AJU PRESS ASIA FIRST NEWS AGENCY

Journalist

Kim Hee-su
Kim Hee-su김희수
ReporterMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul City Hall & Defense, Foreign Affairs
Kim Hee-su is a bilingual reporter at AJU Press, covering defense and foreign affairs. Before joining AJP in 2025, she worked at The Korea Times, where she wrote interview stories, including a profile of North Korean defector Kim Gum-hyok, and produced digital content. She also previously worked as a researcher for KBS News 9’s International News Department, supporting correspondents in 10 countries around the world. She graduated from the University of Toronto in Canada with a double major in Book and Media Studies and East Asian Studies. "I'm driven by storytelling."
Latest by Kim Hee-su
  • Korean shipbuilders expand US partnerships in $150B cooperation push
    Korean shipbuilders expand US partnerships in $150B cooperation push SEOUL, July 24 (AJP) - South Korea’s three major shipbuilders are expanding partnerships with U.S. companies in naval ship design, smart shipyards, workforce training and supply chains, as Seoul moves to accelerate a $150 billion shipbuilding cooperation package with Washington. The moves follow the opening of the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington, D.C., this week. The center is expected to serve as a key platform for Korea’s participation in efforts to rebuild the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Hanwha Ocean signed a professional services contract with Leidos Gibbs & Cox, a U.S. naval ship design firm, to jointly design a global strategic sealift vessel. The vessel is a dual-use ship designed for commercial logistics in peacetime and rapid transport of military supplies in a contingency. Hanwha Ocean also signed separate agreements on workforce training and supply chain development with U.S. partners. HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering signed a contract with Siemens Digital Industries Software to introduce a next-generation marine platform that connects ship design, production, supply chain management, quality control and maintenance through a single 3D data-based system. The company also plans to build a virtual shipyard and develop a “physical AI” shipyard where robots and autonomous production equipment carry out parts of the shipbuilding process. Samsung Heavy Industries received approval in principle from the American Bureau of Shipping for a 12,000-cubic-meter LNG bunkering vessel jointly developed with Conrad Shipyard. The company also agreed to cooperate with U.S. unmanned surface vessel startup Saronic Technologies on autonomous navigation, AI software and automated shipyard processes. Samsung Heavy Industries also signed an agreement with Vigor Marine Group to establish a training center for welding and painting workers and plans to work with U.S. universities on virtual training systems for shipbuilding workers. Industry officials expect Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation to expand further as Korean shipbuilders combine their construction technologies and productivity with U.S. production bases. 2026-07-24 17:38:36
  • US-Saudi nuclear deal exposes limits of Seouls enrichment push
    US-Saudi nuclear deal exposes limits of Seoul's enrichment push SEOUL, July 24 (AJP) - A proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement allowing Riyadh to eventually enrich uranium on its own soil may strengthen South Korea's case for greater control over its civilian nuclear fuel cycle, but it does little to resolve the far more difficult question confronting Seoul's nuclear submarine ambitions: who supplies the fuel. The issue has taken on greater urgency as South Korea and the United States resumed follow-up talks last month on security commitments made by Presidents Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung. The agenda includes Seoul's plans to build nuclear-powered submarines, expand cooperation in shipbuilding and seek greater autonomy over uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker, who led the American delegation, described the discussions as "a brief but very productive visit" that laid the groundwork for "continued technical conversations." At the center of the debate is South Korea's decades-old nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington. Under the bilateral "123 Agreement," Seoul cannot enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel without prior U.S. approval, even for civilian purposes. Those restrictions have remained despite South Korea's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its long-standing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Saudi proposal appears to signal greater U.S. flexibility. According to The New York Times, the agreement envisions a two-year joint U.S.-Saudi study on whether domestic uranium enrichment is economically justified. Depending on the outcome, Washington could eventually permit Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on its own territory. For advocates in Seoul, that could strengthen the argument that South Korea—which already operates one of the world's largest civilian reactor fleets—has an even stronger economic case for domestic fuel production. But experts caution that the Saudi negotiations and South Korea's submarine ambitions involve fundamentally different legal questions. "When people hear enrichment, they immediately think of highly enriched uranium," said Suh Kune-yull, professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University. "Nuclear-powered submarines do not necessarily require that level of fuel. It is technically possible to operate with low-enriched uranium of around 5 percent, similar to commercial nuclear fuel. France and China are known to operate submarines using low-enriched uranium." South Korea has already indicated that any future indigenous nuclear submarines would use low-enriched uranium rather than weapons-grade fuel in an effort to ease proliferation concerns. Yet even that approach does not remove the legal obstacles. "The 123 Agreement governs the peaceful use of nuclear energy, not military purposes," said Chung Bum-jin, professor of nuclear engineering at Kyung Hee University. "Building an enrichment plant for commercial nuclear fuel may be possible, but it has nothing to do with submarines." In other words, even if Washington eventually grants Seoul greater civilian enrichment rights, the allies would still need a separate arrangement covering fuel for military reactors. That leaves unresolved the most sensitive issue surrounding South Korea's submarine program—whether the United States would provide reactor fuel, allow South Korea to produce it domestically, or devise an entirely new legal framework. For Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, the debate centers on economics. Unlike South Korea, Saudi Arabia has no operating commercial nuclear reactors and remains in the early stages of developing a civilian nuclear industry. "The key question is whether Saudi Arabia can demonstrate economic feasibility," Chung said. "If a country has only a handful of nuclear power plants, it may simply be told to purchase fuel instead. If a country with virtually no nuclear industry insists on enrichment, that naturally raises questions about its intentions." He suggested Washington may have left itself considerable room to maneuver. "For years Saudi Arabia insisted it would not purchase reactors unless it received enrichment rights," Chung said. "The United States may be opening the door now, but it can still close it later by concluding there is no economic justification." He said the proposed agreement may primarily serve as a vehicle for U.S. reactor suppliers such as Westinghouse to gain access to Saudi Arabia's emerging nuclear market. South Korea presents a markedly different case. "South Korea operates about 30 commercial reactors, and if exported reactors are included, it effectively supports around 40 units," Chung said. "Those reactors all require fuel. That economic rationale is much easier to demonstrate." Even so, Washington has another reason for caution. "From the U.S. perspective, South Korea is a competitor in the nuclear fuel market," Chung said. "Saudi Arabia is not." For Seoul, the Saudi negotiations may therefore strengthen the political argument for expanding civilian enrichment rights, but they offer little guidance on the separate challenge of fueling a future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. The next round of Korea-U.S. nuclear talks will test whether Washington is prepared to distinguish between those two issues—granting greater flexibility over the civilian fuel cycle while maintaining tighter restrictions on military nuclear propulsion. 2026-07-24 17:05:52
  • Navy tests humanoid robot at ships wheel in first crew experiment
    Navy tests humanoid robot at ship's wheel in first crew experiment SEOUL, July 24 (AJP) - South Korea’s Navy has tested a humanoid robot as a ship crew member for the first time, putting the machine at the wheel inside a bridge simulator as part of efforts to reduce sailors’ workload and prepare for a shrinking pool of military personnel. The Navy said Friday that the experiment was conducted Wednesday at the Naval Education and Training Command’s ship-handling training facility in Changwon, South Gyeongsang Province, in cooperation with the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. Video footage released by the Navy showed KAIST’s humanoid robot PIBOT standing at the helm inside a bridge simulator designed to replicate a naval vessel. Navy personnel stood watch at the windows and control panels, while researchers monitored the robot from nearby computer screens. In the footage, an officer of the watch gave PIBOT a helm order through a handheld microphone, just as he would to a human sailor: “Rudder left five degrees, steady on 330.” PIBOT repeated the command, moved its mechanical arm toward the wheel and turned the steering gear. After the simulated vessel’s heading stabilized, the robot reported that the course change had been completed. The repeat-back procedure is a standard part of ship handling, used to ensure that helm orders are clearly received and correctly executed. The Navy said PIBOT followed the same process used by human sailors. The test was conducted under a range of simulated conditions that naval vessels could face at sea, including narrow-channel navigation requiring frequent course changes, rough weather that repeatedly shifts a ship’s heading and nighttime navigation. The footage showed the simulator’s bridge windows switching between maritime scenarios, while PIBOT remained at the steering station and responded to orders from Navy personnel. The experiment assigned PIBOT the role of helmsman, a crew member responsible for operating the steering gear in response to orders from the captain or the officer of the watch. On a naval vessel, another sailor, known as the engine order telegraph operator, separately adjusts the ship’s speed. The Navy said the experiment was intended to examine whether robots can take over some shipboard duties now performed by sailors, beginning with steering tasks, and to explore how robotic systems could be operated aboard naval vessels. The project is linked to the Navy’s broader Navy Sea GHOST initiative, a manned-unmanned maritime combat system designed to integrate unmanned platforms and advanced technologies into future naval operations. The combat experiment will proceed in four stages: land-based ship-handling simulation, testing aboard a docked vessel, daytime sea trials and long-duration day-and-night sea trials at sea. Wednesday’s experiment was the first stage. “The Navy will use the results of this experiment to explore ways to operate robots aboard ships, reduce the workload of ship crews and actively respond to a changing defense environment, including a sharp decline in military manpower and rapid advances in high technology,” Rear Adm. Kim Hyung-jun, head of the Navy Force Analysis, Test and Evaluation Group, said. KAIST professor Shim Hyun-chul, who leads the research team, said it was meaningful to test whether a humanoid robot based on physical AI technology could perform the role of a Navy helmsman. PIBOT has been under development by KAIST since 2022 under an ADD defense technology program, with $4.1 million in funding from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. 2026-07-24 13:48:56
  • Hyundai Rotem, Hanwha vie for military robot dog project
    Hyundai Rotem, Hanwha vie for military robot dog project SEOUL, July 24 (AJP) - South Korea’s military is moving to acquire quadruped robots, setting the stage for another competition between Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha Aerospace in the country’s growing military robotics market. According to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration and industry sources Friday, the military is preparing to draw up a purchase plan in September for the quadruped robot project, with a contractor expected to be selected through open bidding early next year. DAPA plans to issue a public tender in January for the project, which will be conducted as a domestic purchase program. The robots, often called “robot dogs,” are designed to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and search missions in areas that conventional unmanned ground vehicles have difficulty reaching, including stairs, rough terrain and the interiors of buildings. The planned acquisition comes as militaries around the world are expanding the use of unmanned systems, with the war in Ukraine highlighting the operational value of drones and robotic platforms. For South Korea, the systems are also seen as a way to cope with a shrinking pool of military personnel caused by demographic decline. The initial project is expected to cost about 50 billion won ($36 million) and involve the purchase of 60 to 70 quadruped robots. DAPA is also expected to pursue a separate program to acquire more than 400 additional robot dogs in the future. The robots acquired under the projects are expected to be deployed mainly to Army frontline divisions. The program will be conducted through open competition rather than being assigned to a specific company. Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha Aerospace, which previously competed in the military’s first multipurpose unmanned ground vehicle project, are expected to face off again. That earlier project was awarded to Hanwha Aerospace’s Arion-SMET platform, giving the company an early lead in the Army’s unmanned ground vehicle sector. Hyundai Rotem, seeking to regain ground in the unmanned systems market, is preparing to join the new quadruped robot project in cooperation with Rainbow Robotics, according to industry officials. Under a likely arrangement, Rainbow Robotics would provide the four-legged robot platform, while Hyundai Rotem would adapt it for military use by adding command, control and mission systems. Hanwha Aerospace is also expected to enter the bidding with its own consortium, leveraging its track record in defense systems integration and unmanned ground vehicle development. 2026-07-24 10:32:10
  • U.S. pressure exposes South Koreas limited Hormuz options
    U.S. pressure exposes South Korea's limited Hormuz options SEOUL, July 23 (AJP) - As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains a potential flashpoint, one question is likely to keep returning to Seoul: What can South Korea realistically contribute if Washington asks for military support? Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week have revived that debate, raising fresh questions over what Seoul can realistically offer should Washington turn its expectations into a concrete request. Speaking to reporters in Manila on Wednesday after meetings on the sidelines of ASEAN-related forums, Rubio said the United States had not asked South Korea or other allies that day to provide naval assets. But Washington had raised the issue with several countries previously, he said, arguing that participation would be in their own interest because many Asian economies depend heavily on Middle Eastern oil and natural gas. Rubio also singled out mine-clearing as one area where allies with "unique capabilities" could make meaningful contributions to securing the waterway. His remarks followed reports in Seoul that the Trump administration had asked South Korea to consider deploying a warship to help protect commercial shipping through Hormuz. South Korea's presidential office has said there has been no additional U.S. request for a specific contribution while reiterating that Seoul is considering practical ways to help restore freedom of navigation. The issue is difficult for Seoul to ignore. South Korea imports roughly 70 percent of its crude oil and about one-fifth of its liquefied natural gas from the Middle East, making safe passage through Hormuz a core energy security concern. The military options, however, are far less straightforward. Seoul could dispatch a Cheonghae Unit destroyer to escort South Korean commercial vessels, assign officers to a multinational command structure or expand intelligence and logistical support. A more demanding option would involve mine-clearing assets — the capability Rubio specifically highlighted. Yet analysts say a single destroyer would fall far short if South Korea intends to operate independently rather than under U.S. command. "If South Korea conducts an independent operation, it would need at least 10 ships," Paik Seung-hoon, a senior researcher at the HUFS Middle East Institute, said. "It cannot be done by sending just one Aegis destroyer." Paik said South Korea could participate with a smaller naval presence if it operated within a U.S.-led command structure, relying on American intelligence and missile defense support. But that would fundamentally alter the political meaning of the deployment. "If we say we are joining the operation under U.S. command, that means we are participating in a U.S.-led war," he said. If Seoul wants to avoid that perception, Paik said, it would need to define the mission narrowly as protecting South Korean nationals and commercial shipping, similar to its 2020 expansion of the Cheonghae Unit's operational area during heightened U.S.-Iran tensions. Unlike six years ago, however, the current crisis involves an active war, making parliamentary approval likely before any major deployment. Nor would the mission amount to a symbolic naval dispatch. Mine threats, anti-ship missiles, drones and fast attack craft would require not only a destroyer but also command-and-control assets, escorts, mine countermeasure vessels and potentially submarine or maritime patrol support, Paik said. Japan could further complicate Seoul's calculations. Rubio's reference to mine-clearing capabilities was widely interpreted as applying, at least in part, to Japan, whose Maritime Self-Defense Force has long maintained one of the world's strongest mine countermeasure fleets. If Tokyo decides to participate, pressure on Seoul could quickly intensify. "If Japan sends forces, can South Korea simply refuse to send anything?" Paik said, noting that alliance politics often narrow Seoul's room for maneuver. Kim Houng-yu, a committee member of the Korea Defense Industry Association, said Japan's mine-clearing expertise reflects decades of preparing for the security challenges of an island nation. "Japan is strong in naval operations because it is an island country," Kim said, adding that its mine-clearing capabilities are regarded as among the world's most advanced. He said Tokyo's possible participation should also be viewed in the broader context of Japan's steadily expanding security role alongside the United States. In April, Japan lifted its long-standing ban on lethal weapons exports, marking a major shift in its postwar security policy and opening the door to broader overseas transfers of defense equipment. Around the same time, Tokyo and Washington accelerated defense industrial cooperation aimed at strengthening supply chains, production capacity and long-term sustainment. The momentum continued at a Japan-U.S. defense ministers' meeting in Singapore on May 30, where both sides agreed to accelerate a broad range of initiatives to strengthen deterrence and military readiness. Against that backdrop, Kim said a mine-clearing mission in Hormuz would also allow Tokyo to present its expanding military role as a response to international demand rather than purely domestic policy changes. South Korea's calculus is considerably more complicated. Keeping Hormuz open is clearly in Seoul's economic interest. Yet any naval deployment would immediately raise difficult questions over command authority, combat risk, parliamentary approval and the diversion of naval assets from waters closer to the Korean Peninsula. South Korea's stake in Hormuz is beyond dispute. The harder question is whether Seoul can translate that stake into a military contribution substantial enough to satisfy Washington, yet limited enough to avoid being drawn into a U.S.-led conflict with Iran. 2026-07-23 17:25:59
  • Chinese shipbuilder delivers worlds first solar-powered carrier to Korea
    Chinese shipbuilder delivers world's first solar-powered carrier to Korea SEOUL, July 23 (AJP) - A Chinese shipbuilder has delivered what it says is the world’s first 10,000-car-class vehicle carrier equipped with a solar power system to South Korea, Chinese state media reported Thursday. Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI) recently held an online signing ceremony with China Shipbuilding Trading Co. to deliver the vessel to Korea Ocean Business Corp. (KOBC), according to Chinese media outlets including the Global Times. The vessel is a liquefied natural gas dual-fuel pure car and truck carrier capable of carrying 10,800 vehicles. It can run on both fuel oil and LNG. Chinese media said it is the first 10,000-car-class vehicle carrier to be equipped with a solar power system. The vessel has a shaft generator and a solar power system with a maximum output of 200 kilowatts, designed to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions. Based on 5.5 to 7 hours of sunlight per day, the system can generate about 1,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity daily. The ship was jointly designed by GSI and the Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute. It measures 230 meters in length and 40 meters in width, with a maximum speed of 19 knots. The vessel is expected to be chartered by Hyundai Glovis and deployed on routes connecting Asia with Southeast Asia, North America and Europe. 2026-07-23 16:33:30
  • Korea Coast Guard trains pilots to ease shortage
    Korea Coast Guard trains pilots to ease shortage SEOUL, July 23 (AJP) - The Korea Coast Guard has produced its first group of helicopter pilots through an in-house training program, part of an effort to address a chronic shortage of aviation personnel that has strained maritime rescue and patrol operations. The KCG held a graduation ceremony for the first class of its helicopter pilot training program at Hanseo University’s Taean campus on Thursday. The four graduates — Inspectors Kim Gyu-beom and Cho Hee-young, and Assistant Inspectors Park Jong-seon and Woo Hyo-jin — entered the program in February last year and completed 17 months of training. The course included 580 hours of ground instruction, 170 hours of flight training and 20 hours of simulator training. The graduates completed private, commercial and instrument helicopter pilot courses. They will be assigned to Coast Guard aviation units, where they will carry out missions such as maritime search and rescue, coastal patrols and other public safety operations. The KCG has been building its own pilot training system to reduce its shortage of helicopter pilots. Except for the military, it is the only helicopter-operating government agency in South Korea — among organizations such as the fire agency, forest service and police — to run an internal pilot training program. According to publicly available figures, the Coast Guard had 88 helicopter pilots as of March, leaving about 28 percent of positions unfilled. A parliamentary audit figure from September 2024 showed an even wider gap, with 78 rotary-wing pilots against an authorized strength of 122, or a shortage of 36 percent. The personnel gap has continued despite repeated hiring efforts. From 2019 to September 2024, the KCG hired 47 rotary-wing pilots, but 33 left during the same period. Another recent report said 27 Coast Guard helicopter pilots had left over the past five years, including departures to fire, emergency medical and other helicopter units offering better conditions. The KCG’s difficulty in retaining pilots is partly linked to the nature of its missions as they often fly at night, operate over open water and conduct shipboard takeoffs and landings, all of which are considered more demanding than many land-based helicopter missions. Flying over the sea can also increase the risk of spatial disorientation because pilots have fewer visual references, particularly in darkness or poor weather. The agency also has said Coast Guard helicopter pilots have generally been hired at lower ranks than pilots at other government agencies, making it harder to compete for experienced personnel. The shortage can increase the workload on remaining pilots, creating a cycle in which heavier operational burdens further weaken retention. The agency plans to train 20 helicopter pilots through the program by 2030, including the four graduates from the first class. It also plans to expand recruitment of experienced pilots. To improve retention, the KCG is considering upgrading aviation unit chief positions from senior inspector to superintendent, along with broader measures to improve working conditions for aviation personnel. “We will continue to train pilots who combine the Coast Guard’s field experience with aviation skills, and do our utmost to ensure maritime safety and protect maritime sovereignty,” said Yeo Sung-soo, director general of the KCG’s Guard Bureau. 2026-07-23 16:06:58
  • US House passes defense bill tightening guardrail against USFK troop cuts
    US House passes defense bill tightening guardrail against USFK troop cuts SEOUL, July 23 (AJP) - The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a fiscal 2027 defense policy bill that would strengthen congressional guardrails against any move to reduce the number of American troops stationed in South Korea below 28,500. The House approved its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on Wednesday in a 216-212 vote, advancing a $1.15 trillion defense policy package that authorizes military programs and sets national security priorities for the next fiscal year. The bill includes language barring the use of funds to reduce U.S. Forces Korea below the current level of 28,500 troops. The provision is not new, as previous NDAAs have also included language aimed at maintaining the U.S. troop presence on the Korean Peninsula. The House bill would amend the fiscal 2026 NDAA by expanding the funding restriction to cover money “otherwise made available for fiscal years 2026 or 2027,” extending the guardrail beyond funds authorized under the NDAA itself. The expanded wording appears aimed at limiting the administration’s ability to use money provided through other legislation to carry out a troop reduction, amid renewed concerns over President Donald Trump’s views on overseas deployments and defense cost-sharing with U.S. allies. Trump has repeatedly pressed allies to shoulder more of the cost of hosting American forces and has raised questions over the scale of U.S. military commitments abroad. The measure, however, is not yet final. The Senate is considering its own version of the NDAA, and the USFK provision would have to survive Senate consideration and negotiations between the two chambers before becoming law. The NDAA is an annual defense authorization bill that sets policy and spending priorities for the Defense Department, though actual funding must be provided through separate appropriations legislation. The Pentagon has said the United States has spent $37.5 billion so far on the Iran war, adding pressure on Congress to replenish defense accounts before the fiscal 2027 budget is finalized. Separately, the House passed a $95 billion budget package tied to the Iran war and other Trump administration priorities in a 216-214 vote. The package includes $60 billion for the Defense Department, $13 billion for other national security items, $12 billion in aid for farmers and $10 billion in grants to states for implementing voter identification laws. The Trump administration has argued that additional funding is needed to refill defense accounts depleted by the Iran war before the regular fiscal 2027 budget process is completed. For Seoul, the key provision to watch is whether the strengthened USFK funding restriction remains in the final NDAA. If enacted, it would mark another congressional effort to restrain any abrupt reduction of the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula. 2026-07-23 11:25:53
  • New joint military academy campus could take decade to build, ministry says
    New joint military academy campus could take decade to build, ministry says SEOUL, July 22 (AJP) - Building a new campus in Daejeon for South Korea’s planned joint military academy could take about 10 years, the Ministry of National Defense said Wednesday, raising the possibility that a temporary facility may be used before construction is completed. Kim Hong-chul, head of the ministry’s defense policy office, told reporters after a policy forum at the Korean Constitutional Association in Seoul that construction of the new campus would take “roughly 10 years.” The ministry is reportedly working on the assumption that the campus at Jaundae, a military complex in Daejeon, would be completed around 2036. Asked whether the new Korea Armed Forces Academy could begin accepting cadets at a temporary facility before the Daejeon campus is completed, Kim said several options were being discussed. “Various plans are currently under consideration, but nothing has been decided,” he said. “We will also review that possibility.” The ministry is reportedly considering using the existing Korea Military Academy campus in Seoul’s Nowon District as a temporary home for the integrated academy. The Defense Ministry earlier announced a basic plan to establish a four-year joint academy at Jaundae by integrating the Army, Navy and Air Force academies. Under the proposal, the three existing service academies would be reorganized as separate undergraduate divisions under the joint academy. Cadets would receive common education during their first two years before moving into service-specific education and training in their third and fourth years. He said the integrated academy should strengthen jointness among the armed services and develop officers capable of conducting multidomain operations. The ministry plans to hold public hearings and policy briefings before announcing a detailed establishment plan in October. It is also seeking to enact legislation authorizing the creation of the academy by the end of this year. 2026-07-22 18:08:18
  • North Koreas new DMZ roads seen as border-control project, not invasion route
    North Korea's new DMZ roads seen as border-control project, not invasion route SEOUL, July 22 (AJP) - North Korea's expanding network of tactical roads, fences and bridges along the Demilitarized Zone is aimed at turning the armistice line into a de facto state border and tightening domestic control rather than preparing for an invasion, North Korea experts said Wednesday. The construction reflects Pyongyang's shift away from decades of pursuing peaceful reunification toward treating South Korea as a permanently separate hostile state, they said. Satellite imagery has revealed extensive vegetation clearing and newly built roads along the North Korean side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which runs through the center of the DMZ. Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University, said the project should be understood as the physical implementation of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's declaration that the two Koreas are separate states. "This is a project to turn the line into a state border," Koh said. "Alongside the constitutional measures it has taken, North Korea is now taking physical steps to divide the South and North into two states." "The roads should be viewed as military roads for managing that border." Kim abandoned the North's longstanding goal of peaceful reunification at the end of 2023, redefining inter-Korean relations as those between "two hostile states." Since then, Pyongyang has referred to the MDL area as its "southern border" while steadily fortifying the frontier. Satellite imagery shows that an almost 18-kilometer road has appeared along the North Korean side of the MDL near Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, since July last year. Across the border region, imagery has identified more than 100 kilometers of newly visible roads and cleared corridors. Separately, South Korea's military estimates North Korea has completed roughly 70 kilometers of tactical roads and about 90 kilometers of fencing near the MDL. The figures refer to the combined length of roads extending along the border rather than roads running deep into North Korean territory. Images also show a new road and bridge under construction near the upper reaches of the Bukhan River immediately north of the MDL. The road, about 10 meters wide, is capable of accommodating military vehicles. The roads form part of a broader network of fences, minefields, barriers and cleared strips being established along the northern side of the DMZ. They are likely intended to transport workers and construction materials, patrol newly installed barriers and rapidly move personnel between different sections of the border. Koh, however, questioned the roads' military value as invasion routes. "If North Korea were preparing for an invasion, there would be little reason to move forces through a place that is fully exposed to the South," he said. "A road along the border could itself become an easy target." The DMZ remains a buffer zone established under the 1953 Armistice Agreement, extending roughly two kilometers on either side of the MDL. Deploying armed combat units or heavy weapons into the zone could constitute an armistice violation. Another defense expert agreed that the roads are better suited to maintaining border infrastructure than supporting offensive operations. "Ultimately, I believe the greater purpose is to prevent North Korean residents from moving south," he said. By erecting physical barriers along the frontier, Pyongyang can also reinforce its domestic narrative that South Korea is a separate enemy state posing a constant threat, he added. He also noted that roads immediately adjacent to the MDL have limited military significance in modern warfare because North Korea already possesses artillery, missiles and other long-range weapons capable of striking targets far beyond the border. That assessment broadly aligns with the United Nations Command's own evaluation. In a fact sheet released on June 23, the UNC said fencing, road construction and vegetation clearing do not violate the Armistice Agreement as long as the activities remain north of the MDL and do not introduce heavy weapons, combat units or offensive military technologies into the DMZ. The command said roads and fences could serve legitimate defensive purposes, including preventing infiltration and unauthorized crossings, and added that it had found no evidence North Korea had deployed heavy weapons or drone capabilities inside the DMZ. Most construction remains about 100 meters north of the MDL, although the UNC is investigating South Korean allegations that some fences or land mines may have crossed the line in several locations. The UNC also said the Korean People's Army notified it in the summer of 2025 of plans to begin fence construction and road repairs. North Korean personnel operating close to the MDL later withdrew after receiving UNC warnings, reducing the risk of an accidental confrontation. The border construction has also drawn attention as advanced U.S. surveillance aircraft have conducted repeated reconnaissance flights over and around the Korean Peninsula in recent weeks. Publicly available flight-tracking data showed a U.S. Army Aerial Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare System (ARES) aircraft conducting multiple missions after taking off from Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek on July 18. The aircraft also flew over waters off North Korea's South Hwanghae Province, where missile-related facilities are located. ARES had separately operated near China's eastern coastline on July 11, flying close to Qingdao, Shanghai and Wenzhou while China and Russia were conducting joint naval exercises. A U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton high-altitude surveillance drone was also detected over central South Korea on July 14 and again on July 17. There is no public evidence directly linking those reconnaissance flights to North Korea's border construction. South Korea's Defense Ministry, however, maintains that the project constitutes a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement. "North Korea has approached to within 10 meters of the Military Demarcation Line to install barbed-wire fences and build tactical roads as part of its efforts to fortify the border," the ministry said. "We strongly condemn these actions as clear violations of the Armistice Agreement and are maintaining close surveillance and readiness in coordination with the United Nations Command." While Seoul continues to characterize the construction as an Armistice violation, many North Korea specialists see the project not as preparation for war but as another step in Kim's effort to transform the armistice line into a permanent national border—physically, politically and psychologically. 2026-07-22 17:43:03