Despite rising threats, 418 non-Iranian oil tankers passed through the strait in October, also a monthly high. Lloyd's warned that shipping activity remained below normal levels and further attacks were highly likely.
Tags: Strait of Hormuz, Iran, United States, Israel, Middle East, Maritime Security, Shipping, Oil Tankers, Lloyd's List Intelligence, IRGC, Houthis, Saudi Arabia, Aramco, Yemen, Energy Security, Iran War
Heesu Kim
Kim Hee-su is a bilingual reporter at AJU Press, covering defense and foreign affairs. Before joining AJP in 2025, she worked at The Korea Times, where she wrote interview stories, including a profile of North Korean defector Kim Gum-hyok, and produced digital content. She also previously worked as a researcher for KBS News 9’s International News Department, supporting correspondents in 10 countries around the world. She graduated from the University of Toronto in Canada with a double major in Book and Media Studies and East Asian Studies.
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Iran's Revolutionary Guard Reports Tanker Fires in Strait of Hormuz
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy reported early on November 3 that three tankers navigating illegally in the Strait of Hormuz were engulfed in flames due to mine explosions.According to the IRGC Navy's public relations office, the tankers were moving through unauthorized routes in the strait with their navigation and identification systems turned off when they were struck by mines. The vessels are currently burning off the southern coast of the strait.The statement added that fishermen in the eastern waters of the Strait of Hormuz witnessed a night illuminated as brightly as day due to the explosions and fires.The IRGC emphasized that it has repeatedly notified all vessels of the navigation regulations for the Strait of Hormuz through radio stations and official announcements.The public relations office warned, "If vessels disregard these regulations or cooperate with aggressive U.S. forces to navigate unauthorized routes in the strait, incidents like this will occur."* This article has been translated by AI.
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Iran President Proposes New Peace Plan for Strait of Hormuz, Seeks U.S. Sanctions Relief
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that a new peace plan for reopening the Strait of Hormuz has been coordinated with the Supreme Leader. According to Yonhap News on the 26th, President Pezeshkian stated, "Our new peace plan for reopening the Strait of Hormuz has been coordinated with Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader." In excerpts from an interview with CBS News released by Iran's state-run IRNA news agency, he said, "If the United States accepts our proposal and fulfills its obligations, we will do the same." He further clarified that coordination with the Supreme Leader has already taken place, emphasizing that the plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz is a decision made by Iran's leadership. Additionally, President Pezeshkian explained that a special team consisting of six members, including military, parliamentary, and government representatives, has been formed and holds decision-making authority regarding the peace plan. Iran has demanded the following conditions from the United States for reopening the Strait of Hormuz: the release of overseas frozen assets amounting to at least $12 billion (approximately 16.3 trillion won), the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil, and the cessation of the U.S. maritime blockade against Iran. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical passage for global oil transport and has been a major point of contention amid prolonged military tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Consequently, the decision to reopen the strait could significantly impact international oil prices and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. The U.S. government has not yet issued an official response to Iran's proposal. However, the Wall Street Journal reported that President Donald Trump has rejected the Iranian offer. Meanwhile, President Pezeshkian has maintained a cautious stance regarding direct negotiations with the U.S. In an interview with Al Jazeera, he expressed distrust, stating, "After past negotiations, attacks and sanctions have continued." He added that Qatar and Pakistan are currently mediating between the two sides and conveying messages from Iran to the U.S. He also indicated that Iran could assist in resolving the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.* This article has been translated by AI.
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Analysis of South Korea's Potential Deployment to the Strait of Hormuz
If South Korea's military deployment to the Strait of Hormuz materializes, it could enhance U.S.-South Korea relations, protect energy transport routes, and expand cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, according to diplomatic and security experts. However, concerns about potential Iranian retaliation, the safety of South Korean troops, and domestic public opinion divisions are challenges the government must address. On September 7, Ajou Economics interviewed three experts—Shin Beom-cheol, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute; Min Jeong-hoon, a professor at the National Diplomatic Academy; and Jang Ji-hyang, a senior researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies—to discuss the expected benefits and risks of the deployment to the Strait of Hormuz. The experts agreed that the purpose and method of the deployment, along with international cooperation, are crucial, but they expressed differing views on the timing and alternatives for the government's response. The most immediate expected benefit is the improvement of U.S.-South Korea relations. By contributing to U.S. efforts, South Korea could alleviate pressure from President Donald Trump and create favorable conditions for negotiations between the two countries. Similar to past deployments in Iraq, the key will be whether military contributions can be linked to enhanced influence over alliance management and issues on the Korean Peninsula. Min stated, "The deployment will help manage U.S.-South Korea relations," adding that South Korea's support could positively impact the overall relationship during challenging times for the U.S. He emphasized the need for South Korea to secure corresponding benefits, such as specific commitments from the U.S. regarding the revision of the nuclear agreement and the transition of wartime operational control. Shin acknowledged the potential for improved U.S.-South Korea relations but cautioned that deployment alone would not immediately resolve bilateral issues. He stressed the importance of comprehensively examining complex matters to prioritize negotiations. If dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. resumes, there is also concern about the possibility of South Korea being excluded from discussions, known as 'Korea passing.' Shin suggested that this concern may have influenced the South Korean government's consideration of deployment, as managing relations with the U.S. could expand South Korea's influence on North Korean issues. Min also believed that South Korea's contribution could create a favorable environment for discussions, including those related to North Korea. However, he cautioned that it is difficult to predict specific outcomes, noting that deployment does not guarantee South Korea's participation in U.S.-North Korea talks or leadership on the Korean Peninsula issue. The potential for expanded cooperation with Middle Eastern countries was also highlighted. Jang emphasized that the deployment should not be viewed solely in the context of U.S.-Iran relations but should also consider relationships with Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. These nations are key energy suppliers to South Korea and important partners in nuclear and defense sectors. Jang assessed that if South Korea provides substantial assistance to Gulf countries facing regional security crises, it could lead to future economic cooperation, including defense exports. However, he noted that South Korea's response has been somewhat delayed compared to European countries that have already begun supporting Gulf nations. On the other hand, a major risk factor identified is the deterioration of relations with Iran. Shin warned that South Korea could become a target for Iran, and South Korean companies operating in the region might also face retaliation. Min highlighted the critical challenge of ensuring the safety of South Korean citizens and military personnel amid the risk of becoming embroiled in conflict. Jang pointed out that the threat from Iran is a significant risk factor that distinguishes this situation from past deployments in Iraq. He emphasized that relying solely on communication with Iranian diplomatic authorities may not be sufficient to manage military risks, and the purpose of the deployment—protecting freedom of navigation and conducting non-combat missions—must be clearly articulated. Consequently, experts suggested that not only the decision to deploy but also the scope and nature of the mission are crucial. Min proposed utilizing patrol aircraft and logistical support vessels instead of sending combat troops, stating, "It is necessary to participate within an international cooperation framework with countries like the UK and France to avoid concentrated attacks from Iran and uphold the justification for deployment." He also urged continuous communication with Iran regarding the purpose and scope of South Korea's involvement to reduce the risk of misjudgment and conflict. Shin noted that various options, including arms support and the use of the Cheonghae Unit, should have been prioritized in discussions to persuade the U.S. He added that the appropriateness of the timing and method of the Hormuz deployment as a measure to improve U.S.-South Korea relations should be carefully evaluated. Evaluations of the government's response have been mixed. Shin pointed out that the government's rapid shift in stance following U.S. complaints could raise questions about policy consistency. Jang also criticized the missed opportunity to contribute alongside the international community and deemed the response as delayed. Conversely, Min argued that the government aimed to minimize intervention considering the safety of the military, making it difficult to assert that an earlier response would have improved the situation. He explained that even if limited support had been provided initially, there was no guarantee that there would not have been additional U.S. demands or Iranian backlash. Domestic political burdens also remain. Min emphasized that the government must actively explain the purpose and necessity of the deployment to prevent divisions in public opinion. If casualties occur during operations, it could lead to a deterioration of relations with Iran and raise accountability issues regarding the government's decisions and safety measures. He concluded that negotiations to secure diplomatic benefits, along with clear mission parameters and measures to protect military personnel, should be core criteria in the decision-making process regarding deployment.* This article has been translated by AI.