AJU PRESS ASIA FIRST NEWS AGENCY

Journalist

Kim Hee-su
Kim Hee-su김희수
ReporterMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul City Hall & Defense, Foreign Affairs
Kim Hee-su is a bilingual reporter at AJU Press, covering defense and foreign affairs. Before joining AJP in 2025, she worked at The Korea Times, where she wrote interview stories, including a profile of North Korean defector Kim Gum-hyok, and produced digital content. She also previously worked as a researcher for KBS News 9’s International News Department, supporting correspondents in 10 countries around the world. She graduated from the University of Toronto in Canada with a double major in Book and Media Studies and East Asian Studies. "I'm driven by storytelling."
Latest by Kim Hee-su
  • Canada Moves Towards Selecting South Korea for Submarine Project
    Canada Moves Towards Selecting South Korea for Submarine Project Multiple sources indicate that Canada is leaning towards selecting South Korea as the preferred bidder for its $60 billion next-generation submarine project. However, final negotiations are ongoing regarding whether to award the entire contract to South Korea or to split it with Germany. According to officials, the Canadian government is seriously considering South Korea's proposal, but the final contracting method has not yet been confirmed. A representative from South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy refrained from commenting on the negotiations but stated that the government is expecting "positive news." A German submarine expert familiar with the negotiations noted, "Even if a split order is made, I understand that South Korea is likely to secure a larger share," adding that the announcement is being delayed due to ongoing detailed negotiations. Another source told Aju Business Daily, "The current atmosphere is leaning towards South Korea, with the last issue being whether to award the entire contract to South Korea or to share it with Germany." A different insider mentioned, "There is already talk of congratulatory messages circulating in the industry, indicating that South Korea's victory is seen as a foregone conclusion." Canada was initially expected to announce its preferred bidder by the end of June, but the decision has now been pushed to early July. Discussions continue on whether to award up to 12 submarines included in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) to a single company or to split the order between South Korea's Hanwha Ocean and Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). The CPSP aims to replace Canada's aging Victoria-class submarines while enhancing underwater surveillance and deterrence capabilities in the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific regions in response to increased underwater military activities from Russia and China. Canada plans to acquire up to 12 conventional submarines, with the final candidates narrowed down to Hanwha Ocean's Changbogo-III Batch-II and TKMS's Type 212CD. The Victoria-class submarines are expected to retire in the mid-2030s, necessitating the delivery of the first new submarines by 2035 to avoid a capability gap. The German submarine expert highlighted the main differences between the two submarine types as their size and operational concepts. Both models are conventional submarines equipped with diesel-electric propulsion systems and air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. The Type 212CD is relatively smaller, has fewer crew members, and is optimized for long-duration submerged operations and stealth missions, excelling in detection avoidance and stealth capabilities. In contrast, the Changbogo-III Batch-II is evaluated as having a longer operational range and a greater variety and scale of armaments, making it suitable for long-range patrol and strike missions. The expert explained that the Type 212CD is designed with NATO interoperability in mind, resulting in differences in maintenance methods and operational systems between the two platforms. Canada has reiterated its intention to evaluate not only the performance of the submarines but also job creation, industrial investment, and extensive economic cooperation. As a result, this project has evolved beyond a simple bidding war between companies into a competition supported by the respective governments of South Korea and Germany. During his visit to Hanwha Ocean's Geoje facility in February, Steven Pure identified the automotive industry as a potential area for collaboration that bidding countries could propose. He stated, "Both South Korea and Germany are automobile manufacturing countries, and if there are possibilities for cooperation in this area, we want to expand it beyond defense to larger economic cooperation." South Korea's main proposal involves Project Beaver, a $3.1 billion initiative utilizing Hyundai Motor's hydrogen vehicle technology. This plan includes constructing a liquefied hydrogen production facility in British Columbia, a hydrogen vehicle manufacturing plant in Ontario, and hydrogen refueling stations in British Columbia and Alberta, with the South Korean government estimating the project could create approximately 9,000 jobs. Germany is emphasizing its advantage in NATO interoperability and the existing joint production system of the Type 212CD with Norway, which Canada could participate in. Initially, Canada mentioned Volkswagen's $7 billion battery plant project in Ontario, suggesting that South Korea should make a corresponding automotive investment. However, Volkswagen later clarified that the battery investment was an independent project unrelated to defense procurement and denied any connection with TKMS. The timing of the decision coincides with President Lee Jae-myung's first attendance at a NATO summit. President Lee is expected to emphasize South Korea's role in the global defense supply chain and its rapid weapons production and supply capabilities at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8. An official from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy drew a line between the president's attendance at the NATO summit and the Canadian submarine project, stating, "There are various reasons for attending the NATO summit, and it is too early to say that the submarine project is favorable for South Korea because of the president's attendance." However, he noted that as NATO member countries seek to replenish depleted weapon stockpiles and reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, South Korea's defense production capabilities are becoming increasingly important. He remarked, "While NATO must strengthen its own defense capabilities, the defense supply chain cannot be restored in a matter of months or even one to two years." He added, "South Korea is emerging as an alternative due to its quick delivery, price competitiveness, and operational production lines, and recently has been referred to as the 'arsenal of the free world.'" Canada's initiative to establish a multilateral Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) is also emerging as a new variable in this competition. Previously, Canada became the first non-European country to participate in the EU's €150 billion defense financing program, SAFE (Security Action for Europe), which has been interpreted as a favorable signal for Germany. Observers suggest that as Canada expands its defense cooperation with Europe, TKMS's Type 212CD may have a relative advantage. However, as the deadline for announcing the preferred bidder approaches, Canada is accelerating its own multilateral defense financing system. The DSRB, led by Canada, aims to provide up to £100 billion in low-interest funds to strengthen defense production and supply chains and security-related industries. Canada plans to reveal about ten founding participant countries at the NATO summit, with South Korea's potential participation also being discussed. The chief negotiator from Canada described the negotiations with South Korea as "productive," estimating a "50-50" chance of South Korea participating as a founding member. In contrast, Germany is currently participating in discussions as an observer. If South Korea secures the submarine contract, it could position itself as a long-term partner in Canada's defense manufacturing and financing network, encompassing shipbuilding, maintenance, supply chains, and advanced industrial cooperation, rather than merely a supplier of vessels. This decision will shape not only what submarines Canada purchases but also the industrial and defense cooperation framework that will support the operation and maintenance of future submarine capabilities for decades to come. David McGuinty, Canada's Minister of Defence, recently warned that operating two different types of submarines would require establishing separate maintenance, logistics, and training systems, increasing costs and complexity. However, he did not officially rule out the possibility of a split order. Currently, the key issue is not whether South Korea will win the competition, but whether Canada will award the entire contract to South Korea or divide the order between South Korea and Germany, considering political and industrial balance.* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-03 19:56:00
  • Canadas submarine award in Koreas favor, but final shape uncertain
    Canada's submarine award in Korea's favor, but final shape uncertain SEOUL, July 03 (AJP) - Canada is moving closer to selecting South Korea as the preferred supplier for its multibillion-dollar submarine program, although the final structure of the award remains uncertain, with Ottawa still weighing whether to place the entire order with one bidder or split it with Germany, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter. "The mood is leaning toward South Korea. The last sticking point is whether the full package goes to Korea or is shared with the German team," one source told AJP. "Even if the order is divided, I understand South Korea could receive the larger share," a German submarine expert familiar with the discussions separately told AJP, adding that the announcement had been delayed as the parties continued to coordinate details. Ottawa had initially been expected to name a preferred bidder around the end of June, but the decision has slipped into early July amid continued speculation over whether all 12 submarines under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) will go to a single supplier or be divided between South Korea's Hanwha Ocean and Germany's Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). A South Korean industry ministry official declined to comment directly on the negotiations but suggested the government was awaiting "positive news." Canada plans to acquire up to 12 conventionally powered submarines under the CPSP. The competition has narrowed to Hanwha Ocean's KSS-III Batch-II and TKMS's Type 212CD. The German submarine expert said the principal difference between the two submarines lies in their size and operational philosophy. Both are diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion systems. The Type 212CD is smaller, requires a significantly smaller crew and is optimized for prolonged submerged and covert operations, giving it advantages in stealth and low detectability. The KSS-III, by contrast, offers a substantially longer operational range and carries a larger and more diverse weapons load, making it better suited for long-range patrols and strike missions. The expert added that the Type 212CD was designed primarily for NATO interoperability, while the two platforms also differ in maintenance requirements and operational management. Canada has repeatedly stressed that the selection extends beyond submarine performance to include jobs, industrial investment and broader economic cooperation, effectively turning the competition into a contest between two government-backed industrial packages. During a February visit to Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard, Canada's Secretary of State for Defence Procurement Stephen Fuhr highlighted the automotive sector as an area where bidders could strengthen their proposals, later saying that "auto would be a good place to start." South Korea's package centers on rapid submarine delivery, domestic production in Canada and broader cooperation in steel, artificial intelligence, and mobility. Its flagship proposal includes a C$3.1 billion hydrogen truck project based on Hyundai Motor's fuel-cell technology, featuring a hydrogen vehicle plant in Ontario, a liquefied hydrogen facility in British Columbia and refueling stations across western Canada. Seoul estimates the package could create about 9,000 jobs. Germany's proposal, meanwhile, emphasizes NATO interoperability and Canada's participation in the existing German-Norwegian Type 212CD production program. Earlier in the competition, Canadian officials pointed to Volkswagen's planned Ontario battery plant when encouraging Seoul to present a comparable automotive investment. Volkswagen later distanced itself from the submarine competition, saying the battery investment was independent of the defense procurement process and denying any cooperation with TKMS. The timing also coincides with President Lee Jae Myung's participation in his first NATO summit since taking office. Lee is expected to use the gathering in Ankara on July 7-8 to promote South Korea's growing role in global defense supply chains and its ability to deliver advanced weapons systems quickly and at scale. The industry ministry official cautioned against linking Lee's attendance directly to Canada's submarine decision. "There are many reasons for attending the NATO summit, and it would be too early to say the president is going because the submarine project is likely to go South Korea's way," the official said. He added, however, that South Korea's defense manufacturing capacity has become increasingly valuable as NATO members seek to rebuild depleted inventories while reducing supply-chain vulnerabilities. "NATO urgently needs to strengthen its own defense, but defense supply chains cannot be restored in a matter of months or even one or two years," he said. South Korea has emerged as an increasingly attractive alternative because it offers relatively fast delivery, competitive pricing and active production lines, earning a growing reputation as an "arsenal of the free world," he added. Another factor reshaping the competition is Canada's proposal to establish a multilateral Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB), which could reduce the political advantage Germany appeared to gain from Ottawa's expanding defense relationship with Europe. Canada recently became the first non-European participant in the European Union's €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, giving Canadian companies greater access to European defense projects. While the agreement does not require Ottawa to purchase a European submarine, it strengthened Germany's argument that the Type 212CD fits Canada's expanding defense integration with Europe. At the same time, Canada is leading efforts to establish the DSRB, which aims to mobilize up to £100 billion ($134 billion) in low-cost financing for defense production, resilient supply chains and security-related industries. Ottawa hopes to announce about 10 founding members during the NATO summit. Canada's lead negotiator has described discussions with Seoul as productive and estimated South Korea's chances of joining as a founding member at roughly "50-50." Germany, by contrast, has participated only as an observer. If South Korea ultimately secures the submarine contract, it would position itself not only as a supplier of naval platforms but also as a long-term partner in a broader Canada-led defense manufacturing and financing network spanning shipbuilding, maintenance, supply chains and advanced industrial cooperation. The final decision will therefore determine far more than which submarine Canada purchases. It will shape the industrial and defense partnership underpinning the operation and maintenance of Canada's future submarine fleet for decades. Canadian Defence Minister David McGuinty has also warned that operating two submarine classes would increase costs and complexity by requiring separate maintenance, logistics and training systems, although he has stopped short of ruling out a split order. For now, the central question is no longer whether South Korea remains in contention, but whether Ottawa awards the full contract to Seoul or opts for a politically balanced compromise by dividing the order. 2026-07-03 17:42:22
  • Canada-led global defense bank may include South Korea
    Canada-led global defense bank may include South Korea SEOUL, July 03 (AJP) - Canada plans to announce a group of about 10 countries expected to join a proposed global defense bank at next week’s NATO summit in Türkiye, with South Korea among the potential members, Reuters reported Thursday. Isabelle Hudon, chief executive of the Business Development Bank of Canada and Canada’s lead negotiator for the initiative, said Ottawa was working toward unveiling the founding members of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, or DSRB, by the end of the summit. “Our current objective is to use the NATO summit as the deadline and announce the list of founding countries,” Hudon was quoted as saying. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has promoted the bank as part of a broader push to build cooperation among middle powers amid what he has described as the erosion of the U.S.-led global order. The proposed bank would seek to raise up to 100 billion pounds ($134 billion) in low-cost financing to help participating countries strengthen their defense capabilities. Hudon said most of the initial members, apart from Canada, were expected to be European countries, though she declined to identify them. She cautioned that the announcement could still be delayed depending on the outcome of final negotiations over issues including capital commitments. However, she said the initiative was gaining momentum. According to Hudon, Carney has emphasized that the bank should begin with countries ready to join rather than seek a perfect arrangement from the outset, while leaving the door open for additional members. The project could nevertheless face uncertainty unless it secures strong support from major economies whose participation would be important for obtaining the highest possible credit rating. Hudon said Canada had held “productive discussions” with South Korea and assessed the chances of Seoul joining at about 50-50. She added that no other Group of Seven country appeared close to joining at this stage. South Korea’s Ministry of Economy and Finance said it was reviewing Canada’s proposal. The Canadian Finance Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment, according to Reuters. 2026-07-03 11:45:39
  • Taking command is easier than commanding the war
    Taking command is easier than commanding the war SEOUL, July 02 (AJP) - South Korea says its military is ready to assume wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States immediately. Its ally remains doubtful. The United States has a point. Recent difficulties identifying North Korean missile launches, limitations in military reconnaissance satellites and South Korea's continued reliance on U.S. intelligence, communications and strategic assets suggest Seoul has yet to eliminate some of the capability gaps that the conditions-based OPCON transition is designed to test. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back on Wednesday said more than two decades of preparation had created the military and policy conditions needed for the transfer. "Through the painstaking efforts of our military over the past two decades, the military and policy conditions have been established to the point where there would be no problem even if we recovered wartime operational control immediately," Ahn said. The government aims to complete this year the Full Operational Capability (FOC) verification of the future Combined Forces Command (CFC). Seoul hopes the South Korean and U.S. defense chiefs will then recommend a target year for the transfer to their presidents following the annual Security Consultative Meeting. Under the proposed structure, a South Korean four-star general would command the future CFC, while a U.S. general would serve as deputy commander. The transition, however, involves far more than changing the nationality of the commander. Wartime operational control does not mean South Korea would independently command its military after the transfer. It refers to command authority exercised through the Combined Forces Command, a binational headquarters directing designated South Korean and U.S. forces during wartime. Even then, some South Korean units responsible for capital defense, rear-area security and mobilization would remain under Seoul's national chain of command. The conditions-based transition requires the allies to determine whether South Korea can lead the combined defense, respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and whether the regional security environment supports a stable transfer. The first two conditions reportedly encompass dozens of major tasks and about 100 detailed requirements covering intelligence, weapons, organizations, doctrine, training and facilities. The third is inherently more subjective, involving broader strategic and political judgment. Ahn has said the allies agreed in 2020 that South Korea had fulfilled 94 percent of the first two sets of conditions. The details remain classified, however, making it unclear whether that figure reflects completed capabilities, approved acquisition plans or an average across multiple categories. The future command is also being evaluated through three stages: Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Full Operational Capability (FOC) and Full Mission Capability (FMC). Critics argue such progress is difficult to assess unless the allies first define the "end state" South Korea is expected to achieve. Jeong Kyung-woon, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and senior research fellow at the Korea Research Institute for Strategy, said broad objectives such as leading combined defense or responding to North Korean nuclear threats are too vague to measure. Without a clearly defined end state, the allies cannot determine how many units, weapons, personnel and facilities are actually required, he said. Evaluating progress without first defining the destination, Jeong argued, is like measuring how far a traveler has gone without deciding where the journey should end. Detection is not identification The distinction between detecting a launch and identifying exactly what was launched helps explain why intelligence remains one of the most demanding requirements for OPCON. North Korea's June 25 weapons launches illustrated that challenge. Pyongyang fired a mix of tactical ballistic missiles, upgraded 240-millimeter multiple rocket launchers and extended-range artillery shells. South Korea's military said the allies detected and tracked the projectiles in real time but did not immediately announce the launches and was unable to promptly determine their detailed specifications. A military expert said South Korea's ground-based radar network cannot continuously cover every part of North Korea. Because radar beams rise with distance, projectiles launched from deeper inside North Korea may not be detected until they reach higher altitudes. South Korean sensors may therefore observe only part of a projectile's flight, making precise identification difficult. "The South Korean detection network cannot cover every part of North Korea, and there are still significant blind spots," the expert said. "When the detected portion of a flight is short or its characteristics are unclear, additional U.S. or Japanese data may be needed before a conclusion can be reached." The United States can draw on reconnaissance assets based in Japan, elsewhere across the Indo-Pacific and the continental United States. South Korea has fewer surveillance platforms and a narrower coverage area, leaving it dependent on U.S. support for early warning and the identification of high-value targets. Seoul has sought to reduce that dependence by deploying five military reconnaissance satellites under its 425 Project. Concerns emerged, however, after one attitude-control actuator malfunctioned on both the third and fourth satellites. A retired general involved in earlier OPCON preparations said five satellites alone cannot provide persistent surveillance of the Korean Peninsula and that South Korea remains dependent on U.S. reconnaissance assets to monitor strategic targets. Long-range strike weapons matter only if targets can first be found, identified and tracked. Without persistent surveillance, even sophisticated missiles become significantly less effective. A more complicated command structure The current CFC commander also serves as commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the senior U.S. military officer stationed in South Korea. That arrangement has long simplified coordination among South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CFC, USFK and the UNC. After OPCON transfer, the South Korean general commanding the future CFC would not command either the UNC or USFK, requiring new coordination mechanisms among organizations currently led by the same individual. The change becomes especially significant during a nuclear crisis, when the future CFC would need to coordinate with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command and other organizations controlling intelligence and strategic assets. Questions also remain over how quickly a South Korean commander could secure additional U.S. surveillance capabilities compared with today's American commander. The same issue extends to wartime reinforcements and strategic assets such as aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, strategic bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and military satellites. The future commander could request those assets, but their deployment would remain subject to decisions by the U.S. government and military commands. The scope of South Korea's wartime operational control would likewise depend on arrangements agreed upon by both governments. None of this suggests Washington would reject the authority of a South Korean commander. But changing the nationality of the commander would not automatically guarantee immediate access to every U.S. capability. Even after OPCON transfer, South Korea would continue to rely on U.S. intelligence, missile defense, communications and strategic assets. The transition is therefore not simply about replacing one commander with another. The real test of wartime command is whether that commander can integrate South Korean and U.S. forces, fuse allied intelligence, secure strategic reinforcements and make operational decisions under combat conditions. "Taking command is not simply putting a South Korean general in the top position," the military expert said. "It means having the ability to see the threat, assess it, make a decision and communicate that decision under pressure. That is where readiness must ultimately be proven." 2026-07-02 16:31:59
  • Hanwha cuts petrochemical prices amid Gulf cost pressures
    Hanwha cuts petrochemical prices amid Gulf cost pressures SEOUL, July 02 (AJP) - Hanwha Solutions said Thursday it will cut prices for major petrochemical products by up to 250,000 won ($161) per ton to ease cost pressures on plastics manufacturers after supply disruptions caused by the Iran war. The company will lower prices for products including polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride by between 100,000 won and 250,000 won per ton. Hanwha Solutions said the move is intended to share savings from government support for naphtha and other key petrochemical raw materials with small and midsize customers. The support was introduced after the Iran war disrupted shipments and drove up import costs for South Korean petrochemical producers. The company expects the price cuts to reduce raw material costs for plastics processors and help extend the benefits of government support to downstream industries. It also plans to strengthen cooperation across production, logistics and sales to maintain a stable supply of raw materials and minimize disruptions. “We are grateful for the government’s timely support in response to soaring naphtha and feedstock prices,” said Nam Jung-woon, head of Hanwha Solutions’ chemical division. “We will share the cost burden with plastics manufacturers and work to maintain stable supplies and strengthen industrial competitiveness.” Hanwha Solutions said it will continue cooperating with the government to respond to fluctuations in global raw material prices and support supply chain stability. 2026-07-02 16:09:15
  • Hanwha Ocean named KDDX preferred bidder, contract due in August
    Hanwha Ocean named KDDX preferred bidder, contract due in August SEOUL, July 02 (AJP) - Hanwha Ocean has been selected as the preferred bidder for the design and construction of the lead vessel in South Korea’s next-generation destroyer program, the company said Thursday. The shipbuilder said in a regulatory filing that the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) had formally selected it as the top-priority bidder for the Korean Destroyer Next Generation (KDDX) project. The value and duration of the contract will be determined through negotiations, Hanwha Ocean said. The company plans to disclose further details once the final terms are agreed upon. “Hanwha Ocean feels a strong sense of responsibility upon being selected as the preferred bidder for the construction of the lead vessel under the KDDX program. We will engage in negotiations with the government and do our utmost to bring the project back on track," a company official said. Speaking at a regular Defense Ministry briefing Thursday, a DAPA official said the agency had completed its review of an objection filed over the evaluation and found no problems with the results. “DAPA reviewed the companies’ objections in accordance with the relevant regulations and procedures and ultimately confirmed that there were no problems with the evaluation results,” the official said. “We have notified both companies of the bidders eligible for negotiations and their order of priority and will proceed with negotiations with the top-ranked bidder,” the official added. DAPA aims to sign the final contract by the end of August. The agency notified Hanwha Ocean and rival HD Hyundai Heavy Industries on June 11 that Hanwha Ocean had received the higher score in its evaluation of their proposals. Hanwha Ocean reportedly prevailed by a margin of about 0.59 points. The result was largely determined by a 1.2-point security-related penalty imposed on HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. Company employees were previously convicted of photographing and leaking military secrets, including documents related to the KDDX conceptual design. HD Hyundai Heavy Industries filed an objection to the evaluation, but DAPA rejected the appeal Wednesday. DAPA plans to begin formal negotiations with Hanwha Ocean later this month and is targeting the end of August for the final contract. The 7.8 trillion won ($5.7 billion) KDDX program calls for the construction of six 7,000-ton destroyers using domestically developed technologies. The vessels are often described as “mini Aegis destroyers” because of their advanced integrated combat systems. The detailed design and construction of the lead vessel were originally scheduled to begin in 2024 after the basic design was completed in December 2023. The project was delayed for about two years, however, as DAPA struggled to resolve an intensifying dispute between the country’s two largest naval shipbuilders. Hanwha Ocean’s selection brings the long-delayed bidding process close to completion and gives the company the leading role in the program. There has been speculation that construction of the six vessels could eventually be divided between Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries because of shipyard capacity constraints. The company responsible for the lead vessel, however, is expected to take the initiative in the overall program. The lead destroyer is expected to be delivered to the South Korean Navy by the end of 2032 following the detailed design process. DAPA is expected to begin awarding contracts for the five follow-on vessels in late 2028, with the goal of delivering all six ships by 2036. 2026-07-02 11:43:58
  • Britains defense push adds new variable to Canada submarine equation
    Britain's defense push adds new variable to Canada submarine equation SEOUL, July 01 (AJP) - Britain's latest defense spending plan has added a new variable to Canada's multibillion-dollar submarine equation, strengthening South Korea's industrial partnership with London as Seoul and Germany compete for one of Ottawa's biggest military contracts. The British government on Tuesday unveiled an additional 15 billion pounds ($20 billion) in military spending, focusing on drones, autonomous systems, next-generation fighter aircraft and other technologies expected to define future warfare. Under the plan, Britain's defense spending will rise to 2.7 percent of gross domestic product by 2029, still short of the government's longer-term NATO commitments. London has pledged to increase the figure to 3 percent during the next parliamentary term and to NATO's 3.5 percent target by 2035, although it has yet to present a detailed funding roadmap. The strategy underscores Britain's growing reliance on international industrial partnerships despite Brexit as it modernizes its armed forces while grappling with budgetary and production constraints at home. "This demands a decisive strengthening of European capabilities," British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said, adding that the effort was intended not to replace the United States but to reinforce the transatlantic alliance. The renewed emphasis on defense cooperation comes as Europe prepares for a future in which Washington expects allies to shoulder a greater share of the continent's security burden. During the recent U.S.-Iran conflict, President Donald Trump criticized NATO members for staying out of the U.S. military campaign and again threatened to reduce America's commitment to the alliance. Although Washington has since reaffirmed its support for NATO, the episode has intensified pressure on European governments to strengthen domestic defense industries while expanding partnerships with trusted allies. That changing strategic environment is becoming increasingly relevant to the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), under which Ottawa plans to procure up to 12 conventionally powered submarines. The competition has narrowed to South Korea's Hanwha Ocean, offering the KSS-III Batch-II submarine, and Germany's Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), which is proposing its Type 212CD design. "CPSP is not just about delivering a submarine platform. It is about building long-term industrial capability and skilled jobs in Canada," said Charlie S.C. Eoh, head of Hanwha Ocean's naval ship business. Hanwha has partnered with British defense company Babcock for the Canadian bid. Under the proposed arrangement, Hanwha would build the submarines, while Babcock Canada would provide in-country maintenance, repair and long-term lifecycle support. Britain's defense cooperation with South Korea predates the Canadian competition. Under the 2023 Downing Street Accord, London and Seoul agreed to pursue joint weapons development and signed a memorandum of understanding to identify priority markets for future defense exports. Babcock has also participated in South Korea's KSS-III submarine program since 2011. Under a seven-year contract awarded by Hanwha Ocean, key components of the submarine's weapons handling and launch system are designed and manufactured in Britain, with other components produced under license in South Korea. The British government has likewise expressed support for the partnership, giving Hanwha additional diplomatic backing as it seeks to challenge Germany's long-established position as a NATO submarine supplier. "The U.K. government would like to work with Hanwha on the Canadian submarine project," British Ambassador to South Korea Colin Crooks said during a recent reception attended by President Lee Jae Myung. TKMS, meanwhile, is emphasizing the Type 212CD's interoperability with NATO forces and the industrial ecosystem built around its joint submarine program with Norway. Its proposal offers Canada access to an established European defense partnership involving two NATO members. The Hanwha-Babcock partnership seeks to narrow that advantage by combining South Korea's shipbuilding capability with Britain's defense industrial network, reinforcing its credentials in NATO interoperability, long-term sustainment and allied industrial cooperation. Britain's latest defense investment should not, however, be interpreted as a direct endorsement of Hanwha's Canadian bid. The Canadian submarine project is not mentioned in the government's defense strategy, and London has not publicly linked the spending package to the competition. But the plan does reinforce Britain's broader commitment to expanding international defense industrial partnerships, a trend that could strengthen the strategic rationale behind the Hanwha-Babcock alliance as Ottawa weighs not only submarine performance, but also long-term industrial and geopolitical partnerships. 2026-07-01 16:17:57
  • Military academy alumni groups to stage first joint protest against merger plan
    Military academy alumni groups to stage first joint protest against merger plan SEOUL, July 01 (AJP) - Alumni associations representing South Korea’s Army, Navy and Air Force academies will stage their first joint action next week against the government’s plan to integrate the three military schools. The associations are scheduled to hold a rally outside the National Assembly on July 8, according to parliamentary and alumni group officials Wednesday. The event is expected to be jointly hosted by the three alumni associations, security groups and lawmakers Han Ki-ho and Lim Jong-deuk of the main opposition People Power Party, both graduates of the Korea Military Academy. The associations have circulated details of the rally among alumni and encouraged them to attend. “The alumni associations of the Army, Navy and Air Force academies, together with a coalition of security organizations, will hold a mass rally to stop the hasty implementation of the plan,” in a letter sent to its members Wednesday. The association expects about 1,000 alumni and supporters to take part. Because rallies and demonstrations are prohibited inside the National Assembly compound under current law, the event is expected to take the form of a press conference led by lawmakers. It will mark the first time the alumni associations of all three academies have taken joint action over the proposed integration. The Defense Ministry is considering creating a unified military academy that would jointly select cadets for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Under the proposal, cadets would receive common education during their first two years before choosing a service and undergoing specialized academic and military training in their third and fourth years. The government is reportedly considering introducing unified admissions as early as the 2028 academic year, when students currently in their second year of high school enter university. The ministry is also considering relocating the Korea Military Academy from Seoul to Jangseong, South Jeolla Province. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said in a directive sent to military commanders Tuesday that entrance scores at the academies had continued to decline and pledged to complete the education reform. He reiterated the position Wednesday at a meeting of senior military commanders. 2026-07-01 16:01:46
  • Seoul weighs joint military academy admissions from 2028
    Seoul weighs joint military academy admissions from 2028 SEOUL, July 01 (AJP) - South Korea is considering jointly selecting cadets for its Army, Navy and Air Force academies as early as the 2028 academic year, a move that could affect students currently in their second year of high school. The proposal signals that the government is accelerating plans to integrate the three service academies, but concerns are growing that the timetable could confuse applicants and run counter to the principle that major changes to university admissions should be announced well in advance. The Defense Ministry recently told several members of the National Assembly’s defense committee that it was considering introducing joint admissions for cadets entering in 2028, according to sources familiar with the matter. Under the government’s plan, a new Korean Armed Forces Academy would be established to select Army, Navy and Air Force cadets together. Cadets would receive a common curriculum during their first two years before choosing a military branch and receiving service-specific academic and military training in their third and fourth years. The ministry is expected to announce a basic integration plan as early as this month, followed by a public hearing in late July or early August. It would then seek legislative changes needed to establish the new academy. Once the legal framework is completed, the government is expected to announce an admissions plan outlining the general process, followed by detailed application guidelines. If the restructuring proceeds as planned, the government could publish the guidelines around April next year, conduct the selection process later in the year and admit the first jointly selected cadets in 2028. The schedule remains subject to change depending on the progress of legislation. Under such a timetable, students currently in their second year of high school who have been preparing to apply separately to the Army, Navy or Air Force academies would have to adjust to a new admissions system during the first half of their final school year. Critics say that formally pursuing joint admissions from 2028 could conflict with the intent of South Korea’s advance-notice rules for university admissions. Under the Higher Education Act, universities are generally required to publish their admissions plans at least one year and 10 months before the start of the academic year. Under that requirement, admissions plans for the 2028 academic year should have been announced by May this year. There is also speculation that the government’s integration plan has already affected admissions preparations at the individual academies. The Korea Military Academy said on its website that it would publish its 2028 admissions plan after receiving government instructions. In response to questions from the office of Rep. Yoo Yong-won of the main opposition People Power Party, the Defense Ministry reportedly said there was “no legal problem” because the military academies are special-purpose institutions and are not necessarily bound by the same rules as ordinary universities. The ministry also said it would provide sufficient explanations to applicants and address concerns about possible confusion. However, critics say the accelerated timetable could still run against the broader principle of advance notice, as laws governing the military academies stipulate that provisions of the Higher Education Act apply to their general academic programs and facilities. 2026-07-01 10:35:45
  • Canada submarine race turns winner-take-all as final decision nears
    Canada submarine race turns winner-take-all as final decision nears SEOUL, June 30 (AJP) - Canada's multibillion-dollar submarine competition is increasingly shaping into a winner-take-all contest after the country's defense minister publicly highlighted the financial and operational drawbacks of operating two different submarine fleets. The remarks weaken speculation that Ottawa could split its planned order of up to 12 submarines between South Korea's Hanwha Ocean and Germany's Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) as a political compromise between the two finalists. South Korea's Defense Ministry responded cautiously Tuesday as Canada moved closer to selecting a preferred bidder. "We are aware of the related report," ministry spokesperson Jeong Bit-na said during a regular briefing. "All I can say is that we have done everything we can and will await the outcome." Canadian broadcaster CTV reported Monday that Defense Minister David McGuinty had downplayed the prospect of dividing the order during a visit to Japan last week. "When you split any kind of fleet, it adds costs in many ways," McGuinty said. "You have to maintain, sustain and support two different fleets, which creates more complexity for any country." Although McGuinty stopped short of formally ruling out the option, saying Ottawa was still evaluating all factors before making a final decision, his remarks marked the clearest indication yet that the Canadian government sees significant disadvantages in buying submarines from both bidders. Bloomberg previously reported that Canadian officials had explored an unusual compromise under which German-built submarines would operate from the Atlantic coast while South Korean vessels would be based on the Pacific coast. Such an arrangement would distribute industrial benefits while preserving defense ties with both Europe and Asia. But it would also leave the Royal Canadian Navy operating two separate submarine classes requiring different maintenance systems, supply chains, spare parts inventories and training pipelines. Jeong Kyung-woon, a research fellow at the Korean Association of Military Studies, told AJP in March that such a split would undermine the economic assumptions underpinning both bids. "Current pricing is based on an order for all 12 submarines," Jeong said. "If Canada signs two separate contracts for six boats each, total procurement costs would inevitably increase. A program that costs 100 as a single order could easily become 120 when divided." The financial impact, he said, would extend well beyond procurement. "Operating two different submarine classes would require separate logistics systems, maintenance facilities and training programs," Jeong said. "Lifecycle maintenance costs would rise substantially while the Royal Canadian Navy's operational efficiency would decline." He added that while Canada could still choose to divide the order if it were prepared to accept higher costs and lower efficiency, such a decision would be difficult to justify. "Unless Canada intends to buy submarines as if bargaining in a marketplace, I do not believe a split order is likely," another defense analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AJP. McGuinty's comments largely echoed those assessments, giving official weight to concerns defense analysts had raised for months. The shift toward a likely single supplier does not, however, indicate which bidder currently has the upper hand. Analysts cited by CTV described the competition as "too close to call," suggesting Ottawa is still weighing the broader industrial, economic and strategic packages accompanying the rival proposals. Even after a preferred bidder is announced, negotiations will continue. Stephen Fuhr, Canada's secretary of state for defense procurement, said Ottawa will negotiate with the selected company to convert memorandums of understanding and industrial commitments into binding agreements covering local production, employment, maintenance, technology transfer and long-term industrial cooperation. For South Korea, the fading prospect of a split order presents both risk and opportunity. It reduces Hanwha Ocean's chances of securing part of the contract if Germany ultimately prevails. Conversely, a winner-take-all decision would allow the successful bidder to secure the entire fleet of up to 12 submarines—along with decades of maintenance work, upgrades and strategic industrial cooperation. CTV reported that the preferred-bidder announcement could slip by several days. Citing government sources, it said Ottawa still intends to make a decision before Prime Minister Mark Carney departs for the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye, on July 7. Fuhr had previously indicated that the government expected to announce its preferred bidder around the end of June, allowing for a short delay. With the possibility of a split order rapidly fading, Canada's decision will determine not only the future composition of its submarine fleet but also which long-term defense industrial ecosystem it chooses to join for decades to come. 2026-06-30 16:46:24