United States. During his first meeting with the U.S. president, President Lee Jae Myung described himself as a “pace maker” and the American president as a “peace maker,” signaling his intention to shepherd the two sides toward dialogue. His approach echoes the Moon Jae-in government’s diplomacy in 2018, when Seoul sought to revive inter-Korean engagement. But the track record since then is sobering. Pyongyang demolished the inter-Korean liaison office, scrapped the Sept. 19 military agreement and formally labeled South Korea an enemy state. Those actions severely eroded trust, yet the Democratic Party continues to favor engagement—a stance that many critics argue risks repeating the mistakes of the past. Given today’s geopolitical landscape, a North Korea–U.S. summit remains unlikely, at least until the war in Ukraine reaches some resolution. Former President Donald Trump recently suggested a Ukraine peace deal might be possible “with adjustments,” but the realities are far more complicated: territorial claims, security guarantees and an international order tested by revisionist powers. Meanwhile, Seoul is reportedly considering a shift from confronting North Korea’s “hostile two-state theory” to embracing a “peaceful two-state theory” centered on coexistence. This would align with President Lee’s three guiding principles: acknowledge the North Korean regime, avoid hostile acts and reject any notion of absorption unification. The Unification Minister has gone further, advocating recognition of “two states” and the institutionalization of a peace regime—ideas that could eventually require constitutional reinterpretation. He argues that South Korea must adjust its legal and political frameworks to reflect the long-term reality of division on the Korean Peninsula. Still, the administration remains hopeful it can help facilitate a North Korea–U.S. dialogue. But the memory of 2018—when Seoul found itself sidelined even after brokering the initial breakthrough—serves as a warning against excessive optimism. Some of the recent attempts underscore the challenge. Efforts to deliver a letter from Mr. Trump to Pyongyang reportedly went nowhere. Though U.S. and North Korean officials have held quiet, working-level conversations in recent weeks, North Korea’s demands were seen as unrealistic by Washington. Kim Jong-un has since declared that denuclearization is no longer on the agenda and that future talks should instead focus on peaceful coexistence and recognition as a sovereign nuclear state. He has also claimed that sanctions relief is no longer a priority, an assertion likely rooted in Pyongyang’s strengthened ties with China and Russia. Under these conditions, the prospect of a North Korea–U.S. summit during Mr. Trump’s planned visit to China next April appears remote. The U.S. ambassador to Seoul has noted that a second Trump administration may try unconventional approaches, but only if Washington sees clear strategic value. A turning point could come with the end of the Ukraine war. A shift in the global balance—particularly if it weakens the North Korea–China–Russia alignment—might create new space for diplomacy. Until then, Seoul would be wise to avoid making concessions on territorial claims and to maintain a pragmatic, clear-eyed approach toward Pyongyang. About the Author Joo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University. He studied political science at Wesleyan University and international politics at Peking University. He has served as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and a visiting associate professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2025-12-04 07:26:33
  • OPINION: Chinas rare earth leverage tests America — and its allies
    OPINION: China's rare earth leverage tests America — and its allies SEOUL, October 31 (AJP) - At the APEC summit in Gyeongju, the summit between the leaders of the United States and China drew intense global scrutiny. After months of escalating trade friction, the world watched as Washington and Beijing sought a breakthrough. No major trade deal emerged. Still, the two sides agreed to a temporary pause in their hostilities: China postponed its planned export restrictions on rare earth elements, announced on Oct. 9, while the United States suspended its retaliatory 100 percent tariff on Chinese goods. These concessions, however, did little to mask the deep divide between the two powers. Since trade talks began in April, the United States has levied a 145 percent tariff on Chinese imports, and Beijing has responded with its own rare earth export controls and a 125 percent tariff on American products. A brief truce reached in June unraveled by September, giving way to a new cycle of sanctions and countermeasures. At its core, this standoff is not about tariffs or trade deficits — it is about power. The United States is determined to preserve its global leadership, while China, under Xi Jinping, seeks to demonstrate the superiority of its state-led model. Xi’s “China Dream” and “Made in China 2025” initiatives are not mere slogans; they represent Beijing’s ambition to dominate 80 percent of the world’s manufacturing sectors within the next decade. Washington, meanwhile, has revived its own industrial agenda. Under both Trump’s “reshoring” push and former President Biden’s “friend-shoring” approach, the U.S. has sought to rebuild its manufacturing base and secure its supply chains. The White House claims to have attracted $8.9 trillion in investment commitments, not including $350 billion pledged by South Korea. Beijing’s latest weapon in this economic contest — restrictions on rare earth exports — has sent tremors through U.S. industry. The new rules, due to take effect in November and December, target not only the export of raw materials but also foreign firms that use Chinese rare earths in dual-use technologies, such as defense components. South Korea, which depends entirely on imported rare earths, finds itself in a precarious position. Last year, Beijing warned Korean firms against exporting products containing Chinese rare earths to U.S. military contractors. More recently, China sanctioned five subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean, signaling its readiness to pressure American allies. Yet Seoul missed an opportunity at the APEC summit to address these mounting economic risks. Rather than leveraging the gathering to strengthen its trade resilience or mediate between Washington and Beijing, the South Korean government focused its diplomatic bandwidth on potential talks between North Korea and the United States. South Korea’s vulnerability underscores an urgent need to diversify its rare earth supply. But doing so will not be easy. Most producers are aligned with China or located in the Global South — regions where Seoul’s diplomatic reach remains limited. The upcoming G20 summit in South Africa could offer a second chance. By forging partnerships with emerging producers in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, South Korea can begin to build a more secure and independent supply chain — and avoid being caught in the middle of another great-power struggle. About the author Joo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University and has served as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and at the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs. * This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP. 2025-10-31 08:35:48