As the saying goes, "When the water recedes, the rocks emerge." This phrase, attributed to the poet Su Dongpo, has become a succinct description of today's global economy, revealing structural vulnerabilities that were previously hidden beneath a surface of liquidity and optimism. The current position of China, the world's largest oil importer, represents that 'riverbed.'
Global media outlets have already begun to capture these signs. The BBC recently reported that the impact of the Iran war is hitting China's textile and apparel industry hard. The price of oil, a key raw material for synthetic fibers, has surged, causing polyester prices to rise by around 20% in a short period, which has directly led to increased production costs. Factories in Guangzhou and Zhejiang are struggling to cope with these cost burdens, leading to delays in orders and reduced production. Some traders warn that, given the current cost structure, a global increase in clothing prices is inevitable.
The war is driving up oil prices, and this shock is translating into higher clothing costs through the textile sector, highlighting the deep reliance of modern industrial structures on oil.
However, the issue is not confined to the textile industry. The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal point out that China's manufacturing sector is facing a 'double whammy' of rising raw material prices and logistical disruptions. The electric vehicle industry, heavily reliant on the Middle East market, is experiencing unexpected setbacks. With logistics blocked by the war, vehicles waiting for export are piling up at ports, leading to a severe cash flow crunch. Some companies, which relied on the Middle East for 80-90% of their exports, are effectively at a standstill.
This abnormal disruption, where demand exists but supply is blocked, is a hallmark of a wartime economy.
This situation is not merely a slowdown; it is an exposure of structural issues. Problems that were previously masked by liquidity and optimism are now surfacing due to the external shock of war. As Warren Buffett famously said, "Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked," and that reality is now evident.
These economic shocks quickly lead to diplomatic dilemmas. China imports over 10 million barrels of oil daily, making it the world's largest oil importer. A significant portion of this oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint that accounts for about 20% of global oil shipments. If this strait becomes blocked or dangerous, China's economy will face not just rising prices but also physical supply disruptions.
In preparation for such scenarios, China has been stockpiling strategic reserves of oil. However, the International Energy Agency warns that these reserves are only a short-term buffer and not a long-term solution. They may buy a few weeks or months, but they cannot replace the supply chain itself. Moreover, alternative supply sources from Venezuela and Iran are also unstable due to sanctions and geopolitical risks.
China's state-owned oil companies, Sinopec and Sinochem, are also under pressure. As oil prices soar, refining margins become unstable, and government price control policies further erode corporate profitability. International media report that these companies have entered "crisis management mode," indicating that the energy foundation of the national economy is shaking.
Amid this turmoil, China's diplomatic challenges deepen. While maintaining a strategic partnership with Iran, China must also strengthen its economic ties with Saudi Arabia. Although it can increase imports of Russian oil, logistical and payment system constraints exist.
In the context of strategic competition with the United States, energy supply chains are becoming increasingly politicized. Reuters analyzes that "China positions itself as a stable economic partner and peace mediator, yet it is actually maneuvering within the urgent interests of energy security."
Iran is not merely a supplier; its geopolitical position allows it to control the Strait of Hormuz, making it a strategic asset in itself. Even without executing a blockade, the mere possibility of one sends shockwaves through the market, leading to price increases, higher insurance premiums, and expanded logistical risks. Ultimately, energy is no longer just a commodity but a 'strategic asset' intertwined with politics, military, and diplomacy.
Russia represents another axis in this complex equation. Following Western sanctions, Russia has built new markets by supplying discounted oil to China and India. This is advantageous for China in the short term but poses long-term risks of energy dependence on specific countries. The U.S. aims to counter this trend and leverage energy supply chains as a strategic tool. All these movements are intertwining, pushing the world into a structure of 'blockades and counter-blockades.'
In this intricate diplomatic war, China seeks to maintain balance. However, achieving that balance is becoming increasingly difficult. Cooperation with one side breeds tension with the other. The economy demands stable supplies, but the political environment does not allow for that stability. This contradiction is China's dilemma.
The coming month will be a critical test for this dilemma. If oil prices rise further, the cost pressures on manufacturing will intensify. If exports do not recover, inventory and debt issues may worsen simultaneously. Domestic demand is also likely to shrink under inflationary pressures. International investment banks are consecutively lowering their short-term growth forecasts for China.
Viewing this situation as merely a cyclical economic downturn is risky. It exposes structural vulnerabilities. The Chinese economy has grown on a triangular structure of low-cost production, stable supply chains, and large-scale exports. However, all three pillars are now shaking simultaneously. Rising raw material prices, logistical disruptions, and geopolitical risks are all converging.
As the waters of war recede, the rocks beneath are becoming visible.
China may withstand this crisis in the short term through strategic reserves and diplomacy. However, in the long term, it cannot avoid the tasks of restructuring its energy framework, diversifying supply chains, and upgrading its industrial structure. The problem is that time is running out.
War does not wait, and markets respond more quickly.
Ultimately, the question boils down to one:
"Will this crisis end as a temporary shock, or will it trigger a structural transformation?"
History always answers in the same way.
When the water recedes, the rocks emerge.
And on those exposed rocks, the order of the next era will be reshaped.
※ This article was generated using AI technology and has been reviewed by an editor.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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