In international politics, national interests often take precedence over principles. The recent move by the United States to expand nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including allowing uranium enrichment, underscores this reality. The U.S., which has emphasized nuclear non-proliferation as a core principle of the international order, is broadening its nuclear collaboration with Saudi Arabia, a nation without a single commercial nuclear power plant. This is not merely an energy policy; it is a strategic choice aimed at countering China's influence in the Middle East and securing Saudi Arabia within a U.S.-led security framework. Geopolitical interests are clearly taking precedence over non-proliferation principles.
South Korea has diligently upheld the U.S.-led nuclear non-proliferation regime for over half a century since the nuclear armament controversy during the Park Chung-hee administration in the 1970s. The country has faithfully implemented the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has accepted significant restrictions on nuclear fuel cycle technologies, such as spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment, under the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement. Despite possessing world-class capabilities in nuclear power plant design, construction, and operation, South Korea has prioritized the trust of its ally and limited its own actions.
South Korea has emerged as a globally recognized nuclear power. It successfully completed the Barakah nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates and has demonstrated competitiveness in the European nuclear market. With over 50 years of operational experience and a transparent safety management system recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Korea's nuclear industry is a significant asset. This is why it has been regarded as a model non-proliferation state worldwide.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, lacks operational experience with nuclear power and has made statements suggesting the possibility of nuclear armament, raising concerns in the international community. Nevertheless, the U.S. is expanding nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia due to strategic needs related to countering China and reshaping the Middle Eastern order. The judgment that Saudi Arabia cannot be overlooked, especially as China expands its influence through nuclear power and infrastructure, appears to be a significant factor. While this may be a pragmatic choice for the U.S., it highlights the reality that international politics does not operate solely on principles. When national interests are at stake, interpretations of principles can change.
Our perception also needs to evolve. Nuclear power has become a strategic industry that influences national competitiveness, extending beyond just building power plants to include power supply for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers, small modular reactors (SMRs), nuclear fuel cycles, and decommissioning projects. South Korea, with its world-class technological capabilities, should not cling to outdated frameworks. We must reflect on whether we are still waiting for our ally to eventually recognize our efforts, holding onto the belief that 'we are allies, so they will acknowledge us someday.'
This shift also carries significant implications for security. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities advance, the need for nuclear-powered submarines has been consistently raised. These submarines are strategic assets capable of long-term submerged operations and long-range missions, not nuclear weapons. While we must approach this matter cautiously within the framework of respecting the international non-proliferation regime and the Korea-U.S. alliance, it is less convincing that the U.S. applies flexible approaches to Saudi Arabia while imposing outdated standards on South Korea.
Adhering to non-proliferation principles and accepting excessive constraints in light of changing times are two different issues. We must demand reasonable treatment that aligns with the trust we have built and our world-class technological capabilities. The operational framework of the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement also needs to be re-evaluated. Alliances cannot endure at the expense of one party. If the U.S. applies principles flexibly based on national interests, South Korea should also pursue a more proactive nuclear strategy centered on its own national interests. This is the mark of a mature alliance and the realistic path we must choose in a rapidly changing international order.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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