Top 10 Conglomerates' Internal Transactions Reach 185 Trillion Won

Last year, the internal transaction amount among domestic affiliates of the top 10 conglomerates reached 185 trillion won (KRW). These groups accounted for two-thirds of the total internal transactions among large corporate groups in the country. Although the scale of internal transactions decreased compared to the previous year, the proportion of transactions involving companies subject to profit appropriation regulations was more than double that of other groups, raising concerns about the need for monitoring unfair internal transactions.


According to the Fair Trade Commission's report on the 'Analysis of Internal Transaction Status of Publicly Disclosed Corporate Groups in 2026' released on the 19th, the internal transaction amount among domestic affiliates of the top 10 conglomerates was 185.1 trillion won (KRW), representing 66.7% of the total internal transaction amount (277.4 trillion won (KRW)) among 102 corporate groups. This figure decreased by 8 trillion won (KRW) from approximately 193 trillion won (KRW) the previous year, but the proportion of internal transactions relative to sales was 12.6%, which is 1.1 percentage points higher than the overall average of 11.5%.


Hyundai Motor had the highest internal transaction amount among domestic affiliates at 60.9 trillion won (KRW), followed by SK at 49.7 trillion won (KRW), Samsung at 28.3 trillion won (KRW), HD Hyundai at 11.9 trillion won (KRW), and LG at 9.5 trillion won (KRW). The proportion of internal transactions was 20.7% for SK, 20.5% for Hyundai Motor, and 16.3% for HD Hyundai.


The total internal transaction amount among domestic affiliates increased from 218 trillion won (KRW) in 2021 to 275.1 trillion won (KRW) in 2022, maintaining around 280 trillion won (KRW) until last year. The proportion relative to sales decreased from 12.8% in 2023 to 12.3% in 2024, and then to 11.5% last year, influenced by the overall sales increase from 2,164 trillion won (KRW) to 2,403 trillion won (KRW) during the same period.


There was also a tendency for companies with a higher ownership stake by the founding family to rely more on affiliate transactions. Last year, the proportion of internal transactions for companies with an ownership stake of over 20% was 9.6%, while it was 17.8% for those with over 50%, and 22.8% for those with 100%. Although the proportion of companies with 100% ownership decreased from 27.7% in 2022, it remains nearly double the overall average of 11.5%.


The internal transaction amount for 831 companies subject to profit appropriation regulations was 38.6 trillion won (KRW), an increase of 1.2 trillion won (KRW) from the previous year. Among these, the internal transaction amount for 108 companies belonging to the top 10 conglomerates was 23.6 trillion won (KRW). The proportion of internal transactions relative to sales for these companies was 16.1%, more than double that of the remaining 723 companies subject to regulations (7.3%).


The method of transactions was also heavily skewed towards direct contracts. Of the internal transaction amount for regulated companies, 35.5 trillion won (KRW) (92.0%) was conducted through direct contracts. This trend of direct contract-centered transactions has continued, with figures of 90.8% in 2022, 89.6% in 2023, and 88.2% in 2024.


High proportions of internal transactions or direct contracts alone cannot be deemed as unfair allocation of work. However, since the expansion of profit appropriation regulations at the end of 2021, the phenomenon of transactions concentrating in specific ownership structures has continued, leading to calls for increased effectiveness in legal judgments and sanctions.


Park Sang-in, a professor at Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Administration, stated, "Current legal provisions and precedents make it difficult to properly regulate problematic internal transactions. The law should be amended to assess illegality in accordance with regulatory objectives, such as restricting transaction opportunities for external competitors or the unfair allocation of benefits to the founding family."





* This article has been translated by AI.