AJU PRESS ASIA FIRST NEWS AGENCY

Journalist

Kim Hee-su
Kim Hee-su김희수
ReporterMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul City Hall & Defense, Foreign Affairs
Kim Hee-su is a bilingual reporter at AJU Press, covering defense and foreign affairs. Before joining AJP in 2025, she worked at The Korea Times, where she wrote interview stories, including a profile of North Korean defector Kim Gum-hyok, and produced digital content. She also previously worked as a researcher for KBS News 9’s International News Department, supporting correspondents in 10 countries around the world. She graduated from the University of Toronto in Canada with a double major in Book and Media Studies and East Asian Studies. "I'm driven by storytelling."
Latest by Kim Hee-su
  • Trilateral Freedom Edge to proceed next month as planned
    Trilateral Freedom Edge to proceed next month as planned SEOUL, August 28 (AJP) - South Korea, the United States and Japan will conduct their annual Freedom Edge multi-domain exercise next month as scheduled, even as Washington scales back bilateral drills with Seoul. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said Friday that the three countries will hold Freedom Edge from Sept. 7 to 11 in international waters southeast of Jeju Island. The five-day exercise is aimed at strengthening the three countries' ability to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and maintaining peace and stability in the region, the JCS said. The exercise will mark the fourth iteration of Freedom Edge, a regular trilateral multi-domain drill launched following an agreement reached by the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan at their Camp David summit in August 2023. The inaugural exercise was held in June 2024, followed by a second iteration that November and a third in September 2025. The latest announcement stands in contrast to recent reductions in South Korea-U.S. military exercises. The allies ended this year's Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise on Aug. 21, cutting the originally planned 11-day exercise to five days after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the Pentagon to substantially reduce joint drills with South Korea. Associated field training was also scaled back. The United States has also withdrawn from next month's Ssangyong amphibious landing exercise. The U.S. Marine Corps cited force constraints stemming from the war with Iran. Freedom Edge, however, is moving ahead on its planned five-day schedule. The differing approaches highlight Washington’s broader strategic priorities in the region. While South Korea-U.S. exercises are primarily centered on contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, Freedom Edge has increasingly been framed as part of a wider regional deterrence architecture involving the three countries. Ahead of Freedom Edge 2025, U.S. Pacific Command said the exercise would strengthen deterrence in the Asia-Pacific by “bolstering combat-credible forces inside the First Island Chain.” The First Island Chain, stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, is widely regarded as a key geographic line in U.S. military planning for countering China's expanding military reach into the western Pacific. The continuation of Freedom Edge even as Washington scales back bilateral drills with Seoul therefore highlights the growing importance of trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in U.S. regional strategy. North Korea has repeatedly condemned Freedom Edge, describing it as an aggressive military exercise directed against the country. AJP Takeaways · South Korea, the U.S. and Japan will hold Freedom Edge from Sept. 7 to 11 near Jeju Island. · The trilateral drill will proceed despite recent cuts to South Korea-U.S. military exercises. · Freedom Edge reflects the growing role of trilateral defense cooperation in U.S. regional strategy. 2026-08-28 10:29:56
  • US-Canada tariff war squeezes Korean autos, opens crude door
    US-Canada tariff war squeezes Korean autos, opens crude door SEOUL, August 27 (AJP) - South Korean manufacturers accustomed to being caught between Washington and Beijing now find themselves on a new trade battlefront much closer to their factories. Korean companies poured billions of dollars into North America to escape the heavier tariffs and geopolitical risks of President Donald Trump's second term. The escalating U.S.-Canada trade conflict is now threatening the very assumption behind that strategy - that the United States, Canada and Mexico could continue functioning as one largely integrated production base. For Korean automakers, the rupture creates a new layer of supply-chain risk. For Korea's energy importers, it may create an opening. Canada, increasingly eager to loosen its dependence on the U.S. market, has more crude oil reaching its Pacific coast just as South Korea searches for alternatives to Middle Eastern supplies disrupted by war. The United States imposed a 50 percent tariff on about $20 billion of Canadian imports on Aug. 22 after trade negotiations between Washington and Ottawa collapsed. Canada responded with retaliatory tariffs on roughly the same amount of U.S. goods, scheduled to take effect Sept. 8. The 50 percent rate will hit products including steel, aluminum and smartphones. Duties of 25 percent will apply to cheese, refrigerators, washing machines and other household appliances, while a 15 percent tariff will cover selected industrial equipment including forklifts, industrial robots and some air-conditioning systems and machinery parts. The rates are designed to mirror U.S. tariffs imposed on corresponding Canadian goods. The much larger disruption could arrive next year. Trump has announced plans to double tariffs on Canadian cars, trucks and automotive parts to 50 percent from 25 percent on Jan. 1, striking directly at one of the world's most tightly integrated manufacturing systems. A report released Wednesday by the East Asia Institute (EAI) said the cross-border automotive production network built under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, is entering a period of institutional uncertainty. For Korean companies, North America may no longer be one market in quite the way it used to be. Korean autos face a new calculation Few industries illustrate the problem more clearly than automobiles. A component can cross the U.S.-Canadian border several times before the finished vehicle rolls off an assembly line. Ford's F-Series Super Duty, for example, is assembled in Ontario using U.S.-made transmissions and axles alongside Canadian-made engines. A tariff collected at one border crossing can therefore work its way through factories and suppliers on both sides. U.S. automakers have warned that a 50 percent tariff on Canadian vehicles and parts could sharply raise production costs. The emerging tariff map produces an unusual result. The United States has lowered tariffs on South Korean and Japanese vehicles to 15 percent under separate trade arrangements. A Canadian-built vehicle could therefore enter the United States facing a 50 percent tariff while a car shipped across the Pacific directly from South Korea faces 15 percent. The disparity is awkward enough that American automakers themselves worry North American-made vehicles could lose price competitiveness against Asian imports. For Hyundai Motor and Kia, however, any apparent advantage comes with a catch. The companies have spent years localizing production in the United States precisely to reduce exposure to tariffs and political pressure. South Korea produced about 4.1 million vehicles in 2025 and exported roughly 2.74 million. Around 1.65 million of those exports went to North America, meaning the region absorbed about 60 percent of all Korean-made vehicles shipped overseas. Hyundai Motor produced 362,000 vehicles at its Alabama plant last year and another 65,320 at Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America in Georgia. Kia produced another 355,000 vehicles at its West Point, Georgia, plant. Combined U.S. production reached 782,320 vehicles — equivalent to about 19 percent of all automobiles manufactured in South Korea that year. Hyundai's Tucson shows how quickly the borders blur. The model, assembled in Alabama, was Hyundai's best-selling vehicle in Canada in 2025 with 41,840 units sold. The Alabama factory produced 158,789 Tucsons during the year. A car assembled in America, sold to Canadians and dependent on a regional supplier network can become exposed to a bilateral tariff fight even though the automaker itself is Korean. That is the new calculation. Shipping more vehicles directly from Korea could theoretically exploit the lower 15 percent U.S. tariff. But Hyundai and Kia have simultaneously invested heavily in American factories and in suppliers designed around a continent-wide production system. EAI said the impact would increasingly depend on how much production companies locate inside the United States. Parts suppliers including Hyundai Mobis and HL Mando could face particular pressure as Washington demands greater U.S.-made content and the economics of moving components across borders deteriorate. Localization, once the obvious insurance against tariffs, is becoming more complicated when the tariffs begin appearing inside the supposedly protected market. Canada looks beyond America Canada has a different problem. About 70 percent of its exports go to the United States, leaving the country exceptionally exposed when relations with its largest customer sour. Prime Minister Mark Carney has increasingly called for new trade and security partnerships as Ottawa tries to reduce that dependence. South Korea is already part of that diversification. Energy ties are growing through LNG Canada, whose first phase includes Korea Gas Corp. as an investor. South Korea plans to import at least 1.4 million tons of Canadian liquefied natural gas annually for more than 30 years if the project's second phase proceeds as planned. A longer U.S.-Canada rupture could give Seoul greater room to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy and advanced manufacturing. Oil may offer the most immediate opportunity. South Korea receives about 69 percent of its crude imports from the Middle East, according to the industry ministry, leaving refiners particularly vulnerable to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz. Kpler data on Thursday showed crude flows through the strait averaging only 2.3 million barrels per day in August, compared with 15.82 million barrels a day in the three months before the war. Asia's overall crude imports were running about 14 percent below prewar levels. Thousands of kilometers away, Canada has something Asian refiners increasingly want: oil that does not need to pass through Hormuz. The expanded Trans Mountain pipeline, which nearly tripled capacity for moving Alberta crude to Canada's Pacific coast, has been running at full capacity. By July, about 77 percent of crude shipped from Vancouver through the pipeline was headed to Asia, up from roughly 51 percent in 2024. Japan received its first Canadian crude cargo in more than a year, while India, Malaysia and Singapore resumed purchases after the Iran war began. "Japan's renewed purchases of TMX crude highlight Canada's growing role in Asia's evolving import strategy," said Richard Ro, a senior market analyst at Kpler. South Korea has another reason to take a closer look. The latest U.S. tariffs do not directly apply to Canadian crude, so Korean refiners receive no immediate tariff-induced price advantage. But a prolonged political and trade split could give Ottawa a stronger incentive to move barrels west across the Pacific rather than south into the United States. One obstacle to Korean purchases has already been lowered. The Korea Customs Service and Alberta agreed in April to simplify origin certification for Canadian oil-sands crude, which is frequently blended with U.S. light crude before shipment. Qualifying Canadian crude can therefore receive preferential treatment under the Korea-Canada free trade agreement, eliminating a 3 percent tariff that had discouraged some imports. Canada still has a long way to go before Asia rivals its traditional market. The United States accounted for 93.8 percent of Canadian crude exports during the first year after the Trans Mountain expansion. That dependence explains Carney's urgency. He has set a goal of doubling Canada's non-U.S. exports over the next decade. For Seoul, the timing is notable. Korea itself is trying to secure energy supply lines at a moment when Middle Eastern disruption has exposed the dangers of relying too heavily on one region. Ottawa is trying to find buyers beyond a U.S. market that has absorbed Canadian output almost by default for generations. Their diversification strategies increasingly point toward each other. The irony for Korean industry is that the same trade confrontation producing the opportunity is also undermining another diversification strategy. Hyundai, Kia and their suppliers invested heavily in North America partly because producing inside the region was supposed to insulate them from Trump's tariff walls. The wall is now appearing between the countries inside it. South Korea's relationship with Washington has not deteriorated to anything approaching Canada's. September nevertheless brings its own test, with a possible meeting between President Lee Jae Myung and Trump on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly and Seoul expected to announce the first project under its $350 billion U.S. investment package. For Korean companies, the lesson from Canada may be uncomfortable. Putting factories inside North America can reduce the risk of being outside Trump's tariff perimeter. It cannot guarantee that the perimeter will stay in the same place. For Korean energy buyers, Canada's predicament offers the reverse possibility. As one of America's closest economic partners searches for markets farther from home, some of the barrels it once sent almost automatically south may increasingly head west instead — toward Asia. AJP Takeaways • The escalating U.S.-Canada tariff dispute is challenging the integrated North American production strategy of Hyundai Motor, Kia and Korean auto-parts suppliers, which have invested heavily in U.S. manufacturing while relying on regional supply chains. • A planned 50 percent U.S. tariff on Canadian vehicles and parts from January could produce unusual competitive distortions, as South Korean-made vehicles face a lower 15 percent tariff while some North American-built models face much steeper duties. • Canada's push to diversify away from the United States could create new opportunities for South Korea in energy, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing, building on existing LNG cooperation. • Canadian crude is becoming more attractive to Asian buyers as Middle East disruptions constrain supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, while simplified Korea-Canada origin rules have removed a 3 percent tariff obstacle for qualifying Canadian oil-sands crude. 2026-08-27 17:42:09
  • South Korea probes failed loitering munition test
    South Korea probes failed loitering munition test SEOUL, August 27 (AJP) - South Korea’s arms procurement agency said Thursday it is investigating why two domestically developed loitering munitions crashed into the sea immediately after being launched from a Navy ship, while stressing that the failed maritime test does not mean the underlying development project has fallen short of its original goals. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said the medium-sized loitering munition was developed under an applied research program launched in 2024 to secure core technologies, including a data link connected to low-Earth-orbit satellites. The project was originally designed to develop technologies for ground-based operations, and its planned ground-launch tests had already been completed successfully, a DAPA spokesperson said during the Defense Ministry’s regular briefing Thursday. “The original ground-launch tests were successful,” the spokesperson said. “This was a challenging combat experiment conducted additionally to verify the possibility of maritime operations based on the technologies already secured.” DAPA said the core technologies required for the loitering munition have been secured, but the two aircraft launched from the amphibious assault ship ROKS Marado on Tuesday crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff for reasons that have yet to be determined. The development agency is currently investigating the cause. The remarks came two days after the Navy conducted its first combat experiment involving the domestically developed loitering munition at sea. During the test in waters off South Korea’s southern coast, the drone was supposed to launch from a rail installed on the flight deck of the 14,500-ton ROKS Marado, conduct reconnaissance and then track and strike a fast-moving unmanned surface target about 2 kilometers away. The first drone, launched at around 3:30 p.m., flew for only several seconds before falling into the sea. A second attempt using a backup aircraft at around 5:30 p.m. ended the same way, preventing the military from proceeding to the target-tracking and strike phase. An ADD official at the scene initially suggested that misalignment between the aircraft and its launcher under shipboard conditions could have contributed to the failures, noting that vibrations and movement at sea differ from the conditions of ground testing. DAPA said Thursday that investigators are examining such environmental factors and that it plans to provide the results of its initial cause analysis Friday. The failed test has also drawn questions over the cost of the domestically developed system compared with cheaper loitering munitions increasingly used in modern conflicts. Defense officials pushed back against direct comparisons with low-cost systems such as Iran’s Shahed drones, saying the South Korean aircraft tested this week belongs to a different, higher-end category. Vice Adm. Kwak Kwang-sup, commander of the Republic of Korea Fleet, also signaled that the Navy would continue pursuing the project despite Tuesday’s setback. “Today’s experiment is not the end,” Kwak told reporters following the test. “We will try again.” AJP Takeaways · South Korea is investigating why two loitering munitions crashed after launching from ROKS Marado. · DAPA says the system’s core technology has already been secured through successful ground tests. · The Navy plans to continue maritime testing despite the failed shipboard experiment. 2026-08-27 15:14:55
  • U.S. reaffirms commitment to North Koreas complete denuclearization
    U.S. reaffirms commitment to North Korea's complete denuclearization SEOUL, August 27 (AJP) - The Trump administration has reaffirmed that the United States remains committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, clarifying its policy after President Donald Trump recently declined to say whether denuclearization remained his goal in seeking renewed talks with Pyongyang. “The United States remains committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea,” a State Department spokesperson said Wednesday in response to a question on whether the administration’s goal remained unchanged. Another U.S. official said separately that “there has been no change in U.S. policy.” The statements mark the clearest response from the Trump administration on the issue since the president raised questions over Washington’s longstanding denuclearization policy with a series of conciliatory gestures toward North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump recently ordered a reduction in the annual South Korea-U.S. Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise and has expressed interest in meeting Kim again later this year. Questions over Washington’s position intensified after Trump said on Aug. 19 that North Korea possesses about 57 nuclear weapons, an unusually specific public reference to the size of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. Asked later that day whether denuclearization remained his objective in seeking to reengage Kim, Trump declined to answer directly. “Well, I don't want to talk about that,” Trump said, before emphasizing his personal relationship with the North Korean leader and arguing that South Korea and Japan were safer with him as president. His response fueled speculation that Washington could be considering a shift away from demanding complete denuclearization toward negotiations focused on managing or limiting North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal. South Korea has also sought to dispel concerns over a potential policy shift. Seoul’s Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that South Korea and the United States continue to share the goal of denuclearization, despite the term being omitted from separate readouts of a recent phone call between Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. “The two countries have consistently maintained the goals of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Park Doo-soon said. AJP Takeaways · The U.S. says it remains committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. · The clarification follows Trump’s recent refusal to say whether denuclearization remains his goal. · South Korea and the U.S. continue to share denuclearization as a policy objective. 2026-08-27 11:06:39
  • Military brass rebel against academy merger at hearing
    Military brass rebel against academy merger at hearing SEOUL, August 26 (AJP) - President Lee Jae Myung and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back remain committed to merging South Korea's Army, Navy and Air Force academies into a single institution, but a raucous public hearing Wednesday exposed the depth of resistance among academy alumni, retired officers and military experts. What was supposed to be a forum for public debate quickly descended into angry shouting, profanity and heckling at the Defense Convention Center in Yongsan, central Seoul. Much of the anger was directed at Ahn, whose absence became an issue before the policy discussion even began. "Bring Ahn here now," some attendees shouted. Kim Hong-chul, head of the Ministry of National Defense's defense policy office, represented the ministry instead. Ahn's absence had already drawn criticism from academy alumni groups, which had demanded that the minister personally attend and hear their objections. The tension was apparent from the outset. Attendees shouted over organizers and demanded that the ministry scrap parts of its planned presentation. When officials asked the audience to remain seated and wait for the question-and-answer session, angry voices responded with profanity. "Shut your mouth!" one attendee shouted at the moderator. Others yelled at officials to "come down" from the stage. Organizers repeatedly appealed for what they called a "mature discussion culture," saying the hearing could not proceed if participants continued shouting without microphones. Even technical problems became part of the protest. When a promotional video prepared by the ministry failed to appear properly on screen, an opponent joked that "heaven helped us," drawing reactions from the audience. The video was eventually skipped and the ministry moved directly to its policy presentation. The confrontation intensified when the heads of alumni associations representing the three service academies took the floor. Park Pan-jun, president of the Korea Military Academy alumni association, accused the government of trying to push through the merger without sufficient consultation. "They are handling the closure of the service academies the way gangsters handle business," Park said. He argued that the plan would require the government to close the existing academies, build a new campus at the Jaun-dae military complex in Daejeon and relocate units already based there, resulting in massive public spending. "I am certain this plan cannot be carried through to the end," Park said. "It will only waste the national budget and the country's resources." Park also criticized Ahn for staying away from the hearing, saying alumni groups had specifically asked the minister to attend because he was ultimately responsible for the policy. "We asked that the minister come, listen, answer questions and tell us what he intends to do," Park said. "But once again, the minister stayed away." Lee Beom-rim, president of the Naval Academy alumni association, delivered an even sharper warning. Lee criticized the ministry for announcing plans to preserve monuments and memorial facilities at the existing academy sites before Wednesday's hearing, arguing that such preparations suggested the merger had effectively already been decided. "If you say you are holding a public hearing to listen to the people, then are all these procedures nothing more than a formality to establish procedural legitimacy?" he said. "Are you saying the train will keep running even if the dogs bark?" Lee continued. "Dogs do not only bark. They can bite and tear." He then addressed Ahn directly. "I warn the defense minister once again not to go down in history as a sinner." Hwang Sung-jin, president of the Air Force Academy alumni association, pointed to President Lee's own recent remarks that government proposals should remain open to criticism and revision during public consultation. "Why is the Ministry of National Defense not applying the commander-in-chief's own instruction to the creation of the Armed Forces Academy?" Hwang asked. Behind much of Wednesday's anger was another set of remarks by Lee earlier this month. During a televised government briefing on Aug. 5, Lee criticized the historical role of Korea Military Academy graduates in South Korea's military coups and questioned why the institution had never been held accountable. He urged Ahn to move quickly on integrating the service academies. Lee's comments have since become a rallying point for opponents, who argue that the merger risks being interpreted as political punishment rather than military education reform. Kim Se-jin, secretary-general of the civic group Future Thinking and one of three anti-merger panelists, rejected the president's characterization during Wednesday's debate. Kim argued that criminal responsibility belonged to individuals who took part in past coups, not to an educational institution or generations of cadets who had nothing to do with them. "The government has already decided the conclusion and is only pretending to listen," Kim said earlier in his presentation, accusing officials of repeatedly producing new justifications for the merger after previous arguments came under criticism. He later directly challenged Lee's remarks about three coups and questioned why today's cadets should bear responsibility for the actions of past graduates. "Is Korea Military Academy a school of potential coup criminals?" Kim asked. Even one panelist supporting the creation of a unified academy sought to distance the reform from the idea of collective punishment. Doo Jin-ho, head of the Eurasia Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, said it was an undeniable historical fact that some Korea Military Academy graduates had participated in past coups and political intervention. But, he said, "it is difficult to justify attributing the historical wrongdoing of certain individuals to the Korea Military Academy as an educational institution, including its past, present and future graduates." "The essence of creating the Armed Forces Academy is not whether to impose punitive responsibility on a particular academy," Doo said. "It should be about how to scientifically redesign the officer training system for the future security environment." The government has framed the merger largely as a response to changes in modern warfare. Officials argue that military operations increasingly span land, sea, air, space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, while artificial intelligence and unmanned systems are blurring traditional boundaries between the armed services. Under the basic plan announced July 16, the Army, Navy and Air Force academies would be integrated into a single four-year institution at Jaun-dae in Daejeon. The government says the overhaul is intended to strengthen joint operations and prepare future officers for a rapidly changing security environment. Cadets would receive more common education during the early part of their studies before moving into more service-specific training. The ministry also argues that the reform would help the armed forces cope with South Korea's shrinking pool of military-age recruits while creating an officer corps better equipped for joint warfare. Opponents do not necessarily dispute those challenges. They argue instead that the government has failed to demonstrate why they require dismantling the existing academy system. They warn that integration could weaken the service-specific expertise, institutional identity and traditions developed separately by the Army, Navy and Air Force. That divide was visible throughout Wednesday's hearing. As Kim Hong-cheol attempted to explain the ministry's case, audience members repeatedly heckled him. At one point, after another burst of profanity, Kim responded from the podium: "Please do not swear. If you want to swear, do it after this is over." Around 300 people attended the hearing, including ministry officials, cadets, retired officers, academy alumni and members of the public. Cadets seated inside largely watched the confrontation without making public remarks. The ministry plans to incorporate views collected at the hearing as it draws up a more detailed blueprint around October. The government had previously said it would gather public opinion before finalizing the plan. But Wednesday's confrontation showed that the dispute has moved well beyond questions of curriculum, campuses and military efficiency. The merger has become entangled with competing interpretations of South Korea's history of military rule, distrust of the government's motives and fears among the services that decades-old institutional identities could disappear. If the scene in Yongsan was any indication, drawing up the blueprint may prove considerably easier than building consensus around it. AJP Takeaways • South Korea's Defense Ministry faced fierce opposition at a public hearing on plans to merge the Army, Navy and Air Force academies, with shouting, profanity and heckling repeatedly disrupting proceedings. • Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back's absence further angered academy alumni, who accused the government of treating the hearing as a formality after effectively deciding to proceed with the merger. • President Lee Jae Myung's criticism of Korea Military Academy graduates' role in past military coups has deepened resistance, with opponents arguing that today's academy and cadets should not bear collective responsibility for historical wrongdoing. • The government says a unified Armed Forces Academy in Daejeon would strengthen joint warfare capabilities and prepare officers for AI, unmanned systems and a shrinking military-age population, while opponents warn it could erode service-specific expertise and traditions. 2026-08-26 18:05:18
  • South Korea scrambles fighters as Russian military aircraft enter KADIZ
    South Korea scrambles fighters as Russian military aircraft enter KADIZ SEOUL, August 26 (AJP) - South Korea scrambled fighter jets after several Russian military aircraft entered its air defense identification zone over the East Sea without prior notice, the military said Wednesday, marking the latest such flight by Russian aircraft near the Korean Peninsula. Several Russian military aircraft entered the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) on Tuesday before exiting the area, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The aircraft were flying northwest over the East Sea when they entered the KADIZ near Ulleung Island and Dokdo, South Korea’s easternmost islets, according to military officials. No violation of South Korean airspace was reported. “Our military detected the Russian military aircraft before they entered the KADIZ and deployed Air Force fighter jets to take tactical measures in preparation for any contingencies,” the JCS said. An air defense identification zone is an area established beyond a country’s territorial airspace to allow military authorities to identify and monitor aircraft approaching its territory. Unlike sovereign airspace, entering an ADIZ does not in itself constitute a violation of a country’s territory. South Korea requires aircraft entering the KADIZ to file flight plans, maintain communications with relevant authorities and report their positions. Russia, however, has long rejected South Korea’s authority over the KADIZ, arguing that such zones have no explicit basis in international law. The Russian Defense Ministry made its position explicit in 2019, saying that air defense identification zones are “not envisioned by international rules” and therefore are not recognized by Russia. Moscow said at the time that it had repeatedly conveyed that position to Seoul through various channels. Russia has consequently maintained that its military aircraft are entitled to fly through portions of the KADIZ that lie over international waters without seeking South Korean authorization, as long as they do not enter South Korea’s sovereign airspace. That position has repeatedly put Moscow at odds with Seoul, which treats unannounced entries by foreign military aircraft as a potential security risk and routinely scrambles fighters to identify and monitor them. The latest incident follows a similar entry on June 27, when nearly 10 Chinese and Russian military aircraft entered the KADIZ over the East and South seas during joint air drills between the two countries. AJP Takeaways · South Korea scrambled fighter jets after Russian military aircraft entered the KADIZ over the East Sea. · Russia does not recognize South Korea’s authority over the KADIZ, citing international law. · The incident follows a June entry by Chinese and Russian military aircraft during joint air drills. 2026-08-26 12:18:09
  • Freedom Edge to go ahead despite rollback in Korea drills
    Freedom Edge to go ahead despite rollback in Korea drills SEOUL, August 26 (AJP) -The United States is preparing to move ahead with a major trilateral military exercise with South Korea and Japan, regardless of the scaled-back annual drills with Seoul ordered by President Donald Trump as he seeks to renew rapport with Pyongyang. “In close coordination with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, U.S. Pacific Command is preparing for the 2026 iteration of exercise Freedom Edge,” Lt. Cmdr. Chloe Morgan, a spokesperson for U.S. Pacific Command, said Wednesday. “This premier multi-domain exercise will continue to reinforce our shared values, enhance our shared interoperability and further strengthen our defense partnerships to ensure peace and stability throughout the Pacific,” Morgan said. She said additional details on the exercise would be released at a later date. The comments came in response to questions over whether Trump’s directive to substantially reduce South Korea-U.S. military exercises would also affect Freedom Edge, or whether the trilateral exercise would proceed at its originally planned scale and scope. While PACOM did not specify the scale of this year’s exercise, its response indicates Washington intends to preserve the trilateral training framework even as it adjusts bilateral exercises with Seoul. South Korea, the United States and Japan are reportedly in final coordination to hold this year’s Freedom Edge exercise next month. The three countries agreed at the Camp David summit in August 2023 to conduct regular multi-domain military exercises. The first Freedom Edge exercise was held in June 2024, followed by a second iteration that November and a third in September 2025. The exercises have included ballistic missile defense, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, maritime interdiction and defensive cyber training, bringing together naval and air assets from all three countries. Japan has also emphasized the importance of maintaining trilateral security cooperation amid the changes to South Korea-U.S. exercises. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said during a visit to Australia on Aug. 18 that cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan remains “essential for regional peace and stability,” citing North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities as well as a worsening regional security environment. While avoiding direct criticism of Trump’s decision, Koizumi pointed to real-time sharing of North Korean missile warning information and Freedom Edge as examples of practical security cooperation that the three countries have built up. “We would like to, based on this framework, continue to deepen our bilateral and trilateral collaboration,” Koizumi said during a joint press conference with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles in Canberra. Trump’s decision to scale back the bilateral drills came as he renewed his push for talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, raising questions over whether other U.S.-led exercises involving South Korea could also face reductions. North Korea has repeatedly denounced the trilateral drills. AJP Takeaways · U.S. Pacific Command is preparing the 2026 Freedom Edge exercise with South Korea and Japan. · The trilateral drills will continue despite reduced South Korea-U.S. exercises. · Japan also stressed the importance of maintaining trilateral security cooperation. 2026-08-26 11:02:31
  • Trumps nuclear realism tests Seouls denuclearization line
    Trump's nuclear realism tests Seoul's denuclearization line SEOUL, August 25 (AJP) - North Korea, according to U.S. President Donald Trump, is not Iran. Washington may have "obliterated" Iran's nuclear program, as Trump puts it, but Pyongyang already possesses what he describes as 57 "very powerful" nuclear weapons — an arsenal he appears more inclined to address through renewed diplomacy and his lingering personal rapport with Kim Jong Un. Trump's contrasting approaches to the two nuclear challenges pose a growing conundrum for Seoul, which on Tuesday reiterated its commitment to denuclearization amid a series of mixed signals from Washington. The question has gained urgency following the latest phone call between South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The two agreed Monday to maintain close communication and cooperation for peace on the Korean Peninsula and the "resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue," according to Seoul's Foreign Ministry. Unlike previous high-level statements, however, the readout did not explicitly mention the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The U.S. State Department's separate readout was even more terse, making no mention of North Korea, its nuclear program or denuclearization. The omission alone does not mean Washington has recognized North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state. Only three months ago, South Korea, the United States and Japan submitted a joint working paper to the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference stating unequivocally that North Korea "cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State" under the treaty and reaffirming their commitment to its complete denuclearization. Trump's recent remarks, however, suggest a growing willingness to acknowledge North Korea's nuclear arsenal as an enduring strategic reality even if Washington stops well short of granting Pyongyang formal nuclear status. Trump said last week that he expects to meet Kim later this year and publicly estimated that North Korea possesses 57 "very powerful" nuclear weapons. "He's got them," Trump said, while again emphasizing his personal relationship with the North Korean leader. South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back offered an even higher range during a parliamentary hearing, citing outside estimates that put North Korea's arsenal at between 80 and 120 nuclear weapons. He did add that the South Korean military could not provide an exact figure and stressed that Seoul still does not officially recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. The increasingly explicit discussion of how many nuclear weapons Pyongyang possesses illustrates how far the policy debate has moved. The central issue is no longer whether North Korea has an arsenal. Governments are increasingly forced to consider how to deter, contain and negotiate with a state that already possesses one while preserving denuclearization as the ultimate objective. Washington still cannot simply confer recognized nuclear-weapon-state status on North Korea under the existing international nonproliferation framework. Trump's comments are therefore better understood as an acknowledgement of the arsenal North Korea already possesses rather than legal acceptance of Pyongyang as a recognized nuclear power. "The complete denuclearization of North Korea will probably remain the basic policy objective," said Ko Yu-hwan, professor emeritus of North Korean studies at Dongguk University, projecting that Trump's recent moves appear aimed in part at creating conditions for another summit with Kim. Ko said Trump's public references to North Korea's arsenal and his push for renewed dialogue could be seen as indirect attempts to accommodate some of Pyongyang's demands for talks without formally accepting North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. Another U.S.-North Korea summit could nevertheless have the indirect effect of acknowledging North Korea's nuclear status in practice, Ko added, even if Washington continues to deny it formally. The distinction between legal status and diplomatic reality is becoming increasingly important. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before Jan. 1, 1967. The definition limits recognized status under the treaty to the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. North Korea joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1985, announced its withdrawal in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Possessing nuclear weapons therefore does not give Pyongyang the same treaty status as the five recognized nuclear powers. U.N. Security Council resolutions impose additional obligations. Resolution 1718, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter after North Korea's first nuclear test, demands that Pyongyang conduct no further nuclear tests, return to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes" in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. A change in U.S. diplomatic tactics would not erase those obligations. Washington could nevertheless pursue an interim freeze, arms reduction or risk-reduction agreement with Pyongyang without first securing complete denuclearization. A U.S. president cannot unilaterally overturn existing Security Council resolutions, but Washington can still pursue diplomacy on the assumption that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The resulting gap between legal objective and strategic reality is where Seoul's dilemma becomes more difficult. Washington could continue to support denuclearization in principle while negotiating with North Korea on the assumption that Pyongyang will retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. South Korea would remain bound by the rules governing a non-nuclear state throughout that period. Article II of the NPT prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. North Korea's continued possession therefore gives Seoul no automatic legal right to follow suit. The strategic imbalance could, however, strengthen South Korea's political case for demanding greater protection from Washington. "If Trump effectively tolerates North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons in that process, it could pose a threat to our security," Ko said, adding that such a development could revive calls for independent nuclear armament in both South Korea and Japan. The more immediate response, he said, would likely be demands to strengthen the credibility and implementation of U.S. extended deterrence. A U.S. shift from pursuing rapid denuclearization toward managing North Korea's nuclear risks could also encourage Seoul to seek broader strategic options, including progress on nuclear-powered submarines and greater rights involving uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, Ko said. Neither option would amount to nuclear armament. Both would, however, expand South Korea's nuclear-related capabilities and require extensive legal, technical and political coordination with Washington. Hardware may be only part of Seoul's problem. A recent Sejong Institute policy brief suggests the alliance may also need much clearer agreement over how different forms of North Korean nuclear use should be interpreted and answered. The report, written by Jo Bee-yun, a research fellow at the institute, drew on a tabletop exercise involving South Korean, U.S., Japanese and Australian participants. The exercise exposed a potentially consequential gap between Seoul and Washington over how to respond to a limited nuclear scenario. In one case, North Korea conducted a nuclear demonstration over waters near Incheon without causing casualties. South Korean participants viewed the move as crossing the nuclear threshold and favored calibrated escalation, including requesting a limited U.S. nuclear response or a demonstration of nuclear capability. U.S. participants interpreted the absence of casualties differently. They regarded the action as a possible signal that Pyongyang intended to limit further escalation and placed greater emphasis on de-escalation and ending the conflict. The difference highlights a weakness that broad declarations of extended deterrence do not necessarily resolve. Washington has long warned that any North Korean nuclear attack would result in the end of the Kim regime. A real crisis, however, may not fit neatly into a scenario involving an unmistakable large-scale nuclear attack. Pyongyang could conduct a demonstration, employ a tactical weapon, strike an isolated military target or calibrate nuclear use specifically to create uncertainty over whether Washington should respond with nuclear force. Ambiguity over such scenarios would become more consequential if U.S. policy increasingly focused on managing North Korea's arsenal instead of expecting its rapid elimination. Jo argued that the allies should develop different response packages depending on the form, target, damage and political effect of North Korean nuclear use. Possible categories would distinguish among a nuclear demonstration, limited tactical nuclear use, an attack on allied military assets, a strike on South Korean territory and a large-scale strategic attack threatening the country's survival. The report also warned that excessive reliance on case-by-case U.S. political approval could create openings for North Korean coercion. Pyongyang could conclude that competing U.S. commitments elsewhere might delay an allied response, weaken Washington's willingness to escalate or allow North Korea to isolate Seoul through limited provocations backed by nuclear threats. For South Korea, the paradox would then become sharper. North Korea could remain nuclear-armed in practice while Seoul continued to comply with the legal and political constraints of a non-nuclear state. Formal U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power is therefore not necessarily the most immediate risk. Washington could preserve denuclearization in official statements while shifting diplomacy toward freezes, arms control, risk reduction or other arrangements premised on North Korea retaining at least part of its arsenal for years. Such a shift would place far greater importance on what sits beneath the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Seoul would have stronger reason to seek deeper participation in nuclear planning, clearer agreements on responses to different forms of North Korean nuclear use and more reliable access to U.S. strategic assets and other deterrence capabilities. The language of denuclearization would still matter. The practical guarantees accompanying it would matter more. Seoul's central question may therefore no longer be simply whether Washington continues to support denuclearization in principle. The harder question is what the United States is prepared to provide South Korea if denuclearization remains the declared destination while North Korea's nuclear arsenal becomes a reality the alliance must manage for years to come. AJP Takeaways • Donald Trump's open acknowledgement of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is widening the gap between Washington's formal denuclearization policy and its potential willingness to manage Pyongyang as a long-term nuclear reality. • North Korea cannot gain recognized nuclear-weapon-state status under the NPT simply by possessing nuclear weapons, while U.N. Security Council resolutions continue to require Pyongyang to abandon its arsenal. • A prolonged period of de facto North Korean nuclear possession could increase South Korean demands for stronger U.S. extended deterrence, clearer nuclear planning and broader nuclear-related capabilities. • A Sejong Institute tabletop exercise exposed differences between South Korean and U.S. responses to limited North Korean nuclear use, highlighting the need for more detailed alliance planning as denuclearization becomes a longer-term goal. 2026-08-25 17:50:43
  • Boeing secures $131B F-15 contract covering South Korea
    Boeing secures $131B F-15 contract covering South Korea SEOUL, August 25 (AJP) - Boeing has secured a U.S. Air Force contract with a ceiling of $131.23 billion for production, upgrades and long-term support of the F-15 fighter family, with South Korea included among seven countries covered by potential Foreign Military Sales. The U.S. Department of War said Monday that Boeing had been awarded an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity, or IDIQ, contract for the F-15 Eagle Crest program, which supports the Air Force's broader F-15 fleet. The contract covers what the department described as "aircraft production, systems integration, modernization, upgrades, retrofits, sustainment," as well as the establishment of depot maintenance capabilities. Work will be carried out in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to continue through August 2037. The initial ordering period runs through Aug. 24, 2031, with an option to extend it for another five years through August 2036. "This contract involves Foreign Military Sales to Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Poland," the department said. The deal was awarded to Boeing on a sole-source basis. The $131.23 billion figure represents the maximum potential value of the IDIQ contract rather than money immediately committed to Boeing. Such contracts establish an overall framework under which individual orders can be placed over time without guaranteeing that the full ceiling will ultimately be spent. Only $343,740 in fiscal 2026 research, development, test and evaluation funding was obligated at the time of the award, according to the department. The announcement also does not specify how much of the potential contract value is associated with South Korea or indicate that Seoul is purchasing additional F-15 aircraft. South Korea operates the F-15K Slam Eagle, a customized version of the F-15E that has served as one of the Republic of Korea Air Force's principal long-range strike aircraft since its introduction in 2005. Seoul is already undertaking a major modernization of its F-15K fleet. In January, the U.S. government awarded Boeing a separate contract worth up to $2.81 billion to design and develop an integrated package of upgrades for South Korea's F-15Ks. The department said that contract would support modifications for the Republic of Korea Air Force and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration and would run through the end of 2037. The latest Eagle Crest contract therefore provides a much larger long-term contracting framework covering the U.S. F-15 fleet and several overseas operators, including South Korea, rather than representing a new $131.23 billion aircraft purchase by Seoul. AJP Takeaways · Boeing secured a $131.23 billion ceiling contract for the F-15 Eagle Crest program, covering aircraft production, modernization, upgrades and long-term sustainment. · South Korea is among seven countries included in potential Foreign Military Sales under the contract, alongside Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia and Poland. · The $131.23 billion figure is a maximum contract ceiling, not a confirmed purchase by South Korea, which is separately modernizing its F-15K fleet through a Boeing upgrade program. 2026-08-25 14:53:10
  • Iran blacklists five ships linked to S. Korean carrier Sinokor
    Iran blacklists five ships linked to S. Korean carrier Sinokor SEOUL, August 25 (AJP) - Iran has blacklisted five vessels linked to South Korean shipping company Sinokor Maritime over alleged violations of its rules for crossing the Strait of Hormuz, as Tehran steps up pressure over the strategic waterway. The five ships are the Cyprus Prosperity (IMO 9595216), Mombasa B (IMO 9739501), Singapore Prosperity (IMO 9419967), Sweden Prosperity (IMO 9588392) and Rotterdam Energy (IMO 9508859). All five appear on a list of 45 vessels designated as non-compliant by Iran's newly established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). U.S. Coast Guard vessel records also link each of the five ships to Sinokor Maritime. The PGSA announced the blacklist in a post on X on Monday, saying vessels that violated Iranian protocols for transiting the strait could face restrictions on future passages, including fines, detention or confiscation. The authority also warned that ships conducting ship-to-ship transfers with blacklisted vessels could themselves be added to the list. The 45 vessels include very large crude carriers, LNG and LPG tankers and petroleum-product vessels. Ships associated with the United Arab Emirates' ADNOC Logistics & Services and its Navig8 subsidiary, Saudi Arabia's national shipping company Bahri, Norway's Klaveness Ship Management and Stolt Tankers are also on the list. Sinokor has not commented publicly on the matter. Iran did not specify what rules each vessel allegedly violated. Tehran has previously said ships should receive Iranian clearance before transiting the Strait of Hormuz and pay fees for security and other services. Vessels seeking removal from the blacklist can submit an explanation to Iranian maritime authorities, according to the PGSA. The move could also affect so-called shuttle operations that have emerged during the Iran war, in which smaller or more mobile tankers move through the strait and transfer cargo to larger vessels waiting outside the waterway. Iran's warning comes as the United States has sought to restore energy flows through Hormuz while maintaining a naval blockade against Iran-related shipping. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the U.S. military had helped move a seven-day average of about 8 million barrels of oil per day through the Strait of Hormuz, although commercial ship-tracking data has produced significantly lower estimates. Before the conflict disrupted shipping, the Persian Gulf accounted for roughly 20 percent of the world's daily crude oil and liquefied natural gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The blacklist was announced days after Washington threatened Iran with what it called the "toughest sanctions in history," while Tehran warned that its response to further U.S. pressure would be "devastating." AJP Takeaways · Iran has blacklisted 45 vessels over alleged Strait of Hormuz transit violations, including five ships linked to South Korean carrier Sinokor Maritime. · The PGSA warned that blacklisted ships could face fines, detention or confiscation, while vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers with them may also be added to the list. · The move comes amid continued disruption to Hormuz shipping, U.S. efforts to restore oil flows through the strait and renewed threats of tougher sanctions on Iran. 2026-08-25 11:27:18