Journalist

Lee Jung-woo and Yoo Na-hyun
  • How the Iran conflict is building into Asias economic crisis
    How the Iran conflict is building into Asia's economic crisis SEOUL, May 02 (AJP) - The U.S. congressional deadline to end an unauthorized combat operation has closed in, but President Donald Trump remains unmoved. In letters sent Friday to House Speaker Mike Johnson and Senate president pro tempore Chuck Grassley, Trump reiterated his administration's position that a cease-fire declared on April 7 had stopped the clock on the war — and that "Operation Economic Fury" is still squeezing Iran toward implosion through a naval blockade that has turned the Strait of Hormuz into a chokepoint for Iran's only meaningful export. Iran has not blinked. Brent crude is hovering near $120 a barrel — double its price at the end of December. Under the 1973 War Powers Resolution, presidents must end unauthorized combat operations after 60 days without congressional authorization, with a single 30-day extension permitted only to withdraw troops safely, not to extend fighting. The Trump administration's cease-fire argument remains legally contested. But for Asia's factories, central banks and households, the debate in Washington is almost beside the point. The economic war is already spreading. The toll falls hardest on a region structurally dependent on energy it does not produce. South Korea, Japan, China, India and most of Southeast Asia are not merely consumers of Middle Eastern oil and gas — they are processors. Energy becomes semiconductors, ships, steel, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, electricity and the logistics infrastructure that binds global supply chains together. When prices rise, the effect moves far beyond the pump. The Asian Development Bank has cut its Asia-Pacific growth forecast for this year from 5.1% to 4.7% and raised its 2026 inflation forecast from 3.6% to 5.2%. The World Bank projects energy prices will surge 24% this year — the highest since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations Development Programme estimates the escalation could cost the region between $97 billion and $299 billion in lost output and push 8.8 million people into poverty. The inflation trajectory is the most immediately dangerous variable. A jump of that magnitude narrows central banks' room to support growth, raises debt-servicing burdens and forces governments to choose between protecting households and protecting public finances — a choice that, made badly, converts a price shock into a fiscal crisis. The region has absorbed energy shocks before. The oil crises of the 1970s reshaped industrial policy across Asia. The Gulf War jolted prices. Russia's invasion of Ukraine accelerated the renegotiation of liquefied natural gas contracts and strategic reserves. But each of those shocks arrived when the underlying conditions were more forgiving. This one has landed when Asia is already carrying high debt, elevated interest rates, post-pandemic fiscal pressure and slowing trade. What makes the current disruption structurally distinct is where it hits. Asian production networks are optimized for efficiency, not redundancy. More than half of the naphtha entering Asia by sea passes through the Middle East, feeding the petrochemical plants that supply plastics, fertilizers and pharmaceutical inputs across the region. Disruption at the Strait of Hormuz does not merely raise prices — it introduces uncertainty into systems built on precision timing. Uncertainty, in turn, is poison for capital expenditure and procurement planning. The Gulf is also a fertilizer artery, not just an energy one. Natural gas underpins the production of nitrogen fertilizer, and the region is a significant exporter of both. The United Nations has warned that as much as 45% of the world's seeds and fertilizers depend on Strait of Hormuz access. A prolonged disruption threatens not only current food prices but next year's harvests — a lagged catastrophe that will register in malnutrition and agricultural output long after the guns stop. The UNDP's most alarming scenario — six weeks of major supply disruption followed by eight months of elevated costs — would push 32.5 million people globally below the poverty line. In development economics, that is a projection. In human terms, it means children eating less, farmers planting less, clinics rationing power and households liquidating assets to survive a shock they had no hand in creating. G. Kent Fellows, an economist at the University of Calgary, notes that global crude inventories are "running down quickly" and that prices are likely to keep rising until supply and demand rebalance. Even if the Strait reopens, he cautions, prices will remain elevated while production capacity is rebuilt and inventories restocked. The short-term pressure has already begun reshaping trade relationships: Canada recently eliminated its 3% crude tariff on exports to South Korea, an early signal of the supply diversification that importing economies will pursue regardless of how the conflict ends. Aidan Hollis, also of Calgary, sees a longer-term demand reversal in the making. "While oil prices are elevated today," he says, "the long-term impact on oil prices is clearly negative: there will be massive destruction of demand for oil and natural gas as consumers and industry look for alternative sources of energy, including especially solar and wind.” Higher petrol prices, Fellows adds, will accelerate electric vehicle adoption — a structural shift that was already underway. For Zhiyuan Li, an economist at Fudan University, the deepest consequence of the war may be perceptual rather than material. "Trade, finance, energy, technology and logistics are no longer viewed simply as channels of efficiency and growth," he says. "They are increasingly viewed through the lens of security, vulnerability and strategic leverage." The danger, Li argues, is that governments draw the wrong lesson — that interdependence itself is the problem. His research suggests the opposite: greater bilateral trade raises the cost of military confrontation and can reduce both the likelihood and severity of interstate conflict. "Trade can be weaponized, but trade can also pacify," he says. "The task is not to abandon globalization, but to rebuild a global trade system that protects countries from coercion while preserving the peace-enhancing effects of economic exchange." The fiscal reckoning for governments is already taking shape. Policymakers face three basic choices: let prices pass through to consumers and absorb the political cost; subsidize broadly, cushioning households while straining budgets; or provide targeted, temporary support — economically superior but administratively demanding. The UNDP estimates that protecting the most vulnerable households across developing countries would cost roughly $6 billion, modest against the scale of potential output loss, but requiring coordination that stretched aid systems may struggle to deliver. The more durable fiscal risk is that governments repeat the errors of past shocks: universal fuel subsidies that create constituencies too politically entrenched to dismantle, emergency measures that become permanent, health and education spending quietly cut to fund price support. For high-debt developing economies, that path transforms a short-term energy crisis into a long-term development setback. The Iran war is a demonstration that modern conflict does not respect the boundaries of the battlefield. Missiles fall in the Middle East; the economic blast radius reaches South Korean petrochemical plants, Indian fertilizer importers, Thai factories and Myanmar fuel queues — and a poverty projection that will show up in educational attainment and labor productivity a decade from now. Asia-Pacific's integration into global energy and trade networks made it the engine of world growth. That same integration now makes it acutely vulnerable to a war on the other side of the world. The Trump administration may yet claim the clock has stopped. But the economic consequences are still moving. 2026-05-03 07:32:29
  • Asian stocks fall across the board as oil prices surge
    Asian stocks fall across the board as oil prices surge SEOUL, April 30 (AJP) - South Korea's benchmark KOSPI fell 1.38 percent to close at 6,598.87 on Thursday as rising oil prices dragged Asian markets lower. Brent crude futures jumped more than 5 percent in Asian trading, pushing regional stocks down over 1 percent. The junior KOSDAQ also dropped, closing at 1,192.35, down 2.29 percent. The main index rose to as high as 6,750.27 during the intraday session, setting a new intraday record. However, it later fluctuated and declined, falling below the 6,600 level. It ended lower for the first time in four days. The index briefly hit a new intraday high of 6,750.27 before falling back to close below 6,600, ending its upward streak for the first time in four days. Most major stocks fell. Samsung Electronics closed at 220,500 won (about $149.60), down 2.43 percent, while SK Hynix ended at 1,286,000 won, down 0.54 percent. Hyundai Motor fell 4.5 percent to 531,000 won, LG Energy Solution dropped 2.64 percent to 460,500 won, and Doosan Enerbility declined 1.63 percent to 127,100 won. Among entertainment stocks, HYBE rose more than 4 percent, while other companies declined. HYBE closed at 263,000 won, up 4.16 percent. JYP fell 2.48 percent to 62,900 won, SM dropped 0.92 percent to 96,600 won, and YG declined 1.82 percent to 54,000 won. Japan's Nikkei 225 stood at 59,111.55 as of 3:40 p.m., down 1.35 percent. Hong Kong's Hang Seng fell 1.19 percent to 25,800.75. 2026-04-30 17:46:09
  • Chinas maritime push emboldens, raising strategic stakes in Korean waters
    China's maritime push emboldens, raising strategic stakes in Korean waters SEOUL, April 29 (AJP) - China’s naval activity across Asian waters — including areas off the Korean Peninsula — has surged markedly, according to data obtained by a South Korean lawmaker, raising questions over the intent behind the sudden uptick. Chinese aircraft carriers entered waters under South Korean jurisdiction eight times in 2025, the highest annual figure since the Joint Chiefs of Staff began compiling such data in 2020, the office of People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon said Wednesday. Warship movements showed a similar trajectory. Chinese naval vessels entered South Korean jurisdiction roughly 350 times in 2025, up from about 330 the previous year. Military aircraft also increased their presence, entering South Korea’s air defense identification zone more than 100 times, compared with over 90 in 2024. Carrier activity has steadily built over time: two entries in 2020, seven in 2022, five in 2023, six in 2024 and eight in 2025. The momentum has carried into this year. In the first quarter alone, a Chinese naval vessel approached within about 50 kilometers of South Korea’s territorial waters off the Taean Peninsula — roughly 140 kilometers from Seosan Air Base and about 180 kilometers from U.S. installations at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys. While remaining outside territorial waters, such proximity allows Chinese vessels to potentially collect radar, communications and other electronic signals linked to South Korean and U.S. military operations. The area sits near key approaches to Seoul, major air bases and critical U.S. facilities central to any contingency involving North Korea or Taiwan. Officials across South Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia say the pattern is forcing closer surveillance of Chinese ships and aircraft, even when encounters stop short of direct violations. In Seoul, concerns are growing that Beijing is seeking to normalize its presence in nearby waters while extending its naval reach deeper into the Pacific. The buildup coincides with China’s expansion of its carrier fleet, enhanced amphibious capabilities and more assertive claims in contested seas. China, for its part, maintains that its maritime operations are lawful and defensive, frequently accusing the United States and its allies of heightening tensions through increased military cooperation near its coastline. To governments from Seoul to Tokyo to Manila, however, the pattern increasingly resembles not routine patrols but the emergence of a new maritime order in Asia. South Korea defines “jurisdictional waters” as areas where it exercises sovereignty or sovereign rights, including territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. While international law permits foreign warships to transit EEZs, the South Korean military tracks such movements closely and deploys patrol assets when vessels approach sensitive zones. The Yellow Sea has long been strategically sensitive, given Chinese naval and missile facilities positioned along its coastline facing the Korean Peninsula. Han Ki-ho, a member of the National Defense Committee and a former army lieutenant general, said the growing activity should be viewed within a broader strategic context. China’s effort to expand its control in the Yellow Sea “should not be viewed narrowly as targeting South Korea alone,” Han said. “We must be firm in protecting our maritime sovereignty in the West Sea,” he added. Ksenia Kirkham, a scholar at King’s College London, offered a more cautious interpretation. "China’s increased naval activities in the South China Sea and in the West Sea, near the borders of South Korea, although perceived by South Korea as ‘aggressive’ and as being contrary to international law, should not be understood as aggression against Seoul itself, but rather as a response to what China interprets as provocative US military build-up in the region," she said. She added that Seoul should handle any breaches of airspace or territorial waters through diplomatic channels while maintaining stable relations with Beijing and avoiding entanglement in escalating great-power rivalry. Her assessment underscores a deeper dilemma for South Korea. China remains a key trading partner, creating strong incentives to avoid escalation. At the same time, Seoul’s alliance with the United States leaves little room to ignore repeated Chinese military activity near its coast, airspace and critical infrastructure. For policymakers, the immediate challenge lies in distinguishing lawful passage from strategic signaling. A single carrier transit through an EEZ may be legal, but repeated operations — combined with rising warship entries and air incursions — carry broader military and political implications. Experts broadly agree that the trend should not be viewed as a series of isolated incidents but as part of a wider maritime strategy. Sarah Tzinieris of King’s College London said “China’s naval expansion is about shifting from coastal defense to sustained power projection in the Indo-Pacific,” noting that the Chinese military is “designed not just to defend its shores, but rather to shape the strategic environment beyond them.” Central to this effort is control over maritime approaches and sea lanes, reinforced by what she described as an “expansionist dimension,” including land reclamation that has turned reefs into fortified outposts equipped with runways and radar systems. The use of maritime militia and fishing fleets further enables China to operate at scale while maintaining plausible deniability. “China’s naval build-up is not just about capability; it is about changing the rules of the game at sea,” Tzinieris said, with incremental actions — often described as “salami-slicing” — gradually normalizing its presence in contested waters. 2026-04-29 18:02:52
  • FTC recasts Coupang under founder control, testing Korea-US fault lines
    FTC recasts Coupang under founder control, testing Korea-US fault lines SEOUL, April 29 (AJP) -South Korea’s antitrust watchdog on Wednesday designated Bom Kim as the legal head of Coupang, placing the U.S.-listed e-commerce giant under the country’s full conglomerate regulatory regime after a data breach scandal and despite U.S. pressure. The decision by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) reclassifies the group’s “same person” — a legal term denoting ultimate control — from the corporate entity Coupang Inc. to Kim himself. The shift expands disclosure obligations, broadens the scope of affiliates and tightens oversight of intra-group transactions under Korea’s antitrust framework. It marks the first time in nearly four decades that a head of a U.S.-incorporated company is treated as a controlling individual behind a business entity in operation in Korea. “Under current law, a corporate entity can be designated as the ‘same person’ only when there is no risk of private interest, including where relatives of the controlling individual do not participate in the management of domestic affiliates. The government determined that this condition has been breached," observed Kim Hong-yu, a business professor of Kyung Hee University. "Kim’s brother, Kim Yoo-seok, served at a vice president level and exercised influence over key business decisions through involvement in logistics and delivery policy. This was judged to constitute managerial participation rather than passive employment, invalidating the basis for corporate designation,” he added. The company thus far had operated as a regulatory outlier since being classified as a large business group in 2021 after surpassing the 5 trillion won ($3.4 billion) asset threshold, maintaining that its governance — a single ownership chain with no family stakes in domestic affiliates — did not fit the traditional chaebol model. The FTC’s decision effectively rejects that distinction, applying a framework designed for family-controlled conglomerates to a platform company with dispersed global ownership. The FTC said Coupang no longer met the conditions for corporate designation, citing findings that Kim’s younger brother, a senior executive, exercised substantive influence over key operations, including logistics and delivery policy — effectively participating in management. Under Korean law, once a natural person is designated as the same person, regulatory oversight extends beyond formal ownership to include relatives and related entities. Kim must now submit annual filings detailing family shareholdings and governance structures, while transactions involving related parties will face closer scrutiny under rules aimed at preventing private benefit and unfair intra-group support. For Coupang, the compliance could have structural ramifications, which explains why it is legally challenging the Seoul move. Lee Seong-yeob, a professor at Korea University’s Graduate School of Management of Technology, said the change could be a turning point. “Coupang’s move from a large business group without a designated controlling person to a regular conglomerate group led by Bom Kim means it will now face chaebol-style regulations, including disclosure obligations and restrictions on self-dealing,” he pointed out. “It is significant because it enhances management transparency at a platform company and imposes direct legal responsibilities and obligations on the controlling individual.” Coupang said it will file an administrative suit, arguing the designation amounts to duplicative oversight for a firm already subject to strict disclosure rules as a U.S.-listed company. “As a U.S.-listed company, we are under stringent oversight obligations,” the company said, adding that neither Kim nor his relatives hold equity in Korean affiliates and that its structure leaves “no concern about improper private interest.” The legal dispute is expected to hinge on whether operational influence — absent ownership — constitutes control under Korean law. The latest FTC ruling comes against a backdrop of intensifying scrutiny of Coupang’s business practices and political reach. A major personal data breach last year triggered regulatory investigations and public backlash in South Korea, sharpening concerns over platform accountability as the company has become embedded in daily life for millions of users. Coupang, incorporated in Delaware and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, occupies a hybrid position: legally American, financially global, but operationally Korean, with more than 90 percent of its revenue generated in South Korea. Coupang reported revenue of about 45.5 trillion won last year, with operating profit rising to 2.28 trillion won and net profit to 1.58 trillion won. It also transferred roughly 1.46 trillion won to its U.S. parent, a move the company described as capital allocation rather than profit extraction, but which drew criticism in South Korea as most earnings are generated domestically. The Coupang issue has loomed largely over Korea-U.S. relations, partly as the result of aggressive lobbying. Coupang significantly expanded its lobbying efforts in Washington. Disclosures show the company nearly doubled its U.S. lobbying spending in early 2026 to about $1.8 million, widening engagement beyond trade agencies to include senior government offices such as the White House and National Security Council as regulatory pressure mounted in Korea. U.S. policymakers have already raised concerns over Seoul’s treatment of the company, viewing investigations — including those tied to the data breach — as potentially unfavorable to American firms. In recent weeks, U.S. lawmakers have urged the Korean government to avoid what they described as discriminatory regulatory actions. 2026-04-29 14:05:06
  • Chernobyl at 40: Nuclear Power Recast as a Strategic Asset Amid Energy and AI Demand
    Chernobyl at 40: Nuclear Power Recast as a Strategic Asset Amid Energy and AI Demand On April 26, 1986, the explosion of Unit 4 at the Soviet-era Chernobyl nuclear plant was more than an environmental disaster. The radioactive cloud darkened not only Europe’s soil but also public trust in nuclear power for a generation. In 2026, as the disaster reaches its 40th anniversary, the world is paradoxically turning back toward nuclear energy. Geopolitical instability in the Middle East continues to rattle energy markets, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed Europe’s energy-security vulnerabilities. At the same time, surging electricity demand tied to the artificial intelligence boom and the urgency of the climate crisis are driving a reassessment of nuclear power — from a symbol of fear to a strategic asset. “Chernobyl was an outlier” — engineers weigh what has changed For decades, Chernobyl served as the ultimate warning for opponents of nuclear power. More recently, expert debate has shifted from broad claims that “nuclear is dangerous” to closer analysis of which reactor designs are risky and under what conditions. Jacopo Buongiorno, a professor of nuclear engineering at MIT, described Chernobyl as “an outlier” caused by a flawed RBMK design without a containment structure and reckless actions. Sarah A. Pozzi, a University of Michigan professor and president of the IEEE Nuclear and Plasma Sciences Society, said no modern reactor approved under Western regulatory systems includes all of the defects present at the time. Some experts also point to changes in reactor physics. Steven Lyman, a University of Michigan professor, cited the Soviet graphite-moderated RBMK design as central to the Chernobyl disaster. He said modern water-moderated reactors cannot experience a Chernobyl-style meltdown, describing a physical safety mechanism in which overheating causes water coolant to boil off and naturally slows the nuclear reaction. Lyman added that, as the Fukushima accident showed, the principle does not eliminate risk but can reduce the severity of an accident. He said nuclear power matters as “scalable clean baseload power,” but high upfront costs remain the biggest obstacle. If small modular reactors, or SMRs, can bring initial costs down to a manageable level, he said, that barrier could be overcome. Nuclear’s return in numbers: “An answer for energy security” Nuclear power currently supplies about 10% of global electricity and about 25% of low-carbon power. More than 400 reactors are operating in 31 countries, and about 70 more are under construction. The United States, the world’s largest nuclear-power nation, operates 94 reactors and plans to quadruple capacity by 2050. Thomas DiNanno, a U.S. State Department deputy assistant secretary, recently said, “The world cannot power industry, meet AI demand, or secure its energy future without nuclear power.” China is building about 40 reactors, signaling it could surpass the United States. Even Germany, long a symbol of anti-nuclear sentiment, is showing signs of reconsideration. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, referring to the past rise in reliance on fossil fuels, acknowledged that turning away from nuclear power was a “strategic mistake.” Warnings remain: “System complexity and human error” Not all experts share the optimism. R. Scott Kemp, director of MIT’s Nuclear Security and Policy Program, urged caution, noting that nuclear safety is based in large part on simulation models. “In a complex system like a reactor, it is difficult to fully predict every interaction,” he said. Kemp emphasized that human misjudgment has played a role in major accidents and warned that “a Chernobyl-type accident is absolutely possible even today.” Even if modern plants are safer, he said, unexpected accidents cannot be ruled out if human understanding of the system is incomplete. A new front: SMRs and South Korea’s challenge The next battleground in the nuclear market is SMRs. The factory-built, on-site “plug-and-play” approach promises lower costs and faster deployment. But the BBC and other foreign media have cautioned that SMRs’ commercial viability has not yet been fully proven. That is where South Korea is drawing attention. The country has a top-tier supply chain capable of building standardized reactors such as the APR-1400 on budget and on schedule. But domestic conditions are complicated, with lingering fears after Fukushima, local opposition known as NIMBY sentiment, and policy uncertainty still weighing on the sector. Experts including Lee Jeong-ik, a professor at KAIST, have said South Korea’s 12th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand still falls short of delivering a full revival of the nuclear industry. Forty years after Chernobyl, the international order around nuclear power has shifted. Nuclear energy is increasingly framed not as an automatic object of fear, but as a practical option tied to survival. With climate pressures, energy security and AI-driven electricity demand converging in 2026, the question being asked is no longer whether societies can afford to live with nuclear power, but whether they can afford to live without it. 2026-04-29 11:37:29
  • Digital flashpoint: Koreas network fee concept draws renewed U.S. scrutiny
    Digital flashpoint: Korea's network fee concept draws renewed U.S. scrutiny SEOUL, April 28 (AJP) - A long-simmering domestic dispute over "network usage fees" has now boiled over into a major diplomatic friction point, as Washington ramps up pressure on Seoul to drop proposed legislation that would force U.S. tech giants to pay for data traffic. The rhetoric from Washington reached a new peak this week. In a blunt post on X, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) labeled South Korea’s mooted network fee policy as one of the "Craziest Foreign Trade Barriers Facing American Exporters." The USTR’s 2026 National Trade Estimate Report, released March 31, categorized the issue as a significant service trade barrier. "No country in the world imposes network usage fees on the transmission of internet traffic... Except Korea," the agency wrote, grouping the fees with other "digital concerns" like platform regulation and location-data export restrictions. As video streaming, cloud computing, and AI drive data consumption to record highs, the fundamental question is: Should the "senders" pay the ISPs? Local giants SK Telecom, KT, and LG Uplus argue that foreign "Big Tech" firms like YouTube and Netflix are free-riders. They claim these platforms profit from South Korea’s world-class infrastructure without contributing to its maintenance. "It is unfair that Korean companies are being discriminated against," says Choi Min-hee, chair of the National Assembly’s Science and ICT Committee. Google, Meta, and Netflix argue that users already pay for internet access. Charging content providers for the same data constitutes "double billing" and violates net neutrality—the principle that ISPs should not discriminate against traffic based on volume or type. While South Korea has not yet passed a direct statutory fee, the National Assembly has seen a flurry of bills since 2021 aimed at mandating these payments. Kim Jeong-won, a former senior digital policy official, notes that while no law exists yet, "Korea is one of the countries closest to legislating such measures." This "closeness" has triggered the USTR’s preemptive strike, as the U.S. fears these fees would benefit Korean competitors and further entrench the local telecom oligopoly. While South Korean experts like Choi Won-mog of Ewha Womans University point out that Europe, Brazil, and India have debated similar "fair contribution" models, the global tide seems to be turning against the fees: The EU recently confirmed it would not adopt mandatory network fees, and Brazil dropped its network fee approach in 2024.This leaves South Korea increasingly isolated in its pursuit of a legislative solution. The timing of the USTR’s pressure is not accidental. The network fee dispute is being folded into a broader trade narrative involving Section 301 investigations and the Trump administration’s focus on the trade deficit. For Washington, digital services are a rare bright spot in the balance sheet. Protecting that surplus is a priority, especially following President Lee Jae Myung’s pledge to invest $350 billion in the United States—a commitment Washington views as a baseline for cooperation, not a free pass for digital regulation. The 2023 resolution of the legal battle between SK Broadband and Netflix—which ended in a "strategic partnership" rather than a court-mandated fee—may offer a blueprint for the future. "A practical solution would be to resolve this issue through agreements between the companies involved," suggests Kim Jeong-won. However, as the rhetoric from both capitals sharpens, the "invisible walls" of the internet may become the next major hurdle in the K-U.S. alliance. 2026-04-28 18:04:24
  • Forty years after Chernobyl and nuclear power is back in vogue
    Forty years after Chernobyl and nuclear power is back in vogue SEOUL, April 27 (AJP) - Forty years ago today, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant became a global epitaph for technological hubris. The radioactive clouds that drifted across Europe did more than contaminate soil; they poisoned the public's trust in the atom for a generation. In a historical paradox, the very anniversary of the disaster finds the world—and South Korea included—sprinting back toward nuclear energy with newfound urgency. The shift is being driven by today's "perfect storm": a volatile Middle East destabilizing energy markets, the relentless power hunger of the AI revolution, and the unforgiving clock of the climate crisis. For decades, Chernobyl stood as the ultimate cautionary tale. However, the narrative among experts has shifted from categorical fear to forensic distinction. "Chernobyl was a bizarre event stemming from reckless behavior and a flawed RBMK design that lacked a containment structure," says Jacopo Buongiorno, professor of nuclear science at MIT. Modern engineering has effectively "designed out" the vulnerabilities of the past. Today’s Western-standard reactors, such as the AP1000 or South Korea’s APR-1400, utilize passive safety systems—mechanisms that rely on the laws of physics, like gravity and natural convection, to cool a core without human intervention or external power. “No modern reactor approved under a Western regulatory framework combines those characteristics,” said Sara A. Pozzi, professor of nuclear engineering and radiological sciences at the University of Michigan and president of the IEEE Nuclear and Plasma Sciences Society. Nuclear energy is now undergoing a broad reassessment, driven by converging pressures: climate change, energy security, and surging electricity demand from artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure. It already covers roughly 10 percent of global electricity and about a quarter of all low-carbon power. More than 400 nuclear reactors are in operation across 31 countries, with about 70 more under construction. The United States remains the largest producer, operating 94 reactors and aiming to quadruple nuclear capacity by 2050. China, meanwhile, is rapidly expanding, with nearly 40 reactors under construction and ambitions to surpass the U.S. “The world cannot power its industries, meet the demands of artificial intelligence or secure its energy future without nuclear power,” U.S. Undersecretary of State Thomas DiNanno said recently. Even Europe, once the epicenter of anti-nuclear sentiment, is shifting its stance. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has acknowledged that turning away from nuclear energy was a “strategic mistake,” citing the continent’s growing dependence on imported fossil fuels. Geopolitical shocks have accelerated the shift. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed Europe’s energy vulnerabilities, while Middle East tensions have underscored the fragility of global supply chains. Ukraine itself still relies on nuclear power for roughly half its electricity—even during wartime. In this environment, nuclear energy is no longer viewed solely as a climate solution, but increasingly as a strategic asset. “Nuclear power is among the safest and cleanest power options,” said Daniel Hoornweg, faculty member in engineering and applied science at Ontario Tech University. “Yes, they are safe—historical accidents cannot happen,” Pavel Tsvetkov of Texas A&M University also assured. But the drawbacks are equally clear: high upfront costs, long construction timelines, regulatory hurdles and persistent public skepticism. Waste management and proliferation concerns remain unresolved, complicating expansion. “The challenges with Fukushima and TMI are largely about public perception,” Hoornweg added. At the forefront of the next phase are small modular reactors (SMRs), which promise lower costs, faster deployment and greater flexibility. Yet their commercial viability remains uncertain. While pilot projects are underway, particularly in Canada, their economics are still unproven. “They may remain a niche solution,” Hoornweg added. “SMRs are not commercially available yet,” Buongiorno agreed. South Korea remains a titan in the nuclear sector, boasting a robust supply chain and the rare ability to build reactors on time and within budget. However, the domestic path is fraught with political and social friction. While the current administration has signaled support, domestic experts like Lee Jeong-ik of KAIST argue that policy has yet to fully revitalize the industry. The 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand remains a point of contention, with critics arguing it lacks the aggressive expansion needed for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)—the factory-built, "plug-and-play" future of the industry, he pointed out. The massive upfront costs and the perennial "NIMBY" (Not In My Backyard) sentiment also pose setback. For Koreans, the memories of the 2011 Fukushima meltdown remain vivid, even as the "inconvenience" of energy price hikes pushes the public toward pragmatic acceptance. As the world marks four decades since the tragedy in Ukraine, the atom has undergone a profound rebranding. It is no longer just a source of fear, but a source of possibility. The question for 2026 is no longer whether we can afford to live with nuclear power, but whether we can afford to live without it. 2026-04-27 18:08:47
  • Coupang overstretches into security front, stirring Korea-U.S. friction
    Coupang overstretches into security front, stirring Korea-U.S. friction SEOUL, April 24 (AJP) - In a rare and uneasy convergence, a retail dispute has spilled into the security domain between Seoul and Washington, underscoring the growing political reach of Coupang, a New York-listed retailer whose business is almost entirely rooted in South Korea. According to lobbying disclosure reports filed with the U.S. Congress, Coupang spent a combined $1.785 million in the first quarter of 2026 – nearly doubled from $895,000 in the previous quarter - as political and legal scrutiny mounted for a massive data leak in Korea last November. The filings show that Coupang not only boosted its in-house lobbying to $1.09 million, but also expanded its roster of external firms, adding Ballard Partners, Crossroads Strategies and Williams & Jensen to existing partners including Miller Strategies, Continental Strategy and Monument Advocacy. While the disclosed amount reflects only direct lobbying activities required under U.S. law, it excludes broader advisory and strategic consulting fees, suggesting total spending may be significantly higher. The scope of engagement has also widened. In late 2025, Coupang’s lobbying focused largely on trade-related agencies such as the Commerce Department, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the State Department. By early 2026, outreach had expanded to include the White House, the Office of the Vice President and even the National Security Council, indicating that discussions may have entered security-sensitive territory. The involvement of high-profile lobbyists with deep ties to U.S. policymakers — including figures connected to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and former White House advisory teams — underscores the strategic nature of the campaign. Its efforts appear to have paid off. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance reportedly raised concerns about Coupang during a January meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, while Rubio has also referenced the company in discussions with Korean officials. The issue further blew over this week when 54 Republican lawmakers affiliated with the Republican Study Committee sent a letter to South Korea’s ambassador in Washington, urging Seoul to halt what they described as “discriminatory regulations” against U.S. firms — explicitly naming Coupang alongside Apple Inc., Alphabet Inc.’s Google and Meta Platforms Inc.. According to people familiar with the matter, U.S. officials have also conveyed concerns through diplomatic channels about potential legal actions against Coupang Chairman Bom Kim, warning such moves could complicate high-level security consultations between the allies. Underscoring the elevation of the agenda, South Korea’s National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac acknowledged the spillover effect during an overseas briefing while accompanying the president in Vietnam. “This is fundamentally a corporate issue, but it is true that it is influencing security consultations between South Korea and the United States,” Wi said. “We do not believe it is desirable for corporate matters and security negotiations to become linked.” He added that delays in security talks are already occurring and warned that prolonged disruptions could harm the alliance. At home, the response has been more forceful. National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik described the U.S. lawmakers’ letter as “a clear interference in domestic affairs,” stressing that companies operating in Korea must comply with Korean law. “There have been large-scale personal data leaks and allegations of algorithm manipulation. These are clear violations of current law,” Woo said. The company denied any wrongdoing and dismissed claims that its lobbying extends into security issues as “categorically false,” stating its activities focus on economic cooperation, trade expansion and technology partnerships, including artificial intelligence initiatives. It also emphasized that its lobbying expenditures remain modest compared with other major U.S. and Korean corporations. Founded in 2010 by Bom Kim, Coupang has grown into South Korea’s largest e-commerce platform, often compared to Amazon for its logistics-driven model and rapid delivery services. Headquartered in Seattle, incorporated in Delaware and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it occupies an ambiguous identity — structurally American, operationally Korean. Its rapid growth has been accompanied by controversy. The company has faced criticism over industrial safety conditions in its logistics network, with several worker deaths linked by labor groups to harsh working conditions. It has also been embroiled in a major personal data breach that intensified regulatory scrutiny, alongside allegations of algorithm manipulation to favor its own products — claims the company denies. The dispute may ultimately move into the courts, with lawmakers exploring legal options including class action mechanisms. “We are reviewing class action legislation,” said Kim Yong-min of the Democratic Party of Korea, noting that such systems are already well established in the United States. Meanwhile, Lee Un-ju, a member of the party’s Supreme Council, pointed to a fundamental perception gap in Washington. “In the United States, people tend to think of Coupang simply as an American company,” she said. “They don’t realize that most of its revenue is generated in Korea, and that the majority of victims in the personal data breach are also in Korea.” Lee said she conveyed this view directly to U.S. policymakers during a recent visit, emphasizing that understanding Coupang’s operational reality is key to evaluating the dispute. “It is very important to recognize that Coupang is, in effect, a Korean company,” she said. 2026-04-24 16:37:51
  • Seoul pushes for wartime command transfer as U.S. urges caution on timeline
    Seoul pushes for wartime command transfer as U.S. urges caution on timeline SEOUL, April 23 (AJP) - A long-simmering question at the heart of the U.S.–South Korea alliance is once again coming into sharper focus: when — and under what conditions — should Seoul take full wartime command of its own and U.S. military forces on the peninsula? Behind the scenes, officials in Seoul and Washington are quietly diverging over the timeline for transferring wartime operational control, or OPCON, with South Korea favoring an earlier date and U.S. military leaders urging a slower, conditions-based approach. Timeline divides the allies South Korean officials have been working toward completing the transition before 2028, aligning with President Lee Jae Myung’s term in office. But recent comments by Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, suggest Washington may be working on a different timeline. “Political expediency must not outpace the conditions,” Gen. Brunson said in congressional testimony on Tuesday (local time), cautioning against setting deadlines that could compromise readiness. According to defense officials familiar with the discussions, the U.S. military has been working internally toward a target closer to early 2029 — a timeline not fully coordinated with Seoul. A South Korean government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged the gap. “We are not fundamentally apart on the goal,” the official said. “But there is clearly a difference in how fast we believe we can get there.” Political pressure vs. military conditions Operational control of South Korean troops was handed over to the U.S.-led U.N. Command during the 1950–53 Korean War and later transferred to the Combined Forces Command in 1978. Peacetime operational control reverted to Seoul in 1994. The OPCON transition would place combined Korea–U.S. forces under the command of a four-star South Korean general in wartime, with a four-star U.S. general serving in a supporting role. At the center of the timing debate is a tension between political preference and military preparedness. Rep. Yoo Yong-won, a senior opposition People Power Party lawmaker on the National Assembly’s Defense Committee, criticized what he described as the prioritization of political considerations. “The government is pushing this too hard because it wants to achieve it within its term,” he said. “That is not desirable. The conditions must come first.” Experts with military and intelligence backgrounds also stressed that the OPCON transfer is fundamentally a structural security issue. Chae Sung-jun, a former National Intelligence Service (NIS) official and now head of the Department of Military Studies at Seokyeong University, said the transition must be approached with caution. “This is not simply about reclaiming authority,” he said. “It is about maintaining deterrence under a new command structure — and that is far more complex.” He added that the issue should be understood in its historical and strategic context. “The debate is not about whether to regain control, but how to integrate wartime command into an alliance structure without weakening deterrence,” he said. Lingering dependence Despite improvements in South Korea’s military capabilities, reliance on U.S. assets remains significant. Yoon Sang-yong, a military studies professor at Seokyeong University, pointed to persistent gaps in intelligence and operational integration. “We are still heavily dependent on U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets,” he said. “These are not capabilities that can be replaced quickly.” He also raised concerns about alliance dynamics after the transfer. “If the command structure changes, there is a legitimate question as to whether the United States will respond with the same level of immediacy and scale in a crisis,” he said. Alliance in transition For Washington, the issue is shaped by long-standing institutional norms. The U.S. military has historically been reluctant to place its personnel under full foreign command — a practice sometimes referred to as the “Pershing Principle.” However, it has granted operational control to foreign commanders in joint-force arrangements during combat. At the same time, American strategy is shifting toward encouraging allies to assume greater responsibility for regional security. This creates a delicate balance: supporting South Korea’s autonomy while ensuring that the alliance’s deterrence posture remains intact. The risk of miscalculation Security experts warn that how the transition is handled could influence North Korea’s strategic calculations. “Command structures send signals,” Chae said. “If the transition is not backed by sufficient capability, it could invite miscalculation.” Others argue that further delays could undermine South Korea’s credibility as a self-reliant military power. A narrow window The coming months will be critical, with working-level consultations expected to intensify ahead of the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington later this year. A senior South Korean defense official, speaking anonymously, emphasized the stakes. “This is ultimately both a military and political decision,” the official said. “But if the balance is wrong, the consequences will be strategic.” 2026-04-23 18:00:39
  • Unregulated Fight Videos Spread Online in South Korea, Reaching Teens
    Unregulated Fight Videos Spread Online in South Korea, Reaching Teens In the 1999 U.S. film “Fight Club,” the first rule is not to talk about it. In today’s South Korean version, that taboo has collapsed. Violence is no longer confined to the shadows; it is filmed, distributed and monetized as content. Fight videos are spreading quickly on social media and streaming platforms such as YouTube and Telegram. Blurring the line between sport and violence, the genre draws millions of views and has become a form of mass entertainment — echoing the voyeuristic consumption of violence depicted in Netflix’s “Squid Game.” At the center is so-called “yacha rule,” an informal fighting format presented as consensual. Promoted as a “raw, real fight,” it has spread rapidly. One video titled “Real fight between construction workers in their 20s #yacharule” has surpassed 12 million views. The footage shows two shirtless men trading punches as a crowd watches, evoking a modern-day coliseum. The name is believed to come from “yacha,” a predatory being in Buddhist folklore. Unlike mixed martial arts or boxing, there is little protective gear and few rules; the main restriction is a ban on eye-gouging. Viewers cite that unfiltered “realism” as the appeal. The market is sizable. Related YouTube channels have logged more than 180 million cumulative views, and individual videos often reach the millions. Given the advertising model, violence itself functions as a revenue stream. The concern is how far it is spilling into everyday life. Some creators, claiming “teaching a lesson,” seek out specific people, fight them and livestream it. More alarming is the spread into teen spaces. One Telegram channel was reported to buy and distribute real assault videos involving minors, paying providers from 5,000 won to 50,000 won. Many clips show victims bleeding or losing consciousness. Viewers are not just observers. Through comments, donations and sharing, they participate, and some videos are paired with gambling ads. A violence-centered “ecosystem” is taking shape. Experts link the trend to human instincts. Rosie Dirt, a professor of psychology at the University of North Carolina, said people are naturally drawn to threat and conflict, and violent stimuli grab attention quickly and hold it. As that “safe danger” experience is reinforced online, she said, people’s sensitivity to violence can dull over time. Social learning also plays a role. Under psychologist Albert Bandura’s theory, if repeated behavior is shown being rewarded, it can come to be seen as normal. The more fights are packaged as happening under “agreed rules,” the more likely viewers are to justify violence, experts say. Dirt said sustained exposure to violent media can lead to desensitization, reduced emotional response and gradual shifts in what people see as socially acceptable aggression. When such content is rewarded with visibility and attention online, she said, imitation or performative violence can increase. The University of North Carolina’s Rosa Lee introduced “socialization effects” — the tendency to become more like one’s group, environment and consumed content — and “selection effects,” in which people with violent tendencies consume more violent content or choose like-minded friends. Lee said when those psychological tendencies combine with social media algorithms, a nontraditional form of socialization can occur, allowing violent content to shape thinking and behavior. She said the interview request reminded her of decadeslong debates over the effects of violent TV shows, films and video games. In 2021, 13-year-old Olly Stephens in the United Kingdom was stabbed to death by peers. He went to a park after being lured by a girl he knew and was ambushed by two boys. The attack was later found to have been planned amid conflict and message exchanges on social media. The British daily The Times said the case was not only a personal tragedy but also an example of rising teen knife crime and the influence of the online environment. It said teen knife-related deaths in the U.K. have risen sharply in recent years, driven in part by social media. The victim’s parents have since campaigned for stronger social media regulation and youth protections, and experts have said online conditions and access to weapons must be addressed together. The Washington Post also analyzed the impact of graphic video on young people after the killing of Charlie Kirk in Utah in September 2025, when footage of his death spread rapidly on social media and reached children and teens. The video circulated quickly on major platforms including TikTok, Instagram and YouTube, and some students shared or watched it at school. Parents said they were shocked their children saw the images without warning. Some teens responded that it was “shocking but important” or “just weird,” raising concerns about desensitization. The Post said the spread was tied to algorithmic systems that prioritize sensational, attention-grabbing content. Platforms tried to remove the video or apply age limits, but altered versions kept appearing, making control difficult. Parental controls also failed to work effectively. Experts called for stronger regulation and urged parents to talk with children and respond actively. Legal judgment is clear, experts say. Seong Jung-tak, a professor at Kyungpook National University Law School, said yacha rule is unlikely to receive a legal pass even if there was “consent.” Assault causing injury is not a crime that can be dropped solely at the victim’s request, he said, meaning investigations and punishment can proceed even if the victim signs an agreement saying they do not want the attacker punished. Seong cited a Supreme Court ruling that when a victim’s consent violates social norms, illegality is not removed. Legal responsibility may extend beyond the fighters. Watching or distributing yacha rule content can also be punished under the Criminal Act, the Information and Communications Network Act and the Juvenile Protection Act. As Rome’s Colosseum showed, violence has long been part of entertainment. But the current shift is different in kind: the boundary between reality and performance is fading, and audiences are moving from passive consumers to active participants. As violence-as-content spreads, calls are growing for debate over how to regulate it — and how to build stronger protections for minors. 2026-04-23 10:52:19