On October 2, South Korea's criminal justice system will undergo a significant transformation after 78 years. The prosecution office will be dissolved, replaced by the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (SCIA) responsible for investigations and the Public Prosecution Office handling prosecutions. This marks the beginning of a complete separation of investigation and prosecution.
However, as of October 1, the day before the launch, some prosecutors and investigators heading to the SCIA had not even been informed of where to report for work. The SCIA's headquarters, located in the Renaissance Square building in Jung-gu, Seoul, remains under construction. Communication and security networks are not yet complete, with internet and phone systems expected to be operational only by the end of December. The Criminal Justice Information System (KICS), which facilitates data exchange with the police, is also unprepared. In a country known for its advanced IT infrastructure, officials may have to rely on paper files to communicate between agencies. Additionally, there are no detention facilities available, necessitating the use of nearby police stations. This is the current state of South Korea as it prepares for a major overhaul of its criminal justice system.
How did the situation reach this point?
The laws establishing the Public Prosecution Office and the SCIA were not passed through bipartisan agreement. The ruling Democratic Party of Korea pushed the legislation through the National Assembly, while the opposition People Power Party opposed it with a filibuster. A similar fate befell the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, which abolished prosecutors' direct supplementary investigation rights.
A majority party in the National Assembly has the power to pass legislation. However, this does not mean that the criminal justice system can be altered without sufficient scrutiny. The criminal justice system must function regardless of changes in government or shifts in the majority party in the National Assembly, as it is a fundamental system of the state.
If this reform was based solely on the number of seats held in the National Assembly without adequate social consensus, there is no guarantee that the next assembly will not pursue legislation in the opposite direction. It is not legally or politically impossible for a future National Assembly to restore the prosecution office. What will happen then? Will there be another relocation of offices and a change of signs within two years?
The most concerning aspect is the potential for a 'disappearance of accountability.' The government and ruling party may claim that the initial confusion is merely a 'teething problem' and assure the public that everything will be resolved once the system stabilizes in a few months.
However, for those involved in cases, this is not just a simple 'trial and error' phase. It is a time when fraud victims are unable to recover their money, when victims of sexual violence and stalking must live in fear, and when individuals wrongfully accused must navigate a social quagmire.
Once again, we must ask the government and ruling party: Will normal investigations and prosecutions be possible starting October 2?
* This article has been translated by AI.
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