The Democratic Party's control of both chambers of Congress following the U.S. midterm elections has increased uncertainty regarding U.S.-South Korea security issues. While the Democrats' emphasis on alliances may alleviate concerns about troop reductions in South Korea, there are expectations of stricter limitations on South Korea's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear cooperation due to non-proliferation principles. Former President Donald Trump has indicated he will maintain a hardline stance against Iran despite his electoral defeat, suggesting that the burden of alliance contributions will continue.
On November 5, foreign and security experts analyzed that the Democratic majority in Congress could enhance the stability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, but it may also raise the bar for implementing individual security agreements. Key issues include the construction of nuclear submarines and the expansion of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights. This adds the challenge of persuading Democratic lawmakers who prioritize non-proliferation, in addition to negotiations with the Trump administration.
Lee Shin-hwa, a professor of political science and diplomacy at Korea University, stated, "The Democratic Party has traditionally been much stricter on nuclear non-proliferation policies than the Republican Party," noting that the verification thresholds for expanding uranium enrichment and reprocessing rights have become significantly higher.
Regarding the transfer of wartime operational control, observers believe that significant changes in the overall framework will be limited, as discussions will primarily occur between the U.S. and South Korean administrations. However, support for the transfer itself and the assessment of conditions will be separate matters. Even if the Democrats support the transfer of operational control, they are expected to maintain a firm stance that agreed-upon conditions must be met.
Conversely, there may be increased congressional oversight against unilateral troop reductions or excessive defense cost-sharing pressures from President Trump. Professor Lee remarked, "Concerns about troop reductions in South Korea are likely to be alleviated, enhancing stability." While congressional oversight may ease negotiation burdens regarding defense cost-sharing, he predicted that the necessity for defense cost-sharing will remain unchanged.
It remains uncertain whether changes in Congress will directly lead to a shift in President Trump's foreign policy. On November 4, Trump acknowledged that the war with Iran impacted the Republican Party's electoral defeat but stated he does not regret the decision to initiate the conflict. He also publicly denied the possibility of replacing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, suggesting he may continue his existing policy toward Iran despite the electoral loss.
Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry plans to submit a revised agreement to extend the deployment of the Cheonghae Unit, which will expand its operational area and capabilities. The agreement passed a vice-ministerial meeting on the same day and will undergo approval from the Cabinet and the President next week before proceeding to the National Assembly. The operational area will extend from the Gulf of Aden to the waters south of Duqm Port in Oman. The straight-line distance from Duqm Port to the Hormuz Strait is approximately 650 kilometers, and the waters adjacent to the Hormuz Strait are not included in this expanded area.
Additional assets will include one P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, and mine countermeasure capabilities. The troop level will increase from the current 320 to approximately 395 personnel. These additional assets are planned to be operated from a base in Djibouti.
The primary objective outlined by the Defense Ministry is to protect South Korean citizens and vessels in response to increased piracy activities. The government aims to maintain its principle of non-involvement in wars and independent command of South Korean forces, while also limiting reconnaissance missions within Iranian territory and waters, as well as inside the Hormuz Strait. This approach seeks to respond to U.S. demands for contributions in Hormuz while controlling the potential for combat involvement.
The revised agreement also includes a mission to support the restoration of freedom of navigation in international maritime routes and the deployment of EOD and unmanned mine countermeasure capabilities, which is seen as preparation for future mine-clearing operations in Hormuz. The government stated it would consider participation if a permissive environment is created through a ceasefire or a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran, and if requested by the international community. Additionally, any actual deployment in Hormuz will require separate approval from the National Assembly beyond this extension agreement.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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