IAEA Praises South Korea's Nuclear Submarine Development Process

As the government pushes to launch a nuclear-powered submarine by 2035, a report related to South Korea from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was publicly released for the first time on November 19. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized the significance of the positive evaluation regarding South Korea's compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations and cooperation with the IAEA, stating that follow-up discussions will proceed without delay. In particular, it presented the goal of signing a separate agreement that can ensure both military confidentiality and the non-diversion of nuclear materials.

A Ministry official met with reporters at the Ministry's headquarters in Jongno-gu, Seoul, and stated, "This signifies that close consultations are taking place between the government and the IAEA."

According to the Ministry, the IAEA evaluated that South Korea has fulfilled its reporting obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) related to the Broader Conclusion, which South Korea has maintained annually since 2007. It was also reported that the IAEA expressed satisfaction with the cooperation with South Korea regarding technical discussions and exchanges of opinions related to nuclear-powered submarines.

The Broader Conclusion is a safeguard conclusion by the IAEA that determines all nuclear materials in a country are used for peaceful activities. This evaluation is considered significant as it demonstrates South Korea's compliance with nuclear non-proliferation and safeguard obligations. The IAEA also expressed hope that South Korea's commitments to non-proliferation and safeguards will continue to be upheld in this report.

The government is pursuing the signing of a separate agreement under Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows non-nuclear weapon states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while requiring that nuclear materials are subject to IAEA safeguards to prevent their diversion to nuclear weapons.

However, the nuclear materials used in nuclear-powered submarines fall under military activities that are not prohibited by the NPT and do not involve nuclear weapons development. Article 14 of the CSA allows for the establishment of a separate agreement with the IAEA to determine the application methods and procedures for safeguards on nuclear materials used in such non-prohibited military activities.

A key challenge in this process is to protect military confidentiality while preventing the diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. The official explained that the goal is to negotiate specific conditions for the separate agreement that can maintain the IAEA's safeguards system for confirming the non-diversion of nuclear materials while protecting military confidentiality.

While discussions with the United States regarding the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines remain, the government plans to continue its review of safeguards and legal matters with the IAEA separately. Securing the trust of the international community during the IAEA's annual safeguards assessment process is also considered a task.

The official emphasized, "Having successfully taken the first step, it is now crucial to manage the situation well going forward." The government plans to continue discussions with the IAEA while advancing the necessary follow-up procedures for signing the separate agreement.





* This article has been translated by AI.