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Journalist

Park Sae-jin박세진

Assistant EditorForeign embassies in Seoul & Geopolitics, Diplomacy, Policy

Experienced journalist and editor at AJU PRESS specializing in multilingual news. I cover international diplomacy, geolpolitics, and policy, consistently delivering highly accurate, compelling reporting for a worldwide audience. "Reporting the facts. Shaping the narrative. Every second counts."

Latest by Park Sae-jin

ASIA INSIGHT: Architecture of South Korean reconciliation At exactly 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday, the abstract statistics of South Korea’s ninth nationwide local elections collided with physical reality. Across 258 counting centers, the seals on the first ballot boxes were broken. As millions of paper slips began feeding into automated sorting machines—the initial step before a grueling, newly mandated manual verification process—the republic stood at a critical institutional juncture. Joint exit polls released at the close of voting projected the ruling Democratic Party of Korea claiming widespread administrative control, leading in 11 of 16 metropolitan mayoral and gubernatorial races. Yet, reading this moment as a simple partisan triumph fundamentally misunderstands the structural mechanics of the current political era. As the count begins, this election is not a standard referendum on municipal budgets; it is a live-fire test of whether a political architecture profoundly fractured by recent constitutional shocks can successfully contain a divided nation. The administration of President Lee Jae Myung reached its one-year milestone against the backdrop of deep institutional trauma. This midterm vote operates in the immediate wake of the December 2024 martial law decree and the subsequent impeachment of the former executive, events that fundamentally rewrote the boundaries of South Korean political conflict. The fallout left the conservative bloc fighting an explicit war for baseline political survival. Following a devastating defeat in the general elections two years ago, the conservative People Power Party arrived at this local cycle on the verge of territorial extinction. Stripped of executive authority and severely marginalized in the National Assembly, municipal and provincial governance represented their final remaining foothold on the domestic political map. Because the conservative establishment was backed into an existential corner, their electoral resistance was total. This desperation materialized not in civic apathy, but in a relentless mobilization of the base. By the time polls closed at 6:00 p.m., the National Election Commission verified a definitive national turnout of 60.9 percent. This figure represents the physical footprint of a cornered demographic. The electorate did not flood the polling stations out of a shared desire for national harmony; they mobilized because both factions viewed the alternative as political erasure. It is precisely within this climate of existential anxiety that the true mechanism of South Korean reconciliation reveals itself. True political stabilization in a deeply polarized society does not emerge from sentimental appeals to unity or emotional healing. It is forged when competing factions, driven by the sheer terror of eradication, are forced to channel their conflict entirely through the rigid infrastructure of the democratic state. The shared act of submitting to the ballot box institutionalizes the hostility, proving that even a highly traumatized political class prefers the grueling mechanics of the vote count to extra-parliamentary chaos. The material realities driving this mobilization were split along clear ideological lines. The opposition People Power Party successfully anchored its campaign to acute macroeconomic anxiety, focusing public attention on the 3.1 percent consumer inflation spike recorded in May—the largest inflationary surge in 26 months. While regional economic analysts correctly identify this strain as a byproduct of external pressures, including the depreciation of the Japanese yen and shifting Chinese export strategies, the domestic electorate processed it as an immediate failure of state management. The opposition framed the vote purely as a material defense of personal property and wages. Conversely, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea counter-mobilized by framing the election as a literal defense of the constitutional order, labeling the opposition as the remnants of an insurrectionist faction that sought to subvert the republic two winters ago. As the ballot boxes open under the glare of counting-room lights, the razor-thin margins projected by the exit polls guarantee an intensely volatile night. In the metropolitan city of Daegu, the traditional heartland of South Korean conservatism, exit polls place opposition candidate Choo Kyung-ho at a razor-thin 49.9 percent against the ruling party’s Kim Boo-kyum at 49.1 percent. In the southern port city of Busan, a critical economic hub and outward-facing logistics anchor, the ruling party's Jeon Jae-su holds a narrow edge of 50.2 percent over the opposition's Park Hyung-jun at 48.3 percent. In the capital city of Seoul, the primary national barometer, the ruling party's Jung Won-oh leads opposition incumbent Oh Se-hoon by a projected 51.4 percent to 46.0 percent. In an environment poisoned by the memory of martial law, these sub-one-percent margins will not instantly breed political harmony. In the immediate hours ahead, they will inevitably cause intense friction, legal challenges, and partisan paranoia. A margin of less than one percent is an operational invitation to contest every single ballot box. Yet, over the long arc of the administration, these microscopic margins function as the ultimate structural safeguard against ideological cleansing. A majority faction cannot govern as an absolute conqueror when its mandate rests on fractions of a single percentage point. The projected numbers indicate that the conservative establishment has managed to preserve its core geographic fortresses, denying the ruling party total hegemonic control over the state. Simultaneously, the ruling party’s deep penetration into traditionally hostile territory proves that old geographic dogmas no longer offer absolute insulation. This is the definition of mutually assured political survival. When neither side possesses the numerical superiority required to completely liquidate the other, both are structurally compelled to accept a cautious, administrative coexistence. To guarantee that this volatile equilibrium holds, the state has deployed its final institutional defense. Tonight, 314,000 management personnel across 258 counting centers are executing a completely manual, ballot-by-ballot review process after the automated sorting is complete. In a political climate saturated with institutional distrust, this logistical gauntlet is a deliberate decelerator. The agonizingly slow physical verification of millions of paper slips introduces an immediate surface area for human exhaustion and localized disputes over individual tables. Yet, this manual count is the only process capable of establishing an irrefutable boundary. South Korea's divided factions are not united by a shared vision of the future, and they still view each other's motives with profound suspicion. But by forcing this existential combat into the slow, indisputable, and manually verified reality of the 8:30 p.m. unsealing, the state is successfully engineering a cold, structural equilibrium. The divided hearts of the electorate are not being mended by mutual affection; they are being bound by an ironclad architecture where political survival depends entirely on submitting to the rule of the institution. 2026-06-03 20:51:44
Ruling party leads in South Korean local election exit polls SEOUL, June 03 (AJP) -South Korea's ruling Democratic Party of Korea holds a strong lead in 11 out of 16 metropolitan mayoral and gubernatorial races, according to joint election-day exit polls released Wednesday. The projected outcomes position the party to expand its local administrative power as President Lee Jae-myung enters the second year of his term. The nationwide vote serves as the first major electoral test for the Lee Jae Myung administration, a critical midterm referendum on his first year in office. A decisive victory would grant the ruling party a unified mandate across administrative, legislative, and local levels, while a defeat for the opposition People Power Party could trigger immediate leadership restructuring. In the high-profile race for mayor of Seoul, the country's capital and primary political barometer, ruling party candidate Jung Won-oh leads opposition incumbent Oh Se-hoon by 51.4 percent to 46.0 percent. Control of the capital is historically viewed as a critical prize in South Korean elections due to the city's massive population and economic influence. Broadcasters classified several major regions as tight contests, including the southern port city of Busan and the metropolitan city of Daegu, which is traditionally regarded as the heart of South Korean conservatism. In the Daegu mayoral race, opposition candidate Choo Kyung-ho holds a razor-thin lead over ruling party candidate Kim Boo-kyum by 49.9 percent to 49.1 percent. In Busan, the ruling party's Jeon Jae-su maintains a narrow edge with 50.2 percent over the opposition's Park Hyung-jun at 48.3 percent. Meanwhile, the North Jeolla gubernatorial race shows the ruling party's Lee Won-taek leading independent candidate Kim Kwan-young by 48.5 percent to 46.3 percent. A separate prediction survey released by cable network JTBC projected the ruling Democratic Party of Korea to win 10 seats and the conservative opposition to win one seat. The network classified five regions as battlegrounds, listing Daegu, Chungnam, Chungbuk, Jeonbuk, and Gyeongnam as too close to call. The joint exit polls, conducted by major terrestrial broadcasters KBS, MBC, and SBS, were released simultaneously at 6 p.m. as polling stations closed across South Korea. 2026-06-03 19:00:17
Opposition leader slams South Korean president on election day SEOUL, June 03 (AJP) - South Korea's main opposition leader Jang Dong-hyeok launched a sharp election-day attack against President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday, accusing him of illegal campaigning and severe economic mismanagement. Speaking during a final election committee meeting at the National Assembly, the conservative leader urged voters to cast their ballots as an act of constitutional self-defense against the government. The address underscored the bitter polarization surrounding the nationwide local elections and parliamentary by-elections, which serve as a critical midterm referendum on the one-year-old presidency. A strong showing for the opposition could block the administrative momentum of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea, while a loss threatens to trigger immediate internal disputes over political accountability. Jang asserted that the president committed serious legal violations that warrant impeachment. The former prosecutor specifically claimed that Lee allegedly displayed a marked ballot to television cameras. The opposition leadership also linked the political standoff to broader economic anxieties, arguing that the administration prioritized political survival over public livelihoods. The former prosecutor warned that unchecked government policies would worsen financial conditions, creating what he described as a difficult environment of high interest rates, high inflation, and volatile exchange rates. Pointing to the high voter turnout reported throughout the day, the People Power Party interpreted the long lines at polling stations as a sign of public dissatisfaction. Jang told supporters that staying away from the polls was equivalent to surrendering personal property, wages, and fundamental freedoms. People Power Party chief spokesperson Park Sung-hoon stated that voters intent on protecting their daily routines would continue to drive participation until the polls closed. 2026-06-03 15:30:39
Ruling party leader urges voter turnout citing historical one-vote margins SEOUL, June 03 (AJP) - The ruling Democratic Party of Korea leader Jung Chung-rae urged citizens on Wednesday to participate in the nationwide local elections, emphasizing that a single ballot carries the weight of South Korea's democratic history and can directly determine narrow races. Speaking at a central election committee meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul, Jung highlighted the statistical reality of close contests to combat voter apathy. He noted that the past six local elections have seen 13 races decided by exactly one vote, while seven other contests ended in a dead heat that required the winner to be determined by the candidate's age. "My single vote changes the elected official, regional policies, and the future of the community," Jung said on the morning of election day. "This is not just an empty phrase politicians say during every election." The party leader framed the act of voting as a hard-won democratic right, tracing South Korea's political development from its inaugural 1948 general elections through the March 15 protests against rigged elections and the 1987 June Democratic Struggle against military dictatorship. Jung asked supporters to head to the polling stations with the mindset that their preferred candidate is trailing by exactly one vote. "Show who the owner of South Korea is through voting, and please choose the path the country will take," he said. 2026-06-03 14:55:57
South Korea counts local election votes to decide political control SEOUL, June 03 (AJP) - South Koreans turned out in large numbers for nationwide local elections on Wednesday, setting up a high-stakes verdict on the one-year-old administration of President Lee Jae-myung. Voting proceeded smoothly across 14,288 polling stations before ballot boxes were transferred to designated counting centers. The election serves as a critical midterm referendum that could either grant the ruling Democratic Party of Korea total control over local and national governance or allow the opposition People Power Party to stall the administration's legislative agenda. The ruling party campaigned on a platform to judge insurrection forces, while the opposition focused on judging the government. A victory for the ruling party provides strong momentum for its second year in office, while a loss threatens to trigger severe internal party disputes over political accountability. Data from the National Election Commission showed that voter turnout reached 48.9 percent by 2 p.m., marking an 8.2 percentage point increase from the local elections four years ago. More than 21.8 million of the country's 44.6 million eligible voters cast ballots, including those from a two-day early voting period that recorded a 23.51 percent turnout. The election commission expects the general outline of the winners to emerge around midnight as officials count ballots across 258 centers nationwide. While clear victories may be determined by midnight, highly competitive races and concurrent parliamentary by-elections in key battlegrounds like Seoul and Busan are expected to remain unclear until 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. on Thursday. Total counting times are expected to exceed the seven hours and 40 minutes recorded during the 2022 local elections due to a mandatory manual verification process introduced during the 2024 general elections. "In the past, we used a machine to sort the ballots and then had individuals verify them using a counter, but this time a manual inspection step has been added where the number of ballots is counted one by one by hand, which will cause the counting process to take longer," an election commission official told Yonhap News. Regional data showed Jeonnam province recorded the highest voter turnout at 58.0 percent, followed by Gangwon province at 54.5 percent and Jeonbuk province at 54.2 percent. The capital city of Seoul recorded a 49.4 percent turnout, while the southwestern city of Gwangju saw the lowest participation rate in the country at 45.3 percent. The highest final turnout for a South Korean local election remains the 68.4 percent recorded during the inaugural nationwide vote in 1995. Only two local elections in the country's history have surpassed the 60 percent participation mark. 2026-06-03 14:44:09
South Korean local election turnout reaches 48.9 percent SEOUL, June 03 (AJP) - Over 21.8 million people cast their ballots in South Korea's ninth nationwide local elections by 2:00 p.m. on election day. This pushed overall voter turnout to 48.9 percent, signaling potentially historic final participation levels. The mid-afternoon figure is 8.2 percentage points higher than the turnout recorded at the same time during the previous local elections four years ago. It also sits 2.1 percentage points above the 2018 elections, suggesting the final tally could exceed that year's 60.2 percent total. Surpassing the 60 percent threshold is rare, having happened only twice before in South Korean local election history. The National Election Commission reported that 21,832,984 of the country's 44,649,908 eligible voters had participated by the 2:00 p.m. count. This total includes mail-in votes and ballots from early voting held on May 29 and 30, which saw a 23.51 percent turnout. Jeonnam recorded the highest regional turnout at 58.0 percent, followed by Gangwon at 54.5 percent and Jeonbuk at 54.2 percent. The lowest participation was in Gwangju at 45.3 percent, trailing Gyeonggi at 46.0 percent and Incheon at 46.3 percent. Voter turnout in the capital city of Seoul stood at 49.4 percent. Polls remain open until 6 p.m., with voters required to present identification at their registered local precincts. The election commission calculates these hourly updates using data gathered from 256 district and municipal offices. The highest final turnout for a South Korean local election remains 68.4 percent, recorded during the first nationwide vote in 1995. 2026-06-03 14:35:18
OPINION: The Strait of Hormuz Legal Aspects of the New Arrangements in Light of Aggression and Fundamental Change of Circumstances Prelude For a long period, maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz did not proceed on the basis of exercising an asserted right, but rather within the framework of an interaction founded upon comity and mutual good faith. Over years, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the coastal State, facilitated the passage of vessels through a continuous and peaceful practice. However, this practice was never to be understood as an acceptance of a binding legal obligation or as a relinquishment of the coastal State’s sovereignty and sovereign rights over its own waterway. Nevertheless, today, due to a fundamental change of circumstances and the substantial transformation of security, the continuation of such unilateral comity is no longer possible, and the adoption of appropriate measures based on respect for the sovereign rights of the coastal State has become an inevitable necessity. Indeed, the Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a sensitive and strategic waterway—a status that has now been redefined in light of the repeated acts of aggression by the Zionist regime, the United States, and certain neighboring States in the region. Some neighboring States, by placing their territory at the disposal of aggressors for commission of acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, have become complicit in such aggression. This conduct itself constitutes an act of aggression as defined by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) and, consequently, those States have assumed the heavy burden of responsibility for this act, which is a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the peremptory norm of “prohibition of aggression”. As a result of this aggression and these hostile acts, the security and safety of the region, and in particular of the Strait of Hormuz, have suffered severe and widespread harm. It must not be forgotten that the aggressor and its regional military bases were supplied and equipped, inter alia, through that same strait. Therefore, preventing the recurrence of such internationally wrongful acts is an undeniable imperative. In the wake of the intensification of such acts, the circumstances have fundamentally changed, giving rise to a new and irreversible situation. In this situation, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the coastal State, finds itself compelled to adopt practical and proportionate measures to manage the developments that have expanded into the maritime zones. These measures are taken with a view to preventing further risks from being imposed on vessels and seafarers in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Fundamental Change of Circumstances Since the commencement of acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the security environment of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has undergone significant transformations and has thereby become subject to a fundamental change of circumstances. In the current situation, the underlying circumstances governing the legal regime of the Strait, namely the existence of a minimum level of regional stability and security necessary to guarantee safe passage, have been severely undermined as a result of repeated threats and actions that violate Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. One of the most significant factors that has disrupted the prior order is the persistent disregard for a peremptory norm of international law: the norm that prohibits any act of aggression. In addition to this, despite repeated violations of international law, the United Nations Security Council, as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, has remained practically incapable of condemning the aggressor and has consequently failed to discharge its primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security and to restore stability to the region. Accordingly, under the international law of the sea, the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation cannot be applied in a security vacuum. The coastal State’s obligation to facilitate passage is conditional upon the existence of circumstances in which the safety of navigation and maritime public order have not been seriously disrupted. In a situation where persistent military threats pose real dangers and transform the operational environment, the adoption of necessary measures based on the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances is unavoidable. On this basis, the set of current measures and practices must be regarded as an adjustment of rights and obligations to adapt to the circumstances, in light of the fundamental change of circumstances, measures undertaken with the aim of establishing a balance between the security requirements of the coastal State and the continued safe passage of international navigation. Sovereignty over the territorial sea Under the international law of the sea, the sovereignty of coastal States over their territorial sea, including over that part which lies within an international strait, and the exercise of rights and jurisdiction derived from such sovereignty, constitutes a fundamental and well-established principle. Consequently, the arrangements for managing passage through the Strait of Hormuz are governed within the framework of the domestic laws of Iran and Oman, as well as customary and treaty-based rules and principles, including the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international judicial precedents (including the judgments of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel and Oil Platforms cases). Within this framework, one essential principle is of particular importance: no right under international law, including the right of passage, may be exercised in such a way as to result in a threat, military aggression, or violation of the security of the coastal State. Accordingly, mere reliance on classical concepts is insufficient to address the exigencies of the current unprecedented situation and does not adequately meet the requirements of security and sovereignty. This situation is also premised upon the peremptory norm prohibiting the threat or use of force, as embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized in international judicial precedents and the judgments of the International Court of Justice as an intransgressible rule. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the findings of the International Court of Justice clearly indicate that any foreign military presence or action that endangers the security or sovereignty of another State, even indirectly, is contrary to that principle. Furthermore, Article 2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea affirms the sovereignty of the coastal State over its territorial sea, seabed, and subsoil, and grants no authorization for the stationing of foreign forces. Article 30 of the same Convention confirms the right to require any military ship that fails to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State to leave the territorial sea immediately. Moreover, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea emphasizes the right of coastal States to restrict foreign military presence in order to preserve the neutrality of regional States and the security of the waterway. While preventing the reproduction of aggressive and interventionist patterns that have led to instability and insecurity, this approach establishes a balance between the freedom of navigation and the security rights of the coastal State as affirmed in established international judicial practice. Historic sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz In formulating the arrangements for managing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, it is essential to emphasize the historic sovereignty of Iran and Oman over this waterway. This finding has been affirmed by various arbitral tribunals. Accordingly, the longstanding historic sovereignty of Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, which existed for centuries prior to the Convention and has been continuously exercised, remains valid. In the case of Qatar v. Bahrain, the International Court of Justice, upon examining historic rights in the Persian Gulf, took the view that the continuous exercise of sovereignty and historical activities by coastal States constitutes a valid basis for the recognition of a “historic title” over maritime areas. Given the similar geographic and historical situation of the Strait of Hormuz, this judicial precedent directly confirms the historic sovereignty of Iran and Oman over the strait. Both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognize the full sovereignty of the coastal State over its territorial sea and preserve the historic rights of coastal States in gulfs and semi-enclosed waterways. Therefore, in light of the continuous and historic exercise of sovereignty by Iran and Oman over the Strait of Hormuz over many centuries, this strait possesses a historic title. Hierarchy of applicable rules In this regard, the rules governing this matter must be examined at three distinct but interrelated levels, given that each level possesses a higher rank and a more fundamental character, and rules at lower levels cannot be interpreted or applied in conflict with the principles of higher levels. The first level relates to the fundamental principles of international law, including peremptory norms (jus cogens), that is the prohibition of aggression, and those enshrined in the United Nations Charter including prohibition of threat or use of force (Article 2(4)) and the inherent right of self-defence (Article 51). These principles stand at the apex of the hierarchy of international legal norms and establish the framework and limitations for all other rules. The second level refers to international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict), which governs conduct in armed hostilities and determines which conducts are permissible and which are prohibited in situations of armed conflict. This level of rules complements in hierarchical manner, the fundamental principles of the first level. At the third level, the law of the sea applies as a specialized body of law. The rules governing the regimes of passage through international straits, the rights of coastal States over their territorial sea, and other provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied in a vacuum or by disregarding the higher levels. In other words, the law of the sea must not be analyzed separately from the “root causes” that have shaped the current situation (including aggression, continuous military threats, and the inability of the Security Council to maintain peace), nor separately from the fundamental principles of international law; otherwise, this branch of law would become a tool for justifying aggression and disregarding the sovereign rights of coastal States. With respect to the third level, it must be noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, nor to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, Iran is not bound by their provisions, except insofar as they have become part of customary international law. The regime of “transit passage” set forth in the 1982 Convention does not meet the established criteria of customary international law. The conclusions of the International Law Commission’s 2018 work on the identification of customary international law contain key elements generally considered for determining whether a practice has become customary. Two of these conclusions are particularly relevant: first, under Conclusion 5, “State practice consists of conduct of the State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial or other functions”. Second, Conclusion 15 provides that “Where a State has objected to a rule of customary international law while that rule was in the process of formation, the rule is not opposable to the State concerned for so long as it maintains its objection”. Through its continuous and persistent objection to the regime of “transit passage” provided for in Articles 37 to 44 of the 1982 Convention, Iran has not recognized these rules as binding under customary international law. In this regard, Iran’s consistent legislative and diplomatic practice since 1982 has established its position as a persistent objector to the binding nature of these rules and has challenged the opinio juris necessary for the formation of a customary norm. The first notable document registered in the United Nations Treaty Series is Iran’s interpretative declaration made at the time of signing the Convention, in which it explicitly stated that certain provisions, including the regime of “transit passage” in Part III (Articles 37 to 44), do not represent established customary international law. Iran’s Maritime Law of 1963 (1342), its 2012 (1391) amendment, and Iran’s Law on Maritime Zones of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman of 1993 (1372) are further evidence of this practice. The latter law makes no reference to transit passage and thus does not recognize that regime; rather, it establishes specific regulatory provisions for the strait, including the requirement to obtain prior authorization for the passage of warships, submarines, and vessels carrying dangerous or environmentally harmful substances. Consequently, the applicable legal framework for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, in the absence of a binding treaty obligation and in the absence of a customary rule of “transit passage”, is the customary right of “innocent passage” through straits used for international navigation, as recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case (1949). Within this framework, the coastal State has the right to regulate passage, collect fees for maritime services, require prior notification or authorization for the passage of warships, and adopt necessary measures for the protection of its security. The measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with this customary framework. Accordingly, any legal analysis of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz that proceeds directly to the specific provisions of the law of the sea without first examining peremptory norms, the fundamental principles of the Charter, and international humanitarian law is not only incomplete but also misleading. The law of the sea does not operate in a vacuum and cannot be used as a shield to justify aggression, extra-regional military presence, or the disregard of the historic and contemporary sovereign rights of coastal States. 2026-06-02 16:10:44
Former BIGBANG member T.O.P announces free Yokohama fan meeting SEOUL, June 02 (AJP) - K-pop boy band BIGBANG's former member T.O.P will hold a free solo fan meeting for 10,000 attendees in Yokohama, Japan, next month, the rapper's agency said Tuesday. The event accelerates the 38-year-old's independent activities following the release of his first solo studio album earlier this year. Topspott Pictures announced that the event will take place on July 9 at the Pia Arena MM. The agency stated that the large-scale gathering will be offered completely free of charge, but attendance is exclusively restricted to official paid membership holders in Japan. The management company noted that the artist is planning a diverse range of activities to reconnect directly with his international supporters. "T.O.P is preparing various programs for local fans who have waited a long time to communicate," Topspott Pictures said in a statement. The upcoming Japanese showcase follows the April release of his first full-length studio album, Another Dimension. The album and the arena fan meeting mark a significant public return for the artist, who spent a long period with limited public communication before establishing his standalone footprint. Choi Seung-hyun debuted in 2006 as the lead rapper of BigBang, a highly successful South Korean group formed by YG Entertainment, one of South Korea's entertainment powerhouses. He officially announced his departure from the group to focus on his solo career in May 2023. 2026-06-02 14:25:38
Police forward Gangnam Style rapper Psy to prosecution over illegal drug prescriptions SEOUL, June 02 (AJP) - South Korean police have referred Gangnam Style rapper Park Jae-sang, globally known as Psy, to prosecutors on charges of violating medical laws by using his staff to illegally obtain highly regulated prescription drugs. The case highlights South Korea's strict enforcement of regulations governing psychotropic medications. The 48-year-old singer is accused of bypassing mandatory face-to-face medical consultations to secure sleeping pills and anxiety medication over a multi-year period. Authorities at the Seodaemun Police Station near central Seoul announced Tuesday that they transferred Park, a university hospital professor and management personnel to the prosecution on May 29. A total of six individuals face charges stemming from an investigation that began last summer following an informant tip. From 2022 until last year, Park allegedly received prescriptions for Xanax and Stilnox from a university hospital in Seoul without meeting a doctor in person. He then dispatched his managers and other third parties to collect the medications from the pharmacy. Under South Korean medical law, only physicians who conduct direct patient examinations are authorized to issue prescriptions. The legal framework also strictly dictates that only the examined patient is permitted to collect the prescribed medication. Xanax and Stilnox are psychotropic drugs primarily used to treat sleep disorders, anxiety and depression. Due to their high potential for addiction and dependency, medical protocols dictate that direct in-person consultations and prescriptions are mandatory. 2026-06-02 11:13:05
Researchers discover natural substance capable of slowing down cancer cell growth SEOUL, June 02 (AJP) - Scientists from South Korea and the United States have discovered that a natural substance produced when the body breaks down dietary fats can directly block a key protein responsible for cancer cell growth, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology said Tuesday. The joint study, led by Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) Professor Kim Se-yoon and Korea University Professor Byun Young-joo, identified that a fat byproduct called 13-HODE acts as a natural brake on the mTOR protein. The mTOR protein regulates normal cell growth and energy use, but it becomes abnormally hyperactive in cancer cells, driving rapid tumor growth and spread. The human body creates the 13-HODE molecule when an enzyme called ALOX15 processes linoleic acid, an essential fatty acid commonly found in plant oils. Using computer simulations and mass spectrometry, the research team found that 13-HODE physically attaches itself to the active part of the mTOR protein, completely shutting down its ability to function. Researchers noted that 13-HODE levels are severely depleted in breast and colon cancer cells because the tumors suppress the ALOX15 enzyme needed to make it. During laboratory tests, artificially increasing the production of both the enzyme and the fat byproduct successfully lowered mTOR activity and stopped cancer cells from multiplying. "This research is meaningful in that it reveals a fat metabolite produced within the human body can directly inhibit mTOR, a core protein in cancer growth," Professor Kim Se-yoon said. "It could be utilized not only for new anticancer treatment strategies using fat metabolism in the future but also for developing treatments to regulate mTOR overactivity seen in inflammation and aging processes." Professor Byun Young-joo said the research identified the interaction between a protein and a fatty acid metabolite at the molecular level through the convergence of biology and pharmacy. "It will serve as an important foundation for the development of innovative new drugs in the future," Byun said. Professor Jie Chen of the University of Illinois, a leading researcher in the mTOR field, evaluated the findings in a journal preview, describing the work as an exceptional discovery that presents a new breakthrough in controlling cancer cells. The research involved collaboration with scientists from Gachon University College of Medicine and the University of Maryland School of Pharmacy. The study, co-authored by Dr. Park Seung-ju and doctoral student Kim Se-ra of KAIST, was published as a cover paper in the journal Cell Chemical Biology on May 21, 2026. (Reference Information) Journal/Source: Cell Chemical Biology Title: Mechanism by which a linoleic acid metabolite suppresses cancer cell growth by inhibiting mTOR Link/DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chembiol.2026.04.004 2026-06-02 10:56:34