Journalist

Kim Hee-su
  • To keep US troops, Seoul may have too look beyond NK in defense axis
    To keep US troops, Seoul may have too look beyond NK in defense axis SEOUL, February 12 (AJP) - The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), released last month one year into the Trump administration, delivers a message that is clear — take “primary responsibility” for own defense and expect “critical but limited” U.S. support. For South Korea, which has relied on the U.S. deterrence umbrella against North Korea for more than 70 years, the language feels unsettling. But beneath the rhetoric lies a deeper structural shift: Washington’s strategic focus is no longer centered primarily on Pyongyang. It is centered on Beijing. That shift may ultimately determine the future shape — and relevance — of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Speaking at a recent forum in Washington, Kelly Grieco of the Stimson Center said that under a second Trump administration, “we are likely to see some form of effort to reduce troop levels or scale back the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula.” The 2026 NDS describes South Korea and Europe as “model allies.” Yet they are also the regions where Washington has most openly explored troop reductions — a paradox reflecting President Donald Trump’s transactional view of alliances. Trump has repeatedly argued that wealthy allies benefiting from U.S. security guarantees should bear greater financial burdens. During his first term, troop levels in South Korea became leverage in cost-sharing negotiations. Despite strong words, a sweeping withdrawal remains unlikely. The fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea below 28,500 without strict national security conditions and prior consultation with allies. Strategically, the peninsula remains one of Washington’s most valuable forward positions in Northeast Asia. “The U.S. currently lacks a better strategic location than the Korean Peninsula for deterring China and, to some extent, Russia,” said Koh Yu-hwan, professor at Dongguk University. Even if heavy Army units were trimmed — as some analysts suggest — air and naval assets could be strengthened, aligning with a broader U.S. shift toward more flexible and mobile force structures. In other words, the debate is not about departure. It is about mission. For decades, Seoul’s defense narrative has been built almost entirely around deterring North Korea. That framework was logical in an era when Pyongyang represented the primary threat and Washington’s Asia strategy was narrower in scope. But today, U.S. military planning is dominated by competition with China. In Pentagon documents and congressional hearings, Beijing — not Pyongyang — is identified as the pacing challenge. This creates a strategic question for Seoul: If USFK is viewed in Washington purely as a North Korea deterrent force, does it risk becoming less central to America’s long-term priorities? To remain indispensable, South Korea may need to broaden its defense axis — not by abandoning deterrence against the North, but by positioning itself more clearly within the wider Indo-Pacific security architecture. That means acknowledging that the Korean Peninsula is not only a frontline against North Korea, but also a critical geographic anchor in managing regional stability vis-à-vis China. The timing is significant. Seoul and Washington are working toward 2028 as the target year for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) to a South Korean commander. Under the envisioned structure, a South Korean four-star general would lead the future Combined Forces Command, with a U.S. general serving as deputy. Although OPCON transfer is formally separate from troop reduction debates, it could create political and strategic space for recalibrating USFK’s role. As Washington adjusts its global force posture — including modest recalibrations in Europe — the emphasis appears to be on efficiency and strategic alignment rather than large-scale retrenchment. For South Korea, that suggests the future of USFK will depend less on fixed troop numbers and more on mission relevance. 2026-02-12 16:42:28
  • VWs electrification push adds pressure on South Korea in Canadas $41bn submarine bid
    VW's electrification push adds pressure on South Korea in Canada's $41bn submarine bid SEOUL, February 11 (AJP) - Germany’s industrial offensive is widening beyond defense and into electric vehicles, adding fresh pressure on South Korea in Canada’s $41 billion submarine procurement race. On Wednesday, Volkswagen Group doubled down on its global electrification drive despite slowing EV demand worldwide, highlighting production milestones that underscore Germany’s manufacturing scale — a key factor as Berlin backs a consortium competing against South Korea for Canada’s Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP). Volkswagen said its global production network, spanning Győr in Hungary, Tianjin in China and Kassel in Germany, has now surpassed 5 million electric drive systems. The Kassel plant alone increased output by 24 percent year-on-year, producing more than 850,000 units this year. Beyond volume, the company emphasized technological self-reliance, noting it develops and manufactures core components in-house, including the pulse inverter — often referred to as the “brain” of an electric vehicle — and key control systems. Industry observers say the timing is hardly coincidental. Canada’s submarine program has evolved into more than a defense procurement. Facing tariff uncertainty under U.S. President Donald Trump, Ottawa has made domestic industrial revitalization and job creation central criteria in evaluating bids. Germany has already secured a foothold in Canada’s battery sector. Volkswagen’s battery subsidiary PowerCo is building a C$7 billion gigafactory in St. Thomas, Ontario — its first such facility in North America. According to The Globe and Mail, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche recently visited Ottawa and met senior members of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s cabinet to promote German automotive investment. In an interview, Reiche said discussions went “more than just talking,” adding that “we are looking into numbers, into details.” Analysts interpret the move as part of a coordinated German strategy: pairing submarine technology with tangible, large-scale industrial investment. Against Germany’s aggressive push, Korea’s consortium of Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries faces mounting pressure. While Volkswagen has finalized multibillion-dollar investments and is showcasing operational facilities, Hyundai Motor Group has yet to formalize plans for a direct EV production base in Canada. Industry experts argue Seoul must move beyond a defense-only pitch and present an integrated industrial package. “One defense platform alone is not enough,” said a Seoul-based defense industry official. “Korea needs to link Hyundai and Kia’s EV technologies with battery leaders like LG Energy Solution, SK On, and Samsung SDI, offering Canada a concrete mobility and defense ecosystem.” Such a package, analysts say, could counterbalance Germany’s early-mover advantage in large-scale manufacturing investment. Ryu Yeon-seung, director at the Institute of Defense Industrial Security, cautioned that not all cooperation details can be disclosed publicly. “Regarding cooperation with the three major Korean battery makers, some aspects have not been made public, and some cannot be disclosed,” Ryu said. “Germany is a competitor, so we cannot reveal all of our cards. Doing so would put us at a disadvantage in negotiations.” He added that he understands the government is already working on such coordination at the practical level. While some market watchers see Germany holding the upper hand due to NATO alignment and its visible industrial footprint in Canada, Ryu stressed that the outcome remains open. “No one can guarantee the result,” he said. “If NATO membership alone determined everything, Canada would not still be weighing options between South Korea and Germany.” 2026-02-11 17:51:53
  • South Korea to send submarine to Canadian waters ahead of $41bn bid decision
    South Korea to send submarine to Canadian waters ahead of $41bn bid decision SEOUL, February 10 (AJP) - South Korea will deploy a submarine to Canadian waters in June for its first-ever joint naval exercise with Canada, a high-profile move that coincides with Ottawa’s selection process for a $41 billion next-generation submarine program. According to military sources on Tuesday, the deployment will mark the first time a South Korean submarine operates in Canadian waters. The vessel is scheduled to depart in March and cross the Pacific ahead of the drill. The exercise comes as Canada advances its Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, a major procurement aimed at replacing its aging fleet. Ottawa is expected to choose between South Korea and Germany as early as the first half of the year. Defense officials say the timing gives Seoul an opportunity to showcase the operational range and reliability of its domestically built submarines. “Simply reaching Canadian waters requires long-distance deployment and sustained operations,” a South Korean naval official said. “This is what we call blue-water operational capability. The voyage itself demonstrates the vessel’s reliability.” “The Canadian side will be able to verify firsthand that our submarines can operate globally,” the official added. Linked to submarine competition Canada is seeking to replace its current fleet and is expected to receive final bids by March, with a preferred bidder likely to be selected in the following months. Germany is widely regarded as South Korea’s main competitor. Military officials view Canada’s agreement to conduct its first joint naval exercise with South Korea as a sign of growing interest in Korean platforms. Discussions began during an October visit to Seoul by Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy. “The exercise was discussed as part of broader efforts to strengthen naval cooperation,” a South Korean official said. “It is also true that the submarine being deployed, or its follow-on model, is one Canada has shown interest in.” While officials stopped short of explicitly linking the drill to the procurement contest, they acknowledged that the timing was strategically favorable. “Canada judged that this was a mutually beneficial moment, given South Korea’s operation of a proven 3,000-ton-class submarine fleet,” the official said. Military-backed support for industry bid Officials said there have been no direct bid-related negotiations involving shipbuilders, including HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean. However, the South Korean Navy is providing indirect support by highlighting its training, operations and maintenance systems to Canadian officials. When senior Canadian decision-makers visit South Korea, the Navy demonstrates its training infrastructure and maintenance facilities built around its submarine fleet. Through briefings and site tours, officials aim to reassure Ottawa that Seoul can offer not only hardware, but also a comprehensive package of training, logistics and lifecycle support. As Seoul and Ottawa prepare for their first joint submarine exercise in Canadian waters, attention is now focused on whether this high-profile operational “road test” will give South Korea the edge it needs to outmaneuver its German rival and secure one of the largest defense contracts in its history. 2026-02-10 17:19:59
  • Korea targets $109B Middle East arms market amid aggressive budgeting
    Korea targets $109B Middle East arms market amid aggressive budgeting SEOUL, February 09 (AJP) - With hundreds of billions of dollars pouring into Middle Eastern rearmament, South Korea’s defense industry is moving aggressively to claim its share—using a major arms fair in Riyadh as the gateway to a $109 billion market. The coordinated push is centered on the World Defense Show (WDS), running from Feb. 8 to 12 in the Saudi capital. The event is the region’s largest integrated defense exhibition and a key platform for securing long-term export contracts and industrial partnerships. This year’s show has drawn record participation from Korean companies, reflecting Seoul’s ambition to position itself as a major supplier in a region long dominated by U.S. and European arms makers. Major manufacturers, including Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), are showcasing their systems. In particular, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, LIG Nex1, KAI and EO System have jointly operated a combined booth, highlighting what industry officials describe as a “one-team” approach. The strong showing comes as defense budgets across the Middle East and Africa surge amid intensifying security threats and delayed modernization programs. According to Mordor Intelligence, the Middle East and Africa defense market is expected to reach $73.4 billion in 2026 and expand to about $109.4 billion by 2031, implying an average annual growth rate of 8.3 percent. The broader Middle East and North Africa region already accounts for roughly 27 percent of global major arms imports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait rank among the world’s top 10 importers. Strategic analysts say recent regional tensions have reinforced these trends. The Israel–Hamas war, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and continued friction involving Iran and its proxies have all contributed to rising military spending. SIPRI estimates that Middle Eastern military expenditure reached $243 billion in 2024, up 15 percent from the previous year. Demand is growing for long-range strike systems, integrated air and missile defense, and naval security—areas in which Korean firms have already built export track records in Europe and Asia. Diversification and Localization For Korean exporters, a crucial shift is under way. Gulf and North African buyers, long dependent on U.S. and European suppliers, are increasingly diversifying their sources, pairing high-end Western platforms with more cost-effective alternatives. At the same time, localization and technology-transfer requirements are intensifying under national strategies such as Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Vision 2030, which aims to raise domestic defense procurement to 50 percent of total spending by the end of the decade. Korean firms, which have demonstrated co-production and technology-sharing models in Poland, are now promoting similar frameworks in the Middle East. A notable feature of this year’s WDS is the way Korean companies are presenting themselves as integrated solution providers rather than stand-alone exporters. Hanwha is using the exhibition to promote localization-ready systems aligned with Vision 2030, including a K9A1 self-propelled howitzer configured for desert operations and local production. “Discussions on exports to Saudi Arabia are under way, but it is difficult to say a deal will be finalized this year,” a Hanwha Aerospace official said. Hyundai Rotem is seeking to build on growing interest in its K2 main battle tank, following major contracts in Poland. Regional media reported that senior Iraqi defense officials visited the company’s booth and showed interest in the platform, with officials noting that political stabilization could lead to more concrete talks. KAI is also quietly cultivating expectations around potential exports of its KF-21 fighter, which will be introduced to partners such as the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, Hyundai WIA, making its WDS debut, is using the event to raise its profile as a key subsystem supplier. The company is the sole producer of gun barrels for the K9 howitzer and K2 tank. “Our defense-related revenue has more than doubled over the past three years,” a Hyundai WIA official said. Market Confidence The sector’s momentum is also reflected in financial markets. Korea’s benchmark KOSPI has recently surpassed the 5,000-point mark, signaling investor confidence in the country’s transition toward high-value manufacturing and defense industries. Hanwha Aerospace’s latest earnings have reinforced that trend. The company’s consolidated sales nearly doubled to 26.6 trillion won ($18.21 billion) in 2025, with operating profit jumping 75 percent year-on-year to 3.03 trillion won. Both revenue and operating profit reached all-time highs, while Hanwha Ocean also set record results for the third consecutive year since 2023. Combined sales of Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI exceeded 40 trillion won for the first time, reaching about 40.9 trillion won. Operating profit totaled roughly 5.2 trillion won, ushering in what analysts describe as a “5-trillion-won operating profit era.” The four companies’ combined order backlog is approaching 100 trillion won, effectively securing four to five years of production and signaling that the sector has entered a phase of structural growth rather than a short-term boom. For Korea’s defense exporters, the Middle East is no longer a peripheral market. It is fast becoming a central pillar in their global strategy—where scale, localization and long-term partnerships will determine who captures the next phase of the region’s rearmament boom. 2026-02-09 17:27:15
  • South Korea, U.S. air forces hold first Buddy Squadron exercise of the year
    South Korea, U.S. air forces hold first Buddy Squadron exercise of the year SEOUL, February 09 (AJP) - The South Korean Air Force and the U.S. Air Force on Monday began their first Buddy Squadron exercise of the year, which runs through Friday, at Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi Province. The Buddy Squadron exercise is a squadron-level combined air drill in which South Korean and U.S. fighter units take turns training together at air bases across the country. The exercise began in 1991 under the name “Friendship Training” to enhance combined operational capabilities by allowing pilots from both countries to train jointly and familiarize themselves with the latest tactics, techniques and procedures. It was renamed the Buddy Squadron exercise in 1997. Under a revised training framework this year, the two air forces plan to more than double the number of participating aircraft and significantly increase the number of training sorties per exercise, while reducing the annual number of iterations from eight to four. The current 26-1 iteration involves KF-16 fighters from the South Korean Air Force and F-16s from the U.S. Air Force. South Korea’s F-35A stealth fighters and FA-50 light attack aircraft will also participate to support integrated operations between fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft. After completing their deployment to Osan on Monday, South Korean pilots will undergo local base procedures as well as safety and security briefings. They will then conduct joint training with U.S. pilots, including air-to-air tactical exchanges and integrated fourth- and fifth-generation fighter operations. The exercise incorporates realistic scenarios that reflect lessons learned from modern warfare. During the drills, South Korean and U.S. forces will alternate between friendly and opposing roles and form mixed formations through a variety of tactical training methods. Capt. Lee Seung-hyun, a KF-16 pilot participating in the exercise, said the training would “serve as an opportunity for South Korean and U.S. pilots to share the latest tactics, fly together and strengthen interoperability.” 2026-02-09 12:33:06
  • Back to back in conventional arms, India and Korea have room for alliance
    Back to back in conventional arms, India and Korea have room for alliance SEOUL, February 06 (AJP) - Drones and AI-enabled systems now dominate headlines from modern battlefields. Yet, when wars grind on, they still come down to firepower. A recent study by the Royal United Services Institute and the Open Source Centre estimated that Russian artillery accounts for roughly 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties. The Council on Foreign Relations similarly notes that artillery remains the “king of battle,” responsible for about 80 percent of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war. By that measure, India and South Korea stand among the world’s most capable conventional forces. In the 2026 rankings by Global Firepower, India and South Korea place fourth and fifth out of 145 countries — a rare pairing, reinforced by the fact that both remain de facto at war with hostile neighbors. Beyond that similarity, their military profiles diverge sharply. India is a nuclear-armed, all-volunteer force with one of the world’s largest standing armies. South Korea operates a conscription-based system built around a smaller active force and a massive reserve. India spends about 2.3 percent of GDP on defence, roughly $74.4 billion in 2024, ranking near sixth globally in total outlays. Its army fields more than 4,000 tanks, centered on Russian-built T-90S and T-72 platforms and indigenous Arjun variants, and plans to acquire around 1,770 Future Ready Combat Vehicles. Much of this armour is concentrated along borders with China and Pakistan, reflecting the need to cover multiple fronts across a vast landmass. South Korea, ranked fifth overall, devotes about 2.6 percent of GDP — around $43.9 billion — to defence. It maintains roughly 500,000 active-duty troops, backed by several million reservists. The army operates an estimated 2,300 to 2,500 tanks, mainly modern K1 and K2 Black Panther models, placing it among the few countries with more than 2,000 high-end main battle tanks. In practice, India relies on mass — large numbers spread across immense territory — while South Korea concentrates dense mechanisation and firepower in a compact theatre. Diverging air and naval trajectories India has been steadily shifting defence investment toward air and sea power. In 2024, budget growth for the navy and air force — about 13 percent and 26 percent — outpaced the army’s roughly 11 percent increase, according to a Korea-based KIEP brief on India’s defence modernisation. The shift reflects recognition in New Delhi that land-based defences alone are insufficient under pressure from both China and Pakistan. The Indian Air Force ranks sixth globally in the 2025 World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft. It fields about 1,716 active aircraft, with a balanced mix of fighters, helicopters and trainers. Its frontline fleet blends Russian Su-30MKIs, French Rafales and Mirage 2000s, and the indigenous Tejas, underscoring India’s reliance on multiple suppliers as it pursues stealth and next-generation programs. South Korea’s air arm is smaller but more fighter-heavy. The Republic of Korea Air Force operates roughly 822 aircraft and ranks 12th in the same index. Fighters account for more than half its inventory, anchored by F-35A stealth jets, F-15Ks, KF-16s, FA-50s and the emerging KF-21 Boramae. Geography shapes this structure. The ROKAF is optimized for air superiority and rapid strikes against North Korean artillery, missile and command targets, prioritizing high-end combat aircraft over large transport fleets. Its early adoption of fifth-generation fighters gives it an unusually dense concentration of advanced platforms. At sea, South Korea holds a modest edge. Global naval rankings place the Republic of Korea Navy fifth, ahead of India’s seventh. Seoul operates a highly modernized fleet of Aegis destroyers, advanced frigates and Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class submarines equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. India’s navy, by contrast, centers on two aircraft carriers — INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant — and Arihant-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, making it the world’s sixth nuclear-armed submarine power. These assets support ambitions for expanded SSBN and SSN fleets. However, a significant portion of India’s surface fleet consists of older vessels facing modernization challenges, while South Korea’s smaller navy benefits from a higher share of recently built, domestically designed ships. A demanding “Make in India” customer India’s defence market is shaped by its insistence on industrial self-reliance. “Because India experienced decades of exploitation under colonial rule, there is a deep-rooted reluctance to depend purely on foreign imports,” said Jung Kyeong-woon, a research fellow at the Korea Association of Military Studies. “If you want to sell major systems to India today, the government expects you to bring factories, jobs and technology.” The war in Ukraine has highlighted the risks of India’s long dependence on Russian weapons, from delays in S-400 deliveries to shortages of spare parts for Soviet-era platforms. South Korea’s K9 Vajra programme illustrates how Seoul can adapt to this environment. A 2017 contract for 100 self-propelled howitzers, produced locally and delivered by 2021, was followed by a second order in 2024 for another 100 units through 2030. The programme combined competitive performance with domestic manufacturing — a model aligned with Make in India priorities. Attention is now turning to whether the KF-21 Boramae, set to enter full service with the ROKAF, could become South Korea’s next major export platform for India. Strategic convergence Taken together, India and South Korea represent two of the world’s most formidable conventional military powers, built on different strategic logics but comparable industrial depth. India brings scale, geographic reach and nuclear-backed deterrence. South Korea offers dense high-tech firepower, mature defence manufacturing and rapid production capacity. As supply-chain security, localisation and interoperability gain importance, the overlap between the two systems is growing. For New Delhi, Korea offers a reliable partner less encumbered by geopolitical volatility than traditional suppliers. For Seoul, India represents one of the few markets large enough to sustain long-term defence-industrial cooperation. Back to back in global rankings, the two countries now face a shared opportunity: to translate parallel strengths in conventional arms into a deeper strategic and industrial alliance. 2026-02-06 16:48:18
  • Auto capacity looms over Korea–Germany race for Canadas $41bn submarine project
    Auto capacity looms over Korea–Germany race for Canada's $41bn submarine project SEOUL, February 06 (AJP) - Auto-sector capacity — and Ottawa’s efforts to shield its car industry from U.S. tariffs — is emerging as a decisive variable in the two-horse race between South Korea and Germany for Canada’s Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), sources said after meetings this week with visiting Canadian officials. “Both South Korea and Germany are automotive manufacturing nations,” said Stephen Fuhr, Canada’s special envoy for defense procurement, during tours of Korean defense manufacturers and talks with senior officials. “If there are areas where we can cooperate in sectors like automobiles, we are looking to pursue broader partnerships that go beyond defense,” he said. Fuhr made the point explicit after touring the Jang Yeong-sil, a KSS-III submarine undergoing sea trials, reiterating that the decisive criterion in selecting a CPSP contractor would be which country delivers the greatest industrial benefits to Canada. Auto crisis sharpens offset calculations The message comes as the government of Mark Carney moves to stabilize Canada’s auto sector amid U.S. tariffs and uncertainty over the review of the USMCA trade pact this year. U.S. President Donald Trump last year imposed 25 percent tariffs on Canadian vehicles and parts, a shock to an industry that exports about 90 percent of its output to the U.S. Since then, thousands of workers have been laid off as major automakers, including General Motors and Stellantis, scaled back production. Carney’s government has responded with financial incentives for manufacturers, tariff credits tied to domestic production and the reintroduction of EV buyer rebates, as Ottawa seeks to diversify industrial partnerships beyond the U.S. Against that backdrop, officials say submarine bids are being judged not only on military performance but also on their potential to reinforce supply chains, investment and employment. Two platforms, one industrial test From a technical standpoint, South Korea’s proposed KSS-III Batch-II, developed by Hanwha Ocean, is widely assessed as more heavily armed and mature than Germany’s Type 212CD offered by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). The KSS-III displaces about 3,000 tons and is equipped with 10 vertical launch system cells for long-range precision strikes. It has already entered service with the Republic of Korea Navy, allowing Fuhr to physically tour the submarine during ongoing sea trials. By contrast, the Type 212CD remains at the design and construction stage, with the first vessels for Germany and Norway not scheduled for delivery until 2029 and the early 2030s. The German submarine, displacing around 2,500 tons, uses hydrogen fuel-cell air-independent propulsion optimized for cold and Arctic waters but lacks vertical launch capability. Canadian officials, however, say platform performance accounts for only a fraction of the final evaluation, with fleet sustainability and economic return carrying the greatest weight. That assessment has been reinforced by Fuhr, who has stressed that CPSP is a strategic industrial decision as much as a naval acquisition. Germany’s VW anchor vs. Korea’s constraints Germany enters the race with a notable advantage through Volkswagen’s multi-billion-dollar battery and EV investment in Canada, which Berlin has aligned with its defence bid to underline long-term industrial integration. The Korean side has also emphasized high-level economic diplomacy. Team Korea, led by presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik, included Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun in recent outreach to Ottawa. But analysts note that Hyundai Motor Group faces structural constraints. With a large EV complex already operating in Georgia, the commercial case for building a full-scale plant in Canada remains uncertain. Seoul has instead promoted broader industrial cooperation, including recent bilateral arrangements aimed at encouraging Korean automotive and future-mobility investment in Canada. Wider defense partnership pitch Kang met on Friday with Fuhr in just over a week at the Cheong Wa Dae in line with President Lee Jae Myung’s directive to accord special diplomatic courtesy to visiting Canadian officials. “Many people are hoping for a positive result from this project, and we are well aware of those expectations,” Kang wrote in a Facebook post after the talks. “However, this is by no means an easy situation.” “Although the circumstances are difficult, the government and companies will work together as one team and do their utmost until the very end,” he added. South Korea is also positioning its submarine proposal within a broader defense-industrial partnership as Canada accelerates army modernization and seeks domestic manufacturing capacity. Hanwha Aerospace has highlighted its willingness to invest locally, citing its armored vehicle production hub in Australia as a model for a Canadian facility that could generate jobs and support technology transfer. Germany, meanwhile, has expanded its offer to include joint research and workforce development, seeking to appeal to Ottawa through advanced R&D cooperation as well as platform delivery. With final bids due by March 2, both camps are now treating auto-sector cooperation as a core offset battleground — one shaped increasingly by Canada’s industrial vulnerability under U.S. trade pressure. “The key question,” Fuhr said during his visit to Hanwha’s Geoje shipyard, “is who can offer the best economic opportunity for Canada.” Background: Canada’s submarine replacement drive Canada’s CPSP aims to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s aging Victoria-class fleet, which is scheduled for decommissioning in the mid-2030s. In July 2024, Ottawa announced plans to procure up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice capable submarines, followed by a request for information in September that year. The government expects to award a contract by 2028, with the first new vessel delivered no later than 2035. The program is closely linked to Canada’s updated defense strategy, which prioritizes Arctic security as climate change makes northern waters more accessible to external powers, including Russia and China. Germany and Norway are jointly building six Type 212CD submarines, with deliveries beginning in 2029. South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have formed a “One Team” partnership to offer the KSS-III, with the first four units proposed for delivery by 2035. Korea has also pitched lithium-ion battery propulsion, extended underwater endurance and comprehensive crew training and maintenance facilities on both Canadian coasts. Beyond capability, Ottawa is seeking a partner with robust global supply chains to avoid a repeat of the Victoria-class’s “orphan fleet” problem, which has complicated maintenance and parts procurement for decades. 2026-02-06 16:09:54
  • Hanwha expands Middle East footprint with debut of AI-integrated defense systems
    Hanwha expands Middle East footprint with debut of AI-integrated defense systems SEOUL, February 05 (AJP) - Hanwha is set to showcase next-generation, AI-enabled weapon systems on the global stage for the first time, signaling a major push into the Middle Eastern defense market and a deepening strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. Hanwha aims to demonstrate South Korea’s defense competitiveness at the World Defense Show 2026 (WDS), to be held in Riyadh from Feb. 8 to 12. Hanwha Aerospace, Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Ocean announced Wednesday that they will jointly operate their largest-ever integrated exhibition booth at WDS, spanning 677 square meters, including an outdoor display area. Held biennially, the Saudi defense exhibition marks its third edition this year, with 773 companies from 76 countries expected to participate. At the center of Hanwha’s exhibition is the debut of its AI-enabled loitering precision-guided weapon (L-PGW), presented as a core capability for future warfare. Developed by Hanwha Aerospace, the L-PGW autonomously conducts reconnaissance, target identification and engagement using artificial intelligence. It integrates satellite data links to transmit battlefield information, before deploying and launching a self-destructing drone to strike designated targets. The system is being unveiled for the first time in a market long dominated by major U.S. and European defense contractors. The company will debut its multi-mission radar (MMR), which is designed to counter low-altitude aerial threats such as drones in coordination with ground-based weapon systems. It will also present AI-powered combat management systems, four-face fixed AESA multi-function radars, unmanned platforms and a stealth-designed “Smart Battleship,” reflecting the growing emphasis on networked and autonomous warfare. Beyond individual platforms, Hanwha is emphasizing a comprehensive, localization-focused cooperation model aligned with Saudi Vision 2030 goals. The K9A1 self-propelled howitzer on display has been customized specifically for Saudi requirements and is equipped with a 1,000-horsepower diesel engine produced by Korea’s STX Engine. Also featured is the Tigon wheeled armored vehicle, optimized for desert terrain. In the maritime domain, Hanwha Ocean will highlight its “Naval solutions” portfolio, spanning submarines, surface vessels and unmanned maritime systems. Exhibits include the 3,000-ton Jangbogo-III Batch-II submarine, launched in October last year. A key element of the presentation is Hanwha’s customized submarine base solution, offered as a comprehensive package covering design, construction, equipment, training and operations. The approach reflects a shift away from arms sales toward defense industrialization models focused on localization and long-term operational autonomy. "We are committed to making tangible contributions to Saudi Arabia’s defense capabilities and to further strengthening our strategic partnership,” a Hanwha official said. 2026-02-05 10:29:09
  • Seoul, Washington likely to set 2028 target for wartime command handover
    Seoul, Washington likely to set 2028 target for wartime command handover SEOUL, February 04 (AJP) - South Korea and the U.S. are expected to set 2028 as the target year for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) at their annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington this October, reflecting growing confidence in Seoul’s ability to lead combined defense operations. According to government sources on Wednesday, the allies are considering 2028 as the most realistic timeline, aiming to complete the handover during the respective terms of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump. Ahead of the SCM, the two sides plan to complete verification of Full Operational Capability (FOC), the second stage in the three-step OPCON transition process, and seek formal approval from their defense chiefs. The transition consists of three phases: Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Full Operational Capability (FOC) and Full Mission Capability (FMC). Having completed the FOC evaluation, the allies are now in the final verification stage, with only confirmation of the future Combined Forces Command reportedly remaining. Once the FOC results are approved, the defense ministers are expected to announce a target year for the transfer. With Trump’s current term ending in January 2029, 2028 is viewed as the most viable option. Following the announcement, the allies will move to the final FMC phase, during which the precise timing of the handover will be determined. While FOC involves extensive quantitative assessments, FMC relies more on qualitative judgments, making political leadership a decisive factor. Lee has repeatedly expressed his determination to complete the OPCON transfer during his term. Trump, who has consistently urged allies to shoulder greater security responsibilities, is also regarded as supportive of the transition. Under the 2026 National Defense Strategy released last month, Washington emphasized that South Korea should, as much as possible, take primary responsibility for countering North Korea’s conventional threats. The document describes South Korea as a country with high defense spending, a strong defense industry and a conscription-based military, capable of defending itself with “critical but more limited” U.S. support. If FMC verification begins in 2027 as expected, the long-delayed OPCON transfer—often described as a two-decade-old task for the alliance—could be realized in 2028. Operational control refers to the authority to command designated forces to carry out specific missions within a defined time and space. Currently, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman exercises peacetime control, while wartime control rests with the commander of the Combined Forces Command, a U.S. four-star general. After the transfer, a South Korean four-star general will assume wartime command. The process gained momentum in 2005, when the Roh Moo-hyun administration formally proposed the transfer. In 2014, under the Park Geun-hye administration, Seoul and Washington agreed to pursue a conditions-based transition without a fixed timetable. Under that agreement, the transfer depends on three conditions: South Korea’s ability to lead combined operations, the alliance’s capacity to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and a security environment conducive to a stable transition. To support verification this year, the allies plan to proceed with the Freedom Shield exercise, scheduled for March 9–19, with a crisis management drill from March 3–6. Freedom Shield is a command post exercise designed to rehearse combined operational plans through simulations of a full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It covers scenarios ranging from defensive and counteroffensive operations to securing weapons of mass destruction. Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned the drills as “war rehearsals,” and retaliatory provocations, including missile launches, cannot be ruled out during the exercise period. Against this backdrop, observers say Seoul is likely to adopt a low-key approach, as it did during last year’s Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, by issuing conciliatory messages in advance. At last year’s opening ceremony, Lee stressed the importance of inter-Korean relations, and the joint statement notably avoided references to “North Korea,” “threat” and “provocation.” 2026-02-04 16:13:04
  • Why Korean rockets are finding buyers on Russias European doorstep
    Why Korean rockets are finding buyers on Russia's European doorstep SEOUL, February 02 (AJP) - Norway’s decision to select South Korea’s Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) for its Long Range Precision Fire System (LRPFS) program reflects a broader recalibration under way among European and NATO militaries bordering Russia — one shaped less by brand loyalty than by timelines, industrial resilience and operational flexibility. The contract, signed by the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency with Hanwha Aerospace, covers 16 Chunmoo launchers, precision-guided munitions, training and logistics support, and is valued at roughly 19 billion Norwegian kroner ($2 billion). Deliveries are set to begin in 2028. For Oslo, the decisive factor was speed. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, demand for the U.S.-made HIMARS has surged across NATO and allied states, stretching production capacity and pushing delivery schedules years into the future. By contrast, Chunmoo was offered with a clearer delivery timeline and a phased induction plan, allowing Norway to address what it sees as a growing vulnerability in long-range land fires along its northern flank. “Hanwha’s Chunmoo system was the only offer that met all of the requirements in the competition,” the Norwegian government said in its procurement statement. A Hanwha Aerospace official, speaking on background, was more direct. “There is a substantial backlog for HIMARS, with deliveries delayed even for priority customers such as Poland,” the official said. “Norway’s assessment came down to delivery certainty and overall affordability relative to capability.” That calculation extended beyond sticker price. While Norway evaluated proposals from HIMARS and the German-French EURO PULS, Chunmoo was pitched as a turnkey solution — combining multiple rocket types, training, sustainment and future industrial participation under a single framework. Norwegian planners are understood to have placed particular weight on system integration with national command-and-control networks and the possibility of European-based ammunition production. Chunmoo versus HIMARS: flexibility against standardisation The fundamental distinction between Chunmoo and HIMARS lies in design philosophy. HIMARS is optimised around the U.S.-standard 227mm MLRS rocket family, along with ATACMS and the newer PrSM-class tactical missiles. Chunmoo, by contrast, was conceived from the outset as a multi-calibre modular launcher. A single K239 platform can fire 239mm unguided rockets, 239mm precision-guided munitions, or 600mm-class tactical ballistic missiles. In performance terms, the systems are comparable at shorter ranges. HIMARS firing GMLRS munitions reaches about 80 kilometres with a circular error probability (CEP) of under 10 metres. Chunmoo’s CGR-080 guided rockets achieve a similar 80-kilometre reach with a CEP of roughly 15 metres. Where Chunmoo differentiates itself is payload versatility. The same launcher can be configured for area suppression, precision strikes, or deep fires out to nearly 290 kilometres using CTM-series missiles. In effect, it allows a user to consolidate what would otherwise require multiple weapons systems into a single platform — an approach that appeals to militaries facing both budget constraints and manpower limits. Relearning the value of long-range fires Norway’s choice must also be read against its post–Cold War force posture. For decades, Oslo prioritised expeditionary operations and allied airpower, scaling back heavy land forces and allowing medium- and long-range ground fires to atrophy. That strategy left a conspicuous gap once Russia’s war in Ukraine underscored the enduring value of land-based precision strike — particularly in contested environments where air superiority cannot be assumed. In the High North, geography compounds the problem. Vast distances, limited infrastructure and extreme weather complicate air operations, making organic long-range fires a central element of deterrence rather than a niche capability. The LRPFS program is designed to restore that capability as a standing feature of Norway’s Army and to reinforce NATO’s ability to secure sea lanes and reinforcement routes in the Arctic. From Poland to Norway: toward a European ‘K-rocket belt’ Norway’s decision follows a much larger breakthrough for Chunmoo in Poland, which has effectively served as the system’s European test case. In October 2022, Warsaw signed a contract for 288 Chunmoo launchers under its Homar-K program, with deployments beginning in 2023. In late 2025, Poland deepened the partnership with a $4 billion deal to locally produce CGR-080 guided rockets. Those production lines, Polish and Norwegian officials say, will supply not only Poland but other European users, including Norway. The arrangement links Korean system design with Polish manufacturing and Nordic end users — a supply chain that reduces dependence on U.S. production capacity while anchoring key components inside Europe. The trajectory recalls the earlier spread of South Korea’s K9 Thunder howitzer, now in service across Poland, Norway, Finland and the Baltic states. In much of Northern and Eastern Europe, K9 has become the backbone of tube artillery. Chunmoo is positioning itself as its long-range counterpart — extending that firepower deeper into an adversary’s rear. While HIMARS remains the benchmark for NATO-standard long-range fires, Chunmoo’s appeal lies in its pragmatism. It offers faster delivery, greater configurability and a clearer path to local industrial participation — attributes increasingly prized by European states confronting a long-term Russian threat, strained defence supply chains and tighter fiscal limits. The choice also speaks to a broader unease in the High North. Alongside Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic, renewed U.S. attention to Greenland — including Donald Trump’s past and revived suggestions that Washington should assert greater control over the island — has reminded Nordic governments that even allies can become strategic variables. 2026-02-02 16:52:12