[Expert Contribution] Understanding the 'Grammar' of Korea-U.S. Trade and Economic Security After the Midterm Elections


A Democratic governor has been elected in Alaska, marking the first time since 1998. As discussions about South Korea's liquefied natural gas (LNG) investments continue, there is keen interest in what conditions the new state government will impose on these projects. Now that the elections are over, the approval, permit, and contract documents I handle pose the same question: What will change?

In this midterm election, the Democratic Party gained a majority in both the Senate and the House. There was significant discontent over rising living costs due to tariffs and the war in Iran, as well as increased electricity bills. However, this does not mean that U.S. demands on South Korea will change. Both parties largely agree on the need to counter China and expand domestic production. The president can adjust tariffs within the scope assigned by Congress, making it difficult for the Democratic victory to directly lead to tariff reductions or eased investment demands. The destination remains the same; only the path to get there is changing. The impact of the midterm elections will manifest for South Korean companies in the form of altered export control intensities, permit conditions, and contract clauses.

First, let’s examine the 'intensity of export controls.' The administration has used export controls as leverage in negotiations with China. In January of this year, it allowed case-by-case reviews of exports of NVIDIA H200 semiconductors to China, and the implementation of regulations expanding export controls to companies where sanctioned firms hold more than 50% ownership has been postponed until January 10 of next year. Meanwhile, Congress has been pushing a bipartisan bill that would allow it to review and block semiconductor export permits, which has been included in the Senate's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Key Democratic lawmakers have publicly raised concerns that H200 export permits could jeopardize national security. In the new Congress led by the Democrats, such scrutiny may gain more strength.

This change will be felt immediately in South Korea. Graphics processing units (GPUs), which are essential for artificial intelligence (AI) computations, are among the most strictly controlled items by the U.S. If a company’s ultimate parent is based in China, it must obtain a permit to receive high-performance GPUs, as reaffirmed in May. This means that if Chinese capital owns a South Korean AI data center, every time it orders GPUs, it will have to undergo a permit review. The industry views this as a virtually closed door. To knock on that door, the ownership structure, decision-making authority, customer selection, and GPU usage management must all be designed from the outset to meet export control standards. The investment consulting I provide for data centers starts from the question of 'what structure is necessary to clear the permit threshold' rather than 'can we invest?'

Next are the 'conditions of permits.' Here, we see what has not changed and what will change due to the election. In July, the U.S. added humanoid and mobile robots produced overseas to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) list of security threat equipment, effectively blocking new models from receiving the necessary certifications for import and sale in the U.S. The path for new robots to be exported to the U.S. has been effectively closed.

In the conditional approval work I am currently engaged in, production plans within the U.S. are a key focus of review. Companies must answer questions about where they will build factories when they go to sell their products. As of November, this requirement remains unchanged even after the elections. Companies that manufacture in South Korea using materials sourced from China must align with both the usage purposes permitted by China and the transactions allowed by the U.S., and the judgment will vary depending on whether they transfer the materials as is or process them. Conversely, the burden of electricity and water for data centers was a major issue in this election. If state and local governments impose stringent construction permit conditions, the speed of orders for South Korean semiconductors and power equipment will also change.

Finally, we consider the 'clauses of contracts.' Investments in U.S. energy and production facilities lead to demand for engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC), making it an essential market for construction companies facing a shortage of domestic work. However, investment announcements do not guarantee work. The inclusion of U.S. material usage and local wage standards as support conditions in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was also a Democratic initiative.

If the new Congress raises these requirements again in budget and legislative negotiations, even if the investment amount increases, South Korean companies' share may decrease. When construction costs rise or timelines are delayed, who bears the losses will determine profitability. For multi-year supply contracts, clauses must be included to account for the possibility of intensified controls after January 10. The conditions set by the new state government will also affect the speed and profitability of Alaska LNG projects.

The intensity of controls, the conditions of permits, and the clauses of contracts. These three elements represent the grammar of economic security that drives Korea-U.S. trade. The midterm elections did not change this grammar. However, Congress and state governments have begun to influence the narrative that was previously solely written by the White House. As I mentioned in my book 'The Era of Conditional Free Trade' published last year, free trade is not disappearing; it is transforming into trade with conditions.

Companies must ask themselves: Can we withstand the tightening of U.S.-China controls on our materials and GPU procurement? Are there any of our investors or customers that might get caught on the threshold of permits? Who will bear the increased costs? The government must also consider these conditions alongside the scale of investment in negotiations. Elections may pass as news, but their impact remains in a single document or a line in a contract.




* This article has been translated by AI.