The construction of Gwangju Metro Line 2 has been found to be fundamentally deficient.
Construction costs were estimated and paid at tens of millions of won above the set amount. Additionally, necessary contract reviews for large-scale design changes were not conducted, and there were numerous issues with train operation facilities and safety measures for unmanned stations.
The Gwangju Audit Committee uncovered a total of 24 irregularities during an audit conducted in March.
They also demanded that Gwangju recover and reduce the construction costs of 9.18 billion won and issue an institutional warning to the Metro Construction Headquarters for failing to follow contract review procedures.
According to the audit results released on the 27th, it was confirmed that despite changes to the project schedule, budget, and operation plan for Metro Line 2, these changes were not reflected in the basic plan.
The basic plan approved in 2023 specified that Phase 1 would open in 2026 and Phase 2 in 2029. However, at the time of the audit, the construction of the Phase 1 Section 1 station was scheduled for completion in February 2027, while construction on Section 5 was temporarily halted.
Phase 2 Sections 7 and 10 also faced a delay of two years and two months due to the failure of the construction company.
The total project cost increased from the initial 2.8772 trillion won to 3.2177 trillion won after 18 adjustments, an increase of 340.5 billion won (11.8%), but the procedures for changing the basic plan were not followed.
Issues were also identified in the train operation plan.
The average speed for Phase 1 was reduced from the initial 33.45 km/h to 26.76 km/h, necessitating an increase in the number of trains from 15 to 17 for five-minute intervals.
During the budget execution process, the Metro Construction Headquarters pursued design changes that increased costs by 109.8 billion won across 506 instances in six Phase 1 sections without undergoing contract reviews.
It was discovered that 4.24362 billion won was overpaid or accounted for due to the inflation of indirect construction costs, such as health insurance and national pension premiums.
The Audit Committee has demanded the recovery of 637.96 million won already paid and a reduction of the remaining amount.
In the station construction, 2.85695 billion won was overrepresented due to errors in wall, platform safety door, and finishing material quantities. In Phase 2, reductions of 1.53232 billion won were required due to miscalculations in lane markings, asphalt removal, and ground reinforcement quantities.
In Phase 2 Sections 9 and 10, errors in calculating seismic loads resulted in a design that included 32% more rebar than other sections of the same specifications. A review indicated that 286 tons of rebar and 486.74 million won in construction costs could be saved.
Deficiencies in construction and supervision directly related to safety were also confirmed.
In some structures of Phase 1 Section 5, the space necessary for safe train operation was found to be 90 mm below the standard. Materials worth 46.99 million won, including 32 air conditioning units for the vehicle base, were processed as installed despite not being actually installed.
Fire and explosion prevention measures for large-capacity secondary battery facilities were also insufficient, and some equipment for the integrated railway wireless network was paid for without undergoing performance testing.
The Metro Construction Headquarters stated that it would accept the Audit Committee's findings and would pursue reductions in overestimated construction costs, design changes, facility improvements, and measures to prevent recurrence.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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