[Kim Han-jung Column] It's Time to Clarify Principles in Pragmatic Diplomacy

Three significant events occurred within ten days. On November 3, the Democratic Party regained control of both chambers of Congress in the U.S. On November 10, the South Korean government submitted a proposal to expand the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit to the waters south of Oman. On November 11, Stephen Biegun, former special representative for North Korea under President Trump, published an article titled, 'Trump Faces a Very Different North Korea.' Questions arise about the extent of ship protection and the threshold for engagement. Is nuclear freeze a first step or an endpoint? As the moment of decision approaches, the government's previously stated criteria remain unclear.

These three events illustrate the challenges that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's pragmatic diplomacy must overcome. The direction of pragmatic diplomacy is correct; it should prioritize results that enhance the safety and lives of the people over ideology. However, if it remains unclear what can be gained and how far concessions can go, pragmatism risks devolving into mere improvisation. It is now essential to clarify principles, objectives, and the order of execution.

Divided Washington and Growing Risks of Involvement

The first challenge is the division in American politics. While Congress has shifted to the Democratic Party, President Trump still retains broad diplomatic and military authority. As the new Congress convenes in January, conflicts with the White House may intensify. Trump, constrained by Congress, could rush to arrange a North Korea-U.S. summit or escalate military pressure in the Middle East. It cannot be assumed that political weakness will lead to caution in foreign policy.

South Korea must engage with both the White House and Congress. The Democratic Party's majority does not necessarily favor South Korea; they prioritize American industries and jobs. Rather than relying on any single party, South Korea should articulate the mutual benefits of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and secure bipartisan support for North Korea agreements. It is also crucial to assess how long promises made between leaders can last without congressional budget approval and political backing.

Changing North Korea: The Order of Negotiations Matters

The third challenge is the changing nature of North Korea. Biegun noted in his Foreign Affairs article that Trump now faces a North Korea that is different from that of 2019. North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have grown, and support from Russia has alleviated the pressure of sanctions. This means that moving Kim Jong-un through mere sanctions relief and personal rapport is increasingly difficult.

On the same day, North Korea unveiled a revised constitution that omits unification clauses, officially recognizing the two Koreas as separate states. While this reality must be acknowledged, it should not close off the possibility of dialogue. Biegun's proposal suggests maintaining the ultimate goal of denuclearization while initiating negotiations to halt nuclear expansion and reduce risks. The approach is to maintain deterrence while aligning the starting point of negotiations with current realities.

Concerns arise that negotiating a nuclear freeze could imply recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. If a freeze is treated as a final agreement, such criticism is valid. However, using a verifiable production halt as the first step toward reduction and dismantlement is different. The risk of North Korea increasing its nuclear arsenal while negotiations are delayed must also be considered.

For South Korea, the content of any agreement is crucial. An agreement that only limits intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the U.S. while leaving nuclear capabilities targeting South Korea intact is insufficient. Preventing 'passing' means more than just securing a seat at the negotiating table; it involves including the reduction of threats against South Korea in the negotiation objectives and ensuring that changes to U.S. forces and joint defense are subject to prior consultation and agreement between South Korea and the U.S.

It is essential to first clarify what must be protected. Principles should serve as common criteria to address these three challenges. At the core should be the prevention of war and the promotion of peaceful coexistence. It must be clear that the policy does not assume the collapse or absorption of North Korea. Negotiations and compromises become pragmatic when they expand the safety and long-term options for the people.

Some may argue that making principles public could rigidify negotiations. However, what should be disclosed are not the specifics of concessions but rather the goals and criteria for judgment. Clarity in objectives ensures that even if means change, the credibility of the policy remains intact.

Implementation should begin with establishing South Korea's vision for North Korea. The government must prepare a negotiation plan that includes restoring communication channels, preventing conflicts, freezing and verifying nuclear material production, and reducing and dismantling nuclear capabilities. Each stage should connect North Korea's verifiable actions with improvements in relations and corresponding measures such as sanctions relief in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, and agreements should be designed to allow for reversibility in case of violations. This should evolve into a joint negotiation framework between South Korea and the U.S.

China and Russia should also be asked to play different roles under the same objectives. China should cooperate to prevent instability and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, while Russia should be urged to cease cooperation that aids North Korea's nuclear and missile advancements. Continuing economic cooperation with China while diversifying dependence on key materials and markets will also enhance diplomatic options.

I witnessed the necessity for South Korea to take the lead during my time at the Blue House. In 1999, the U.S. was undergoing a comprehensive review of its North Korea policy. Hardline views were prevalent in Washington. President Kim Dae-jung did not wait for the U.S. conclusion; he presented a comprehensive vision from South Korea and persuaded William Perry, the U.S. coordinator for North Korea policy. The Perry Report released that fall incorporated the framework of South Korea's vision. President Yoon Suk-yeol must also explain the objectives to the public and collaborate with the National Assembly to establish a foundation for sustainable diplomacy. The success of pragmatic diplomacy should be evaluated not by the number of summits but by how much safer the people feel and how much their burdens are reduced.

Failures in security translate into rising oil prices, job insecurity, investment risks, and instability in daily life. The risks that pragmatic diplomacy must mitigate are precisely these. Pragmatism does not mean being able to do anything; only a country that knows what to protect can be flexible.





* This article has been translated by AI.