SEOUL, January 26 (AJP) - A national military is both a tool of power and the ultimate safeguard for a country's survival. Historically, military control has rested on a balance between two pillars: political oversight and the autonomy of a professional military organization. When these two elements are in balance, a military grows stronger. When only control remains and autonomy vanishes, the military ceases to be an army and becomes a political organ.
What is currently unfolding within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a process where this balance is collapsing.
On the surface, recent personnel reshuffles within the Central Military Commission (CMC) appear to be an extension of anti-corruption efforts and the establishment of discipline. However, looking at the scope and depth of the purges, as well as the nature of the individuals removed, this is not a simple cleanup of corruption. It is a political restructuring that changes the very nature of the military power structure. The military command elite is being dismantled, and the collective military decision-making system is effectively ceasing to function.
Originally, while the CMC centered on a single chairman, practical military judgments were made through discussion and coordination among vice chairmen and members. Strategy, operations, theater command, weaponry systems, and joint operation doctrines were the domain of professional military elites. Recent trends, however, move toward dismantling this group and concentrating the responsibility for military judgment into the hands of the top political leader alone.
The core of this change is more evident in who remains rather than who was removed. It is symbolic that the survivors are not from combat command lines but from inspection and political backgrounds. This signifies that internal control, loyalty management, and political security have become higher priorities than actual combat capability. This is the moment a military organization shifts from a system prioritizing combat efficiency to one prioritizing political trust.
The problem begins here.
Modern warfare is no longer a matter of troop size or equipment quantity. It is a complex conflict combining intelligence, space, cyber, AI, and electronic warfare. Such wars require rapid judgment from field commanders, creative responses to unexpected situations, and horizontal collaboration rather than a top-down structure. However, when the fear of purges dominates an organization, officers choose "safe judgments" over proactive ones. Reporting increases and responsibility moves upward while field autonomy disappears. The military may appear safer, but it does not become stronger.
Another structural issue is the collapse of responsibility distribution. In a collective leadership system, military failures are absorbed within the institution. But when supreme decision-making power is concentrated in an individual, failure is directly linked to that individual.
This may make a leader more cautious, but it also increases the risk of excessive information control and self-confirmation bias. A structure where only the information a leader wants to hear is reported may look powerful on the outside, but it is actually the most vulnerable.
These internal structural changes have repercussions for the international order. It is difficult to conclude whether China will become more aggressive or more cautious. One thing is certain: predictability is decreasing. As the military becomes politicized, it becomes harder for outsiders to analyze China’s actions through military logic, as political considerations are likely to override strategic calculations.
The Taiwan issue must also be viewed through this lens. While large-scale military actions tend to be suppressed during periods of internal military restructuring, the temptation to use external tension for internal cohesion also exists. The United States and its allies are likely to perceive this uncertainty as a threat and strengthen their defensive systems. Consequently, a paradox emerges where China’s internal military maintenance stimulates an external arms race.
The Korean Peninsula cannot avoid indirect impacts. If the strategic focus of the Chinese military weakens, its crisis management capabilities in surrounding regions may also decline. When combined with the North Korean variable, this becomes a new factor of instability. The process of reorganizing into a control-centered military rather than a strong one increases uncertainty for neighboring countries rather than providing a sense of stability.
Looking back at history, there have been many leaders who completely seized control of their militaries, but cases where those militaries remained strong for long are rare. A strong military stands on expertise and trust, not fear. Balance is maintained only when political power controls the military while allowing the autonomous space necessary for the military to prepare for war on its own.
Where China stands now is both the pinnacle of power and an institutional testing ground. The more important question than whether the leadership succeeded in seizing the military is this:
Does that military remain in a structure capable of fighting a modern war?
The completion of control can, paradoxically, be the beginning of vulnerability. This is the point the international community must watch.
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