Journalist
Lee Jung-woo이정우
cannes2030@ajupress.com
ReporterMinistry of Unification & North Korea, Politics, Foreign Affairs
I studied philosophy in college, and sociology and journalism in graduate school. I cover North Korea, South Korean politics, foreign affairs and films. I enjoy Nordic cinema, Indian cuisine and Japanese detective novels. I have a cat and like bright, acidic coffee.
"Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."
"Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."
Latest by Lee Jung-woo
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'The Assassin(s)' reopens an old fault line in Korea's history SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) -For an octogenarian South Korean like Kim Yoo-jeong, who lived through the Korean War and the country’s rags-to-riches transformation under President Park Chung-hee, the controversy surrounding The Assassin(s) cuts close to the bone. “It’s despicable that a film implies the president plotted an assassination that ended up killing the first lady,” she fumed. “What will young people think about our history?” Some took that anger to the streets. Conservative activists on Sunday carried their protest to the Seoul home of lead actor Yoo Hae-jin, demanding an end to screenings and apologies from the cast and filmmakers, even as the controversy appeared only to fuel the film’s box-office momentum. About 50 people attended, according to an unofficial police estimate. Some groups also threatened to pressure companies using Yoo as an advertising model to terminate their contracts. The political backlash crossed borders. The opposition People Power Party said it would ask the Singapore International Film Festival to drop The Assassin(s) from its opening-night program, carrying a domestic dispute over historical representation onto an international stage. Much of the uproar worked in the film’s favor. The Assassin(s) passed 2 million admissions in 11 days and remained the top-selling Korean film. A dispute over artistic license has since widened into a broader argument over where fiction ends and history begins, and how readily cinematic speculation can seep into public memory when it touches one of South Korea’s most politically charged episodes. At the heart of the controversy is the assassination attempt on President Park Chung-hee on Aug. 15, 1974. During a Liberation Day ceremony at the National Theater of Korea in Seoul, Mun Se-gwang, a Korean resident of Japan, opened fire while Park was delivering a speech. Park survived, but first lady Yuk Young-soo was fatally shot. The established account identifies Mun as the gunman who attempted to assassinate Park, with Yuk killed in the attack. Uncertainty has nevertheless lingered over the precise sequence of gunfire. In 2005, Bae Myung-jin, then a Soongsil University professor specializing in sound engineering, analyzed recordings and television footage and argued that the fatal shot may have been accidentally fired by a presidential security officer. His conclusion remained an expert theory rather than an official finding and did not overturn the historical record. The controversy surrounding The Assassin(s) has blurred those distinctions. Directed by Hur Jin-ho, the film follows a detective, a newspaper editor and a reporter as they pursue inconsistencies surrounding the shooting. From those discrepancies, the fictional investigation moves toward suspicions involving the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Conservative critics argue that the narrative goes far beyond questioning the trajectory of a bullet and invites audiences to infer that Park’s own government may have been implicated in the plot. No established judicial or official finding has concluded that Park ordered his wife’s killing or that the KCIA organized the assassination attempt. The filmmakers reject the suggestion that such speculation is presented as historical fact. The production team has said the movie was “not made to establish a new historical conclusion or deny or distort existing facts,” describing it instead as a fictional work drawing on historical records, books and documentaries. Hur has separately rejected claims that he conceived Park as the architect of the attack. “I never thought of Park Chung-hee as being behind it,” he said in an interview with a Korean broadcaster. The distinction is clear on paper. It becomes far less stable once fiction borrows real people, real deaths and unresolved fragments of history, especially when the past itself remains politically contested. A film set more than half a century ago has therefore evolved into a political hot potato. Park remains among the most divisive figures in modern Korean history. For many older South Koreans who experienced war, deprivation and rapid industrialization, his name remains inseparable from the export drive and industrial buildout that helped transform the country into a manufacturing power. For others, the economic transformation cannot be detached from military rule, the Yushin Constitution, suppression of political opponents and restrictions on the press and civil liberties. Those competing memories have never fully reconciled. The Assassin(s) has entered directly into the fault line, using historical uncertainty as the dramatic engine of a fictional thriller. Its box-office success has only broadened the audience for a dispute that might otherwise have remained among historians, filmmakers and political partisans. The consequences are now visible well beyond the screen. Actors faced protests and advertisers have been threatened with boycotts. Filmmakers have been forced to defend where imagination ends and historical assertion begins. More than five decades after the gunshots at the National Theater, the argument over The Assassin(s) has moved well beyond the question of who fired which bullet. The deeper dispute concerns who has the authority to interpret the past, how far filmmakers may travel into its unresolved spaces and what happens when cinematic possibility begins to compete with historical fact. 2026-10-04 17:21:57 -
Seoul orders probe as financial hacks widen SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) - South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Sunday ordered a thorough investigation into a widening wave of cyberattacks on financial companies, as evidence emerged that the campaign had reached beyond major banks into savings banks, capital firms and mutual-finance networks. Lee instructed officials to investigate the breaches and devise countermeasures with a “grave awareness” of the seriousness of the incidents, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said. The latest findings suggest the attacks were considerably broader than previously known. The Korean Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives detected attempted access from the same attacker IP address linked to the breach at Shinhan Bank, while NongHyup’s mutual-finance network faced similar intrusion attempts. Both blocked the attacks without confirmed data leaks. Welcome Savings Bank, meanwhile, found that information belonging to corporate customers had been compromised. A financial industry official said the number of institutions targeted could be “far greater” than those disclosed publicly. The Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service have been investigating the incidents since Shinhan reported its breach on Sept. 30. FSC Chairman Lee Eog-weon on Sunday convened an emergency meeting with financial regulators, the Financial Security Institute, industry associations and the chief executives of seven affected financial companies, including Shinhan, KB Kookmin, Hana and Busan banks. Authorities are also examining whether artificial-intelligence agents were used to automate parts of the attacks, including the search for vulnerable systems. Similarities in timing and tactics have raised suspicions that some of the incidents may be connected, although officials have not established that a single group was responsible and some attacks appear not to have involved AI. What has drawn particular scrutiny is where the hackers struck. Rather than breaking through the heavily protected core systems that process customer transactions, attackers appear to have targeted peripheral employee-facing websites and support applications where authentication and monitoring were less stringent. At Shinhan, a service used by loan brokers became one route for the breach. The attack is believed to have continued for about 30 hours and exposed 25,727 records. At KB Kookmin, attackers targeted mobile systems used by employees for more than 42 hours, exposing customer and staff information, according to data submitted to lawmakers. The pattern points to an uneven security perimeter across the financial sector: banks may heavily fortify their central networks while maintaining numerous externally accessible employee and support services that can offer attackers a softer point of entry. As AI makes it possible to scan large numbers of systems and test vulnerabilities at greater speed, those peripheral systems can become increasingly difficult to defend through conventional monitoring alone. The FSC had already begun reassessing that model before the latest breaches. Tests conducted this year found that advanced AI tools could examine millions of lines of source code within hours and systematically identify potential vulnerabilities, prompting regulators to explore wider use of AI-based defensive tools and changes to Korea’s strict network-separation rules. The latest attacks are likely to accelerate that overhaul. Financial authorities are considering stronger management of internet-exposed systems, faster security patching and greater use of AI to detect attacks — an effort regulators have described as using “AI to defend against AI.” AJP Takeaways - President Lee Jae Myung ordered a thorough investigation as cyberattacks spread across banks, savings banks and mutual-finance networks. - Hackers appear to have exploited weaker employee-facing and support systems rather than banks’ heavily protected core transaction networks. - Regulators are considering tighter controls on internet-exposed systems and wider use of AI-based defenses as attackers increasingly use automation to find vulnerabilities. 2026-10-04 15:32:22 -
From DMZ mines to skin boosters, audit looms SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) - South Korea’s National Assembly will open its annual state audit on Tuesday, setting the stage for three weeks of clashes over everything from housing and North Korea to a massive semiconductor project, nuclear exports and an unlikely new health-policy controversy involving skin injections made from donated human tissue. The audit, the second to scrutinize President Lee Jae Myung’s administration, will run from Oct. 6 through Oct. 27, with several overlapping committees continuing through the end of the month. The ruling Democratic Party has cast the session as an audit focused on policy and people’s livelihoods, while the main opposition People Power Party is preparing a broad challenge to what it calls the Lee government’s failures in economic, security and personnel policy. Interviews with lawmakers and government officials by AJP suggest that the political battle will play out through a strikingly wide range of issues, from bread-and-butter economic concerns to highly technical questions over nuclear intellectual property and medical regulation. “This audit is about people’s livelihoods. The other side may engage in partisan fighting, but as the ruling party responsible for people’s lives, we intend to focus solely on livelihood issues,” Kim Nam-joon, a Democratic Party lawmaker on the National Assembly’s Strategy and Finance Committee, told AJP. Kim’s committee is expected to be one of the main economic battlegrounds. Government tax policy, fiscal spending and the newly created future response fund are among the issues facing scrutiny. Kim, a former presidential spokesperson and first secretary to Lee, sits on both the finance committee and the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. The opposition sees the same audit very differently. “We need to call out and correct the Lee Jae Myung government’s policy failures,” said Ahn Sang-hoon of the People Power Party, also a member of the Strategy and Finance Committee. “The biggest problem is that national policy dances to a single word from a president who is not an expert. In this government, ministers simply obey orders from above and offer no candid advice. Professional bureaucrats should be willing to tell even the president, ‘This cannot be done.’” Ahn, who served as a senior social policy secretary under former President Yoon Suk Yeol, is among the opposition lawmakers expected to use the audit to challenge the administration’s decision-making process as well as its policy results. Financial policy will provide another frontline. “The opposition will probably keep hammering away at leveraged ETFs,” Democratic Party lawmaker Son Myoung Soo of the National Policy Committee told AJP. “I plan to propose alternatives to the real-estate PF problem to help stabilize housing supply.” Single-stock leveraged exchange-traded funds have already emerged as an opposition target, while concerns over real-estate project financing, or PF, remain closely tied to housing supply and financial-sector stability. The People Power Party has sought to bring senior presidential officials before parliamentary committees over both leveraged ETFs and housing policy. Inside Cheong Wa Dae, officials are preparing for the audit as both a policy examination and a political defense of the administration. “We have to defend against the opposition during the audit and also properly explain the Lee Jae Myung government’s achievements,” Bae Jin-gyo, presidential secretary for public engagement, told AJP. Some of the sharpest clashes, however, are likely to come over foreign policy and national security. “I expect next week’s audit to focus mainly on the repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war from Ukraine, the DMZ mine incident and Alaska LNG, among other pending issues,” People Power Party lawmaker Kim Gunn, a former South Korean chief nuclear envoy and member of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, told AJP. The DMZ case has already developed into a politically explosive dispute. On Sept. 21, South Korean troops were opening a new search route inside the Demilitarized Zone to examine terrain changes suspected of being connected to North Korean mine-laying when a series of explosions injured three soldiers, two seriously. Eighteen troops involved in the operation were evacuated. A subsequent joint investigation by the South Korean military and the United Nations Command found a North Korean-made plastic antipersonnel mine south of the Military Demarcation Line. Both the South Korean military and the UNC concluded that a North Korean mine had been placed south of the line and that an armistice violation had occurred. North Korea rejected Seoul’s account, with Kim Yo-jong calling the episode a fabrication. The incident is likely to feed a broader opposition argument that Lee’s efforts to lower tensions with Pyongyang have gone too far. “I plan to examine the diplomatic and security breakdown stemming from the Lee government’s submissive posture toward North Korea and its efforts to cater to Kim Jong-un, as well as what I regard as Unification Minister Chung Dong Young’s policies that effectively aid the enemy,” People Power Party lawmaker Park Choong-kwon of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee told AJP. Park’s language reflects the confrontational line the PPP is expected to take toward the administration’s North Korea policy. The party has already blamed what it describes as the government’s overly conciliatory approach for weakening deterrence after the DMZ incident. But criticism of Lee’s foreign policy will not come only from the conservative opposition. “The core of this audit is livelihoods and reform. Our party intends to focus especially on inequality,” Kim Joon-hyung, floor leader of the Rebuilding Korea Party and a member of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, told AJP. “As a member of the committee, I plan to critically examine foreign policy across the board because I believe it has not changed much from the Yoon Suk Yeol government.” Kim, a former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, represents a critique of the Lee administration from the progressive flank rather than the right. Industry policy will provide another major test, with lawmakers preparing to scrutinize both one of Lee’s flagship regional development projects and the legacy of a controversial nuclear agreement signed under Yoon. “I plan to focus my questions on the Honam semiconductor cluster,” Democratic Party lawmaker Jung Jin-wook of the Trade, Industry, Energy, SMEs and Startups Committee told AJP. Jung said he also plans to examine what he called the Yoon administration’s “sellout Settlement Agreement” involving Korea Electric Power Corp., Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and U.S. nuclear company Westinghouse, while highlighting what he described as Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and “Team Korea’s” success in overcoming some of its constraints. The agreement has been contentious since KEPCO and KHNP settled a long-running intellectual-property dispute with Westinghouse in January 2025, clearing a major obstacle to Korea’s Czech nuclear project. Reported provisions required the Korean side, for every exported reactor, to purchase about $650 million in goods and services from Westinghouse and pay roughly $175 million in technology fees. The agreement also imposed restrictions on independent Korean entry into some major nuclear markets and subjected future technologies, including small modular reactors, to procedures intended to verify technological independence from Westinghouse. Critics have argued that the terms gave away too much of Korea’s nuclear export competitiveness. The deal was also reported to have a 50-year term, with repeated extensions possible unless both sides agreed to terminate it. Supporters, however, have argued that settlement of the dispute was necessary to remove a legal obstacle hanging over Korean nuclear exports. That dispute has taken on new significance after Seoul and Washington unveiled plans for up to $120 billion in U.S. nuclear investment involving eight large reactors — six Westinghouse AP1000 units and two Korean APR1400s. Kim Jung-kwan has said the existing Westinghouse agreement would be amended to make the deployment of APR1400 reactors in the United States possible. Seoul has also been negotiating to acquire a roughly 5 to 10 percent stake in Westinghouse, with the government saying even such a stake could carry voting rights. For Jung, that contrast — between restrictions accepted under Yoon and an attempt under Lee to reopen the U.S. market to Korean reactors — is likely to become a central line of attack and defense during the industry committee’s hearings. The Honam semiconductor project will be another. The Lee government has selected the site of Gwangju’s military airport for a new Honam semiconductor cluster, part of its signature regional “mega-project” strategy. Samsung Electronics and SK hynix are expected to build four semiconductor fabs in the region, with infrastructure planners estimating the complex could eventually require about 6.3 gigawatts of electricity and 650,000 tons of water a day. The project is already politically sensitive. People Power Party lawmakers have sought to question Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong and SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won over whether the government pressured the companies to invest in Honam, while the Democratic Party has dismissed the allegation as an attempt to turn a regional industrial project into a political conspiracy. Health care may produce some of the audit’s most unusual debates. Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Yoon, a physician and Health and Welfare Committee member, told AJP that his agenda will cover the relationship between non-covered medical services and private indemnity insurance, shortages and poor working conditions among essential-care doctors, reimbursement reform, cross-hospital staffing networks and legal burdens on physicians. But Kim also plans to take up two increasingly visible consumer health issues: ECM skin boosters and high-caffeine drinks. ECM, or extracellular matrix, skin boosters are cosmetic injections made from processed acellular dermal matrix derived from donated human tissue. The treatments have expanded rapidly in South Korea, but critics have raised both ethical and safety questions because the products are regulated as human tissue rather than as conventional pharmaceuticals or medical devices. That distinction matters. Unlike drugs and medical devices, which generally require product-level approval and clinical evidence before sale, human-tissue products can enter the market through a different regulatory framework. The rapid commercialization of material originally donated for human-tissue use has also raised questions over donor consent and the use of donated tissue in for-profit cosmetic procedures. Regulators have moved to strengthen post-market monitoring, including tighter adverse-event reporting requirements. High-caffeine drinks pose a different problem. Data obtained by Kim’s office from South Korea’s four major convenience-store chains showed sales rising around major school exam periods in neighborhoods dominated by private academies. Average daily sales at stores analyzed in Daechi, Mokdong and Junggye rose from 2,445 drinks in March to 2,887 in April, an increase of about 18 percent. They rose from 2,533 in May to 3,154 in June, a jump of roughly 25 percent ahead of final exams. South Korea classifies liquid products containing at least 0.15 milligrams of caffeine per milliliter as high-caffeine products. The Food and Drug Safety Ministry recommends that children and adolescents consume no more than 2.5 milligrams of caffeine per kilogram of body weight per day and warns that excessive intake can cause sleep problems, anxiety and heart palpitations. The ministry already restricts the sale of high-caffeine children’s favorite foods at schools and designated “excellent sales” stores, but the new sales data are likely to intensify debate over whether existing protections are sufficient. The ministry’s latest October notice again listed high-caffeine products subject to school and designated-store restrictions. AJP Takeaways - South Korea’s annual state audit will open Tuesday, with lawmakers preparing for major clashes over economic policy, North Korea, housing, nuclear exports and regional industrial projects. - Opposition lawmakers plan to challenge President Lee Jae Myung’s handling of security and economic policy, while ruling-party lawmakers say they will focus on livelihoods, inequality and policy reform. - Key committee battles are expected over the DMZ mine incident, the Westinghouse nuclear settlement, the Honam semiconductor cluster, leveraged ETFs, real-estate project financing and emerging health issues including ECM skin boosters and high-caffeine drinks. 2026-10-04 14:46:50 -
Trump touts Kim ties, cites '112 nuclear missiles' SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) - U.S. President Donald Trump again touted his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Saturday, saying it was beneficial to get along with leaders who command large nuclear arsenals and making an unexplained reference to “112 nuclear missiles.” Speaking at a Republican campaign rally in Vandalia, Ohio, Trump defended his relationships with leaders including Chinese President Xi Jinping. “Isn’t it nice to get along with the leaders of massive nations, massive nuclear nations?” Trump said. “I get along great with Kim Jong-un of North Korea. When people have 112 nuclear missiles, it’s nice to get along.” “But here’s the difference,” he added. “Iran will never have a nuclear missile.” Trump did not explain what the figure of 112 referred to. Because the comment immediately followed his reference to Kim, it appeared to refer to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, although Trump did not explicitly say that North Korea possessed 112 nuclear missiles. The figure also differed sharply from one Trump cited in August, when he said North Korea had 57 “very powerful” nuclear weapons. Independent estimates vary widely: SIPRI and the Federation of American Scientists put North Korea’s assembled arsenal at about 60 warheads, while South Korea’s defense minister said in August that private estimates ranged from 80 to 120. Warhead estimates are not directly comparable with the number of nuclear-capable missiles. Trump has repeatedly signaled in recent months that he wants to revive direct diplomacy with Kim. In August, he said he expected to meet the North Korean leader before the end of the year. His administration has also taken steps aimed at easing tensions with Pyongyang. Trump ordered the Pentagon in August to substantially scale back the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises with South Korea, calling the drills costly and a “totally inappropriate and hostile” signal to the North. The allies subsequently shortened the exercise from 11 days to five and reduced some field training. The State Department said Friday that Trump did not regard talks with North Korea as a “concession” and remained willing to engage Pyongyang if doing so served U.S. interests. Trump’s latest remarks came as North Korea continued expanding its weapons programs. North Korea said Sunday that Kim had overseen an intermediate-range strategic missile drill a day earlier, with the North Korean leader saying such activities were aimed at further advancing the country’s nuclear war deterrent. AJP Takeaways - Trump said he gets along well with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and made an unexplained reference to “112 nuclear missiles,” without clarifying what the figure represented. - The remark differs from Trump’s August claim that North Korea had 57 nuclear weapons, while independent estimates generally place Pyongyang’s assembled arsenal at around 60 warheads, with some estimates higher. - Trump has continued signaling interest in renewed diplomacy with Kim as his administration scales back some joint military exercises with South Korea, even as North Korea pushes ahead with its missile and nuclear programs. 2026-10-04 13:17:19 -
From Tom Kim to BTS, Korea debates military exemptions SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) - South Korean golfer Tom Kim won an Asian Games gold medal in Japan on Saturday, earning not only a place atop the podium but also one of the most consequential benefits available to an elite South Korean athlete — relief from active-duty military service. His case has again put a uniquely Korean question under the spotlight. Why can one medal dramatically alter a young man’s military obligations, while some of the country’s most globally successful entertainers still have to serve? South Korea requires able-bodied men to perform mandatory military service, generally lasting 18 months in the Army or Marine Corps, 20 months in the Navy and 21 months in the Air Force. Athletes, however, can qualify for a special category known as “arts and sports personnel” by winning any Olympic medal or an Asian Games gold. Artists may qualify by placing highly in designated international arts competitions, winning certain domestic competitions in fields such as traditional Korean music, or completing designated training in intangible cultural heritage. The arrangement is routinely described in South Korea as a “military exemption,” although that shorthand is technically inaccurate. Successful athletes and artists are assigned to 34 months of service in their professional field and must complete 544 hours of public-interest activities using their skills, rather than spending their service period in a military unit. For professional athletes whose careers can hinge on a few peak years, the difference can be enormous. That was vividly illustrated at the 2024 Paris Olympics. Table tennis player Lim Jong-hoon was scheduled to enlist only about three weeks after the Games when he and Shin Yu-bin won bronze in mixed doubles. Lim, then 27, saluted toward the stands after securing the medal, while Korean fans jokingly dubbed Shin a “legal military exemption broker” for helping her partner qualify for the benefit. Lim later acknowledged that it would have been dishonest to claim the military was not on his mind during the bronze-medal match. Such episodes make for lighthearted sports stories. But military service itself is anything but a lighthearted subject in South Korea, where perceptions that celebrities or the privileged receive special treatment have repeatedly triggered public anger. “The criteria for military-service exemptions need to be substantially revised, particularly in areas such as dance and traditional Korean music, where some competitions held in Korea are international competitions in name only,” People Power Party lawmaker Sung Il-jong, a former chair of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, told AJP. The distinction between elite classical arts and popular culture has long been one of the system’s most politically awkward features. Winning a government-designated classical music or dance competition can qualify someone for arts personnel status. Global commercial success in K-pop, by itself, cannot. The disparity fueled years of debate over BTS, whose extraordinary international success led some politicians to argue that globally successful pop musicians contributed at least as much to Korea’s international standing as medal-winning athletes or classical musicians. The group’s members ultimately fulfilled their military obligations rather than receiving exemptions. “Korean cultural content has recently drawn worldwide attention, contributing significantly not only to enhancing the country’s global standing but also to revitalizing the cultural industry. I believe there is room to improve and supplement the special military service system so that it is applied more equitably alongside the benefits available in sports,” Kim Seung-su, a member of the National Assembly’s Culture, Sports and Tourism Committee, told AJP. Questions of fairness have also been shaped by a very different series of celebrity cases — those involving allegations of draft evasion, poor service or preferential treatment. Three days before Kim’s Asian Games victory, WINNER member Song Min-ho was sentenced by the Seoul Western District Court to one year in prison, suspended for two years, for violating the Military Service Act while serving as a social service agent. Song was found to have been absent without authorization for a total of 102 days between 2023 and 2024. The court said military service was an obligation tied to the country’s existence and should be performed faithfully, although it cited Song’s health problems in explaining the suspended sentence. Song admitted wrongdoing and apologized before the ruling. “Illegal acts committed by some household names in an attempt to evade military service must be dealt with firmly,” Jin Seong-joon, chair of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, told AJP. “Military service is a constitutional duty that all citizens are required to fulfill,” Jin added. Few cases, however, have left as deep a mark on South Korea’s collective memory as that of singer Yoo Seung-jun, also known as Steve Yoo. Yoo, one of the country’s biggest pop stars around the turn of the century, became a U.S. citizen in 2002 shortly before he was expected to fulfill his military obligation. South Korean authorities subsequently barred him from entering the country, and he became perhaps the most enduring symbol of alleged draft evasion in Korean popular culture. That controversy is still playing out nearly a quarter-century later. On Thursday, the Seoul High Court again sided with Yoo in his third round of litigation over the government’s refusal to issue him a visa, upholding a lower-court ruling that the visa denial should be revoked. Yoo has repeatedly prevailed in court while South Korean authorities have continued to resist his return. Earlier this year, the Justice Ministry said it was seeking clearer legal grounds to continue barring people deemed to have avoided military service from entering the country, explicitly citing the Steve Yoo case. Justice Minister Jeong Seong-ho, who was serving as justice minister at the time, went so far as to characterize abandoning Korean nationality to avoid military service and later returning for personal benefit as an act against the social order. Psy, who later became a global star with “Gangnam Style,” faced a different military scandal years before his worldwide breakthrough. He initially fulfilled his obligation by working as technical personnel at a software company from 2002 to 2005. Authorities later determined that his work did not satisfy the requirements of the alternative-service program, after investigators found that he had not properly performed the designated duties while continuing entertainment activities. He was ordered to enlist again and entered active-duty service in December 2007, ultimately spending a combined 55 months under the two service arrangements. G-Dragon, meanwhile, did serve as an active-duty soldier, but his service demonstrated how intensely celebrity military life can be scrutinized. In 2018, the BIGBANG leader faced allegations that he had received preferential treatment by using a private room while being treated for an ankle injury at a military hospital. His agency rejected the allegation, while the Defense Ministry said the hospital did not operate a special “colonel’s room” and that the single room could be used by enlisted personnel when medically necessary. The ministry also said his use of sick leave complied with regulations. Together, the cases illustrate why military service carries a cultural weight in South Korea that extends far beyond defense policy. For ordinary young men, service can interrupt university, employment and relationships. For athletes and entertainers, it can interrupt careers that may have unusually short windows at their peak. That tension is becoming harder for the government to ignore as South Korea’s demographic decline reduces the number of men available for military service. Military Manpower Administration Commissioner Hong So-young said in August that relevant government agencies had reached a broad consensus on reforming the arts and sports alternative-service program, including concentrating benefits on more prestigious competitions and potentially tightening eligibility requirements. Hong said the number of South Korean men in their 20s fell from about 371,000 in 2015 to 224,000 in 2025 and could decline to about 120,000 by 2043, making military manpower an increasingly scarce national resource. AJP Takeaways - South Korean golfer Tom Kim’s Asian Games gold medal has revived debate over a system that allows elite athletes and selected artists to avoid active-duty military service while globally successful pop stars remain ineligible. - Recent controversies involving Song Min-ho, Steve Yoo, Psy and G-Dragon show how military service remains a potent test of fairness in South Korea, particularly when celebrities appear to receive special treatment or fail to fulfill obligations. - Lawmakers across the political spectrum are calling for tougher scrutiny of South Korea's military-service system, with former defense committee chair Sung Il-jong urging an overhaul of exemption criteria and current chair Jin Seong-joon calling for firm punishment of illegal draft evasion. 2026-10-04 11:23:23 -
AI-linked cyberattacks spread across South Korean finance SEOUL, October 04 (AJP) - South Korean financial authorities will convene an emergency meeting with industry leaders Sunday after a wave of suspected AI-assisted cyberattacks spread from major banks to savings banks and finance companies, exposing personal data and raising fears that more breaches may have yet to be detected. Financial Services Commission Chairman Lee Eog-weon is scheduled to chair the meeting at 2 p.m., with Financial Supervisory Service officials, financial industry associations and executives from affected companies expected to attend. The meeting had initially been planned for Oct. 7 but was brought forward as new breaches emerged. The attacks first surfaced at major banks. Shinhan Bank said information belonging to about 25,000 customers was exposed, while KB Kookmin Bank and Hana Bank reported breaches affecting 119 and 89 customers, respectively. BNK Busan Bank said personal information belonging to 11 outsourced developers was exposed. The damage has since spread beyond commercial banks. Yegaram Savings Bank said a hacker accessed a server containing customer information, with roughly 40,000 people believed to have been affected. Hyundai Capital also found that a website containing information on 146 mortgage loan recruiters had been attacked, although the company said ordinary customer information and its internal systems were not compromised. Woori Bank and NH NongHyup Bank were also targeted, but no customer information has so far been confirmed leaked. The attacks have largely focused on externally accessible systems, including sales-support and loan-recruiter platforms, rather than core banking networks. Financial authorities suspect the incidents may be connected and have asked institutions to compare their access logs with IP addresses linked to the attacks. Officials have also said AI agents may have been used to automate vulnerability searches and penetration attempts, although the use of AI has not yet been conclusively established. The latest incidents come after South Korea suffered a string of major data breaches beginning in 2025. A hack of SK Telecom exposed USIM-related data belonging to 23.24 million users, including phone numbers, subscriber identity numbers and authentication keys. Lotte Card later disclosed that personal credit information belonging to 2.97 million customers had been stolen, with card passwords and security codes exposed for about 283,000 of them. Game publisher Netmarble suffered a breach affecting about 6.11 million people, while e-commerce giant Coupang disclosed one of the largest leaks in Korean history. The Personal Information Protection Commission later determined that information belonging to about 37.55 million people had been compromised and imposed a record 624.68 billion won ($463 million) in fines. The problem continued into 2026. Seoul's public bicycle service Ttareungi disclosed a breach affecting about 4.62 million users in July. Government figures underline the broader trend. South Korea received 447 personal-data breach reports in 2025, up 45.6 percent from a year earlier, with hacking accounting for 62 percent of the cases. AJP Takeaways - South Korean financial authorities called an emergency meeting after suspected AI-assisted cyberattacks spread from major banks to savings banks and finance companies. - Shinhan Bank, KB Kookmin Bank, Hana Bank, Yegaram Savings Bank and Hyundai Capital reported breaches or attacks, while authorities are investigating whether the incidents are connected. - The attacks add to a broader cybersecurity crisis following major breaches at SK Telecom, Lotte Card, Netmarble and Coupang since 2025, exposing data belonging to tens of millions of people. 2026-10-04 09:34:00 -
South Korea seeks military sovereignty, but still needs Uncle Sam SEOUL, October 02 (AJP) - South Korean President Lee Jae Myung was unequivocal on Armed Forces Day - Seoul should reclaim wartime operational control of its military, a goal he wants to achieve before his five-year term ends in 2030. “There is no country in the world that relies on another person or another country for its military command authority,” Lee said at a luncheon following the ceremony marking the 78th Armed Forces Day, in a country that maintains roughly 450,000 active-duty troops and about 2.6 million reservists to defend against North Korea — a combined force of just over 3 million people, equivalent to roughly 5.9 percent of its population of about 51.6 million. The declaration came at a fraught moment. South Korea had linked explosions that wounded three of its soldiers in the Demilitarized Zone to North Korean mines, and the U.N. Command had determined that an armistice violation had occurred. Pyongyang denied responsibility. The incident was a sobering reminder of the security realities confronting Seoul’s pursuit of greater military autonomy. Doubts about the reliability of the United States under President Donald Trump have strengthened the case for South Korea to assume greater responsibility for its defense. Yet North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal and deepening military ties with Russia make American intelligence, reinforcement capabilities and nuclear deterrence indispensable to that effort. The question surrounding wartime operational control, known as OPCON, reaches beyond the nationality of the general commanding allied forces. Seoul must determine how to exercise greater authority while preserving the military integration and political commitment on which the alliance’s deterrence rests. “Greater Korean autonomy and a stronger alliance are not contradictions,” Patrick Cronin, chair of Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute, told AJP. “South Korea can assume greater responsibility for its own defense while remaining firmly anchored in the ROK–U.S. alliance.” “Indeed, a more capable South Korea should strengthen the alliance, provided greater Korean responsibility is matched by interoperability, credible deterrence, and genuine joint decision-making,” he said. That places a demanding test on the transition: greater authority must be accompanied by the capacity to exercise it. “OPCON is a means, not an end,” Cronin said. “Its measure should be stronger deterrence, not adherence to a political timetable.” The allies formally agree that the transfer should depend on military readiness and the security environment. How close they are to satisfying those conditions remains a matter of debate. Rep. Jin Seong-joon, chair of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, said Seoul was not seeking to assume wartime command before meeting the agreed requirements. “The military authorities of South Korea and the United States have continuously assessed the extent to which those conditions have been met, and we are now in the final stage of that assessment,” Jin told AJP. “I believe the conditions have been substantially met,” he said. “What remains now is a political decision on when the transfer should take place. I do not think there is a major difference between South Korea and the United States over the timing.” Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, told U.S. lawmakers in April that the allies had developed a roadmap aimed at meeting the conditions by the first quarter of 2029. Those include South Korea’s ability to lead combined forces, its strike and air-defense capabilities, and a regional security environment conducive to the handover. Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and a former chief of the CIA’s Korea Branch, described South Korea’s military as highly capable, with substantial investment in weapons and training. But he warned that critical gaps remain. “While substantial progress has been made, significant deficiencies remain in the country’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), its ability to conduct joint and combined operations, and to push tasking to U.S. or multinational forces,” Klingner told AJP. These are capabilities that allow a commander to assemble a reliable picture of the battlefield, coordinate different services and direct allied forces under combat conditions. Their readiness bears directly on the pace at which Seoul can assume greater command responsibility. The disagreement also reflects competing views of what OPCON represents. Yoo Seong-min, a former chair of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, rejects the suggestion that the existing command arrangement compromises South Korea’s independence. “Self-reliant defense refers to our own defense capabilities,” Yoo told AJP. “The fact that we make use of the combined capabilities of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and do not take back OPCON does not mean that we are not a sovereign and independent country.” For Yoo, the alliance adds to the military strength Seoul can bring to its defense. “I believe our defense capability is maximized when we strengthen our own capabilities while also utilizing the alliance’s combined defense capabilities,” he said. His central concern is the nuclear imbalance with Pyongyang. “The essence of the security crisis is North Korea’s nuclear weapons,” Yoo said. “It is ridiculous for a country without even a small nuclear weapon to talk about self-reliant defense simply because it has a sizable defense budget.” Edward Howell, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford, warned that Pyongyang would seek to exploit any impression that the transition reflected weakening ties between Seoul and Washington. “We must remember that North Korea has not ruled out forcible annexation of South Korea, not least using nuclear weapons offensively, under times of war,” Howell told AJP. “If OPCON transfer is to take place, it must not be rushed to serve domestic political aims,” he said. “South Korea must be ready for what is arguably its most perilous regional security environment in the postwar era.” One risk is that the two allies could attach different meanings to the same transition. Seoul may see the handover as recognition of its growing capabilities and a more equal partnership. Washington could see an opportunity to reduce its obligations. “I do worry that some in Washington might see OPCON transition as an excuse for the United States to do less on the Peninsula, which could create a rift in the alliance,” said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Cooper argued that greater South Korean capability should be accompanied by closer integration. “It would be better for the alliance to be tight and both allies highly capable, but to avoid decoupling,” he said. “We have to recognize that both countries need each other to maintain regional stability.” “South Korea needs the U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrent,” he added. “The United States needs to work closely with South Korea’s innovation ecosystem and utilize its unique geographic position.” That mutual dependence gives both governments reasons to preserve the alliance, but does not resolve the question of timing. “I am worried about the pacing of OPCON transition,” Cooper said. “I believe the goal should be to tie OPCON transition to specific measurable progress, rather than a set time.” Lauren Richardson, a lecturer in international relations at the Australian National University, places greater emphasis on Seoul’s search for room to act amid uncertainty about its ally. She described the transition as “a move by the South Korean government to establish greater autonomy within the context of ROK-US alliance — not as a move away from relying on the alliance as the bedrock of South Korea’s defense policy.” Among the forces driving that effort, she said, is the “increasing unreliability of the US as an ally.” The pursuit of autonomy, however, carries regional implications of its own. If the handover accompanies a significant expansion of South Korea’s conventional capabilities, Richardson said, neighboring countries are likely to see it as an acceleration of the regional arms race. “Strengthening deterrence without strengthening risk reduction can be an unstable combination,” she said. The diplomatic and institutional arrangements surrounding the transfer will therefore help determine whether it strengthens security. Jonathan Corrado, director of policy at The Korea Society, said a smooth handover could deepen allied coordination. Conversely, retaining an American four-star general in command would offer little protection against a deterioration in the underlying relationship. “Whether or not OPCON is transferred matters less than the robustness of alliance coordination, continued credible signaling, high level political commitment, and multidimensional collaboration across economics, culture, and throughout society,” Corrado said. Nuclear deterrence adds another layer to that relationship, requiring Seoul to seek a greater voice in decisions involving capabilities it does not possess. “Korea will continue to have more say in strategic decision-making through conventional-nuclear integration (CNI), the Nuclear Consultative Group, and over time, it is conceivable that the US and South Korea could adopt some form of NATO-style nuclear sharing,” Corrado told AJP. For decades, the OPCON debate has drawn much of its political force from a straightforward question: when should South Korea assume wartime command of its own forces? The strategic answer has become increasingly complicated. A nuclear-armed North Korea, deepening cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, a more assertive China and uncertainty over Washington’s priorities all bear on the conditions under which Seoul would exercise that authority. A South Korean general commanding allied conventional forces would still rely on American intelligence networks, reinforcements and nuclear deterrence. An American general occupying the same position would still depend on Washington’s willingness to honor its commitments. Klingner warned that even a perceived weakening of U.S. resolve could erode deterrence. Trump’s criticism of allies and emphasis on the cost of overseas deployments, he said, have already heightened South Korean concerns about American reliability. Seoul’s challenge is to build the capacity to lead while securing confidence that Washington will remain committed to the common defense. “Korea’s geography leaves little room for strategic solitude,” Cronin said. “Its security depends on maintaining a favorable regional balance of power, and partnership with a distant great power such as the United States helps sustain that balance without threatening South Korean sovereignty.” Greater Korean responsibility in the next decade, he said, should mean “greater capability, not greater strategic distance from the United States.” AJP Takeaways - President Lee Jae Myung wants South Korea to regain wartime operational control before his term ends in 2030, but experts caution that the transfer should depend on measurable military readiness rather than a political timetable. - South Korea has built formidable conventional capabilities, yet gaps remain in C4ISR and combined operations, while North Korea’s nuclear arsenal means Seoul will continue to rely heavily on U.S. intelligence, reinforcements and extended nuclear deterrence. - Experts broadly argue that greater South Korean autonomy need not weaken the alliance — but OPCON transfer will strengthen deterrence only if it is paired with tighter coordination, credible U.S. commitment and deeper joint decision-making. 2026-10-02 15:33:23 -
Lee accuses Ukraine of making him a 'liar' in deepening POW dispute SEOUL, October 02 (AJP) -South Korean President Lee Jae Myung issued his bluntest rebuke yet of Ukraine on Friday over its disclosure of the confidential transfer of North Korean prisoners of war, accusing Kyiv of making him a “liar” and expressing “grave” regret over its handling of the sensitive matter. “I had been as polite as I can be as the president,” Lee wrote on X, referring to his earlier response to Ukraine’s “unilateral” disclosure and breach of trust. But Kyiv had made him a “liar” by denying that the two governments had formally agreed to keep the transfer confidential, he said. Instead of apologizing, Ukrainian officials had made remarks that sounded as though they wanted conflict between the two Koreas, Lee said. He warned of action if Kyiv continued to deny the facts and undermine the South Korean government and its people. The dispute began with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Sept. 23 address to the U.N. General Assembly and has escalated into an unusually public diplomatic spat between countries that have maintained close ties since Russia’s invasion in 2022. Seoul claimed Ukraine had agreed to keep the transfer confidential because of security and humanitarian concerns, including the safety of the two soldiers and their families in North Korea. Ukrainian officials have denied that such an agreement existed. Cheong Wa Dae has accused Kyiv of damaging trust between the two governments. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry summoned Ukraine’s acting ambassador in Seoul on Monday to lodge a protest. The dispute widened after Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s presidential office, warned that North Korea was applying battlefield lessons learned in Ukraine to its own military. He also suggested that rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula could eventually lead to an uncontrolled confrontation. Ukraine’s foreign minister struck a more conciliatory tone Thursday, a day before Lee’s latest remarks. “I would not like to call this an incident. Let’s say, it’s a diplomatic misunderstanding,” Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told reporters. Sybiha said Ukraine was working to resolve the dispute quickly and stressed that South Korea remained an important partner for Kyiv. The two North Korean soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces in January 2025 while fighting alongside Russian troops. They were the first North Korean soldiers known to have been captured alive after Pyongyang deployed troops to support Moscow’s war effort. AJP Takeaways: - South Korea–Ukraine tensions deepen: President Lee Jae Myung accused Kyiv of making him a “liar” by denying an agreement to keep the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war confidential. - Seoul cites safety concerns: South Korea says secrecy was needed to protect the soldiers and their families in North Korea. Ukraine denies that a confidentiality agreement existed. -Kyiv seeks to ease the dispute: Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called the spat a “diplomatic misunderstanding” and reaffirmed South Korea’s importance as a partner. 2026-10-02 13:25:35 -
Energy-poor, tech-rich Korea must link renewables with storage: IRENA chief SEOUL, October 02 (AJP) - South Korea, an energy-poor but high-tech powerhouse, must pair renewables and hydrogen with storage technology to power its advanced manufacturing economy, a senior international energy expert said. “Korea has strong technological and industrial capabilities to advance its energy transition,” Francesco La Camera, director-general of the International Renewable Energy Agency, said in an email interview with AJP. “The priority is to mobilize those capabilities through a coordinated approach to renewable deployment, infrastructure and electrification.” La Camera pointed to batteries, transformers, subsea and terrestrial cables, power electronics and digital controls as areas where Korean manufacturing expertise could support a renewable-energy system. The country's semiconductor sector could also play a role as grids become more digitally sophisticated. “Domestic deployment can help companies demonstrate solutions, develop skills and build experience for export,” he said. His prescription carries greater urgency as the conflict in the Middle East stretches into its eighth month, unsettling energy-dependent South Korea and other importers ahead of winter. Brent crude is hovering around $103 a barrel and Dubai crude around $93.38, with little sign of the crisis subsiding. The war in Iran has disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, a passage for roughly one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas trade. For South Korea, which sourced about 70 percent of its crude imports from the Middle East last year, the disruption has sharpened questions about energy security just as the power-hungry artificial intelligence industry drives up electricity demand. “Renewable electricity is a strategic asset for industrial competitiveness,” La Camera said. “What has most profoundly shaped my thinking is the growing convergence of climate action, energy security and economic opportunity,” he said, reflecting on his years at IRENA. “The multiple crises of recent years have made the risks of dependence on internationally traded fuels more visible, while technological progress has strengthened the case for renewable energy.” South Korea is a manufacturing powerhouse on course to reach $1 trillion in annual exports this year, yet it relies overwhelmingly on imported energy. Imports accounted for 93.7 percent of its energy supply in 2024, with the bill reaching $161.3 billion, according to government energy statistics. The Iran conflict has turned that structural vulnerability into an immediate policy concern. Seoul last week announced plans to cut the Middle East's share of its crude imports from about 70 percent in 2025 to 50 percent by 2035, while expanding strategic stockpiles and diversifying suppliers. Diversification changes where imported fossil fuels come from. Renewables offer another form of insurance by allowing the country to produce more energy without importing the fuel. The distinction lies at the heart of La Camera's argument. He has led IRENA since April 2019 and was appointed to a second four-year term in 2023. Previously, the Italian official served as director-general for sustainable development and international environmental affairs at Italy's environment ministry and led Italian delegations to U.N. climate conferences, including COP21 in Paris. Based in Abu Dhabi, IRENA is an intergovernmental organization devoted to renewable energy, with 170 member countries plus the European Union. Its figures show how rapidly the global electricity system is changing. The world installed about 692 gigawatts of renewable capacity in 2025, lifting the total to 5,149 GW. Renewables accounted for 85.6 percent of net power-capacity additions, with solar adding roughly 511 GW and wind nearly 159 GW, according to IRENA. Renewables also overtook coal in global electricity generation for the first time in modern power-system history last year, supplying 33.8 percent of the total, according to energy think tank Ember. Yet deployment remains too slow to meet the global goal of tripling renewable capacity by 2030. “The central challenge is implementation at the speed and scale required,” La Camera said. “Technology is available and the economic case is strong. We now need infrastructure, policies and investment to advance together.” South Korea illustrates that challenge. The country's latest finalized long-term power plan calls for renewables to rise from 8.4 percent of electricity generation in 2023 to 29.2 percent by 2038. The Lee Jae Myung administration has since accelerated the near-term push, targeting more than 100 GW of renewable capacity and at least 20 percent of electricity generation before 2030. With about 40 GW currently installed, South Korea would need to more than double its renewable capacity to reach the target. The government says the country added about 3.8 GW in 2025, its largest annual increase since 2022 but well short of the pace required. For La Camera, the task extends beyond installing more solar panels and wind turbines. Generation, transmission networks, storage and flexible electricity demand need to be planned together, he said. Digital technology can help make better use of existing infrastructure, while faster and more predictable permitting would support new investment. Seoul is on course. On Tuesday, the government unveiled a sweeping power-grid overhaul designed to accommodate more than 100 GW of renewable capacity by 2030. Officials acknowledged that transmission and distribution bottlenecks have become a major barrier to development. In the southwestern Honam region, network congestion had left some new projects facing waits until after 2034 for grid connections. The government plans to expand transmission infrastructure while making greater use of energy-storage systems and flexible grid connections, allowing renewable projects to come online before every new transmission line is completed. Falling generation costs strengthen the case for that investment. More than 90 percent of utility-scale renewable projects commissioned worldwide in 2025 produced electricity more cheaply than the least-expensive new fossil-fuel alternative available in their markets, IRENA found. The global weighted average cost of new onshore wind fell to $33 per megawatt-hour, while solar photovoltaic power averaged $44 and offshore wind $78. IRENA estimates that renewable generation avoided about $480 billion in fossil-fuel costs worldwide last year. Storage is also becoming more affordable. Battery-storage costs have fallen 93 percent since 2010, according to IRENA, allowing combinations of solar, wind and batteries in favorable locations to provide round-the-clock electricity at costs increasingly competitive with new fossil-fuel generation. La Camera said Korea should capitalize on that shift by combining renewables with storage, greater electrification and energy efficiency. Renewable hydrogen could help meet the needs of industrial processes that are difficult to electrify directly. That approach could be particularly important for semiconductors, steel and batteries — industries central to Korea's export economy that face growing pressure from customers and regulators to reduce the carbon embedded in their products. Korea's industrial base also gives it an opportunity to supply the transition at home and abroad. La Camera singled out offshore wind as an area where the country's shipbuilding and engineering expertise could translate into a global competitive advantage. “Korea's maritime capabilities provide a strong foundation for installation vessels, offshore structures, floating platforms and associated engineering services,” he said. Seoul is targeting 25 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2035 and plans to auction at least 4 GW of offshore projects annually to build the domestic market. The Hormuz crisis has made the broader choice increasingly difficult to treat as abstract. Alongside larger stockpiles, alternative suppliers and overseas energy projects, Korea can reduce its exposure by generating more power from resources that do not need to pass through a strait, cross an ocean or survive a war. In La Camera's view, energy security and renewable deployment are becoming part of the same industrial strategy. Delivering it will require more than technological strength. “Competitive technologies alone are not enough,” he said. “Countries need infrastructure, effective institutions, affordable finance and skilled people to deploy them at scale.” AJP Takeaways - IRENA chief Francesco La Camera says South Korea should pair renewables with storage, grid investment and electrification to strengthen both energy security and industrial competitiveness. - The Iran war and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz have exposed Korea’s vulnerability as a country that imports 93.7 percent of its energy and relies heavily on Middle Eastern crude. - Korea aims to exceed 100 GW of renewable capacity before 2030, but transmission bottlenecks, permitting delays and insufficient storage remain major obstacles to meeting that target. 2026-10-02 10:36:22 -
Alaska LNG steals the show as Trump sells Korea deal at home SEOUL, October 01 (AJP) - South Korea and the United States have finally put multibillion-dollar price tags on the energy ventures underpinning Seoul’s investment pledge in return for tariff relief - $120 billion for eight nuclear reactors and $22.3 billion for a South Texas power project. But the project that stole the limelight when President Donald Trump announced the package was the one Seoul has yet to commit to — a long-proposed gas pipeline in Alaska. Flanked by U.S. officials and Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan at the Oval Office on Wednesday, Trump touted a “gigantic win” for Alaska, presenting the LNG project as a centerpiece of South Korea’s $200 billion investment pledge outside shipbuilding. On Truth Social, he credited his meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly last month with securing the package and again celebrated the Alaska project. “The United States and Korea have agreed to commence working together on the 50 Billion Dollar ALASKA LNG PROJECT — unlocking the tremendous resources of our Great State of Alaska, and creating new American Gas Infrastructure, and building it with our wonderful American Workers. This Project will deliver transformational change for the People of Alaska,” he wrote. The problem is that Alaska is far from a done deal. The official language was considerably more restrained. South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources said the two governments had agreed to begin reviewing Alaska LNG, dubbed Project North. A decision on whether to proceed would depend on its “commercial reasonableness” and compliance with domestic legal requirements. The U.S. Commerce Department’s fact sheet likewise made cooperation conditional. For those familiar with the project’s long struggle to get built, the gap between the presidential celebration and the negotiated language reflected the audience each was intended to reach. “It was a political announcement from President Trump,” Larry Persily, a former federal coordinator for Alaska natural-gas transportation projects and former deputy commissioner of the Alaska Department of Revenue, said in a phone interview with AJP. “No one from South Korea was at the event. It was made for TV.” Sullivan is fighting a competitive reelection race against Democrat Mary Peltola. Trump praised his work on the pipeline and presented the project as a victory for Alaska just weeks before the Nov. 3 midterm elections. The senator’s connection to Alaska LNG nevertheless runs deeper than election-year staging. He has spent years promoting the project in Washington and Asia, courting governments, utilities and potential investors. His office said last year that he had made four trips to Japan and South Korea to promote it and had personally pressed Trump and senior administration officials to make it a priority. Yet the venture Trump celebrated still needs enough buyers, financing and investors willing to bear its risks. Alaska LNG is 75 percent owned by Glenfarne Group, with the state holding the remaining 25 percent through the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation. It would carry gas from the North Slope through more than 800 miles of pipeline to a liquefaction plant capable of producing 20 million metric tons a year for export. Developers have preliminary arrangements covering about 13 million tons annually, but need additional commitments and ultimately binding contracts to support financing. Construction estimates range from roughly $44.5 billion to $54.5 billion. For Persily, the most striking implication of Trump’s announcement was that an investment roughly equivalent to the cost of the entire project could be assigned to South Korea. Large LNG ventures normally distribute risk among producers, infrastructure companies, governments, lenders and long-term buyers, he said. “Look at Australia, Papua New Guinea or Mozambique,” Persily said. “No one entity ever takes the entire risk.” He pointed to LNG Canada, which began operations in 2025 with five major partners despite being smaller than Alaska LNG. “For one entity, it is too much risk,” he said. The construction estimate itself offers little reassurance, in his view. “Most people in the industry seriously question the supposed $54 billion estimated cost of construction,” he said. “The estimated price tag has low credibility.” Such doubts help explain Seoul’s caution. One member of South Korea’s National Assembly committee overseeing industry and energy said Trump’s announcement should not be confused with what Seoul had agreed to. “This is Trump’s unilateral announcement,” the lawmaker told AJP. “The agreement and Trump’s announcement will be very different.” The lawmaker said the negotiated language was understood to be closer to “explore the possibility” of investing in Alaska LNG, leaving Seoul room to walk away if the economics fail. Another committee member said South Korea remained unconvinced of the project’s commercial viability and viewed the announcement partly through the lens of the U.S. midterms. “The Alaska LNG project has not been agreed,” the lawmaker said. “Consultations have begun. Korea is still not convinced of its commercial viability.” Seoul’s assessment, however, has become less dismissive as the risks surrounding other energy supplies have grown. A committee member said Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan had questioned the project’s commercial rationale last year. Since then, the war with Iran and disruption to Middle Eastern energy flows have strengthened the case for diversifying South Korea’s LNG supplies. Alaska offers a relatively short shipping route to Northeast Asia that avoids the Strait of Hormuz. It would also give South Korea another source of supply outside the Middle East and Australia. Its strongest selling point may therefore be the security of having another option. Whether buyers will pay enough for that advantage is another question. “Geographically, Alaska LNG is not going to Germany, Poland, Lithuania or the U.K.,” Persily said. “It has to go to the Asian market, and the Asian market is price sensitive.” The economics depend on prices over decades, well beyond the current disruption. Brett Watson, a professor of applied and natural-resource economics at the University of Alaska Anchorage, said the Japan-Korea Marker, the benchmark for spot LNG delivered to Northeast Asia, was around $25 per thousand cubic feet in the price framework he uses. That compares with a range of $8 to $14 from January 2024 through February 2026, he said, against $25 to $35 after Russia invaded Ukraine and as little as $2 to $5 during the pandemic. “When we think about the competitiveness of LNG, everything hinges on one’s expectations of future prices,” Watson told AJP. For Alaska, the same volatility presents a different calculation. Southcentral Alaska’s traditional Cook Inlet gas supply is becoming more expensive as production declines. Without access to North Slope gas, the region could increasingly depend on imported LNG, paying the Asian benchmark price plus shipping and regasification costs, Watson said. “If gas prices are low, then it makes more sense for Alaska to be a gas buyer,” he said. “If gas prices are high, then we want to be a gas seller.” Alaska’s Department of Revenue has estimated that the project could generate a 10 percent internal rate of return at a gas price of $9.07 per thousand cubic feet, according to Watson. But construction costs remain a decisive variable — and precisely the figure industry skeptics consider least dependable. The geographic advantage is easier to quantify. Watson said state estimates put shipping costs from Alaska to Japan at about 94 cents per thousand cubic feet, with the pipeline toll adding about $1.92. For Alaskan consumers, the potential benefits are substantial. Watson estimates that without North Slope gas, prices in Southcentral Alaska could rise from roughly $10 today to $13 to $16 per thousand cubic feet as Cook Inlet resources are depleted. A successful Alaska LNG project could bring prices closer to $5 for consumers along or near the pipeline route. Those local benefits help explain the enthusiasm in the Oval Office. They do not, by themselves, establish the investment case for South Korea. Seoul said that if the project proceeds, Washington would provide favorable conditions for Korean equipment suppliers, tariff relief on materials such as steel, economically viable long-term LNG purchase arrangements and priority Korean access to the gas. Those terms remain part of the case Seoul must assess. Trump has already claimed the political dividend; South Korea has yet to decide whether the investment will pay. AJP Takeaways - Trump cast Alaska LNG as a centerpiece of South Korea’s $200 billion U.S. investment pledge, but Seoul has agreed only to review the project and says any participation depends on commercial viability and domestic law. - The project still faces major financing and cost questions, with developers needing more binding buyers and experts warning that the roughly $44.5 billion to $54.5 billion construction estimate carries substantial uncertainty. - Alaska LNG could strengthen South Korea’s energy security by diversifying supplies and avoiding Middle Eastern chokepoints, but whether those strategic benefits justify the cost remains unresolved. 2026-10-01 17:06:44