Survivors of the Shuaiba incident in Kuwait, where six U.S. soldiers were killed in an Iranian drone attack, claim that military leadership ignored prior warnings and responded inadequately. The U.S. military countered that a multi-layered defense system was in place at the facility and that command supported troop evacuation immediately after the attack.
The Washington Post reported on July 12 that 17 individuals, including surviving soldiers, eyewitnesses, and sources familiar with the military investigation, provided these accounts.
The attack occurred on March 1, one day after the start of hostilities between the U.S. and Iran. An Iranian Shahed suicide drone struck the operations center of the U.S. Army's 103rd Expeditionary Support Command, resulting in six fatalities and over 30 injuries.
Survivors allege that Brig. Gen. Clint Barnes and his superior, Maj. Gen. John Hinson, received warnings from intelligence agencies indicating that Shuaiba was a likely target for Iranian attacks. An initial assessment conducted by the unit reportedly indicated that Shuaiba lacked adequate air defense systems to intercept Shahed drones and recommended against deploying troops there. A soldier's complaint submitted to the Army Inspector General also advised against any troop deployment to Shuaiba.
According to the soldiers, the two generals received a classified briefing in December detailing vulnerabilities at Shuaiba and its inclusion on a list of potential Iranian targets. However, the U.S. military decided to deploy troops to Shuaiba to disperse forces concentrated at larger bases in the Middle East.
Prior to the attack, the unit requested the deployment of the vehicle-mounted drone defense system known as EAGLS, but the request was denied due to a lack of resources. Some soldiers claimed they moved to Shuaiba without personal or shared weapons.
On the day of the attack, prolonged alarms had led to fatigue among command and soldiers. At approximately 4:30 a.m., an evacuation alert was issued, and soldiers remained in the bunker for over four hours. Some reportedly returned to the operations center for work before receiving official safety confirmation.
Survivors testified that a safety confirmation alert was issued around 9 a.m. However, subsequent investigations revealed that no related records were available at Camp Arifjan. It was suggested that multiple simultaneous alerts may have led to record omissions.
About 30 minutes later, a Shahed drone descended rapidly onto the building, striking the operations center and causing an explosion and fire, showering soldiers inside with metal and glass debris.
Survivors claimed that immediately after the attack, Brig. Gen. Barnes gathered his body armor and helmet and evacuated to a nearby bunker, not participating in the rescue of soldiers remaining in the building. Maj. Stephen Ramsbottom, who was present, stated, "We stayed there to ensure everyone got out," adding that he did not see the two generals during the evacuation of the deceased and injured.
The U.S. Army Central Command denied these claims, stating that command "immediately supported the evacuation of on-site personnel and assessed the initial personnel situation before being evacuated due to their own injuries." Maj. Hinson reportedly sustained traumatic brain injuries and hand injuries.
Testimonies also indicated issues with the evacuation and treatment of the injured. Survivors claimed they drove unit vehicles to a hospital in Kuwait City immediately after the attack, with many being transported to Germany without undergoing tests for brain injuries or internal injuries.
However, they were listed as regular passengers on flight manifests rather than medical evacuees, resulting in their inability to receive inpatient treatment at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. The Army Central Command stated that all injured soldiers received ongoing physical and psychological treatment, as well as assessments for traumatic brain injuries.
Survivors expressed concern that the military's internal investigation may not hold command accountable. A U.S. official familiar with the investigation indicated that the current report does not include disciplinary actions or identification of responsible parties.
The Army Central Command asserted that Shuaiba was selected according to operational plans and was equipped with sufficient bunker space and a multi-layered defense system to counter drones and missiles. Additionally, a separate classified assessment of intelligence warnings and defensive capabilities was completed before the attack, but the results are unlikely to be made public.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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