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Large $1.7 billion international money transfer completed in one hour via China's payment network A large international money transfer worth 1.7 billion dollars was completed in just one hour through China's payment network. According to the South China Morning Post on July 24, the Bank of China processed a remittance of 1.7 billion dollars (approximately 2.5 trillion won) through its Shenzhen branch using mBridge, the international payment platform of the People's Bank of China. This month, a larger amount was reported to have been transferred to the Bank of China's Fujian branch from overseas. The July transaction was the largest in terms of value among those using mBridge. The June transaction involved a Chinese corporate client sending money to an overseas corporate client, while the July transfer was made by an overseas remitter to a corporate account in mainland China. The transfer took less than 60 minutes to complete. China launched mBridge, a digital payment platform based on blockchain technology, in 2021. A key feature of mBridge is that it does not go through the international payment network SWIFT. Central banks from various countries join mBridge to settle transactions using central bank digital currencies, allowing financial institutions to conduct cross-border remittances. This system differs from the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which China established in 2015 to facilitate international transactions in yuan. CIPS uses existing banking payment systems for international yuan payments and settlements and also utilizes the SWIFT system. Market analysts view mBridge as a crucial tool for China to reduce geopolitical risks and decrease reliance on the dollar-centric international payment network. A recent report from the Japan Research Institute described mBridge as a project designed to establish a mechanism for continuing yuan-denominated payments amid rising geopolitical tensions and economic sanctions. French investment bank Natixis stated, "As the use cases for mBridge increase, the platform's maturity will grow, and in the long term, it could establish itself as an alternative payment network to SWIFT while supporting the internationalization of the yuan."* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:40:00 -
U.S. Imposes 12.5% Tariff on South Korean Goods Over Forced Labor The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has decided to impose a minimum tariff of 12.5% on South Korean products due to deficiencies in the country's forced labor import ban. The South Korean government noted that the U.S. reaffirmed the 15% tariff cap agreed upon in the Korea-U.S. tariff agreement, which alleviates some uncertainty regarding tariffs.According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the USTR announced the final results of its Section 301 investigation into the forced labor import ban on July 23 (local time). The U.S. will categorize South Korea, China, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, India, and 60 other economies into four groups, applying tariffs of either 10% or 12.5% based on their forced labor import ban and existing trade agreements.For South Korea, Japan, and Switzerland, if the existing Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff is lower than 12.5%, the Section 301 tariff will be added to ensure a total tariff rate of 12.5%. Products already subject to MFN tariffs of 12.5% or higher will not incur additional Section 301 tariffs, maintaining the existing rates. As a result, South Korean products will face a minimum tariff rate of 12.5%.However, products and components subject to Section 232 tariffs, such as automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, are excluded from this measure. Raw materials and certain specific items that could cause supply shortages or economic disruption in the U.S. are also exempt.The new tariffs will take effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on July 24. Previously, the U.S. had imposed a temporary global tariff of 10% under Section 122 of the Trade Act after a court ruled that the reciprocal tariffs based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were illegal. The forced labor Section 301 tariffs will be applied when the Section 122 tariffs expire.The Ministry of Trade assessed that the recent decision does not undermine last year's Korea-U.S. tariff agreement. Minister Kim Jung-kwan and Trade Negotiations Chief Yeo Han-goo visited the U.S. this week to discuss the forced labor and overproduction Section 301 tariffs with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Rutnik and USTR Representative Jamieson Greer.South Korean officials emphasized that the combined burden of the two types of Section 301 tariffs should not exceed the agreed-upon 15% level. The U.S. also reaffirmed its commitment to adhere to existing trade agreements. The joint fact sheet from the Korea-U.S. agreement states that the U.S. will apply the higher of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or MFN rates and the 15% tariff on South Korean products.Looking ahead, the South Korean government aims to limit any additional tariff burden from the ongoing structural overproduction Section 301 investigation to a maximum of 2.5 percentage points. If the total tariff rate already reaches 12.5% due to the forced labor tariff, adding an overproduction tariff exceeding 2.5 percentage points could surpass the agreed 15% threshold.The overproduction investigation targets key South Korean manufacturing sectors, including steel, automobiles, batteries, semiconductors, chemicals, machinery, and shipbuilding. The USTR began its investigation in March involving 16 economies, including South Korea, China, the EU, and Japan, but has yet to finalize the tariff rates and targeted products.The government believes that the finalization of the forced labor tariffs has reduced some uncertainty following the court ruling on reciprocal tariffs and the expiration of the Section 122 tariffs. However, as the overproduction investigation is still ongoing, high-level consultations and sector-specific responses will continue until the U.S. announces its final measures.A Ministry official stated, "We clearly communicated to the U.S. that the total of the forced labor Section 301 tariffs and the overproduction Section 301 tariffs should not exceed 15%. The U.S. has reaffirmed its commitment to adhere to the existing Korea-U.S. tariff agreement, and we will work closely to maintain a balance of interests for our side."* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:32:00 -
KOSPI and KOSDAQ Plunge Over 5%, Triggering Sell Sidecar The KOSPI index dropped more than 5%, falling below the 6,700 mark. Major semiconductor stocks, including Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, showed significant weakness, leading to increased volatility in both the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets, prompting the activation of sell sidecars.According to the Korea Exchange, as of 1:08 PM, the KOSPI was trading at 6,695.23, down 401.66 points (5.66%) from the previous trading day. The index opened at 7,000.78, down 96.11 points (1.35%), and continued to decline throughout the session.Foreign and institutional investors sold a net 33.75 billion won and 16.84 billion won, respectively, contributing to the index's drop. In contrast, individual investors were net buyers, purchasing 50.99 billion won.As market volatility increased, a sell sidecar for the KOSPI was activated at 11:23 AM. This occurs when the price of the most traded futures contract based on the KOSPI 200 falls by more than 5% for one minute.The decline was primarily driven by major semiconductor stocks. SK Hynix was trading at 1,763,000 won, down 156,000 won (8.13%). Samsung Electronics also fell by 21,500 won (7.96%), trading at 248,500 won.Other large-cap stocks also showed weakness, with Hyundai Motor (-8.68%), SK Square (-8.48%), Samsung Electro-Mechanics (-8.29%), Samsung C&T (-6.25%), Samsung Life (-5.61%), LG Energy Solution (-5.60%), and KB Financial (-4.76%) all declining. However, Samsung Biologics was the only stock showing strength, rising by 10.15%.The KOSDAQ also experienced a decline of over 5%. At the same time, the KOSDAQ index recorded a drop of 40.57 points (5.13%), trading at 749.73.In the KOSDAQ market, individual investors were net buyers, purchasing 48.21 billion won, while foreign and institutional investors sold a net 22.51 billion won and 25.53 billion won, respectively.A sell sidecar for the KOSDAQ was activated at 11:47 AM after the KOSDAQ 150 futures fell by more than 6% and the KOSDAQ 150 index dropped by over 3% for one minute.Factors weighing on the domestic stock market include geopolitical uncertainties in the Middle East and a surge in international oil prices.As military tensions rise in the Middle East, Brent crude oil traded at $100.69 per barrel, up 7% from the previous session, surpassing $100 for the first time since May. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) also surged by 6.2%, reaching $92.19 per barrel. Concerns over oil supply disruptions have increased following attacks on Saudi Arabian tankers by Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi rebels and ongoing military clashes between the U.S. and Iran.Han Ji-young, a researcher at Kiwoom Securities, stated, "The current surge in oil prices is exerting upward pressure on interest rates again, which could create a burden on stock market valuations. However, it is important to note that the valuation burden on the KOSPI is lower compared to previous periods of rising interest rates."* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:32:00 -
Small Business Agency Launches S-GDP Initiative to Measure Economic Value The Small Business Market Promotion Agency announced on July 24 that it will actively pursue research to establish the 'Small Business Gross Domestic Product (S-GDP)', a measure of the production and added value generated by small businesses in the national economy, similar to GDP.On the same day, the agency launched the 'Expert Advisory Group for Establishing a System to Measure the Economic Value of Small Businesses' at Dream Square in Mapo District and began research based on the System of National Accounts (SNA) for the S-GDP.The advisory group includes experts from relevant institutions and academia, such as the Bank of Korea, the National Data Agency, the Korea Development Institute (KDI), the Korean Economic Association, and the Korean Association of Applied Economics.During the meeting, participants discussed sharing past research outcomes, concepts and measurement methods, consistency with national statistics, and policy utilization strategies.The launch of this advisory group is one of the implementation tasks of the 'Small Business Value Coexistence Project' announced by Director In Tae-yeon during a press conference marking his 100th day in office. The aim is to establish a foundation for measuring the economic value of small businesses through the development of S-GDP.With the establishment of the advisory group, the agency plans to enhance its previous research and incorporate expert opinions to improve the objectivity and policy applicability of the study.In Tae-yeon, the agency's director, stated, 'Small businesses are an ecosystem that drives our economy and local communities. We will use data to show who is producing in the Korean economy and establish a policy foundation that allows the public to feel the economic value created by small businesses.'* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:32:00 -
SK Group to Delist SK Signet and Sell Shares Through Tender Offer SK Group has decided to delist its subsidiary SK Signet and will initiate a tender offer to buy back shares from minority shareholders. This move aims to protect the rights of small shareholders while accelerating portfolio rebalancing.On July 24, SK announced its decision to conduct a tender offer for common shares of SK Signet, which is listed on the KONEX. The tender offer price is set at 8,200 won per share, which is more than 20% higher than the weighted average price over the past month.The tender offer period will last for one month, from today until August 24. During this time, SK plans to purchase up to approximately 10 million shares of both common and preferred stock of SK Signet.NH Investment & Securities will manage the tender offer, and interested shareholders can sell their shares by visiting NH Investment & Securities branches or through an online platform. Following the tender offer, a comprehensive stock exchange process will be carried out to delist SK Signet.Typically, a comprehensive stock exchange can secure 100% ownership during the delisting process. However, SK has opted to conduct a tender offer first to provide general shareholders with an opportunity to sell at a premium compared to market prices.SK plans to acquire shares from shareholders who do not participate in the tender offer through the stock exchange method.SK aims to complete the delisting of SK Signet and its transition to a wholly-owned subsidiary by the fourth quarter and finalize the sale of SK Signet by the first quarter of next year, thereby accelerating proactive portfolio rebalancing.This tender offer aligns with recent capital market policies emphasizing the protection of minority shareholders. The Financial Services Commission is working on a mandatory tender offer system that would require companies acquiring large stakes to buy shares from minority shareholders at the same price and conditions as the majority shareholder.Founded in 1998, SK Signet specializes in electric vehicle charging solutions and was integrated into SK in 2021, providing customized charging solutions focused on rapid and ultra-fast charging. The company reported an operating profit of 3 billion won in 2022 but has since recorded operating losses of 149.4 billion won in 2023, 242.8 billion won in 2024, and 48.4 billion won in 2025.An SK official stated, "This tender offer is a decision made to fulfill our responsibility in enhancing the value for minority shareholders ahead of the sale of SK Signet. Currently, there are no specific confirmed details beyond the plan to fully integrate it as a subsidiary before the sale."Meanwhile, the sale of SK Signet is seen as part of SK Group's ongoing portfolio rebalancing efforts. Since 2023, SK Group has been working to divest non-core assets and secure investment resources focused on future growth sectors such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Following the sales of SK Siltron and SK Specialty, SK Signet has also been added to the list of assets being streamlined.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:28:00 -
Dongyang Life Insurance Moves Closer to Full Subsidiary Status Under Woori Financial Dongyang Life Insurance's plan to become a full subsidiary of Woori Financial Group has passed a shareholder meeting.On July 24, the company held an extraordinary general meeting where shareholders approved the comprehensive stock exchange agreement with Woori Financial Group by a majority vote.Previously, some minority shareholders expressed concerns over the stock exchange ratio and the method of determining the exchange price. In response, Dongyang Life held two shareholder meetings to explain the basis and procedures for the valuation.To minimize the exit of dissenting shareholders, Woori Financial Group raised the stock buyback price from 8,505 won to 9,356 won, a 10% increase, earlier this month.The stock exchange ratio is set at 0.2521056 shares of Woori Financial Group for each common share of Dongyang Life Insurance. The exchange prices have been established at 34,589 won for Woori Financial Group and 8,720 won for Dongyang Life.The securities registration statement submitted by Woori Financial Group became effective on July 16 after passing the Financial Supervisory Service's review, approximately two months after the FSS requested a corrected filing on May 26.Woori Financial Group is also expected to hold a board meeting today to approve matters related to the comprehensive stock exchange. Dongyang Life shareholders can exercise their stock buyback rights until August 3. Following this, all shares issued by Dongyang Life will be transferred to Woori Financial Group on August 11, with new shares of Woori Financial Group expected to be listed by the end of the month.Once the related procedures are completed and Dongyang Life is delisted from the securities market, it will officially become a full subsidiary of Woori Financial Group.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:28:00 -
Editorial: Super-weak yen is Korea's problem too The yen has just done something it hasn't done in 40 years: it broke past 163 to the dollar, a level not seen since 1986. In Tokyo, that's being read as bad news for Japanese households, who now face pricier imports and a shrinking real income. But Seoul shouldn't be watching this from the sidelines. A weaker yen doesn't just weaken Japan's currency — it chips away at Korean export competitiveness and drags the won down with it. The won has been softening against the dollar too, but the yen is falling faster. That's the awkward part. Even as the won loses value, Korean goods are somehow becoming less price-competitive relative to Japanese ones. Korean firms are stuck importing oil, gas and raw materials in expensive dollars, while fighting for market share abroad against Japanese rivals who get a built-in discount from their own currency's collapse. It's a cost squeeze and a competitiveness squeeze at the same time. This isn't confined to a couple of legacy industries. Korea and Japan go head-to-head across autos, steel, machinery and petrochemicals, but also in semiconductor equipment, batteries, robotics and defense manufacturing — precisely the sectors both countries are betting their industrial futures on. A prolonged weak yen lets Japanese firms either cut export prices or plow their currency-driven windfall into R&D and capital investment. Korean firms, facing the same global buyers, are left choosing between defending market share by cutting margins or protecting margins by ceding orders. Smaller exporters, with the least room to absorb either option, take the hardest hit. Some argue Korean firms have closed the technology gap enough that yen weakness doesn't sting the way it once did. That may be true in segments where design and quality dominate. But in auto parts, machinery and materials — industries won on price as much as performance — an exchange-rate gap translates directly into lost orders. If a Japanese supplier can offer a comparable part for less, the incentive for a buyer to choose Korea shrinks accordingly. There's a second-order effect, too. Won and yen tend to move together as "Asian currencies" in the eyes of global investors. When the yen keeps sliding, foreign capital is more inclined to treat the won as part of the same weak-currency basket and sell accordingly — a dynamic that only intensifies if global financial markets turn volatile. A weaker won might sound like a small silver lining for exporters, but the costs outweigh the benefit. Import prices for oil, gas and grain rise, corporate foreign-currency funding gets more expensive, and a fragile consumption recovery gets harder still as living costs climb. This also complicates the Bank of Korea's job considerably. Domestic conditions argue for lower rates, but a weakening won and rising import prices argue against moving too quickly. Hold rates too high for too long to defend the currency, and households, the self-employed and small businesses absorb the interest burden instead. Super yen weakness is narrowing Korea's monetary policy options from both directions at once. The government's response can't stop at currency intervention. Smoothing out disorderly swings in the foreign exchange market is a stopgap, not a fix — it does nothing to close the underlying competitiveness gap. What's needed is a sector-by-sector look at where the yen shock is hitting hardest, along with expanded exchange-rate insurance and policy financing, particularly for smaller exporters heavily exposed to raw material imports. More fundamentally, Korean industry needs to build a structure that isn't so easily rattled by currency swings in the first place. While Japanese companies redirect their yen-driven profits into technology and capacity, Korean firms shouldn't be left boxed in by high interest rates, regulation and a sluggish domestic market. Without gains in core technology and productivity, the competitiveness gap will outlast the currency cycle that exposed it. A won that's weak, paired with a yen that's weaker still, is about the worst combination Korea could face right now — rising import costs, falling export competitiveness, and a monetary policy squeezed by currency instability on both sides. Super yen weakness shouldn't be filed away as a Japanese problem. It's a compound risk to the Korean economy, and it calls for action now, not after the fact. 2026-07-24 13:25:43 -
U.S. Airstrikes on Iran Continue for 13th Day, 4 Dead On July 23, the United States conducted airstrikes against Iran for the 13th consecutive night. Attacks targeted military facilities around the Strait of Hormuz and extended into southwestern Iran, resulting in casualties.The U.S. Central Command announced that the strikes began at 6:45 p.m. Eastern Time and concluded around 9 p.m., lasting approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes.Targets included Iranian military command centers, drone storage facilities, communication networks, and coastal surveillance bases. The Central Command described the operation as aimed at reducing threats posed by Iran to civilian mariners and commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.The Central Command asserted that the Strait of Hormuz remains open and that commercial shipping continues. It also stated that more than 50,000 U.S. troops are currently deployed across the Middle East.Following the airstrikes, a series of explosions were reported in southern Iran, particularly around Hormozgan Province. Iranian state broadcaster IRIB reported that power lines were damaged in the major port city of Bandar Abbas, causing outages in some areas, and that two people were injured.Explosions, believed to be from missile attacks, were also reported on Qeshm Island, a key energy and logistics hub at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.According to Iranian state news agency IRNA, four people were killed and five injured in missile strikes on the outskirts of Ahvaz in Khuzestan Province. Explosions were also reported in nearby Andimeshk and Omidiyeh. The extent of the damage and specific locations of the strikes have not been independently verified.This round of airstrikes comes as President Donald Trump indicated he is considering a larger-scale attack against Iran. In an interview with Axios, Trump stated, "I am considering a larger-scale attack than ever before," adding that a decision is imminent and military preparations are complete. However, U.S. officials noted that no final decision has been made or new operational orders issued.Trump warned that if the Iran-backed Houthi militia attacks commercial vessels again, both the Houthis and Iran will be held accountable.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:24:00 -
The quiet weapon: Why Korea doesn't need to beg at the tariff table There is a war raging in the Middle East, oil is creeping back into the headlines, and an American midterm election is closing in fast enough that every policy in Washington now wears a campaign button. Into this crowded battlefield, Donald Trump has opened a second front — not with missiles, but with tariff schedules. Section 301, Section 122, Section 338, a Depression-era statute nobody in Congress remembered still existed: the instruments keep changing, but the intent doesn't. Trump wants leverage, and he has decided that tariffs are the lever he trusts most. Seoul has spent the past year absorbing blow after blow from that lever — a 25 percent reciprocal tariff talked down to 15, a forced-labor tariff of 12.5 percent it fought and lost, and the looming shadow of a second Section 301 investigation into "structural overproduction" that could push the total right up against the ceiling Korea thought it had already negotiated. On paper, this looks like a country perpetually on the back foot, absorbing terms rather than setting them. But look past the tariff schedule and a different picture appears. Korea isn't just a defendant in this trade war. It may be one of the few countries holding a card the United States actually needs. The Card Nobody Talks About America's tariff strategy is built for leverage over goods — cars, steel, semiconductors made somewhere else. It is not built for leverage over capacity. And capacity is exactly what the United States has run short of. Take shipbuilding. The U.S. Navy wants more ships. It doesn't have the yards, the welders, or the supply chains to build them at the pace a rising China demands. Korea does. Hanwha's yard in Philadelphia — modest by Korean standards, but sitting on one of the largest graving docks in the country — is already building missile-tracking vessels for the Missile Defense Agency's Golden Dome program. Hanwha Ocean's home base in Geoje dwarfs anything America has: the world's largest dry dock, a crane rated at nearly a thousand tons, and a production line capable of turning out everything from LNG carriers to destroyers. When Trump asked Korea's president at the G7 whether Seoul could simply build ten warships for the United States, it wasn't a rhetorical question. It was an admission of dependency dressed up as a favor. Semiconductors tell a similar story, just one rung further up the value chain. Washington can write all the export-control rules it likes, but it cannot manufacture its way out of a shortage of advanced logic and memory chips overnight — the fabs, the yield curves, the decades of process knowledge sit in Korea (and Taiwan), not in Ohio or Arizona. Every AI ambition the U.S. has, from data-center buildouts to defense applications, runs through chips that Korea's foundries help supply. Then there's the piece that rarely makes the tariff headlines but may matter most in the next decade: power. The AI race is no longer just a software race — it is an energy race. Training and running frontier models at scale requires electricity in quantities the American grid is not currently built to deliver. Korea's nuclear expertise, its small modular reactor programs, and its manufacturing base for reactor components position it as a supplier not just of ships and chips, but of the physical infrastructure that keeps AI's engines running. Add in Korea's growing footprint in "physical AI" — robotics, automation, the hardware layer where artificial intelligence meets the real world — and a pattern emerges: America has the algorithms, Korea increasingly has the machines that let those algorithms do anything in the physical world at all. Software Power Meets Manufacturing Power This is the trade that nobody is writing into the tariff schedules, but it's the one that actually matters. The United States has extraordinary strength in software, in model architectures, in the frontier of AI research. What it lacks — and increasingly cannot build fast enough on its own — is the industrial substrate underneath that software: the ships, the chips, the reactors, the physical hardware that turns intelligence into capability. Korea has spent decades building precisely that substrate, quietly, without much of the swagger that attends Silicon Valley product launches. That asymmetry is the leverage Seoul has been sitting on all along. Every dollar of the $350 billion in U.S. investment Korea has already pledged, every new shipyard cooperation center opened in Washington, every joint research project on AI-assisted ship design — these aren't just concessions extracted by American pressure. They are also Korea buying itself a seat at a table where its manufacturing base becomes indispensable rather than optional. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick can talk about judging the partnership by ships actually built rather than meetings held, and he's right to — but that standard cuts both ways. If the ships get built, they get built because Korea can build them and the U.S., for now, largely cannot. The Real Negotiation None of this means Korea can simply shrug off a 12.5 percent tariff or wave away the threat of a steeper one on overproduction. Trade wars fought with real tariffs cost real money, and Korean exporters will feel every percentage point. But there's a difference between a country negotiating from need and a country negotiating from utility. Korea is doing the latter, whether or not Washington's tariff announcements make that obvious. Fair play, as the old bargaining maxim goes, has never been the currency of negotiation — leverage is. Trump understands this instinctively, which is why he keeps reaching for new legal tools to manufacture leverage where none existed before. What his administration may be slower to recognize is that leverage runs in both directions. The country that can build the ships, fab the chips, and power the reactors that America's AI ambitions depend on is not simply a tariff target. It is a supplier the United States cannot easily replace — and in the arithmetic of bargaining, that fact is worth more than any concession wrung out of a Section 301 hearing. *The author is the managing editor of AJP. 2026-07-24 13:16:58 -
Prosecutors Seek 5-Year Sentence for Yoon Suk Yeol in Diplomatic Escape Case The Special Prosecutor's Office, led by Lee Myung-hyun, has requested a five-year prison sentence for Yoon Suk Yeol, the former president, who is accused of facilitating the escape of former Defense Minister Lee Jong-seop abroad.During a hearing on July 24 at the Seoul Central District Court, presided over by Judge Jo Hyung-woo, the prosecution made its sentencing request regarding Yoon's charges of aiding a fugitive and obstructing the exercise of rights. The prosecution also sought three years in prison for former National Security Office chief Cho Tae-yong and former Justice Minister Park Sung-jae. Additionally, they requested two years for former Civil Service Ethics Secretary Lee Si-won, former First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Jang Ho-jin, and former Deputy Minister of Justice Shim Woo-jung.The Special Prosecutor's Office stated that the defendants "turned a blind eye to the truth and remained silent, conducting a formal review to send Lee Jong-seop as ambassador and mechanically processing the procedure to lift his travel ban." They characterized this as an "organized act of concealing the truth" rather than a series of individual coincidences.Regarding Yoon, the prosecution argued that he "mobilized state power for personal and political purposes ahead of the general election, not only obstructing but also undermining the criminal justice process," asserting that he "completely violated the state's investigative authority." They added, "It is evident that appointing Lee Jong-seop as ambassador to facilitate his escape would disrupt the investigation by the High-ranking Officials Crime Investigation Agency, based on common sense."Yoon was indicted for allegedly directing the appointment of Lee, a key suspect in the pressure on the investigation into the death of Sergeant Chae Sang-byeong, to the position of ambassador to Australia, intending to facilitate Lee's escape just four months after Chae's death in November 2023.Cho is accused of being systematically involved in the appointment and departure process of Lee under Yoon's orders, while Park and Shim are charged with involvement in the process of lifting Lee's travel ban after his appointment as ambassador.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-24 13:04:00


