Journalist

Abe Kwak
  • AI Reshapes Asias Industrial Landscape
    AI Reshapes Asia's Industrial Landscape When the U.S. market falters, the KOSPI often follows suit. A downturn in China's economy typically leads to sell-offs in South Korea. This year, however, is different. Neither the Middle East conflict nor the U.S.-China power struggle has managed to shake the markets. This week, the key variable was expected to be the U.S.-China summit. Yet, the KOSPI continues its march toward an all-time high. Having already surged nearly 80% this year, it is achieving the best performance among major global indices. South Korea has surpassed the United Kingdom to become the eighth-largest stock market in the world, valued at $4.04 trillion. Six of the world's top ten stock markets are now in Asia. The market is beginning to prioritize AI over geopolitical concerns. This is not merely a thematic rally; the industrial order itself is changing. Even a single response from ChatGPT relies on GPUs, memory, power grids, and data centers to function. While AI may appear to be software, it actually operates on a vast hardware supply chain, with Asia at its core. Taiwan dominates the foundry sector. Without TSMC, there is no AI. Over 90% of the world's most advanced chip production passes through this company. In the first quarter of 2026, TSMC's revenue increased by 35% year-on-year to $35.6 billion, with net profit soaring by 58%. This year, its capital expenditure guidance is set to reach up to $56 billion, a 40% increase from the previous year. TSMC's clients are expected to spend over $1.2 trillion on data center capital expenditures by 2028. South Korea controls the memory bottleneck. In the AI era, High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) is not just a common component; it is a critical infrastructure that determines processing speed. SK Hynix is projected to surpass Samsung for the first time in operating profit in 2025, reaching 47.2 trillion won, with its stock price rising by 210%. The company holds a market share of 57-62% in HBM, and its production for 2026 is already sold out. Bank of America has labeled this year as a "1990s-style memory supercycle." This fervor is spreading beyond semiconductors to power equipment, transformers, shipbuilding, and batteries. This is why HD Hyundai Electric and LS ELECTRIC have backlogs filled for several years. Japan supplies the equipment needed to manufacture chips. Tokyo Electron, Advantest, and Lasertec benefit every time TSMC and SK Hynix expand their operations. The Nikkei 225 index surpassed 60,000 for the first time in April 2026, soaring 5.58% on the first trading day after Golden Week, led by SoftBank, which rose 18%. JP Morgan's year-end target is set at 70,000. China and Hong Kong are building their own ecosystems. With advanced chip imports from NVIDIA blocked, China surprised the world with its DeepSeek R1. The Hang Seng Index rose by 28% in 2025. Alibaba announced a $52 billion investment in AI infrastructure over three years. The price-to-earnings ratio for Hang Seng Tech is 24, lower than the Nasdaq 100's ratio of 25-31. While the U.S. has created a leading model, China is constructing a parallel ecosystem around it. The structural logic is straightforward. Software originated in the U.S., but the supply chain that powers it is in Asia. Once, Asia was known as the "world's factory" based on cheap labor. Now, it is shifting to become the central axis of critical infrastructure supporting the global AI system. What is happening in the market is not just a technological rally; it is a once-in-a-generation shift in industrial value. The KOSPI stands at the center of this flow. This is why the market remains resilient despite bubble concerns; investors are betting on a reorganization of the industrial order rather than a short-term trend. Intelligence was born in California. However, the power, memory, semiconductors, and factories that make that intelligence operational now pulse from Asia.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-05-14 17:51:32
  • China Insight: What the rain-soaked Temple of Heaven revealed about Trump-Xi summit
    China Insight: What the rain-soaked Temple of Heaven revealed about Trump-Xi summit President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping met once again in Beijing on May 14. A summit between the leader of the world’s foremost superpower and the head of the world’s second-largest economy invariably carries global significance. Yet this meeting possessed an unusually heavy symbolism and strategic gravity. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the intensifying contest for artificial intelligence supremacy, the semiconductor conflict, the Taiwan question, rare-earth export controls, supply-chain restructuring, the future of dollar dominance, and the internationalization of the yuan have all converged at the same historical moment. This summit was therefore far more than a routine diplomatic engagement. In many respects, it amounted to a grand strategic exploration of who will shape the architecture of the mid-21st century world order — and how that order will ultimately be constructed. The United States seeks to preserve the existing framework of global primacy. China, meanwhile, seeks to accelerate the emergence of a multipolar order. Between those two ambitions, the world watches with equal measures of anxiety and expectation. The two leaders met for more than two hours at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Following the formal talks, they moved together to the Temple of Heaven, the sacred imperial site where Chinese emperors once prayed for peace, prosperity, and abundant harvests under the Mandate of Heaven. A state banquet followed later that evening. China’s decision to include the Temple of Heaven in the summit itinerary was no accident. The site is far more than a tourist destination. It is one of the great symbolic spaces of Chinese civilization itself — a place where the emperors of the Ming and Qing dynasties affirmed what traditional China regarded as heavenly legitimacy and cosmic order. It represents continuity, historical consciousness, and civilizational permanence. The image of Trump and Xi walking together along the rain-darkened stone paths of the Temple of Heaven therefore carried extraordinary symbolic weight. Trump reportedly remarked only briefly that the scene was “beautiful.” More notable was his unusual restraint regarding Taiwan, a subject on which he has often spoken bluntly in the past. The silence itself was revealing. It reflected the complicated strategic reality now confronting the United States. America remains the world’s most powerful nation. Yet it no longer possesses the effortless strategic dominance that defined the immediate post-Cold War era. The war in Ukraine drags on. Conflict between Iran and Israel threatens to widen across the Middle East. Inside the United States, fiscal deficits, high interest rates, industrial hollowing, and deepening social polarization continue to intensify. Washington seeks to contain China’s rise in artificial intelligence and advanced semiconductors. Yet it also understands an uncomfortable reality: the global supply chain itself cannot easily function without China. Beijing faces its own profound vulnerabilities. China’s property crisis, local-government debt burdens, youth unemployment, and weak domestic consumption have created structural strains throughout the economy. Nevertheless, China remains the world’s largest manufacturing power and continues to dominate critical sectors ranging from rare earths and batteries to solar panels and electric vehicles. Above all, Beijing sought through this summit to project an unmistakable message to the world: China considers itself not merely a modern nation-state, but a civilization-state standing as an equal to the United States. That is precisely why the Temple of Heaven mattered. The United States is a relatively young republic, barely 250 years old. China sees itself as the inheritor of a civilization stretching back five millennia. Xi Jinping’s decision to host Trump at the Temple of Heaven was therefore not simply ceremonial diplomacy. It was an assertion that China is not a temporary geopolitical actor, but an enduring civilization shaped by history, philosophy, and cultural continuity. The summit itself revolved around six principal themes. The first was trade and tariffs. Trump, acutely aware of American farmers and industrial workers as a crucial political constituency, is believed to have pressed strongly for expanded Chinese purchases of American soybeans, grain, and agricultural products, while continuing to raise concerns about trade imbalances. China, facing slowing economic momentum, likewise requires a degree of stability in access to American markets. The second issue was semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The United States has tightened restrictions on exports of advanced AI chips and semiconductor technologies in an effort to slow China’s technological ascent. China, meanwhile, has accelerated domestic substitution efforts centered around companies such as Huawei. This is no longer merely a technological competition. It is increasingly a struggle over who will shape the operating system of the future global civilization. The third issue concerned rare earths and supply chains. China has increasingly employed rare-earth export controls as a strategic instrument. Because critical sectors — electric vehicles, semiconductors, defense systems, and renewable energy infrastructure — remain deeply dependent upon Chinese-controlled supply chains, Washington’s efforts to diversify away from China face immense practical limitations. The fourth issue was Taiwan. It was perhaps the most sensitive topic of the summit and also the one approached with the greatest caution. Xi reportedly warned that mishandling the Taiwan issue could dangerously increase the possibility of direct confrontation between the two powers. The United States cannot easily abandon Taiwan, yet neither can it afford a full-scale military conflict with China. As a result, the Taiwan Strait is increasingly emerging as one of the world’s most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints. The fifth issue involved the Middle East. As tensions between Iran and Israel intensify, Washington increasingly recognizes the importance of China’s relationship with Tehran. China has sought to present itself as a stabilizing diplomatic force in the region, particularly after previously helping facilitate rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The sixth issue concerned the deeper structure of the global financial system itself. Beneath the formal agenda lay an invisible but highly consequential competition between dollar dominance and the internationalization of the Chinese yuan. Should the yuan continue expanding its role in energy settlements and global trade, the foundations of the postwar financial order could gradually begin to shift. Yet perhaps the summit’s most important message was this: even amid rivalry, dialogue continues. The United States and China compete fiercely, but they also remain deeply dependent upon one another. China cannot easily thrive without the American market and financial system. Nor can the United States fully disentangle itself from the manufacturing and supply-chain infrastructure centered in China. The global economy itself would struggle to survive a complete rupture between the two powers. For Northeast Asia, the summit may mark the beginning of a new strategic phase. China will likely intensify efforts to limit American involvement in Taiwan. The United States, meanwhile, is expected to deepen security coordination with Japan and South Korea. Japan may continue accelerating military normalization, while North Korea will closely monitor every shift in the relationship between Washington and Beijing. In that sense, Northeast Asia is increasingly becoming the principal front line of great-power competition. The original Cold War was centered largely upon military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The emerging strategic rivalry of the 21st century, however, is likely to be far more complex — an intertwined contest involving artificial intelligence, semiconductors, energy systems, maritime power, finance, and supply chains. What, then, should South Korea understand from all this? Seoul must look not through the lens of emotion, but through the lens of structure. The United States remains South Korea’s indispensable security ally. China remains one of its most important economic partners. Korea cannot survive by choosing only one side in absolute terms. Its challenge is therefore not blind alignment, but the cultivation of strategic balance grounded in technological strength, industrial competitiveness, and diplomatic sophistication. South Korea already possesses globally competitive capabilities in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, batteries, and defense manufacturing. The essential task is not to think of Korea merely as a “middle power,” but as a genuine strategic state capable of exercising meaningful influence within a rapidly changing Northeast Asian order. The rain falling over the Temple of Heaven was more than weather. It may well have been a signal that the world itself is entering a new season. And along those rain-soaked paths, America and China — two powers moving according to profoundly different historical clocks — were quietly calculating the future of the same world. *The author is a senior columnist of AJP. 2026-05-14 16:47:17
  • ASIA INSIGHTS: How Asia is redrawn into the AI map
    ASIA INSIGHTS: How Asia is redrawn into the AI map SEOUL, May 14 (AJP) -The software was written in California. The intelligence is being manufactured in Asia. A Bloomberg chart circulating this week tells the story cleanly: South Korea has overtaken the United Kingdom to become the world's eighth-largest stock market, at $4.04 trillion. Six of the ten largest equity markets on Earth now sit in Asia. The United States ushered the generative AI era. But the East building its physical infrastructure is collecting the dividend. This is not a coincidence. It is the logical consequence of how artificial intelligence actually works. Every AI query, response, every generated image begins not with software but with hardware: electrons moving through silicon, copper, and exotic materials assembled to nanometer tolerances. That supply chain runs through Asia. Understanding how each major market fits into it reveals not a single AI boom but four distinct ones, each feeding into the next. Taiwan: The Indispensable Foundry Without TSMC, there is no AI at scale. The pure-play foundry controls more than 90% of the world's leading-edge chip production. Nvidia's Blackwell GPUs, AMD's MI series, Apple's M-chips — all fabbed in Taiwan. In Q1 2026, TSMC reported revenue of $35.6 billion, up 35% year-on-year, with profit jumping 58%. Capital expenditure for 2026 is guided at $52–56 billion, a 37% increase, signaling management sees no demand ceiling. Goldman Sachs estimates Taiwan's market is "well over 80%" exposed to AI-related revenue. TSMC's largest customers are collectively planning over $1.2 trillion in data center capex through 2028. Almost all of it flows through Hsinchu. South Korea: The Memory Monopoly If Taiwan is the foundry, South Korea is the memory bank — and in AI, memory is no longer a commodity. It is a chokepoint. High-Bandwidth Memory, or HBM, sits alongside AI processors and feeds them data at speeds standard DRAM cannot approach. The world's HBM comes overwhelmingly from two companies in Gyeonggi Province. SK Hynix beat Samsung in operating profit for the first time in 2025, posting a record 47.2 trillion won for the year. Its stock rallied more than 210%. The KOSPI has gained nearly 80 percent in just five months into the year to become the world's best-performing major index. SK hynix holds a 57–62% share of the global HBM market, supplies Nvidia almost exclusively, and has already sold out its entire 2026 capacity. The Bank of America calls 2026 a "memory supercycle similar to the boom of the 1990s," projecting the HBM market to reach $54.6 billion — up 58 percent year-on-year. The stock rally however goes broader than memory. Investors have poured into shipbuilding, defense, power equipment, and cultural exports. HD Hyundai Electric, LS Electric, and Hyosung Heavy Industries carry order books extending years forward as AI data centers drive unprecedented electricity demand. Goldman Sachs has noted Korea's market is "deeper and broader" than Taiwan's — a rare thing to say about a market whose memory champions alone have rewritten the rules of the semiconductor industry. Japan: The Equipment Layer Japan's role sits one layer upstream: the machines that make the chips. Tokyo Electron, Advantest, and Lasertec supply the lithography tools and test equipment that TSMC and SK Hynix depend on to scale. The Nikkei 225 crossed 60,000 for the first time in history on April 23, 2026. On May 7, markets reopened after Golden Week and immediately priced in a global AI rally that had run in their absence — the index surged 5.58 percent, its largest single-day point gain ever, led by SoftBank (+18.44%), Tokyo Electron (+9%), and Advantest (+7%). J.P. Morgan has set a year-end 2026 Nikkei target of 70,000. SoftBank deserves a sentence of its own. Once mocked for Vision Fund losses, Masayoshi Son's bets on Arm Holdings and OpenAI have made the company, in the words of one analyst, "the listed proxy for OpenAI and Arm." Japan's decades of stagnation have found, in AI infrastructure demand, a genuine secular growth engine. China and Hong Kong: The Challenger Ecosystem China's position is the most contested and the most consequential to watch. Blocked from advanced Nvidia chips since 2022, Chinese companies have responded by building a parallel AI ecosystem. DeepSeek's R1 model, released in January 2025, claimed performance comparable to OpenAI's best systems at a fraction of the cost — and rattled global markets. The Hang Seng Tech Index surged nearly 30 percent in the weeks that followed. Alibaba, which has pledged $52 billion over three years in AI infrastructure, added $153 billion in market value from its January 2025 lows. Chinese chipmakers SMIC and Hua Hong Semiconductor have rallied as Beijing backs semiconductor self-sufficiency with incentives reportedly worth up to $70 billion. The valuation case is straightforward: Hang Seng Tech trades at roughly 24 times forward earnings versus 25–31 times for the Nasdaq 100. UBS rates Chinese tech "most attractive," citing rapid AI monetization and policy support. The U.S. built the leading models; China is building a parallel ecosystem around them. There is a layer beneath the semiconductors that deserves attention: the power grid itself. AI data centers consume electricity at two to five times the rate of conventional facilities, creating a global shortage of high-voltage transformers, cables, and switchgear — equipment made disproportionately in Asia. Korea's HD Hyundai Electric dominates ultra-high-voltage transformer supply for North America. LG Energy Solution and Samsung SDI supply large-scale battery storage systems stabilizing AI campus power grids. Japan's Fujikura, a cable specialist, has been among the surprise winners of the infrastructure buildout. Every kilowatt delivered to a GPU cluster passes through equipment increasingly likely to carry an Asian manufacturer's nameplate. The structural thesis is simple. AI is a software product requiring a hardware supply chain of extraordinary complexity. The software came from the United States. The hardware supply chain is Asian — from the foundries of Taiwan to the memory fabs of Korea, from Japan's equipment makers to China's challenger chipmakers, down to the transformers and cables that keep the whole system powered. The intelligence was born in California. The factory floor is in Asia. 2026-05-14 14:09:13
  • Trump-Xi summit to test fragile détente as CEOs descend on Beijing
    Trump-Xi summit to test fragile détente as CEOs descend on Beijing SEOUL, May 14 (AJP) -U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping for two days from Thursday engage a high-stakes and closely-watched summit in Beijing as war in the Middle East, tariff disputes and the global artificial intelligence race reshape the balance between the world’s two largest economies. While both sides are expected to emphasize symbolism and stability in public, the summit is emerging as a transactional negotiation over tariffs, semiconductors, energy security and Taiwan, with a heavyweight U.S. business delegation underscoring how corporate America remains deeply tied to China despite escalating geopolitical rivalry. Trump on Wednesday evening arrived in Beijing seeking Chinese cooperation on multiple fronts: easing pressure on American farmers through larger agricultural purchases, stabilizing supply chains for rare earth minerals, and leveraging Beijing’s influence over Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global oil shipments. Xi is expected to push for tariff relief, softer export controls on advanced semiconductors and reduced U.S. military support for Taiwan. The summit comes at a delicate moment for both leaders. Trump enters Beijing amid criticism over the economic fallout from the Iran conflict and rising questions about America’s strategic overstretch. Xi faces mounting pressure from China’s slowing economy, weak domestic demand and worsening deflationary pressure. Analysts say both leaders need visible wins without appearing to concede too much strategically. Still, beneath the ceremonial choreography lies a more fundamental rivalry. Washington increasingly sees China’s industrial strategy and export-driven manufacturing dominance as a long-term threat to U.S. economic security. A report released this week by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Rhodium Group described China’s policy direction as an “industrial policy of everything,” warning that Beijing’s state-backed expansion into sectors ranging from AI to raw materials is narrowing the room for Western competitors. Tariffs are expected to dominate much of the negotiations. Although portions of Trump’s sweeping tariff regime have been challenged in U.S. courts, the administration is preparing additional trade actions linked to forced labor and industrial production concerns tied to China. Beijing is expected to press hard for lower tariff barriers, though Washington faces political constraints in appearing softer toward its biggest strategic competitor. Another central issue will be semiconductors and AI. Xi is reportedly seeking broader access to advanced U.S. chips after Washington partially loosened restrictions on exports of Nvidia’s H200 processors while continuing to block the company’s top-tier Blackwell systems. U.S. officials, meanwhile, remain concerned about China’s advances in AI, military-civil fusion technologies and rare earth export controls that have exposed vulnerabilities in American supply chains. Taiwan remains the summit’s most politically sensitive fault line. Chinese officials are expected to push Trump to shift Washington’s longstanding position from “not supporting” Taiwanese independence toward explicitly “opposing” it — a wording change that would signal a major diplomatic concession to Beijing. Trump has also indicated willingness to discuss a multibillion-dollar U.S. arms package for Taiwan during talks with Xi. The composition of the U.S. delegation accompanying Trump highlights the business stakes surrounding the summit. More than a dozen top executives traveled to Beijing, including Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, Apple CEO Tim Cook, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink, Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg and Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon. The lineup reflects how deeply intertwined U.S. corporations remain with the Chinese market despite years of “decoupling” rhetoric. For technology firms such as Nvidia, Qualcomm, Micron and Apple, China remains a critical manufacturing base and consumer market. Boeing is seeking to revive aircraft sales to Chinese airlines after years of trade tensions and regulatory freezes, while financial firms including BlackRock, Citi and Goldman Sachs continue to pursue long-term expansion in China’s capital markets. The presence of Elon Musk is particularly notable. Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory remains one of the company’s most important production hubs, while Musk has maintained unusually close ties with Chinese officials compared with many U.S. executives. His attendance signals that Beijing still views select American corporate leaders as potential stabilizers in an otherwise deteriorating bilateral relationship. The delegation also reveals Washington’s competing priorities. Alongside national security concerns over semiconductors and strategic industries, the administration is simultaneously seeking export deals, investment opportunities and supply-chain stability. Analysts say the summit illustrates the contradiction at the heart of current U.S.-China policy: intensifying strategic rivalry paired with continued economic interdependence. For Seoul and other Asian economies caught between the two powers, the outcome could have direct implications for semiconductors, energy prices, shipping routes and regional security architecture. Korea’s export-heavy economy remains particularly exposed to any changes in U.S.-China trade policy, Taiwan tensions or disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of Asia’s imported crude oil passes. 2026-05-14 09:39:49
  • Seoul signals phased support for US-led Hormuz mission
    Seoul signals phased support for US-led Hormuz mission SEOUL, May 13 (AJP) -South Korea has told the United States it is willing to consider a phased contribution toward restoring safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said Tuesday. Seoul conveyed to Washington that it would “participate as a responsible member of the international community” and review “step-by-step contribution measures” related to the reopening and protection of maritime traffic through the strategic waterway, Ahn said in an online briefing on the Korea-U.S. integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) in Washington and talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon. Ahn said possible forms of support discussed included diplomatic backing, personnel dispatch, intelligence-sharing and military asset assistance. “We did not go deeply into specific discussions about expanding the participation of our military,” Ahn said, adding that any such move would also require procedures under South Korean domestic law. The remarks mark Seoul’s clearest indication yet that it may expand its role in the multinational effort surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global oil shipping route, following the recent attack on the South Korean-operated cargo vessel HMM Namu. The presidential office earlier strongly condemned the attack after a joint government investigation concluded that the fire aboard the vessel was caused by an external strike. Seoul also pledged to continue cooperating with international efforts to guarantee maritime safety and freedom of navigation. Ahn also said Hegseth expressed understanding over Seoul’s push for an early transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) under a conditions-based framework. Ahn said he explained South Korea’s recent efforts to boost defense spending, secure key military capabilities and strengthen its ability to lead the defense of the Korean Peninsula. “It was a meaningful opportunity to candidly discuss key alliance issues, including the OPCON transition and plans to pursue nuclear-powered submarines,” he said. Ahn stressed Seoul’s commitment to accelerating the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States. “Our position on pursuing an early OPCON transition is firm and unwavering,” he said. “If additional understanding and persuasion are needed, we will continue engaging with the United States.” On Korea’s push to develop nuclear-powered submarines, which both governments previously agreed to explore, Ahn said security issues should be handled “on a different track from economic matters.” He added that both sides shared the view that working-level discussions should begin promptly despite the ongoing conflict involving Iran. According to South Korea’s Defense Ministry, the two ministers reaffirmed the importance of adopting a “realistic and practical approach” to modernizing the alliance, deterring threats and strengthening the combined defense posture. The ministry said the two sides agreed to maintain close communication and expand cooperation in areas of mutual security interest ahead of this week’s Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) meetings in Washington. Ahn said no discussions took place regarding a reduction of U.S. Forces Korea or the strategic flexibility of U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. 2026-05-13 07:36:14
  • Seoul walks tightrope at Korea-U.S. defense talks amid Hormuz crisis
    Seoul walks tightrope at Korea-U.S. defense talks amid Hormuz crisis SEOUL, May 12 (AJP) - South Korea and the United States used their first defense ministerial meeting in six months to steady alliance coordination at a moment when the widening Iran conflict and mounting U.S. pressure over the Strait of Hormuz are testing Seoul’s strategic balancing act. The talks between South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon came as Washington intensifies calls for allies, including Seoul, to play a more proactive role in reopening the Strait of Hormuz following attacks on commercial shipping and escalating Iranian threats. The backdrop to the meeting was the recent strike on the Korean-operated bulk carrier HMM Namu near Hormuz, which Seoul concluded was caused by an “external strike” involving unidentified airborne objects. While South Korea strongly condemned the attack and vowed a response, it has stopped short of publicly naming Iran as the perpetrator despite repeated pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump earlier alleged Iran attacked the vessel and publicly urged South Korea to support U.S.-led efforts to secure maritime routes through Hormuz, arguing that countries benefiting from Gulf energy shipments should contribute more directly to reopening the strategic waterway. Hegseth used the Pentagon meeting to sharpen Washington’s message on burden-sharing and a greater South Korean security role within the alliance framework, linking the Korean Peninsula more directly to broader global security challenges. “Our meeting today arrives at a pivotal moment for the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Hegseth said in opening remarks. “Together, our nations are taking strong actions to ensure our combined readiness and to defend vital national security interests.” Referring to the U.S. military campaign against Iran, dubbed “Operation Epic Fury,” Hegseth said the operation demonstrated “this administration's unwavering commitment to confronting threats and defending those interests.” “In this current global threat environment, the strength of our alliance is critical, and we look to our partners to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with us,” he added. Hegseth also renewed pressure on Seoul over defense burden-sharing, praising South Korea’s pledge to raise defense spending and assume greater responsibility for peninsula security. The Pentagon later explained that greater allied burden-sharing forms one of the four core pillars of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy alongside homeland defense, deterring China in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base. “As I noted during my visit to Seoul last November, Republic of Korea's commitment to increase defense spending and your leadership in assuming primary responsibility for the security of the Korean Peninsula is very important,” Hegseth said. “Real burden-sharing is the foundation of a resilient alliance, and it is essential for effectively deterring our mutual adversaries.” Though the official Pentagon and Defense Ministry readouts did not explicitly mention Hormuz, officials in Seoul acknowledged the regional crisis and maritime security concerns formed part of the broader consultations surrounding Ahn’s Washington trip. Seoul has so far attempted to calibrate its response carefully. The presidential office condemned attacks on civilian shipping as unacceptable and pledged continued participation in international efforts to ensure freedom of navigation, while avoiding direct attribution to Tehran pending further analysis. That cautious approach reflects Seoul’s concern over being drawn deeper into a U.S.-Iran confrontation while still preserving close alliance coordination with Washington. South Korea remains heavily dependent on Middle Eastern crude imports and has historically sought to maintain working diplomatic channels with Iran. Ahn, while avoiding direct references to Iran, stressed alliance unity amid what he described as “difficult conditions.” “Just because we get to see familiar faces today, it really epitomizes what an alliance truly is,” Ahn said. “It's a big honor to have such a good meeting between the two countries, despite the difficult conditions that we're facing today.” At the same time, Seoul continued emphasizing its long-term objective of a more autonomous defense posture. “We are also keeping pace, putting our utmost efforts into achieving a ROK-led defense of the Korean Peninsula by acquiring critical national defense capabilities through measures such as increasing defense spending,” Ahn said. According to the joint readout, the two ministers discussed wartime operational control transition and “Alliance modernization,” while agreeing to strengthen cooperation moving forward. The issue remains one of the alliance’s most sensitive fault lines. U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson recently referred to the first quarter of 2029 as a possible timeline for OPCON transition during congressional testimony, exposing differences in expectations between the allies. The Lee Jae Myung administration is understood to be seeking progress before the current administrations in Seoul and Washington end in 2028. The ministers reaffirmed the importance of this week’s Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) in Washington, describing it as a key mechanism for advancing alliance cooperation and national interests. The three-day meeting through Wednesday is being led by South Korean Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Kim Hong-cheol and U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs John Noh, with senior officials from both defense and foreign affairs agencies participating. The KIDD agenda is expected to cover broader alliance security issues including OPCON transition, combined defense posture and alliance modernization. “I believe this meeting is a significant opportunity to assess the achievements of the joint fact sheet between the presidents last year and the 57th Security Consultative Meeting, and to communicate about the alliance's direction moving forward,” Ahn said. “As a ROK-U.S. alliance has stood together upon a bedrock of unwavering trust even through hard times, we remain committed to close cooperation in the future in one voice.” At the same time, Seoul expanded its defense outreach beyond the traditional alliance framework. South Korea and North Atlantic Treaty Organization held their second defense industry consultative meeting Monday as Seoul seeks to deepen coordination with Western partners amid growing links between Indo-Pacific and European security following the Ukraine war and Middle East instability. The consultative body was launched after South Korea and NATO agreed during the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague to establish a working-level framework for defense industrial cooperation. The first session was held at NATO headquarters in Brussels in September last year. At the second meeting held eight months later, the two sides shared information on potential cooperation areas and discussed concrete defense industrial collaboration. South Korea stressed that access to NATO standards was essential to improve interoperability of Korean weapons systems, while NATO requested Seoul’s participation in multilateral projects in areas such as ammunition and space cooperation. DAPA Commissioner Lee Yong-chul said Seoul hopes to establish itself as “a reliable IP4 partner nation,” referring to NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners of South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. He added that the Indo-Pacific and NATO security environments have become “more closely connected” following Russia’s war in Ukraine and pledged continued coordination with NATO’s international staff to develop concrete cooperation frameworks. The NATO delegation’s visit followed a trip last month by ambassadors from 30 NATO member states to South Korea, during which they toured major defense firms including HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Aerospace, underscoring growing European interest in South Korea’s defense manufacturing capabilities. 2026-05-12 07:51:42
  • BTS Captivates Mexico City with Historic Performance at Zocalo
    BTS Captivates Mexico City with Historic Performance at Zocalo On May 6, a convoy of black vehicles slowly entered the heart of Mexico City. As news broke that BTS had arrived, the atmosphere in the city changed dramatically. Fans flocked to the airport early in the morning, with many holding purple light sticks and waiting for hours. Each time the vehicles moved, the sound of phone lights and cheers echoed along the streets, with police motorcycles clearing the way and security vehicles following closely behind. It was a scene reminiscent of a visit from a foreign head of state. Zocalo Square, located in the center of Mexico City, is a space of power. Overlooking the square is the presidential palace, and the massive national flag waves in the wind, surrounded by layers of memories of revolution, independence, protests, and crowds. This is the closest place to the heart of Mexico as a nation. This week, a somewhat unusual scene unfolded in that very heart. Young people dressed in purple began to fill the area in front of the presidential palace. Some painted the South Korean flag on their faces, while others shouted "I love you" in broken Korean. The city buzzed with a mix of Spanish, English, and Korean, resembling the eve of a national festival. Finally, over 50,000 people erupted in cheers, waving their arms as BTS appeared alongside Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum on the palace balcony. It was a sight typically reserved for state visits. Mexico City was the most streamed city for BTS music in March, with 714,212 streams over the month. The three concerts at Estadio GNP Seguros sold out quickly, and the local chamber of commerce estimates that the events will generate an economic impact of approximately 1.86 billion pesos, or about $140 million. However, these figures only capture the scale of the excitement, not its intensity. The real spectacle began at night. As the stadium lights dimmed on May 7, a brief silence was followed by the sounds of traditional Korean music. In that moment, as thousands held their breath and gazed at the stage, the first beat of a new song, "Hooligan," broke through the darkness. The crowd of 65,000 erupted in unison, the silver glow of light sticks illuminating the night sky, and the stadium shook with a massive sing-along. Two young girls embraced each other in tears, while strong male fans sang the chorus with their arms around each other. Despite the noise from nearby aircraft taking off and landing, it was drowned out by the cheers of the crowd. The climax of the concert came during the song "Body to Body" from the album "Arirang." As the heat of the stage momentarily paused, the chant began with just a few voices. "Arirang, Arirang, Arariryo..." The song quickly spread like a wave. Under the Mexican night sky, thousands of young people sang "Arirang" in perfect Korean pronunciation. The scene was strangely unfamiliar yet oddly poignant. It was not merely a crowd singing along to a foreign song; it felt as if they were discovering a melody that had long existed in their hearts. This fervor had already been hinted at the previous week in Tampa, Florida. Tampa is not a global cultural capital like New York or Los Angeles. With a population of 400,000, it is not traditionally considered a core market for K-pop. Yet, BTS sold out all three shows at Raymond James Stadium, hotels were booked solid, and the city implemented what was described as "Super Bowl-level traffic control" during the concert period. Even more interesting was the diversity of the audience. It was not just the stereotypical "teenage female fandom." There were elderly women with gray hair, families with young children, and a mix of Hispanic, White, Black, and Asian male fans. Local fans remarked, "This is not just an idol concert; it feels like a festival for the entire city." Why is North America so captivated by BTS and K-pop right now? On the surface, the reasons are clear: the rise of platforms like YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram, high-quality performances, and BTS's unique closeness with their fans. However, that alone does not suffice. The more fundamental reason may lie in the resonance of emotions. Latin culture is rooted in intense rhythms and collective fervor. Reggaeton, salsa, street festivals, and cheer culture all have structures that simultaneously explode with sorrow and joy. Similarly, Korean pop culture centers around a collective emotional energy known as "heung." The unique emotional spectrum of Korea, which intertwines sorrow and joy, restraint and explosion, resonates remarkably well with Latin fiesta culture. Though the languages differ, the rhythms that prompt the body to respond are the same. Adding to this is the narrative surrounding BTS. They are not a group that emerged from cultural centers like the U.S. or the U.K. They rose to the top from a small Asian country that was once considered peripheral. This narrative provides a strong emotional connection for audiences in Latin America, who have long remained on the fringes of Western culture. They see their own shadows reflected in the success story of another marginalized group. Thus, when young people in Mexico sing "Arirang" in Korean, it is not merely an expression of fandom. It may be a process of discovering emotions that have been outside the mainstream. Originally, "Arirang" was a song sung while watching someone leave. Throughout the years of colonization, war, poverty, and displacement, Koreans sang this folk song. It encapsulated both resignation to survive and the will to keep moving forward. A century ago, Korea was a country that imported culture. Koreans sang along to American and Japanese music, longing for the Western center, and the Korean language was close to a peripheral language. Yet now, that song resonates across the Pacific, reaching the other side of the world. The true meaning of the Korean Wave is not merely that Korean content has been exported globally. It lies in the fact that the emotions of a country once too small and distant for anyone to heed are now shaking the hearts of people on the other side of the globe. This is why the night in Mexico will not be easily forgotten. * This article has been translated by AI. 2026-05-11 03:31:23
  • UK Elections Signal Shift in Political Landscape as Reform Party Gains Ground
    UK Elections Signal Shift in Political Landscape as Reform Party Gains Ground The long-standing two-party system in the UK, dominated by the Conservative and Labour parties for nearly a century, has shown signs of fracture. The recent local elections in England were not merely a referendum on the ruling party but a clear indication of the deep-seated fatigue and distrust voters have towards the existing political order. As of May 8, the Reform Party has swept approximately 790 seats in local councils across England, nearly all of which were newly acquired. In contrast, Labour lost 597 seats, while the Conservatives saw a decline of 366 seats. The number of councils where Labour maintains a majority has shrunk from 32 to 18. In Wales, the nationalist party Plaid Cymru has taken the top party position for the first time since the establishment of the devolved assembly in 1999. In Scotland, Labour leader Anas Sarwar failed to retain his own constituency seat. The geography of these losses is particularly shocking. The Reform Party made significant gains in traditional Labour strongholds, such as Teesside, represented by former Deputy Leader Angela Rayner, and Wigan, the base of Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy—areas in northern and central England that Labour has cultivated for decades. This shift indicates a movement beyond mere ideological realignment. Led by Nigel Farage, the Reform Party emerged in 2018 as the Brexit Party, growing on a platform of anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment. Long regarded as a 'protest party' outside the mainstream political arena, this election has transformed its status. The Reform Party is now positioned as a potential right-wing alternative to the Conservatives. On the opposite end, the Green Party has expanded its influence, attracting younger progressive voters with radical agendas such as wealth taxes and the nationalization of public services. This marks a new political landscape where centrist parties are being eroded from both sides. Interpreting this phenomenon solely as an ideological shift misses the underlying issue: the politicization of economic insecurity. Rising prices, housing crises, local economic stagnation, the collapse of public services, and immigration tensions have culminated in a judgment that the existing political establishment has failed to address these long-standing grievances. The Conservatives are not immune to the fatigue of 14 years in power and economic failures, while Labour has not delivered the expected changes since taking office. Voters are now seeking stronger language and clearer messages. For Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the results serve as a dire warning. Once seen as a symbol of stable centrist leadership following a decisive victory in the 2024 general election, he is now labeled as 'the most unpopular prime minister in history' less than two years into his term. Economic downturns, policy retreats, and personnel controversies have compounded the challenges he faces. Despite this, Starmer has refused to resign, stating, "This is a painful result, and I take full responsibility. However, I will not plunge the country into chaos by stepping down." Notably, the financial markets reacted positively to his refusal to resign, with the pound strengthening and government bond yields falling. Markets appear more concerned about the potential emergence of a hard-left leadership following Starmer's departure than about his continued tenure. This situation illustrates how today's political upheaval is not confined to the ballot box but is immediately linked to financial markets and national trust. Just four years ago, in the 2019 general election, the combined vote share of the Conservative and Labour parties was around 75%. That figure has now become a relic of the past. The political landscape has shifted to a multi-party competition, with the Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, Green Party, and Reform Party all vying for influence. The structure of British politics is changing. The implications for South Korean politics are significant. In South Korea, ahead of local elections, fatigue towards the two major parties has already accumulated. Disappointment with the ruling party does not directly translate into support for the opposition, and distrust towards the opposition does not lead to stable support for the ruling party. The centrist electorate is rapidly becoming more fluid, while younger voters remain cynical. Regional sentiments have become more sensitive to livelihood issues than to ideology. The warning from the UK is clear: the history, organization, and branding of large parties are no longer sufficient to guarantee victory. Voters are asking not 'who is right?' but 'who can change my life?' Can they control inflation, create jobs, reduce housing insecurity, and revive local economies? If these questions remain unanswered, even long-established parties can quickly become outdated. Local elections are the stage for livelihood politics. Issues such as transportation, housing, education, care, safety, and local economies directly influence voter sentiment far more than grand national discourses. Just as issues like garbage collection, public housing, and local welfare have sparked national outrage in the UK, livelihood insecurities in South Korea could also erupt as a variable that disrupts the political landscape at any moment. Yesterday's overwhelming victory can become today's arrogance, and today's defeat can serve as the starting point for tomorrow's reversal. In the UK, the door to that reversal has opened for the Reform Party and the Green Party. Where that door will lead in South Korea remains uncertain. However, one thing is clear: if the political sphere, ahead of local elections, continues to rely solely on factional unity while ignoring the signals from the electorate, voters will respond in another way. Public sentiment is borrowed; it can never be owned forever. * This article has been translated by AI. 2026-05-09 09:05:34
  • Korea and US move toward materializing MASGA with MoU on shipbuilding
    Korea and US move toward materializing MASGA with MoU on shipbuilding SEOUL, May 09 (AJP) -South Korea and the United States took the first concrete step Friday toward activating the $150 billion “MASGA” shipbuilding package embedded in Seoul’s broader $350 billion U.S. investment pledge, a move that could help ease lingering trade and tariff uncertainties hanging over Korean industries as Washington’s tariff regime faces mounting legal challenges. The U.S. Department of Commerce and South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIE) signed a memorandum of understanding in Washington establishing the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI), a bilateral platform designed to deepen cooperation in commercial shipbuilding, industrial modernization, maritime manufacturing investment and workforce development. The agreement marks the operational launch of what Seoul has branded the MASGA initiative — shorthand for “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” — which formed a central pillar of Korea’s commitment to invest $350 billion in the United States under last year’s trade understanding with Washington. Of the total, $150 billion was earmarked for revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding sector. The signing comes at a delicate moment for Seoul’s trade strategy, as Korean exporters continue to navigate uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s evolving tariff policies. U.S. courts have recently delivered a series of rulings questioning the legal foundation of several Trump-era tariff mechanisms, including challenges to “global reciprocal tariffs” imposed under emergency authorities. While the court setbacks have raised hopes in Seoul that some tariff pressure may eventually soften, Korean officials remain wary that Washington still retains powerful trade tools under Section 301 of the Trade Act, which allows the U.S. administration to impose tariffs or retaliatory measures over alleged unfair trade practices. Seoul’s aggressive investment push into strategic American industries such as shipbuilding is increasingly viewed as both an industrial partnership and a geopolitical hedge aimed at reducing bilateral friction with Washington. The MOU was signed by Park Jung-sung, South Korea’s deputy trade minister, and William Kimmitt, U.S. under secretary of commerce for international trade, under the oversight of Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. Under the agreement, the two governments will establish a Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington later this year to coordinate collaboration among shipbuilders, suppliers, universities and research institutions from both countries. Planned projects include facilitating foreign direct investment into the U.S. maritime industrial base, workforce training programs, shipyard productivity upgrades and technical exchanges. “The MOU signing builds on ongoing U.S.-Korea cooperation in strategic industries and reflects continued efforts to strengthen allied industrial capacity, promote investment, and expand collaboration in advanced manufacturing sectors,” the U.S. International Trade Administration said in a statement. The partnership also arrives amid growing alarm in Washington over the collapse of America’s shipbuilding capacity and increasing dependence on Asian allies for maritime industrial strength. A CNN-highlighted CBS “60 Minutes” investigation in March portrayed U.S. shipbuilding as a national security vulnerability, contrasting America’s shrinking industrial base with the massive scale and efficiency of South Korean shipyards led by firms such as Hanwha Group . The report noted that the United States now produces only a handful of large commercial vessels annually compared with roughly 1,000 cargo ships built each year by China, while South Korea remains one of the world’s dominant shipbuilding powers. It also spotlighted Hanwha’s acquisition and modernization of the Philadelphia shipyard as a symbol of Korea’s growing role in reviving U.S. maritime manufacturing. In the program, Hanwha executives said the company plans to invest up to $5 billion into the Philadelphia yard and expand production capacity from roughly one ship per year to as many as 20 annually through automation, robotics and workforce expansion. The report framed the issue not simply as industrial policy but as a national security imperative for Washington amid intensifying competition with China and growing vulnerabilities in global supply chains. “Shipbuilding is a national security necessity,” Michael Coulter, Hanwha’s top executive overseeing U.S. operations, said in the broadcast. “The U.S. needs to be able to secure our own commerce.” The strategic logic has increasingly aligned Korean industrial ambitions with U.S. geopolitical priorities. For Seoul, the shipbuilding partnership offers an opportunity to lock Korean firms deeper into America’s industrial rebuilding push while potentially cushioning Korean exporters from future tariff escalation. For Washington, Korean capital and expertise provide one of the few realistic paths toward rebuilding a severely weakened domestic shipbuilding ecosystem. The Trump administration has repeatedly described America’s maritime decline as a national security crisis, with Trump himself signing executive orders last year to prioritize shipbuilding revival and establish a White House office dedicated to the sector. The MOU signed Friday signals that South Korea is moving beyond pledges and into implementation. Whether the MASGA initiative ultimately translates into large-scale projects, shipyard modernization and meaningful tariff relief for Korean industries may determine how durable the broader Seoul-Washington economic alignment becomes in an increasingly protectionist era. 2026-05-09 08:17:57
  • US court strikes down Trump tariffs again as Korea watches next trade front
    US court strikes down Trump tariffs again as Korea watches next trade front SEOUL, May 08 (AJP) -President Donald Trump’s global tariff regime has been struck down by U.S. courts yet again, marking the fifth consecutive major legal defeat for his second-term inward trade strategy and intensifying uncertainty for export-dependent allies such as South Korea. On Thursday, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that Trump illegally imposed a 10 percent blanket tariff on most imports using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, concluding the administration exceeded powers granted by Congress. The ruling represents the latest collapse in a rapidly evolving tariff strategy that has repeatedly shifted legal foundations as earlier measures were invalidated by courts. The newly invalidated tariffs had themselves been introduced only hours after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Trump’s earlier sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” in February. Those previous tariffs were imposed under emergency executive powers through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), with Trump arguing that chronic trade deficits and supply-chain vulnerabilities constituted a national emergency. The administration used that authority to impose broad double-digit tariffs affecting nearly every major U.S. trading partner, including South Korea, the European Union, Japan and Canada. But courts increasingly rejected the legal rationale. The tariff regime was first challenged at the U.S. Court of International Trade, then blocked by a federal district court and later rejected again at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ultimately delivered the decisive blow earlier this year, ruling that Trump had exceeded presidential authority by using emergency powers to impose sweeping trade tariffs without congressional approval. Rather than retreat, the White House moved immediately to preserve the tariffs through a new legal pathway. Within hours of the Supreme Court ruling, Trump unveiled a replacement system using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a little-used Cold War-era provision allowing temporary tariffs of up to 15 percent for a maximum of 150 days in response to “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits or “fundamental international payments problems.” The law was originally written during the Bretton Woods monetary era, when the U.S. dollar remained tied to gold and policymakers feared destabilizing international payment imbalances. The move was largely met with scorns. A coalition of states and small businesses sued, arguing the United States does not face the type of balance-of-payments crisis envisioned by Congress in the 1970s. Economists also noted that modern U.S. trade deficits differ fundamentally from the monetary instability Section 122 was designed to address. The trade court agreed. In a split ruling Thursday, judges found the administration failed to demonstrate the specific economic conditions required under Section 122 and declared the tariffs “invalid” and “unauthorized by law.” The administration is expected to appeal again, potentially setting up another Supreme Court confrontation. But the latest defeat further exposes the increasingly unstable legal architecture behind Trump’s tariff offensive. The repeated setbacks, analysts agree, won't likely humble Trump’s trade agenda. The administration has been migrating toward a more legally durable mechanism: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 301 — the same authority Trump used during the original U.S.-China trade war — allows the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate unfair foreign trade practices and impose retaliatory tariffs following formal reviews and hearings. Unlike emergency powers or Section 122, Section 301 requires a lengthier procedural process. But once tariffs are implemented, they become substantially harder to overturn in court because they rest on clearer statutory authority delegated by Congress. The White House has already signaled that future Section 301 investigations will increasingly target strategic industries tied to economic security and industrial competition, including semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, pharmaceuticals and advanced manufacturing supply chains. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in March announced it was launching investigations into Korea and 15 other major manufacturing economies under Section 301, accusing them of "structural excess capacity." The Korean trade minister has been in Washington for an USTR hearing to defend the industry anchored on "market economy principles" and explain how the two countries are in a complementary relationship that is expected to expand based on the Korea-U.S. strategic investment memorandum of understanding where Korea has pledged a combined investment of $350 billion. 2026-05-08 07:58:48