Journalist

Lee Jung-woo
  • Koreas science ministry drops titles to loosen bureaucratic culture
    Korea's science ministry drops titles to loosen bureaucratic culture SEOUL, February 13 (AJP) - What’s in a title? In South Korea, quite a lot — enough to make headlines. Last month, the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) replaced nameplates for more than 900 employees, removing official titles and leaving only first names followed by the universal honorific suffix “-nim.” The change cost about 10 million won ($6,900). The move was ordered by Minister Bae Kyung-hoon, an AI engineer-turned policymaker who also serves as a deputy prime minister. Upon taking office in October, Bae asked ministry officials to abandon formal forms of address such as “deputy prime minister, sir.” The unfamiliar shift became widely known during a televised briefing to the president, when a spokesperson referred to his boss simply as “Kyung-hoon-nim.” Before entering government, Bae worked as a consultant for Naver and LG AI Research. He has sought to apply private-sector management practices to a ministry overseeing science and ICT — sectors where innovation and speed are critical. A Gentler Atmosphere At first, the change felt awkward. But officials say it has gradually softened the atmosphere inside the traditionally rigid bureaucracy. “The organization feels gentler now,” said a director-level official. “We’ve started using colleagues’ first names — even those we worked with for years without ever calling them directly. It feels more personal.” Still, discomfort remains. “I still feel awkward calling my superiors by their first names,” the official admitted. As a compromise, some senior officials have encouraged juniors to use nicknames. First Vice Minister Koo Hyuk-chae, for example, is sometimes called “Ja-ryong-nim,” a reference to the legendary warrior Zhao Yun in Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Efficiency Behind the Experiment Officials say the initiative goes beyond symbolism. “We’re trying to build respect and trust across ranks and improve efficiency,” said a deputy director-level official. The title change has been accompanied by adjustments in daily work practices. After-hours and weekend messaging has been restricted. Monday meetings were moved from mornings to afternoons to ease post-weekend workloads. Briefing materials are now limited to one page. For foreign executives working in Korea, the country’s complex title hierarchy can be bewildering. Honorifics remain central to social life, reflecting Confucian traditions rooted in the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910), where age, rank and status shaped language and behavior. In government offices, organizational charts typically run from “sajang-nim” (CEO) down to junior staff, and using first names for superiors has long been taboo – practice reinforced under Japanese colonial and military governments in modern history. The removal of titles and the use of the universal honorific “-nim” to show respect for all employees, regardless of status, has long been common in the private sector. Younger employees have largely welcomed the change, while older officials and academics have expressed reservations. Jo Kyung-ho, a professor at Kukmin University, said the move could help modernize public administration. “Korea’s civil service has developed closed, class-like structures,” he said. “Changing titles can be a starting point for cultural reform and more field-oriented governance.” Yoo Sang-yeop of Yonsei University emphasized the distinction between authority and authoritarianism. “Cultures change slowly,” he said. “Small adjustments like this can gradually erode rigid hierarchies, like water wearing down rock. But de-bureaucratization carries risks, since conservatism also protects public value where failure is costly.” Ki Jung-hoon of Myongji University noted that bureaucratic caution stems from accountability and institutional rules, not just habit. “Korea’s context differs from individualistic Western societies,” he said. “Hierarchy is embedded in governance structures.” What matters are results, not rhetoric, observers all agree. “Dropping titles is only meaningful if it leads to improvements in appointments, evaluations and decision-making,” said Rho Seung-yong, a professor at Seoul Women’s University’s Department of Public Administration. “De-bureaucratization cannot be achieved through symbolic gestures alone.” 2026-02-13 09:56:17
  • Seoul offers cautious compromise on medical student expansion, satisfies no one
    Seoul offers cautious compromise on medical student expansion, satisfies no one SEOUL, February 11 (AJP) - South Korea has proposed adding 668 medical students between 2027 and 2031, limiting the increase to 32 medical schools outside the capital region in a bid to ease doctor shortages without triggering backlash like the 2020 walkout. The cautious approach, however, has drawn criticism from across the spectrum, with both doctors and civic groups arguing that it avoids addressing structural problems in the healthcare system. According to an outline released by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, all additional seats will be allocated to regional universities and placed under a “regional physician” track. Students admitted through the program will receive government support in exchange for a mandatory 10-year service commitment at public medical institutions in provincial areas. Under the phased plan, medical schools will admit 490 more students in 2027 compared with pre-conflict levels of 3,058 in 2024. The increase will rise to 613 additional students in both 2028 and 2029, and then to 813 from 2030, when two new public and regional medical schools are scheduled to open. By 2030, Korea’s annual medical school quota will reach 3,871, up 813 from before the dispute. The ministry estimates the plan will produce 3,342 additional doctors between 2027 and 2031, and another 3,542 between 2033 and 2037. This would cover about 75 percent of the previously projected shortfall of 4,724 doctors by 2037. Health and Welfare Minister Jeong Eun-kyeong said the pace was designed to avoid overwhelming medical schools already coping with overlapping freshman classes from 2024 and 2025. “Considering the current strain on educational capacity, particularly due to the doubled student cohorts, a 75 percent increase is an appropriate step,” Jeong said. “This plan prioritizes the quality of medical education and sustainable physician training.” To prevent excessive concentration at major institutions, the government will impose differentiated caps on enrollment growth. National universities with fewer than 50 students will be allowed to double their quotas, while larger national schools will face a 30 percent ceiling. Private medical schools will be capped at 30 percent for smaller institutions and 20 percent for larger ones. The Ministry of Education will form an allocation review committee to assess each university’s expansion and training plans, releasing a preliminary distribution in March and final quotas in April. The government will also provide funding to upgrade facilities and equipment, and support current students preparing for licensing exams and residency placements. Officials say the expansion aims to address regional healthcare shortages by deploying more doctors to provincial areas, particularly in essential and public medical services. Funding will come from a newly created special accounting system for regional essential healthcare, which will also strengthen safety nets for patients and medical workers. Renewed backlash Despite the compromise, the announcement immediately reignited tensions with the medical community. During Tuesday’s Health and Medical Policy Committee meeting, Korean Medical Association President Kim Taek-woo walked out in protest, accusing the government of prioritizing numbers over reform. “The government’s announcement focuses only on figures, not on real normalization of healthcare,” Kim said at an emergency briefing. “We hold the government fully responsible for any confusion that follows in the medical field.” Civic and patient groups, meanwhile, criticized the government for not going far enough. Nam Eun-kyung of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice said the modest increase left much of the shortage unresolved. “The government cited educational capacity, but this decision falls short of what’s needed to protect public health,” she said. The Korea Patient Federation also expressed regret, warning that reduced expansion could prolong shortages in essential and regional services. As the government moves forward with its phased plan, South Korea’s long-running dispute over medical workforce policy appears set to intensify once again—leaving the central challenge of balancing access, quality, and sustainability unresolved. 2026-02-11 14:10:13
  • Seoul weighs heavier fines for antitrust offenses
    Seoul weighs heavier fines for antitrust offenses SEOUL, February 09 (AJP) - South Korea is reviewing a major overhaul of its antitrust penalty system, moving toward fines linked to overall corporate revenue as part of a broader effort to curb repeated violations by large conglomerates. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) said Monday it has commissioned an external study to redesign its sanctions framework for unfair trade practices, laying the groundwork for tougher legislation later this year. At the center of the reform is a proposal to calculate fines based on a company’s total sales, rather than limiting them to revenue generated in the specific market tied to a violation. Under the new approach, larger firms would automatically face heavier penalties—aimed at preventing major conglomerates, or chaebol, from treating fines as a routine business expense. “Companies often find that the profits gained from violations exceed the penalties imposed,” said Sun Jung-gyu, director-general of the FTC’s Competition Policy Bureau. “The goal is to make collusion and unfair practices economically unviable.” He added that President Lee Jae Myung has repeatedly criticized Korea’s cartel fines as being too lenient by international standards. A System Favoring Large Firms Currently, the FTC calculates penalties based on “related turnover,” or sales linked directly to the offending activity. In practice, this has produced sharply uneven outcomes. A 2020 study by the Korea Institute of Public Finance found that between 2011 and 2017, fines imposed on large corporations averaged just 0.17 percent of their total sales. By contrast, midsize firms paid 0.47 percent, medium enterprises 1.45 percent, and small businesses 3.33 percent. The smallest firms—often penalized for minor violations—shouldered fines equal to more than 22 percent of revenue. Officials argue that this imbalance weakens deterrence and effectively shields dominant players. Learning from Europe The reform draws inspiration from European competition policy, which bases fines on company-wide turnover. In 2024, the European Commission fined Apple €1.84 billion for abusing its dominant position in music streaming. Only €40 million was the base penalty, while the remainder reflected Apple’s global revenue and market power. By comparison, Korean penalties for similar abuses have rarely exceeded a few hundred million won—negligible for firms with trillions of won in annual sales. FTC Chairperson Joo Byung-ki said in January that Korea would follow European and German models by factoring company size into sanctions through new research and a dedicated task force. Introducing a Minimum Floor Regulators are also considering minimum fine thresholds to prevent token penalties. The new system could impose either a fixed minimum amount or a baseline percentage of turnover, ensuring that no major violation results in nominal punishment. Under current rules, “very serious” abuse of market dominance carries a minimum fine of 3.5 percent of sales during the violation period. Officials are reviewing plans to raise that floor by the end of February. The FTC is also reassessing fixed-amount penalties—typically ranging from 500 million won to 4 billion won—used when violations cannot be clearly tied to specific sales. “These static limits fail to reflect corporate gains or social harm,” an FTC official said. “A revised system would allow stronger sanctions even when market impact is hard to measure.” Legislative Push and Corporate Resistance To institutionalize the changes, the FTC plans to submit amendments to the Fair Trade Act in the first half of the year. The bill would raise both maximum and flat-rate penalties, expanding regulatory discretion. Business groups are already pushing back, warning that heavier fines could dampen investment and innovation amid slowing exports and economic uncertainty. “Firms will argue this hurts business activity, while regulators will stress deterrence,” said Professor Lee Hwang of Korea University Law School. “The challenge is balancing discipline with economic dynamism.” Lee also emphasized the legal distinction between administrative surcharges and criminal penalties. “This reform concerns administrative sanctions, not criminal punishment,” he said. “It is about deterrence, not criminalization.” The FTC’s policy blueprint, expected later this year, is likely to present multiple models for scaling fines. Officials say the intent is not to penalize corporate success but to ensure accountability proportional to financial capacity. Supporters argue that scale-sensitive fines will strengthen market discipline and public trust noting that Japan and Australia also employ similar systems. Critics, however, warn that aggressive enforcement could trigger prolonged legal battles and encourage firms to shift profits or operations offshore. Some also fear that minor compliance lapses could be punished too harshly. The reform comes amid rising public frustration over price-fixing scandals and collusion among major conglomerates, making competition policy a politically sensitive issue. For President Lee’s administration, tightening corporate accountability aligns with its pledge to create a “level playing field” for small and medium-sized enterprises. Tensions with business groups have recently intensified. The government sharply criticized the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry after it issued a statement claiming wealthy Koreans were fleeing high inheritance taxes. Lee publicly condemned the claim as “fake news,” prompting an official apology from the group, led by Chey Tae-won, chairman of SK Group. The FTC initiative represents one of the most ambitious regulatory shifts since Korea strengthened its competition laws in the late 1980s. If enacted, revenue-based fines would significantly reshape the relationship between the state and big business, marking a decisive move toward tougher enforcement. 2026-02-09 17:52:58
  • <Ukraine War in 5th year> A long war, fading certainties
    A long war, fading certainties *Editor’s Note: As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nears its fifth year, AJP reviews how the war began, how it has evolved, and where it is heading — and asks the most urgent question of all: will it end? This first installment examines the toll on Ukraine, Russia, and the world. SEOUL, February 07 (AJP) - As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches its fifth year, the war shows signs of diplomatic motion without political resolution — inching toward talks, yet anchored by irreconcilable claims over land, security and identity. According to a recent report by Reuters, Washington is pressing Moscow and Kyiv to explore a tentative peace framework, with March floated as an ambitious target for progress. U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators, led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and former presidential adviser Jared Kushner, have discussed proposals that could eventually be put to a Ukrainian referendum. Yet diplomats on both sides acknowledge that the timeline is fragile. Russia remains adamant about retaining occupied territories, while Ukraine refuses to legitimize territorial loss. For now, the war grinds on — suspended between battlefield exhaustion and diplomatic paralysis. A Goliath Wounded What began on Feb. 24, 2022, as a rapid campaign envisioned by President Vladimir Putin has hardened into a prolonged war of attrition. Russia failed to seize Kyiv, lost tens of thousands of elite troops, and settled into incremental advances measured in meters rather than kilometers. An analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that Russian forces have suffered roughly 1.2 million casualties, including more than 325,000 killed since 2022 — the highest toll for a major power since World War II. At current rates, CSIS warns, combined casualties on both sides could approach two million by 2026. Ukrainian losses are estimated at 500,000 to 600,000, according to CNN, while Britain’s UK Ministry of Defence said Russia crossed the threshold of one million killed or wounded by mid-2024. Despite sustained offensives, Russian units in some sectors have advanced by no more than 70 meters per day — slower than the pace of trench warfare at the Somme in 1916. The result is a modern paradox: a militarized giant bleeding manpower, capital and credibility, yet still capable of sustaining war. The Logic of Attrition Unable to secure a decisive breakthrough, the Kremlin has embraced a strategy of exhaustion — wearing down Ukraine’s infrastructure, economy and manpower through steady artillery fire, drone strikes and missile barrages. Russia now controls about one-fifth of Ukrainian territory. Most of those gains, however, have come at extraordinary human cost. Economically, Moscow’s war footing rests on narrow foundations. Manufacturing output weakened through much of 2025, consumer demand softened, and growth slowed to around 0.6 percent. Demographic decline and labor shortages have deepened structural fragilities. Russia, once eager to present itself as a technology power, no longer hosts a single firm among the world’s top 100 by market value. Yet the war machine persists, sustained in part by external lifelines. Western intelligence agencies say Chinese exports of dual-use goods have enabled Russian factories to expand missile production, while North Korea supplies ammunition in exchange for economic and technological support. Iran, too, remains a critical drone supplier. These networks have allowed Moscow to absorb losses that would have crippled most economies — but at the price of deeper strategic dependence. A Fraying Western Consensus The war has also tested Western cohesion. “The West is showing fatigue,” said Berthold Rittberger of LMU Munich. “Without the U.S., Europe still lacks the capability to contain Putin. Populists and pro-Russian forces are exploiting this to deepen polarization.” Across the Atlantic, Joseph Parent of the University of Notre Dame offers a bleaker assessment. “The war was effectively over in its first six months,” he said. “Both sides lost. Ukraine won’t get its old borders back, and Russia won’t keep Ukraine out of the West. The longer it drags on, the weaker both societies become.” In Washington, election politics further complicate strategy. Uncertainty over future U.S. commitment has already influenced European calculations — and emboldened Moscow. Europe’s Strategic Dilemma For Europe, the war has been both a geopolitical awakening and a fiscal burden. In the early months of the invasion, European leaders moved with unusual unity, imposing sanctions, expanding defense budgets and funneling military aid to Kyiv. Nearly five years on, that consensus has thinned. Energy prices have stabilized, but political cohesion has not. Far-right and Eurosceptic parties — many openly sympathetic to Moscow — are gaining ground from Paris to Prague. Governments face rising defense bills at a time of slowing growth and voter fatigue. “Europe has done more than it ever imagined it would,” said Berthold Rittberger of LMU Munich. “But it is reaching the limits of what it can sustain politically and economically.” While European Union members have pledged tens of billions of euros in military and financial assistance, much of their security architecture still depends on American power. Without U.S. leadership, Europe struggles to translate resources into credible deterrence. “Without the United States,” Rittberger added, “Europe still lacks the military capacity and institutional coordination to contain Russia on its own.” This dependency has sharpened anxieties about Washington’s future reliability. A shift in U.S. policy, European officials fear, would leave the continent exposed — diplomatically, militarily and psychologically. Privately, European diplomats now speak less about “victory” and more about “managing decline”: preventing Ukraine’s collapse, limiting escalation, and preserving NATO’s credibility. The change in tone reflects hard arithmetic. Ammunition stocks are depleted. Defense industries are struggling to scale up production. And public patience is eroding. “Support for Ukraine remains strong in principle,” one senior EU official said, “but weaker in practice. Every budget cycle becomes harder.” For Moscow, this erosion is strategic. Russia’s war planners have long calculated that Western unity would fray before Ukrainian resistance. Europe’s growing ambivalence — amplified by domestic politics — suggests that calculation may yet prove correct. Seoul’s Strategic Lens In South Korea, the war is increasingly viewed not only as a European crisis, but as a rehearsal for geopolitical realignment in Asia and feels too closely at home with the same global superpowers deeply involved in the war including North Korea. Kwon Young-se, a senior lawmaker of the People Power Party and former ambassador to China, observed Trump’s return to had reshaped the conflict. “Trump is unlikely to invest large sums of money in a war he considers unrelated to U.S. interests. That is why Washington is now pushing ceasefire ideas that Kyiv can hardly accept.” For Seoul, the war’s most troubling byproduct lies farther east. “North Korea has gained leverage,” Kwon said. “With Russian technology transfers, its missile and nuclear programs are advancing. That changes the threat environment.” Another former ambassador and lawmaker Kim Gunn traced the conflict to deeper historical anxieties, invoking British geographer Halford Mackinder’s theory of Eurasian power. “Russia believes that without controlling its neighbors, it is vulnerable,” he said. “But recognizing spheres of influence is dangerous. That logic justified past imperialism. It invites endless expansion.” “After the war, Russia will seek new partners,” Kim said. “Its Far East development could become central. Korea may emerge as an important economic partner.” Between War and Peace The current diplomatic push reflects exhaustion more than reconciliation. Russia seeks recognition of its territorial gains. Ukraine seeks security guarantees and sovereignty. The United States wants stability before electoral uncertainty intensifies. None of these goals align easily. For now, negotiations resemble parallel monologues rather than genuine compromise. The front lines barely shift. Casualties accumulate. Reconstruction plans outpace peace prospects. For South Korea, the lesson is strategic duality: maintain solidarity with Western allies while preserving diplomatic channels across Eurasia. “Korea must strengthen its military and work with value-sharing partners,” Kwon said. “But we must also remain pragmatic.” He suggests Seoul must have eyes on post-war order. “It may sound cold,” he said, “but once reconstruction begins, there will be a huge economic stage. Korea should position itself early.” Kim echoed that view: “Our diplomacy must be multidimensional. If major powers tolerate revisionist aggression, global instability will deepen.” Nearly five years in, Russia’s war has become more than a territorial dispute. It is a test of endurance, governance and global resolve. It has exposed the limits of military power, the fragility of alliances, and the costs of strategic ambiguity. Whether March produces a ceasefire or another missed deadline, the deeper reckoning will persist. The conflict has already reshaped Europe’s security order and Asia’s strategic calculations. As one empire’s ambitions erode under the weight of reality, the fault lines of the next global contest are taking shape — slowly, relentlessly, and at immense human cost. 2026-02-08 07:30:53
  • Presidential SNS politics: excess or essential?
    Presidential SNS politics: excess or essential? SEOUL, February 03 (AJP) - U.S. President Donald Trump is notorious for overnight social-media barrages — posting more than 160 times in a single day as recently as Dec. 1 — and for spending hours on Truth Social. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is a relative newcomer to such digital excess, but he appears to be embracing the medium with equal enthusiasm. On Sunday, Lee posted a reflective yet firm message on X, formerly Twitter, calling for a national debate on a proposed “sugar levy” aimed at curbing excessive consumption of sweetened beverages. “The more difficult the issue, the more we must discuss it,” he wrote, citing a World Health Organization recommendation for steep global price hikes on sugary drinks and alcohol by 2035. Social-media politicking itself is hardly new in Seoul. Korean politicians have long used online platforms as unfiltered arenas for attack and mobilization. What is new is the scale and centrality of presidential participation. Over just two months, Lee’s use of X surged from a handful of posts in December to nearly four dozen by early February, spanning issues from real estate and fiscal reform to local government efficiency. Cheong Wa Dae stresses that these posts are not off-the-cuff remarks. “They emphasize policy consistency, leadership resolve and a call for responsible journalism,” a presidential aide said. To critics, however, the shift signals something broader: a deliberate attempt to set the national agenda through direct public address, bypassing cabinet deliberation, legislative review and media scrutiny. Lee’s recent posts on the sugar levy, housing policy and administrative restructuring have drawn both praise and backlash. His messages — often lengthy, impassioned and sharply worded — share a consistent theme: impatience with intermediaries, whether political or journalistic. Responding to criticism that the sugar levy amounted to a disguised tax hike, Lee argued that “a tax and a burden charge are fundamentally different,” warning against debate shaped by “distortion and framing.” Elsewhere, he rebuked outlets questioning the end of a real-estate tax exemption, accusing them of “defending ruinous speculation.” When the opposition People Power Party labeled his remarks “provocative populism,” Lee replied on X: “Enough with ruinous real-estate speculation and outdated red-baiting. It’s time to move on.” The tone is unmistakably combative, the pace relentless. On some mornings, Lee posts three separate messages — all drafted, aides say, by the president himself. To detractors, this amounts to governing by post: impulsive, emotional and dismissive of institutional checks. To supporters, it is communicative leadership — a president visibly accountable in real time. Lee’s assertiveness fits a broader global shift. Leaders worldwide have increasingly turned to social media as tools of direct, performative governance. Few exemplify this more starkly than Trump, who, according to The Washington Post, posted more than 2,200 times on Truth Social during the first four months of his second term — roughly 17 posts a day, triple his rate during his first presidency. While Trump’s outbursts often rattle allies and alarm opponents, the logic is similar: direct-to-public communication with minimal mediation and maximal emotional charge. Alex Tahk, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, describes this as a modern extension of presidents “going public” — appealing directly to voters to shape agendas and pressure institutions. “Social media makes that process faster and more personalized,” he said, “with far fewer journalistic gatekeepers.” But the power cuts both ways. “By making positions public and emotionally charged, leaders reduce room for compromise,” Tahk warned. “It can undermine negotiation more than it facilitates it.” That risk is acute in South Korea’s polarized political climate. Lee’s forthright tone mirrors a global move from closed-door policymaking toward performative governance, where visibility and conviction often rival coalition-building in importance. “Highly confrontational communication,” Tahk noted, “raises the political cost of bipartisan bargaining.” Media psychologists point to deeper cultural dynamics. Hang Lu of the University of Michigan says social media offers leaders speed, visibility and message control — while blurring the line between governance and performance. “Immediacy and emotional framing can oversimplify complex policy debates,” she said. Lee’s posts often compress intricate fiscal or housing policies into moralized soundbites, tapping what Lu calls the “participatory psychology” of social media — a space where citizens become active, emotionally engaged participants rather than passive audiences. In such an environment, even serious policy proposals can take on the pulse of campaign rhetoric. Tahk calls this “agenda politics through emotional framing.” “Leaders signal direction and energy,” he said, “but the cost is that complex issues become simplified into moral binaries—fair versus unjust, patriotic versus corrupt.” Agenda-setting through social media can privilege attention-grabbing topics over long-term governance,” Lu notes. “It blurs the line between informing the public and performing for them.” That blurring extends beyond content to tempo. Lee’s posting frequency — sometimes several times a day — reflects a presidency operating at the rhythm of the digital news cycle rather than the slower cadence of policy deliberation. Communication becomes continuous, but comprehension more fleeting. Each post triggers immediate responses: ministries scrambling to clarify, pundits to interpret, supporters and critics to mobilize. The presidency becomes a hub of perpetual mediation. Unlike Franklin Roosevelt’s carefully timed fireside chats or Ronald Reagan’s choreographed television addresses, today’s digital presidency operates in an algorithmic, fragmented and perpetual environment. There is no single national audience, only segmented feeds optimized for engagement. In Seoul, the effect is immediate. Presidential posts are instantly reframed by supporters and opponents alike, creating an always-on feedback loop that amplifies both authority and division. Lee’s embrace of this landscape is deliberate. Since his days as mayor of Seongnam and governor of Gyeonggi Province, he cultivated a reputation for online accessibility. As president, that instinct has evolved into a daily rhythm of agenda-setting posts, often paired with news articles he critiques or reframes. Cheong Wa Dae insists this is transparency, not theatrics. Critics see spectacle. The tension between the two may define Korea’s emerging media presidency — one where policy debate unfolds in public view, but where deliberation grows harder the louder the conversation becomes. 2026-02-03 17:07:47
  • The president has not been joking — and Korea is now part of the global sugar tax debate
    The president has not been joking — and Korea is now part of the global sugar tax debate SEOUL, February 02 (AJP) -The president has not been joking. What first sounded like a provocative aside has evolved into a serious public health proposition, as President Lee Jae Myung pushes South Korea into a widening global debate over whether taxation should be used to curb excessive sugar consumption and its long-term health costs. South Koreans are hardly restrained when it comes to dessert. The recent craze for dujjonku — a sugar-drenched, crunchy cookie inspired by Dubai chocolate — has underscored the country’s growing sweet tooth. But that enthusiasm is now being questioned from an unexpected quarter: health policy. Over the weekend, Lee returned to the idea of a so-called “sugar levy” via social media, pointing to international precedent and rising concern over diet-related disease. On Monday, he shared a report by the World Health Organization titled “The War Against Sweet Addiction — WHO’s Official Sugar Tax Recommendation,” framing the issue as one requiring open, evidence-based national debate. “Proposals such as a sugar charge require open, fact-based national debate precisely because they are complex, easily misunderstood and touch many interests,” Lee wrote. He stressed that excessive sugar intake is a key driver of obesity and metabolic disease, while emphasizing that what is under discussion is not a conventional tax hike. “A health burden fee could be imposed on products where excessive sugar consumption harms health, with the funds directed toward prevention and treatment to reduce pressure on public health insurance,” he said. Lee also drew a distinction between general taxation and earmarked levies designed to serve specific social purposes. “The key is purpose,” he wrote. “A tax without usage restrictions is not the same as a levy dedicated to improving national health outcomes.” The remarks immediately triggered debate among lawmakers and industry groups. Food and beverage companies warned that a sugar charge could raise prices or disproportionately affect lower-income households, while public health advocates said the discussion was long overdue. A broader global shift Korea’s emerging debate mirrors a broader shift underway across Europe, where governments are increasingly turning to fiscal tools to reshape dietary behavior. In January, Slovakia approved a fiscal consolidation package that included a targeted value-added tax increase on sugary and salty foods. Under the plan, which takes effect this year, products such as chocolate, ice cream, confectionery and crisps will be taxed at 23 percent, compared with a standard rate of 19 percent. Slovak authorities said the measure was intended to promote responsible consumption while strengthening public finances. In the United Kingdom, the Labour government has announced plans to expand its Soft Drinks Industry Levy to include milk-based beverages such as bottled milkshakes, sweetened coffee drinks and plant-based dairy alternatives from January 2028. The move closes a long-standing exemption that health officials now argue weakened the policy’s effectiveness. A new “lactose allowance” will exempt naturally occurring milk sugars, ensuring that only added sugars are taxed. Since its introduction in 2018, the UK levy has become one of the most closely watched public health policies in Europe. Officials say it has driven widespread reformulation, with more than 90 percent of soft drinks now containing less sugar than the taxable threshold. Between 2015 and 2022, total sugar sold in soft drinks fell by nearly half. Policy experiments across Europe Across the European Union, nutrition-related taxes have moved from experimental to mainstream. Hungary operates a Public Health Product Tax on sugary drinks, confectionery and salty snacks, generating dedicated revenue for healthcare. France expanded its soft drink tax to include both sugary and artificially sweetened beverages. Portugal applies a tiered tax based on sugar content, while Ireland mirrors the UK approach through its Sugar-Sweetened Drinks Tax. Even Denmark, which repealed its short-lived “fat tax” more than a decade ago, continues to revisit measures aimed specifically at excess sugar intake. These policies, while controversial at inception, are now widely regarded as standard tools of modern public health governance. The WHO formally recommends sugar taxation as one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce obesity and diabetes, alongside education, food labeling reforms and improved access to healthier diets. Korea’s health context South Korea’s public health indicators remain among the strongest in the OECD, but experts warn that dietary shifts toward processed foods and sugar-heavy beverages are eroding that advantage — particularly among younger adults. According to the Korean Diabetes Association’s Diabetes Fact Sheet 2024, an estimated 308,000 people aged 19 to 39 in South Korea are living with diabetes, accounting for 2.2 percent of the country’s total diabetic population. While the proportion may appear small, health authorities caution that early-onset diabetes significantly increases lifetime risks of cardiovascular disease, kidney failure and other complications. More striking is the scale of metabolic risk among young men. The same report found that 37 percent of men in their 30s are in a prediabetic state, meaning their blood sugar levels are already elevated enough to place them at high risk of progressing to full diabetes without intervention. Public health experts say the figures reflect broader lifestyle and dietary changes, including higher consumption of sugary snacks, sweetened beverages and ready-to-drink products, combined with sedentary work patterns and long hours. Marc Diederich, a professor at Seoul National University’s Department of Pharmacy, said the scientific case for preventive action is well established. “Excess added sugar, particularly from sweetened beverages, contributes to obesity, insulin resistance and chronic inflammation,” he told AJP. “These conditions not only undermine metabolic health but also increase cancer risk indirectly through physiological stress and immune dysfunction.” Children and young adults, he added, are especially vulnerable. “High sugar intake is linked to dental disease, unhealthy weight gain and early metabolic abnormalities,” Diederich said. “Fiscal tools can help shift consumption patterns, but they must be paired with education.” He also pointed to Korea’s traditional diet as a preventive asset worth protecting. “Meals centered on grains, vegetables, fermented foods and soups have long supported good health,” he said. “Preserving that food culture should be part of any long-term prevention strategy.” 2026-02-02 17:22:34
  • Trump admin pressures Seoul over unfulfilled trade commitments
    Trump admin pressures Seoul over "unfulfilled" trade commitments SEOUL, January 28 (AJP) - U.S. Trade Representative Jamison Greer told Fox Business on Tuesday that South Korea had yet to honor commitments made under last summer’s “framework agreement,” including a planned 350-billion-dollar investment in the U.S. over three years and steps to open its market to more American automobiles and agricultural products. “We showed good faith by lowering our tariff rate on Korea from 25 percent to 15 percent,” Greer said. “But they haven’t done their part—they haven’t passed the bill to support their investment, they’ve introduced new digital service laws, and they haven’t moved forward on agriculture or industry. It’s hard to keep our end of the bargain when they’re moving so slowly.” The remarks come amid escalating trade tensions between the two allies. The U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) Joint Committee, which was supposed to meet last December in Washington for the first time since last fall’s summit, has been postponed indefinitely after Washington demanded “more concrete proposals” from Seoul on non-tariff barriers and digital regulation. According to Korean officials, the dispute centers partly on South Korea’s amended Information and Communications Network Act—a digital-services law aimed at curbing false online content, which U.S. tech firms argue imposes new restrictions on their operations. Trump, speaking during a campaign stop in Iowa on Tuesday, doubled down on his approach, saying that the threat of 25% tariffs has been effective in prompting other countries to return to the negotiating table. “When we mention tariffs, they move,” Trump said, suggesting that the policy remains a core component of his negotiation strategy. Strategic Leverage or Economic Self-Harm? Some experts view the move as an example of Trump’s reliance on tariff threats as leverage, a strategy largely absent from modern U.S. trade diplomacy. “President Trump is using tariffs as political and economic pressure in ways we haven’t seen before,” said J. Lawrence Broz, chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. “Publicly singling out Korea’s National Assembly personalizes the dispute and justifies unilateral escalation. But protectionism harms U.S. consumers and distorts resource allocation—it’s economically counterproductive in the long term.” Broz added that the episode underscores the eroding influence of multilateral trade institutions like the WTO, which were designed to restrain powerful countries from acting unilaterally in trade conflicts. Domestic Politics in Play Other analysts suggested political motivations may also be at work. Eric A. Langenbacher, a professor at Georgetown University, noted that two rival bills are currently before South Korea’s National Assembly to create a mechanism for the pledged investments. “The timing may not be coincidental,” he said. “Trump might be trying to break the legislative impasse in his own way. His policy messages often follow from the most recent conversation he’s had, so the key question is—who raised the South Korean issue to him, and to what end?” Langenbacher added that it remains unclear whether Trump has a preferred political faction in South Korea, but drew parallels with his administration’s past signals of support for European right-wing populist parties, suggesting that “this might be a way to tilt the domestic debate.” 2026-01-28 18:20:40
  • Trumps tariff threat jolts Seoul politics but leaves markets largely unruffled
    Trump's tariff threat jolts Seoul politics but leaves markets largely unruffled SEOUL, January 27 (AJP) - President Donald Trump’s renewed tariff threat against South Korea rattled the political establishment in Seoul but stopped short of derailing financial markets, underscoring investors’ view that the dispute is more political theater than an imminent economic shock. Washington’s displeasure over what it sees as Seoul’s slow follow-through on investment commitments tied to tariff relief had been telegraphed in advance. According to government sources, the U.S. government sent a letter to Seoul about two weeks ago urging South Korea to fulfill follow-up obligations under the trade-related section of a bilateral “Joint Fact Sheet” agreed last November. The correspondence was reportedly addressed to Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and Fair Trade Commission Chair Ju Biung-ghi, and appears to have served as a prelude to Trump’s latest move. In a post Monday on his social media platform Truth Social, Trump accused South Korea’s National Assembly of failing to complete the legal procedures required to implement the trade commitments. He announced that tariffs on Korean automobiles, timber, pharmaceuticals and “all other reciprocal TARIFFS” would be raised from 15 percent to 25 percent, without specifying an effective date. Industry Minister Kim, who was in Ottawa to support a Korean consortium bidding for Canada’s submarine procurement project, cut short his schedule and headed to Washington to engage U.S. officials. U.S. observers noted that Seoul has become the latest target in what they described as a broader Trumpian tariff offensive that has also swept in the European Union and Canada, all accused of foot-dragging on trade or investment pledges. The overnight threat had an immediate wake-up effect on the political front in Seoul. President Lee Jae Myung, presiding over a cabinet meeting, criticized the National Assembly for moving “too slowly” on legislation, without explicitly referencing the special bill related to U.S. investment commitments. Rep. Kim Han-kyu of the ruling Democratic Party, a member of the National Assembly’s Strategy and Finance Committee, said lawmakers were already advancing the necessary bills and budget measures. “Despite President Trump’s remarks, the National Assembly will proceed calmly according to the planned schedule,” Kim said, adding that tariff-related commitments “are being carried out as agreed.” Financial markets, however, appeared largely unfazed. The benchmark KOSPI rose 2.73 percent to close at a record 5,084.85, while the tech-heavy KOSDAQ gained 1.71 percent to 1,082.59. The Korean won weakened only marginally, with the U.S. dollar rising 0.20 won to 1,448.2 won. “The market rally shows that investors trust the government’s composed response and are not shaken by President Trump’s actions,” the ruling party lawmaker said. Opposition figures were less sanguine. Rep. Choi Eun-seok of the main opposition People Power Party argued that the administration had downplayed the need for parliamentary ratification of the trade deal. “The government’s complacency has given the U.S. an excuse to act unilaterally,” Choi said, calling for a parliamentary hearing with Deputy Prime Minister Koo Yoon-cheol to determine “what went wrong.” The blame game quickly escalated. Democratic Party Rep. Cho In-chul countered that opposition lawmakers themselves had slowed legislative progress. “The agreement clearly states that ratification is not required,” Cho said. “All that’s needed is supporting legislation. The Strategy and Finance Committee is chaired by the opposition, yet they accuse us of inaction.” U.S. scholars were broadly critical of Trump’s tariff posture toward allies. Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard Kennedy School, said Trump was not singling out South Korea. “He is imposing tariffs that are illegal, illogical and harmful on almost all U.S. trading partners,” Frankel said. Matthew Bunn, also of Harvard, said Trump’s actions were difficult to explain. “I have no idea what has caused President Trump to suddenly do this — along with so many other things that undermine the interests of American allies,” Bunn said. Erik A. Gartzke, a political science professor at the University of California, San Diego, described Trump’s behavior as “bullying.” “Don’t worry — the Republic of Korea is nothing special,” Gartzke said. “People around the world are learning that Trump is a bully. Accommodate him and he will come back for more. Stand up to him and he usually chickens out.” John Dunn, professor emeritus at the University of Cambridge, called Trump “a very impatient bully,” arguing that his approach reflects “a minimalist conception of a contract — it binds others but not him unless they have a means to enforce it.” Trump, Dunn added, “rightly supposes that South Korea is more dependent on the U.S. than the U.S. is on South Korea, and therefore cannot enforce the agreement.” “This is a completely general pattern of behavior,” Dunn said. “He has only really backed off in the case of China. The South Korean legislative process, meanwhile, is seldom brisk.” 2026-01-27 17:44:38
  • South Korea pushes bid for Canadas submarine project as economic ties deepen
    South Korea pushes bid for Canada's submarine project as economic ties deepen SEOUL, January 27 (AJP) - South Korea is stepping up efforts to win Canada’s next-generation submarine contract, leveraging a flurry of industrial cooperation deals and high-level diplomacy aimed at deepening the two countries’ strategic and economic ties. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources said it hosted the South Korea–Canada Industrial Cooperation Forum on Monday at the Park Hyatt hotel in Toronto, bringing together business and government leaders from both countries. The event comprised a two-part program: an automotive industry cooperation forum and a South Korea–Canada CEO dialogue. Senior figures in attendance included presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, and Defense Acquisition Program Administration Commissioner Lee Yong-cheol. From the Canadian side, participants included Philip Jennings, deputy minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, and Victor Fedeli, the Ontario minister of economic development, job creation and trade, alongside other federal and provincial officials. Officials discussed strengthening collaboration in future mobility sectors such as eco-friendly and autonomous vehicles. “The auto industry is a core backbone industry that runs through both countries,” Kim said, emphasizing that South Korea will help both nations’ automakers “seek opportunities together and grow.” In a show of expanding cooperation, six memorandums of understanding (MOUs) were signed between major firms in key high-tech and strategic industries. They included agreements between Hanwha Ocean and Algoma Steel (steel), Hanwha Systems with Telesat and MDA Space (low-Earth-orbit satellites), Hanwha Ocean–Hanwha Systems–Cohere (AI), Hanwha Systems and PV Labs (advanced sensors), and POSCO International and Torngat Metals (rare earths). The MOU was signed as part of discussions between the South Korean and Canadian governments and companies on industrial cooperation ahead of Canada’s upcoming submarine procurement program. It outlines a concrete model for industrial collaboration that aligns with the Canadian government’s emphasis on local industry participation and Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) — the so-called “Buy Canadian” policy. Hanwha Ocean first signed an agreement with Algoma Steel, Canada’s largest steel manufacturer, to support the Canadian submarine project. If Hanwha wins the submarine contract, the two companies will cooperate on building a steel plant in Canada and establishing a stable supply chain for steel products used in submarine construction and maintenance (MRO) infrastructure. Hanwha Ocean will invest approximately CAD 345 million in the initiative. Hanwha Ocean and Hanwha Systems also entered into an artificial intelligence partnership with Cohere, a leading Canadian AI unicorn, to jointly develop specialized AI technologies applicable to shipbuilding and submarine system integration and operation. The collaboration will utilize Cohere’s large language models (LLMs) and large multimodal models (LMMs) to enhance processes across production planning, design, and manufacturing. Hanwha Systems will further collaborate with Telesat, a Canadian satellite communications company, to develop next-generation low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communications. By combining Hanwha’s expertise in satellite manufacturing and terminal development with Telesat’s satellite network operation and design capabilities, the two companies aim to deliver a globally competitive LEO satellite communication network for both domestic and international markets. In addition, Hanwha Systems signed an MOU with MDA Space to cooperate on defense and security-oriented satellite communications and space technologies, and another with PV Labs to advance electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensor technologies for defense applications. A study by global consulting firm KPMG estimated that Hanwha’s proposed industrial cooperation plan for the Canadian submarine project could create more than 200,000 cumulative job-years in Canada by 2040. The ministry said the deals are expected to reinforce collaboration across advanced industrial sectors including steel, defense, space, AI, and rare earth development. During the second session, business leaders gathered for the third South Korea–Canada CEO Dialogue, co-hosted by the Federation of Korean Industries and the Business Council of Canada. Executives from 12 South Korean and nine Canadian companies discussed opportunities in supply-chain resilience and strategic industries. “Our companies already see Canada as a trusted, key partner,” Kim said, adding that stronger cooperation will “enhance supply chain stability, create jobs in both countries, and boost global competitiveness.” Strategic Stakes in Canada’s Submarine Modernization Beyond trade, Seoul’s outreach carries strategic weight. South Korean shipbuilders — notably Hanwha Ocean — are reportedly positioning themselves for Canada’s multibillion-dollar Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), one of Ottawa’s largest and most consequential defense procurements. Canada’s aging fleet of Victoria-class submarines, built in the 1980s and slated for retirement by the mid-2030s, has prompted Ottawa to pursue up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice-capable submarines under the CPSP. The project, part of the government’s “Our North, Strong and Free” defense policy, reflects growing security concerns in the rapidly warming Arctic, where Russia and China are expanding their presence. “Submarines are crucial to Canada’s ability to defend its sovereignty, monitor maritime approaches, and project power beyond its shores,” said Julie Kim of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. “The CPSP has assessed that the most efficient path forward is to procure foreign-built, Military-Off-the-Shelf submarines that meet Canada’s operational needs.” A Deeper Strategic Partnership If South Korea were selected as a partner, analysts say the decision could mark a watershed in bilateral ties. The two nations upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022, identifying defense cooperation as one of five core pillars. That partnership deepened further with the signing of the Canada–Republic of Korea Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership in October 2025. “With mounting global instability and the shifting dynamics of Canada–U.S. relations, Ottawa is actively seeking reliable defense partners with proven production capacity,” Kim noted. “South Korea has earned a reputation for delivering cost-effective, U.S.-interoperable systems that are already in service with key Western allies.” The Royal Canadian Navy already conducts joint maritime exercises with the ROK Navy through Operation HORIZON and Operation NEON, while also operating together in multinational maneuvers such as RIMPAC and PACIFIC VANGUARD. If Canada were to procure South Korean-built submarines, both navies would share advanced underwater technologies for decades — a move expected to significantly strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and interoperability in the Pacific. 2026-01-27 09:35:14
  • Team Korea in Canada under watch as Koreas defense manufacturing moves to global center
    Team Korea in Canada under watch as Korea's defense manufacturing moves to global center SEOUL, January 26 (AJP) -As countries accelerate rearmament amid a more inward-looking U.S. security posture, South Korea’s defense manufacturing capacity has moved to the center of global procurement — a shift underscored by Seoul’s decision to dispatch a high-level delegation to Canada to back a $44 billion submarine bid. Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon-sik departed for Canada on Monday, leading a delegation that includes Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and Defense Acquisition Program Administration head Lee Yong-cheol. The visit is aimed at supporting Seoul’s bid for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), estimated at around 60 trillion won ($44 billion). Joining the delegation are Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun and Hanwha Group Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan — a lineup that underscores how seriously Seoul views the opportunity and highlights the growing role of state-industry coordination in major defense contracts. Before boarding his flight at Incheon International Airport, Kang told reporters the competition has narrowed to two contenders — South Korea and Germany. “Germany is a global manufacturing powerhouse in automation and advanced chemical engineering,” Kang said, adding that “given how South Korea inherited core submarine technologies from Germany in our early development stages, the situation will not be easy.” Germany, which recently lost Poland’s submarine tender, is said to be approaching the Canadian competition with exceptional intensity. Nevertheless, Kang emphasized the scale of the project and its implications for South Korea’s industrial base. “This is the largest defense procurement project currently underway internationally,” he said. “If we win, the domestic production ripple effect alone would exceed 40 trillion won, creating more than 20,000 jobs and securing work for over 300 partner companies.” Manufacturing capacity meets strategic demand The CPSP has emerged as a test case for how defense procurement is evolving globally. Canada is seeking up to 12 diesel-electric submarines of roughly 3,000 tons, along with decades of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). Ottawa is also reportedly requiring part of the project to be carried out at a new local shipyard, while allowing initial units to be built in the contractor’s home country. Such conditions favor suppliers with large-scale manufacturing capacity and the ability to integrate local production and long-term sustainment — areas where Korea has increasingly differentiated itself. Global demand for weapons has surged as allies face pressure to rebuild inventories as the United States urges partners to shoulder more of their own defense burden under an America-First security policy. In Europe, rearmament has accelerated, but fragmented industrial structures and capacity bottlenecks have limited supply. Korea’s ability to produce and deliver complex systems at scale has elevated its standing from a fast-growing exporter to a core manufacturing hub in the global defense market. Historical ties and diplomatic signaling On Sunday, the eve of his departure, Kang paid tribute to Canadian soldiers who fought in the Korean War at the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul. He laid a wreath at the monument honoring Canada’s fallen and observed a moment of silence. Though Korea and Canada are not formal military allies, the two countries have expanded security cooperation under their “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” Last October, Seoul hosted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, and the two governments signed a Military Information Security Agreement, laying the groundwork for deeper defense industrial collaboration. A bid shaped by geopolitics Experts say the CPSP has become more than a procurement contest, reflecting broader shifts in the global security architecture. “Canada–South Korea relations have long been strong,” said Daniel Béland, professor of political science at McGill University. “More than 500 Canadians died during the Korean War defending the South against the North’s aggression, and since then, Canada has played a direct role in the UN Command.” Béland said ties have deepened since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1960. “Economic and strategic ties have increased since the advent of the CKFTA trade agreement a decade ago,” he said. “Given the current geopolitical and trade uncertainties created by the second Trump administration, we’re likely to see even stronger security and economic ties between our two countries — in line with the multilateral collaborative strategy outlined by Prime Minister Carney in his recent Davos speech.” He added that “the very fact that a South Korean company was shortlisted for the CPSP has already brought the two countries closer together,” and that a win by the KSS-III design would deepen cooperation across both economic and security fields. Canada’s recalibration and Europe’s signal Patrick Lennox, a Canadian politician from the ruling Liberal Party, described the submarine project as central to Ottawa’s push to strengthen maritime capabilities and diversify partnerships. “Canada’s participation in the Korean conflict hearkens back to a time when our foreign policy could leverage multilateral institutions like the UN to attempt to constrain and moderate American decisions,” Lennox said. “With those days squarely behind us, we are seeking to diversify and strengthen our global partnerships and rebuild our military capability.” He called the CPSP “a key feature of this generational investment,” linking it to Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy. “Canada is looking to open new opportunities for security cooperation and to strengthen stability on the Korean Peninsula,” Lennox said. “At a strategic level, geopolitical imperatives are pushing our two democratic nations closer together as we work towards enhancing middle power alliances and strategic partnerships in the face of unconstrained great power politics.” Beyond submarines Trade officials say Canada has asked both South Korea and Germany for broader industrial commitments as part of offset negotiations, with Ottawa favoring local investments and supply-chain integration. Kang’s entourage is therefore expected to pursue parallel discussions on industrial cooperation. Hyundai’s Chung and Hanwha’s Kim are reportedly exploring local partnerships aligned with Canada’s manufacturing and climate priorities. Public diplomacy is also part of the visit. Seoul plans cultural and commemorative events highlighting historic ties, including a memorial marking 70 years since the death of Oliver R. Avison, a Canadian medical missionary and founder of Severance Hospital. A musical dramatizing the work of early Canadian missionaries in Korea is scheduled to coincide with the delegation’s stay. 2026-01-26 16:13:20