The recent conflict in the Middle East has raised concerns about the potential blockade and toll collection in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting renewed attention from the international community on the strategic significance of this and other straits. Issues related to the Strait of Hormuz are closely linked to other international straits and choke points. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, expanded the territorial sea limit from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. As a result, 116 straits that were previously open for international navigation became part of the territorial waters of coastal states, leading to restrictions on the previously free right of passage. To address this issue and balance the interests of coastal states and user states, the international community introduced the legal concept of transit passage for straits used for international navigation. This guarantees the right for ships, submarines, and aircraft to pass quickly and without interference through relevant straits and their airspace. If the right of transit passage is denied in the Strait of Hormuz and tolls are imposed, it would directly contradict the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and have profoundly negative implications for all international straits worldwide.
In the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which are familiar to us, a significantly larger volume of crude oil and refined oil passes through daily compared to the Strait of Hormuz. The volume of general cargo is also vastly greater than that of Hormuz. Over 30% of South Korea's import and export cargo and about 90% of its crude oil imports transit through these straits. Moreover, the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 39 kilometers wide, while the narrowest point of the Singapore Strait is only about 3.7 kilometers, making the Malacca/Singapore Straits strategically more sensitive. Recently, Indonesia's finance minister suggested imposing tolls in the Malacca Strait, but this proposal was withdrawn due to backlash from coastal states Malaysia and Singapore, as well as negative domestic reactions. However, if the maritime order in the Strait of Hormuz fundamentally changes, there is no guarantee that their stance will remain unchanged.
The Taiwan Strait, through which over 45% of our import and export cargo and more than 85% of our crude oil imports pass, is another critical choke point. Although its narrowest point is about 130 kilometers wide, it is a heavily trafficked route, with approximately half of the world's container ships passing through it. If tensions between China and Taiwan escalate or if military conflict erupts, the impact on both the South Korean economy and the global economy would be unimaginable.
The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz raises fundamental questions about straits: “Can coastal states charge tolls for straits like the Suez Canal or Panama Canal? Who owns the straits, and who can control them?” Toll collection is possible for artificially constructed waterways under the complete territorial sovereignty of individual nations, as seen with the Suez Canal and Panama Canal, which are granted the right to collect tolls under separate international treaties. In contrast, international straits are recognized as having the right of transit passage, which is a stronger right than the innocent passage allowed for foreign vessels in territorial waters. This means that international straits are not entirely under the sovereign control of coastal states and are guaranteed the right of passage free from interference by coastal nations as international public goods.
Of course, reality cannot be explained solely by law. International law provides norms, but actual control over straits is heavily influenced by military power and geopolitical logic. When a specific coastal state militarizes islands or maritime features within or around a strait, or attempts to extend control beyond what international law permits, the legal principles agreed upon by the international community face significant challenges.
What implications does this situation hold for South Korea? As a maritime trading nation that relies heavily on imports for energy and raw materials, South Korea's economy would suffer tremendously if energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait were disrupted. South Korea's import and export volumes are also significantly dependent on maritime routes in East Asia, including the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, South Korea must recognize this issue not merely as a regional dispute but as a structural risk directly related to national survival. First, it must consistently support the freedom of navigation and the right of passage, which are core to the international maritime order. Second, strategies to reduce dependence on specific straits through diversification of energy and supply chains are necessary. Third, South Korea should strengthen its naval capabilities and international cooperation to protect maritime routes. Most importantly, a balanced approach is crucial. Rather than aligning with the position of any specific country, maintaining a principled stance based on international law and multilateralism aligns with long-term national interests. A clear message runs through the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca, and Taiwan Strait: when norms collapse, most countries, including ours, suffer tremendous losses. Straits are not the exclusive property of any one nation; they are lifelines for the entire international community.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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