Aju Press - Aasia News Hub

Journalist

Lee Jung-woo이정우

cannes2030@ajupress.com

ReporterMinistry of Unification & North Korea, Politics, Foreign Affairs

I studied philosophy in college, and sociology and journalism in graduate school. I cover North Korea, South Korean politics, foreign affairs and films. I enjoy Nordic cinema, Indian cuisine and Japanese detective novels. I have a cat and like bright, acidic coffee.
"Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."

Latest by Lee Jung-woo

South Korea sees 'no immediate oil supply disruptions' SEOUL, July 21 (AJP) - South Korea has enough crude oil supplies to last through September and expects no immediate disruption even if shipping through the Red Sea is halted, the government said on Tuesday, as lingering tensions in the Middle East put another major energy shipping route at risk. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources said refiners had secured crude for July and August equivalent to more than 110 percent of last year's average import volume. Bookings for September have continued to rise and already exceed 90 percent of the volume imported during the same period last year. "We have confirmed that there should be no major problem with crude oil supplies through September," said Yang Ki-wook, a senior official at the ministry. "Even if the Red Sea is blocked, we do not expect any particular difficulty." The assurances came after Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi movement declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia the previous day, raising fears that ships carrying Saudi exports could face attacks or restrictions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow gateway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The Houthis said the blockade took effect immediately in retaliation for what they described as Saudi Arabia's siege of Yemen. Saudi Arabia condemned the announcement and began taking measures to protect commercial vessels using its shipping routes. The threat is particularly significant because the Red Sea has served as an alternative outlet for Saudi crude while passage through the Strait of Hormuz remains vulnerable to the conflict involving the United States and Iran. Saudi Arabia can move crude through its East-West Pipeline from fields near the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing exports to bypass Hormuz. Ships bound for Asian markets, however, must then pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. A disruption there could sharply reduce the value of the Saudi bypass route and force tankers onto much longer voyages. Oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb averaged about 5.4 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026. By comparison, roughly 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day in 2024, equivalent to about one-fifth of global consumption. The ministry said vessels were continuing to operate normally in the Red Sea and that officials were monitoring conditions in real time. "If the Red Sea is blocked, the situation would become more difficult," Yang said. "But because that has not materialized, we are not taking any immediate action. Should problems arise, we would have to devise alternative means, including routes involving the Suez Canal." The latest escalation comes after a brief period of easing tensions following a June 17 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Washington and Tehran aimed at ending their hostilities. The situation deteriorated again in July after Iran announced renewed restrictions around Hormuz and the United States resumed military action against Iranian targets. Of six South Korea-bound tankers that passed through Hormuz after the June agreement, three have already reached the country, while the remaining three are expected to arrive this week, the ministry said. South Korea remains highly exposed to disruptions in Middle Eastern energy supplies because it produces virtually no crude oil domestically and operates one of Asia’s largest refining and petrochemical industries. Middle Eastern suppliers accounted for about 69.9 percent of the country's crude imports in 2025, despite efforts to expand purchases from the United States and other regions. The government began allowing domestic refiners to borrow crude from national reserves in March under the country's first strategic oil swap program. Refiners receiving reserve oil are required to return the same amount after their delayed overseas shipments arrive. The measure was introduced after the Hormuz crisis disrupted tanker movements and increased the risk of temporary shortages at individual refineries. Korea National Oil Corp. held about 100 million barrels of government crude and petroleum reserves at the end of 2025, excluding stocks stored under joint arrangements with foreign producers. Its nine storage facilities have a combined capacity of about 146 million barrels. Officials said there was no immediate reason to resume the swap program because refiners had secured more than their normal crude requirements for July and August. The government could nevertheless reactivate the measure if the Middle East conflict drags on or shipping conditions deteriorate further. South Korea has also sought to strengthen direct supply arrangements with oil-producing countries. Earlier this month, the government and the United Arab Emirates' state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. agreed to expand cooperation on long-term crude supply, emergency coordination and oil storage in South Korea. The agreement followed a UAE pledge in March to provide up to 24 million barrels of crude. The government said it would continue tracking tanker movements, refinery inventories and international oil prices while considering additional cargoes from outside the Middle East. The widening risks around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have highlighted the limits of relying on a single alternative route, even as officials maintain that South Korea has enough contracted supplies and emergency reserves to withstand a short-term disruption. 2026-07-21 14:38:30
Reality check for Korea's Lee and Japan's Takaichi as their honeymoons end SEOUL, July 20 (AJP) - The chemistry between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi appeared immediate, culminating in an impromptu drumming performance during their January summit in Nara. They also had much in common. Both took office as agents of change after periods of political turmoil. Both entered government with approval ratings that would be enviable in almost any mature democracy. Both benefited from weakened opposition camps and presented themselves as decisive leaders capable of breaking with the drift and disorder associated with their predecessors. Lee took office on June 4, 2025, after winning a snap election triggered by the removal of former President Yoon Suk Yeol following his short-lived declaration of martial law. Takaichi became Japan’s first female prime minister on Oct. 21, 2025, giving the governing Liberal Democratic Party a new face after years of scandals, factional conflict and declining public trust. Their political honeymoons were unusually strong. Lee's first Gallup Korea approval rating stood at 64 percent in late June 2025 and later peaked at 67 percent in March and April 2026. Takaichi's Cabinet began with similarly robust support. A Kyodo News poll conducted immediately after its formation put approval at 64.4 percent, while Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys measured 68 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Some later polls placed her support above 70 percent. The numbers reflected more than ordinary post-election goodwill. Lee benefited from a widespread desire to restore institutional stability after the martial law crisis. Even voters wary of his combative political style could view his government as a return to normal democratic administration. His emphasis on economic revival, pragmatic diplomacy and active government reinforced the perception that the presidency was functioning again. Takaichi combined the symbolism of becoming Japan's first female leader with a direct and energetic communication style. Her promises to raise disposable income, confront inflation and restore confidence resonated particularly strongly with younger voters. She quickly converted personal popularity into political power. In February, the LDP won 316 seats in the lower house, while the governing bloc, including the Japan Innovation Party, secured 352 of the chamber's 465 seats, exceeding the two-thirds threshold needed to override the upper house on ordinary legislation. By July, however, the mood surrounding both leaders had changed. Lee’s Gallup Korea approval rating fell to 52 percent in a July 14-16 survey, down from 67 percent at its spring peak. His disapproval rating rose to 37 percent. Realmeter placed his positive assessment lower, at 48.4 percent, marking a fifth consecutive week in the 40 percent range. Takaichi's decline was sharper in some polls. An Asahi survey conducted July 18-19 put Cabinet approval at 53 percent, down 7 percentage points from June and the lowest level since her government was formed. A Mainichi poll over the same weekend recorded approval at just 41 percent, down 10 points in a month, while disapproval rose to 44 percent. Polls from different countries and organizations are not directly comparable. Survey methods, political cultures and question wording differ. The more meaningful comparison is the direction of travel within each pollster's series. On that measure, both leaders have moved from unusually favorable conditions into the first genuinely difficult phase of governing. Their immediate problems differ. Takaichi faces a backlash over national identity, gender and the use of parliamentary power. Lee confronts a more diffuse set of doubts involving election administration, financial regulation, housing and younger voters. But the underlying question is the same: Can leaders who rose as symbols of change retain public trust once they become responsible for the failures and contradictions of the systems they control? Takaichi's imperial gamble The immediate trigger for Takaichi's latest decline appears to be parliament's July 17 revision of Japan’s Imperial House Law. The legislation was intended to address the shrinking size of the imperial family and the shortage of potential male heirs. Japan's succession rules permit only men descended through the male line to inherit the Chrysanthemum Throne. The revised law allows male-line descendants of former imperial branches that lost royal status after World War II to be adopted into the current imperial family. Their future male-line sons could then become eligible for succession. It also allows female members of the imperial family to retain their status after marrying commoners and continue performing official duties. Their husbands and children, however, would not become members of the imperial family. What the law does not permit is a female emperor. Princess Aiko, the only child of Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako, therefore remains excluded. The succession line continues through the emperor's younger brother, Crown Prince Fumihito; Fumihito's son, Prince Hisahito; and the emperor's elderly uncle, Prince Hitachi. The reform addresses an administrative problem — how to maintain enough imperial family members to perform public duties — without confronting what many voters regard as the central question: why the emperor's daughter should remain ineligible solely because she is a woman. Polls have repeatedly shown that roughly 70 percent or more of Japanese voters would accept a female emperor or support Princess Aiko's accession. Instead, the government chose to reach into distant male branches separated from Emperor Naruhito by centuries of genealogy. Some potential candidates share an ancestor with him from roughly 600 years ago. The solution is vulnerable from both sides. Traditionalists may object that bringing people raised outside the imperial household into the family weakens the institution's continuity. Reformists argue that preferring a remote male relative over the emperor's daughter exposes the irrationality of preserving an exclusively male line. The Asahi poll found that 60 percent of respondents believed the revision had not gained sufficient public understanding. Among them, Cabinet approval stood at 42 percent and disapproval at 49 percent, suggesting that the controversy contributed materially to Takaichi’s decline. The Mainichi poll was more negative. Forty-five percent viewed the revision unfavorably, compared with 19 percent who approved. Sixty-two percent said they could not accept the continued exclusion of women from the throne. For Takaichi, the issue carries added symbolism. Her appointment as Japan's first female prime minister was widely seen as a breakthrough in one of the world's most male-dominated political systems. Yet she has long been associated with the conservative wing of the LDP and has resisted changes to traditional family and gender institutions. She is now defending a system in which she can lead the government but the emperor's daughter cannot inherit the throne. Takaichi argues that male-line continuity is a defining element of imperial legitimacy, not a broader judgment about women's ability to lead. But the controversy has reinforced concerns about how her government exercises power after its landslide lower house victory. In the Mainichi poll, 46 percent said the government was not sufficiently careful or respectful in advancing policy, while 38 percent judged its approach favorably. The result echoed opposition accusations that the governing bloc is using its numerical dominance to push through measures without adequately considering public objections. Many younger voters who initially admired Takaichi's energy and economic message did not necessarily embrace her social conservatism. They were drawn to her promises to increase take-home pay, reduce bureaucratic caution and provide faster economic relief. A supermajority can pass a law. It cannot manufacture public consent. Takaichi's government approved a major stimulus program in November 2025, including energy subsidies, tax measures and household assistance. Yet the weak yen, expensive food and energy, social insurance burdens and worries over fiscal sustainability continue to weigh on consumers. Her early support among younger voters was partly transactional. If living standards do not improve, it can disappear quickly. The imperial dispute is therefore dangerous because it reinforces a broader narrative: that the government is spending political capital on conservative institutional priorities while households remain preoccupied with the cost of everyday life. Economic discomfort combined with perceived ideological overreach has weakened governments far more secure than Takaichi's. Lee's more diffuse challenge Lee's decline has no single equivalent to Japan's Imperial House Law revision. Instead, a series of controversies has accumulated since early June, raising questions about competence, oversight and fairness. South Korea's June 3 local elections were marred in some areas by ballot-paper shortages and other administrative failures. The incidents angered voters who were delayed or unable to vote normally and revived broader distrust of the National Election Commission. Documented administrative failures must be distinguished from allegations of deliberate election fraud. Ballot shortages demonstrated serious planning and management problems. They did not prove that votes were fabricated or that officials sought to alter the results. But they occurred in a political environment already saturated with suspicion, allowing genuine logistical failures to fuel more sweeping claims. A Gallup Korea survey conducted June 9-11 found that 67 percent regarded the shortages as poor election management and an infringement of voting rights. Twenty-five percent saw them as evidence of illegal intervention or attempted fraud. On whether entirely new elections should be held, 44 percent agreed and 48 percent disagreed. Support for a rerun was particularly high among younger voters, reaching 67 percent among those aged 18 to 29 and 62 percent among people in their 30s. In the same survey, election-management failures, alleged fraud and problems involving the commission were cited by 16 percent of Lee's critics as the main reason for their negative assessment, the largest single category. His approval fell to 57 percent, down 7 points from the previous Gallup survey. By June 23-25, approval had fallen further to 51 percent. Economic and cost-of-living concerns led negative responses at 15 percent, while election-related issues and housing policy each accounted for 10 percent. The election commission is an independent constitutional institution, not an agency directly controlled by the presidency. Lee expressed regret and called for accountability, positioning himself alongside voters demanding reform. That may have limited the damage, but it did not resolve the deeper problem of institutional distrust. A stock-market success turns into a liability Lee made revival of the domestic stock market a central part of his economic agenda. He promoted corporate governance reform, stronger protection of minority shareholders and measures to reduce the "Korea discount." As the KOSPI rallied, the market became evidence that optimism and reform were returning. That narrative was weakened by extreme volatility in leveraged exchange-traded funds tied to individual companies, particularly Samsung Electronics and SK hynix. Introduced in late May, the products were designed to deliver roughly twice the daily movement of their underlying stocks. Because Samsung Electronics and SK hynix account for an unusually large share of the benchmark index, heavy trading in leveraged products linked to the two companies magnified pressure across the broader market. Such funds must rebalance as prices move. In volatile markets, that mechanism can force additional buying during rallies and additional selling during declines, amplifying momentum in both directions. The KOSPI, previously celebrated as one of the world's strongest major markets, began recording violent daily swings. Retail investors who entered at elevated prices faced losses, margin calls and growing concern that a market promoted as a vehicle for national wealth creation had become excessively speculative. Lee ordered regulators on July 15 to prepare safeguards. The Financial Services Commission suspended new listings of single-stock leveraged funds, increased the minimum retail deposit from 10 million won to 30 million won, raised minimum trading units and strengthened mandatory investor education. There is no evidence that Lee personally approved the products, and public criticism has also focused on regulators, the stock exchange and senior economic officials. Major polls have not yet identified leveraged ETFs as an independent driver of his approval decline. The political risk is nevertheless clear. The episode strikes at one of Lee's central claims: that his government can make Korean markets both more dynamic and fairer to ordinary investors. If retail investors conclude that the state encouraged risk during the boom and intervened only after losses emerged, the controversy becomes a story about unequal responsibility. Profits appear private at the top, while small investors bear the cost of belated regulation. Housing poses a more persistent threat. Korean presidents repeatedly discover that public judgment of the economy is inseparable from apartment prices. Rising prices reward existing owners but exclude younger and first-time buyers. Falling prices threaten highly leveraged households, construction and consumption. There is no politically painless equilibrium. Lee initially appeared to be performing well. In March, 51 percent of Gallup respondents positively assessed the government's housing policy, the highest favorable rating in the pollster's series since 2013. Only 27 percent judged it negatively. Four months later, the balance had reversed. A Gallup survey conducted June 30-July 2 found that 46 percent believed the government was handling housing poorly, while 26 percent approved. Fifty-five percent expected home prices to rise over the next year, compared with 14 percent who expected them to fall. Negative sentiment was strongest among younger adults. More than half of respondents in their 20s and 30s disapproved of the government’s housing policy. Among people in their 30s, 56 percent rated it negatively, the highest share of any age group, while just 15 percent approved. Critics most frequently cited the failure to restrain prices. Lending restrictions and excessive regulation were also mentioned. The tension is obvious. Young Koreans are told that household debt is excessive and tighter lending rules are necessary. But when borrowing limits are tightened without a corresponding fall in prices, people without family wealth are placed at an even greater disadvantage against cash-rich buyers. Credit controls can therefore deepen perceptions of unfairness if they fail to cool the market. Older homeowners may regard rising apartment values as economic security. For salaried workers in their 20s and 30s, they can represent the disappearance of any realistic path into the middle class. Lee knows the political history. The previous progressive administration of Moon Jae-in was badly damaged when Seoul housing prices surged despite repeated regulation. Lee has sought to distinguish himself by combining supply, redevelopment and regional development with financial controls. But voters judge outcomes faster than housing supply can be delivered. Gallup's July 14-16 survey showed housing as the second-most cited reason for disapproving of Lee, at 11 percent. Economic conditions, livelihoods and the weak won ranked first at 16 percent. That combination is politically combustible. Households are not only worried that homes are unaffordable. They also fear that daily costs are rising and their savings are losing purchasing power. Macroeconomic optimism rarely overcomes that experience. Lee's unresolved youth problem Housing is central to Lee’s fourth challenge: weak support among younger voters. Even when his national approval was near its peak, Lee performed less strongly among people in their 20s than among voters in their 40s and 50s. A Gallup report in April showed his approval among young adults remaining in the 40 percent range while his national rating stood in the mid-60s. By June 23-25, approval among those aged 18 to 29 had fallen to 36 percent, the lowest of any age group. Approval among people in their 30s stood at 47 percent, also below the national average. Several forces are at work. The first is the generational gender divide. Young women played an important role in Lee's 2025 victory. Exit polling indicated that about 58 percent of women in their 20s and 57 percent of those in their 30s supported him, while many young men backed conservative or third-party candidates. Lee therefore entered office with a divided youth coalition. Some young women expected stronger action on workplace discrimination, digital sex crimes and gender-based violence and have become frustrated by what they see as excessive caution. Young men remain skeptical of the Democratic Party's positions on military service, recruitment, gender policy and fairness. Attempts to avoid alienating either side risk satisfying neither. Employment is another concern. Young Koreans face intense competition for stable entry-level jobs at large companies and public institutions, while artificial intelligence and automation create uncertainty over white-collar careers. Semiconductor-led growth and rising asset prices do not necessarily translate into opportunity for graduates and first-time job seekers. Housing and asset inequality deepen the frustration. Older generations who bought homes before major price increases accumulated wealth even when wage growth was modest. Younger workers must save from income while the cost of entry moves steadily farther away. A rising stock market was supposed to offer another path to asset building. The leveraged ETF controversy showed how quickly retail participation could become exposure to amplified losses. Political representation is another source of alienation. Younger voters often view mainstream parties as organizations dominated by older politicians who invoke youth during elections but exclude younger people from candidate selection and senior decision-making. This is why Lee's youth problem cannot be repaired with one cash benefit or slogan. It is rooted in a belief that the system distributes opportunity according to accumulated assets, family background, institutional connections and timing rather than effort. Younger voters are also less attached to traditional parties and more willing to shift rapidly over specific fairness controversies involving elections, recruitment, housing loans and investment losses. Lee's strength remains concentrated among voters in their 40s and 50s, whose political identities were shaped by earlier democratic struggles and partisan conflicts. Younger voters are less inclined to support him because of the Democratic Party's historical identity or because the opposition remains associated with Yoon. The memory of martial law still matters, but it cannot indefinitely substitute for answers on housing, jobs and fairness. Two different mandates The comparison between Lee and Takaichi should not obscure the differences between their political systems. Lee is a directly elected president serving a single five-year term. His authority does not depend on remaining party leader or repeatedly winning parliamentary confidence. Takaichi's position depends on control of her party and a parliamentary majority. Even a prime minister with a huge lower house advantage can be removed if internal support collapses. Their approval ratings also carry different implications. Lee's 52 percent Gallup rating remains above half, while the Democratic Party led the opposition People Power Party by 40 percent to 26 percent in the July 14-16 survey. His numbers represent a significant retreat, not a collapse. Takaichi still recorded 53 percent approval in the Asahi poll. But Mainichi's finding of 41 percent approval and 44 percent disapproval suggests her support is more sensitive to pollster, audience and issue framing. The abrupt 10-point fall may also influence expectations inside the LDP. Their opposition camps differ as well. Lee faces conservatives who remain divided and burdened by their association with Yoon and martial law. That weakness allows him to absorb lower approval without immediately losing control of the political agenda. Japan’s parliamentary opposition is also fragmented, but Takaichi's greater danger may come from within the LDP. If lawmakers conclude that her ideological agenda is eroding the electoral advantage created by her personal popularity, internal pressure could grow before the next election. For both Lee and Takaichi, the easy phase is over. Their early popularity rested on what they represented: stability after turmoil, change after stagnation and leadership after drift. Their durability will depend on something harder — whether voters believe the systems they now control are becoming fairer, more competent and more responsive to ordinary life. 2026-07-20 18:01:53
Record Heat Waves Hit South Korea Amid Global Climate Crisis Record heat waves and large wildfires that have swept across Europe and the United States have now become a reality in South Korea. On July 12, the country issued its first-ever 'Extreme Heat Warning,' marking the onset of a new era of extreme summer conditions. Heat waves are no longer seasonal weather anomalies but have become a national disaster, posing new risks to energy, industry, and the economy.The Korea Meteorological Administration issued the first Extreme Heat Warning at 10 a.m. in Pohang and Gyeongsan, where the daily perceived temperature is expected to exceed 35 degrees Celsius for more than two days, with a perceived temperature of 38 degrees Celsius or a maximum temperature of 39 degrees Celsius expected to last for at least one day. This highest-level warning was introduced this year to address 'life-threatening extreme heat' that could not be adequately conveyed through existing heat advisories.In an interview with Aju Economy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Climate Change Ambassador Kwon Jong-ho assessed that while the direction for the international community to combat extreme weather is clear, the political leadership needed to drive this effort is weakening."The direction of the international community is clear. We are moving towards reducing carbon and protecting the Earth. Therefore, it is right for our country to take the lead in technology and innovation."Ambassador Kwon noted that since the United States effectively withdrew from international climate negotiations, tensions between developed and developing countries have intensified."In the absence of the U.S., there is a vacuum in leadership to guide negotiations on the international stage. It would be beneficial if the European Union took a more leading role, but the EU is also facing economic challenges."He mentioned that he felt this shift firsthand at a recent meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Bonn, Germany."In the past, we could reach agreements on technical issues, but now, almost every issue leads to clashes between groups."UN climate negotiations require consensus from all parties. While the influence of the U.S. has diminished, developing countries, including China and Saudi Arabia, are participating in negotiations more actively and strategically than before."Developing countries are not what they used to be. Middle Eastern nations are showing negotiation power comparable to that of the EU."Developing countries emphasize the historical responsibility of developed nations for carbon emissions during industrialization and demand climate finance and technology transfer. However, developed countries are finding it difficult to promise the same level of support due to economic slowdowns and financial burdens."There is a huge gap between the carbon reductions needed to achieve the 1.5-degree target and the actual commitments made by countries."Ambassador Kwon also suggested that the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East could paradoxically accelerate the transition to renewable energy."This year's Middle East situation has made energy security a serious issue. Paradoxically, it has raised awareness about the need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels."For South Korea, which imports most of its energy, climate policy and energy security are essentially aligned."To achieve energy independence, we must ultimately emphasize renewable energy. Our direction must be towards an electrified society and the expansion of renewable energy."He expressed confidence that the government's goal of deploying 4.2 million electric vehicles and 300,000 hydrogen vehicles by 2030 is achievable."We have a competitive supply chain centered around Hyundai and Kia. The direction is correct, and compared to developed countries, our targets are not excessively high."Ambassador Kwon predicted that the key agenda for the next international climate negotiations will be 'electrification.'South Korea has been viewed as a country where climate action is challenging due to its high reliance on manufacturing and coal power. However, the recent coal phase-out policy has garnered international attention."South Korea is a manufacturing powerhouse, and few countries among manufacturing nations are as proactive in carbon reduction as we are. The announcement of our membership in the Powering Past Coal Alliance surprised the international community significantly."He emphasized that carbon reduction should be seen not as a cost but as a new growth driver."If the international community is moving towards reducing carbon, it is right for us to take the lead in technology and innovation."Climate policy is now intertwined with trade policy. The European Union has begun implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) this year, and similar systems are being prepared in the UK and other countries.Ambassador Kwon expressed concern that applying different standards in each country could increase the burden on businesses."Companies are already making efforts to reduce carbon from an ESG perspective. However, if each country enforces different methods, it could hinder private climate action. It could become a 'stumbling block' rather than a 'building block.'"He proposed that future climate and trade norms should adhere to three principles: non-discrimination, consistency, and compatibility.The absence of the U.S. is also changing China's role. South Korea and China recently resumed their climate change cooperation joint committee for the first time in seven years."With the U.S. absent from negotiations, the competition between the U.S. and China is not the focus. There is significant room for cooperation with China in areas such as reduction, trade, and adaptation."South Korea's Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) plays a role in proposing compromises between developed and developing countries."South Korea must also propose more alternatives in the future."Ambassador Kwon stated that climate negotiations are ultimately a form of diplomacy."You must read the other party's red lines. You cannot reach an agreement by only asserting what you want."He shared a saying among diplomats."If you win a negotiation 100 to 0, you are a fool. You should win about 60 to 40 so that the other side can return to their country and explain the results."However, he expressed concern that the international community is increasingly leaning towards confrontation rather than compromise.Since becoming the climate envoy, he has been using public transportation instead of a personal vehicle."I practice BMW: Bus, Metro, Walk."As record heat waves in Europe and South Korea's first Extreme Heat Warning illustrate the climate crisis as a current disaster rather than a future warning, Ambassador Kwon reiterated the need for South Korea to lead industrial and energy transitions rather than waiting for international consensus."The direction the world is heading is clear. Therefore, South Korea must take the lead in technology and innovation."* This article has been translated by AI. 2026-07-15 07:04:00
Seoul court suspends FTC order naming Coupang founder as controlling head SEOUL, July 14 (AJP) -A South Korean appeals court on Monday suspended the antitrust regulator's decision designating Coupang founder and Chairman Bom Kim as the controlling individual of the U.S.-listed e-commerce giant, handing the company an early legal victory in a closely watched dispute over Korea's conglomerate rules. The Seoul High Court granted part of Coupang's request for an injunction, temporarily halting the Korea Fair Trade Commission's May 1 decision to change the group's legal "same person" designation from Coupang Inc. to Kim until 30 days after a final court ruling in the main administrative lawsuit. The court also suspended the FTC's order requiring Coupang to submit documents related to Kim that had been requested in April as part of the designation process. "The applicant faces a risk of irreparable harm if the order takes effect immediately, and there is insufficient evidence that suspending the measure would undermine the public interest," the court said in its ruling. The injunction does not determine the legality of the FTC's decision but freezes its enforcement while the underlying lawsuit proceeds. The FTC in April redesignated Kim as Coupang's "same person," a legal term referring to the ultimate controlling entity of a business group under South Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The move shifted the designation from the corporate entity Coupang Inc. to Kim himself, making the company subject to the full disclosure and governance requirements imposed on family-controlled conglomerates. The regulator argued Coupang no longer qualified for the exception allowing a corporation to be designated as the controlling entity because Kim's younger brother, Kim Yoo-seok, had effectively participated in management through his involvement in logistics and delivery operations. The decision marked the first time a founder of a U.S.-incorporated company operating in South Korea had been designated as the controlling individual of a large business group under Korea's antitrust regime. Coupang immediately challenged the designation, arguing that neither Kim nor his relatives own shares in the group's Korean affiliates and therefore there is no possibility of private-interest transactions that the regulations are designed to prevent. "As a U.S.-listed company, we are already subject to stringent disclosure obligations," the company has said, describing the FTC's decision as duplicative regulation that applies traditional chaebol rules to a globally listed technology company. Had the designation taken effect, Kim would have been required to disclose family shareholdings and governance information annually, while transactions involving relatives and related entities would have become subject to expanded regulatory scrutiny under Korea's conglomerate regulations. The legal battle is expected to center on whether managerial influence exercised by a family member, absent ownership, is sufficient to justify designating an individual rather than a corporate entity as the controlling person of a business group. 2026-07-14 14:16:00
The world is scorching and Korea's climate envoy sees opportunity in crisis SEOUL, July 13 (AJP) - South Korea issued its first top-tier heat warning Sunday as temperatures neared 39 degrees Celsius in the southeastern cities of Pohang and Gyeongsan, joining countries across Europe and North America confronting summers that are becoming longer, hotter and increasingly dangerous. The Korea Meteorological Administration activated the newly created Heat Wave Emergency Warning after apparent temperatures were forecast to exceed 38 degrees following days above 35 degrees. The alert, introduced this year above the country’s existing advisory and warning system, reflects an acknowledgement that conventional heat warnings are no longer sufficient for conditions authorities describe as potentially life-threatening. To Kyun Jong-ho, South Korea’s ambassador for climate change, the extreme weather offers a glimpse of the future governments have spent decades promising to prevent, even as the international system built to confront global warming becomes more divided. “The international direction is clear,” Kyun said in an interview with AJP at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul. “The world is moving toward reducing carbon emissions and protecting the planet. If that is the direction, South Korea should secure the technology and move ahead of others.” The intensifying heat arrives as international climate leadership weakens. The United States has stepped away from major climate processes, Europe is preoccupied with economic and immigration pressures, and negotiations between developed and developing countries have grown increasingly confrontational. “There is now a vacuum in leadership,” Kyun said. “I had hoped the European Union would take a stronger role, but the E.U. is also facing difficult economic conditions.” The consequences have been especially visible across Europe, where repeated heat waves have pushed temperatures above 40 degrees, fueled wildfires and contributed to heat-related and excess deaths. Climate researchers say fossil-fuel emissions have made such events substantially hotter and more dangerous. Yet Kyun argued that another geopolitical crisis — conflict in the Middle East and anxiety over energy supplies — could paradoxically accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. “The energy security issue became extremely serious after the Middle East crisis,” he said. “Paradoxically, it reminded countries that they must reduce their dependence on fossil fuels.” For South Korea, which imports most of the energy it consumes, climate policy and energy security are becoming inseparable. Kyun described the country’s future as an “electric society” built on expanded renewable generation. “In the end, renewable energy has to be emphasized if we want energy independence,” he said. “The direction we need to take is electrification and the expansion of renewable energy.” He said the government’s goal of putting 4.2 million electric vehicles and 300,000 hydrogen-powered vehicles on the road by 2030 was not excessively ambitious, given the strength of South Korea’s automobile and battery industries. “We have an extremely competitive supply chain,” he said, pointing to Hyundai Motor, Kia and the country’s domestic manufacturing capacity. “The direction is right, and it is difficult to say that the target is overly high when compared to other advanced economies.” A bridge between ministries — and nations The climate change ambassador is a senior Foreign Ministry post rather than a traditional overseas ambassadorship. The envoy represents South Korea in United Nations climate negotiations, talks on plastic pollution and other environmental diplomacy. The position emerged as governments were building the framework that eventually produced the Paris Agreement. At home, it also served as an intermediary between ministries whose mandates often pull in opposite directions. “The Environment Ministry exists to protect the environment, while the Industry Ministry exists to promote industry, so different perspectives are natural,” Kyun said 2026-07-14 08:42:41
Teen's killing tests South Korea's family exemption law SEOUL, July 10 (AJP) - A serving police officer destroyed evidence in his own son's murder case, and under South Korean law he cannot be prosecuted for it. That fact, uncovered during the investigation into the killing of a high school girl in the southern city of Gwangju in May, has pushed South Korea into a national debate over a decades-old provision of its Criminal Act that shields relatives from punishment when they hide offenders or destroy evidence on their behalf. Prosecutors say Jang Yun-gi, 23, attacked the student after stalking her with the intent to abduct and sexually assault her. While Jang was in custody, investigators found that items prosecutors considered important to proving a sexual motive, including life-like sex dolls and mobile phones, had disappeared from his residence. Prosecutors later determined that Jang's father, a police officer, had discarded the dolls and burned the phones. Ordinarily, destroying evidence in another person's criminal case is punishable by up to five years in prison or a fine. But Articles 151 and 155 of the Criminal Act carve out an exception: when a relative or cohabiting family member commits those acts for the benefit of the suspect, the person is not punished. The father is therefore unlikely to face criminal charges. The National Police Agency has said disciplinary measures remain possible if misconduct is confirmed, a distinction that has only intensified criticism that the law is out of step with the seriousness of the case. The exemption rests on an old legal judgment that the state should hesitate before forcing family members to betray one another. It is the same impulse at the heart of "Mother," Bong Joon-ho's 2009 thriller about a mother who buries the truth of her son's crime; the cover-up horrifies because it feels emotionally comprehensible. Critics say the Jang case shows what happens when the law gives that impulse automatic protection: a legal safe harbor for evidence destruction in a murder case, exploited by a man sworn to uphold the law. Other legal systems draw the line differently. Japan's Penal Code allows courts to exempt relatives rather than requiring it, giving judges room to weigh the gravity of the crime. Germany exempts relatives but separately punishes public officials who obstruct prosecution in the course of their duties, with no family exception. For critics of South Korea's law, that is the point: family loyalty may explain a parent's impulse, but it should not excuse a police officer's misuse of access and authority. Defenders of the exemption warn that abolishing it entirely would create hard cases, forcing parents and spouses to help prosecute people they love. But even lawmakers sympathetic to that view see the current rule as untenable. Rep. Min Hong-chul, a four-term Democratic Party lawmaker and former chief justice of the High Military Court, predicted a revision restricting the exemption would pass the National Assembly, saying the case had caused "such a major social impact." "This case has exposed a blind spot in the family-member exemption system," Min said. "There were likely many undisclosed cases in which the exemption applied to serious crimes such as murder, rape and robbery." Rep. Yoo Sang-bum, a two-term People Power Party lawmaker and former chief prosecutor, said abolishing all family exemptions would go too far, but that the exemption should be removed for people in investigative and inspection authorities. "The harm is too great to recognize the family-member exemption even for crimes committed by those responsible for uncovering the truth," Yoo said. Neither party has yet moved beyond early discussions. "I understand that the party leadership and floor leadership are discussing the family-member exemption issue, but there has not yet been any concrete discussion at a general meeting of lawmakers," said a two-term Democratic Party lawmaker. "This is a matter for the floor leadership, so we do not yet know the details. It will probably be discussed at Monday's general meeting of lawmakers," said a two-term People Power Party lawmaker. 2026-07-10 15:41:09
South Korea pushes back on US' proposed forced-labor tariff SEOUL, July 10 (AJP) - South Korea opposed a U.S. proposal to impose a 12.5 percent tariff on imports linked to forced labor, saying the measure is "unjustified" and "unnecessary" as Washington moves to expand its tariff policy under new legal grounds. Lee Seung-heon, counselor for trade, industry and resources at the South Korean Embassy in Washington, presented Seoul's position Thursday at a public hearing hosted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) at the U.S. International Trade Commission. The hearing was part of USTR proceedings on proposed tariff action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a legal tool that allows Washington to investigate and respond to foreign trade practices it considers unreasonable, discriminatory or burdensome to U.S. commerce. USTR has proposed additional duties of 10 percent or 12.5 percent on imports from 60 economies that it says have failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on goods made with forced labor. South Korea was placed in the higher-rate group, along with several other major trading partners. "Korea reserves its basic position that action against South Korea with regard to the importation of forced labor goods is neither appropriate nor necessary," Lee said. Lee argued that South Korea has pursued policies to address forced-labor risks both domestically and in global supply chains including sustainability disclosure standards, corporate guidelines and efforts to promote responsible business conduct under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development framework. He also pointed to a joint fact sheet issued after last year's South Korea-U.S. summit, saying Seoul had already reaffirmed its intention to cooperate with Washington in combating imports of goods made with forced labor. South Korea's argument is twofold. Seoul says it shares Washington's concern over forced labor but disputes USTR's conclusion that South Korea's current system burdens U.S. commerce. It also says that, even if Washington decides to impose tariffs on countries covered by the investigation, South Korea should receive more favorable treatment because of its broader trade cooperation with the U.S. The South Korean government earlier submitted a written statement to USTR, saying the proposed measure appeared to lack a sufficient factual basis and did not adequately reflect Korea-specific circumstances. Seoul also argued that some of the examples cited by USTR, including concerns related to polysilicon produced with forced labor, did not directly implicate South Korea. The Korea International Trade Association (KITA) separately asked USTR to defer implementation of the tariff or reduce the proposed rate for South Korea to 10 percent. The group said South Korea strictly prohibits forced labor through domestic laws and international commitments, even if it does not have an import-ban regime identical to the U.S. model. KITA also requested that goods with low forced-labor risk, or products for which USTR has not identified specific evidence of injury to U.S. commerce, be excluded from any final tariff measure. The dispute comes as the Trump administration is trying to rebuild its tariff policy after earlier emergency-based global tariffs were challenged in U.S. courts. Washington has increasingly turned to other legal authorities, including Section 122 and Section 301 of the Trade Act, to preserve tariff leverage against major trading partners. A temporary 10 percent global tariff imposed under Section 122 is expected to expire later this month, increasing attention on how quickly USTR will finalize the Section 301 cases. The forced-labor investigation is one of several trade probes that could shape the next phase of U.S. tariff policy. USTR is also conducting a separate Section 301 investigation into alleged structural overcapacity in manufacturing sectors, including in South Korea. That inquiry focuses on whether major trading partners are producing more than they can consume domestically and exporting the excess in ways that harm U.S. industry. For South Korea, the stakes are significant as the export-driven country depends heavily on the U.S. market for products including automobiles, electronics, batteries, steel and machinery. Although USTR has proposed exemptions for certain products, including goods already subject to separate national security tariffs, officials and businesses remain concerned that new duties could complicate the tariff balance reached with Washington last year. During the hearing, USTR officials asked South Korea to provide more detail on its policies to prevent imports of goods made with forced labor as well as a timeline for specific measures and plans. It remains unclear whether the public hearing and written submissions will lead USTR to revise the proposed tariff rate for South Korea. A final decision is expected to be closely watched in Seoul as a test of whether last year's bilateral trade understanding can shield Korea from Washington's latest tariff campaign. 2026-07-10 10:41:14
PPP leader turns to hardline conservatives amid loosening grip within party SEOUL, July 9 (AJP) - Jang Dong-hyuk, the leader of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) has taken his fight over a ballot shortage in last month's local elections out of Parliament and onto the streets, alarming lawmakers in his own party who fear that the campaign could pull conservatives back toward election fraud conspiracy theories. Jang began a nationwide tour on Wednesday to demand a re-run of the June 3 local elections along with an investigation into the ballot shortage controversy. His first stop was Incheon, west of Seoul, where he met young supporters before joining a rally at a busy shopping and nightlife district there. It was the first time Jang had joined a field rally on the ballot issue outside Seoul's Olympic Park, where protests over the election controversy had already drawn attention from hard-line conservatives. Party officials said the Incheon event was intended to build momentum for similar gatherings in other cities, including Busan and Gwangju. To Jang and his allies, the campaign is a fight for voting rights. To some lawmakers and strategists inside the party, it is something riskier: an attempt to mobilize a restless conservative base at a moment when the party's poll numbers are falling and Jang's leadership is under pressure. The dispute began with a shortage of ballots during the elections, a logistical failure that opposition lawmakers have seized upon as evidence of serious election mismanagement. Jang has called for a special prosecutor recommended by the opposition, arguing that an inquiry led by the governing side would lack credibility. Park Sung-hoon, the party's chief spokesman, told reporters at the National Assembly that the special counsel now being discussed "must be led by a person recommended by the opposition." He said the party would "properly reflect voices from outside Parliament" to ensure that a meaningful investigation is carried out. But the language of election integrity has begun to unsettle some conservatives, who worry that the campaign could blur into the kind of voter-fraud claims long associated with far-right activists. The distinction has not fully eased concerns inside the party. The People Power Party has been losing ground in several recent polls. A Realmeter survey conducted on July 2 and 3 found the ruling Democratic Party (DP) at 43 percent and the PPP at 40.3 percent, reversing the conservatives' brief lead from three weeks earlier. A Gallup Korea survey conducted from June 30 to July 2 put the PPP at 26 percent, far behind the DP's 41 percent. The regional numbers have been especially troubling for conservatives. According to Gallup, the party's support in Busan, Ulsan and South Gyeongsang Province — a traditional conservative stronghold — fell from 37 percent in the second week of June to 25 percent in the first week of July. In Daejeon, Sejong and the Chungcheong region, support dropped from 40 percent in the fourth week of June to 20 percent a week later. For critics inside the party, Jang's turn to rally politics looks less like a disciplined opposition strategy than an effort to survive a leadership crisis. Since the elections, he has faced criticism for what some lawmakers describe as "disciplinary politics" aimed at rivals aligned with former party leader Han Dong-hoon. He has also overseen an escalating boycott of parliamentary committees, deepening internal frustration among lawmakers who believe the party should focus on legislative work and rebuilding its image with moderate voters. Jang's current strategy has reminded some party members of his conduct during the campaign, when calls emerged for him to step back from the front line. At that time, he tried to hold his ground by visiting Chungcheong, his home region, and Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, the conservative heartland. Now, critics say, he is again leaning on the party's most loyal supporters rather than broadening its appeal. Jang had initially planned to travel to Daegu on Friday for a youth meeting and a voting-rights rally. The trip was later postponed. Party officials said the schedule had been adjusted because a weekday event would have limited political impact. But people familiar with the matter said lawmakers from the Daegu area had conveyed concerns about the nature of the rally. The sensitivities were heightened by the expected appearance of Jeon Han-gil, the far-right YouTuber, at the same rally on Saturday. Most PPP lawmakers who spoke with AJP expressed concern. "It is difficult to justify trying to rally the party's support base through street protests while at the same time weakening internal unity through disciplinary politics," said a four-term PPP lawmaker. "The party chairman represents the entire party. Whatever he intends to do, he should first discuss it with fellow lawmakers at a general meeting of the parliamentary party or through other internal channels," said a three-term lawmaker. "I didn't even know Jang was considering a nationwide tour," the lawmaker said. "At some point, he stopped consulting other lawmakers and began making decisions on his own." "His credibility as a leader is finished," said a first-term lawmaker. "The chairman has been pursuing an increasingly unilateral course, and I don't know whether it is for the good of the party or for his own political interests." "Even PPP lawmakers are not rallying behind Jang," the lawmaker added. "Politics is not something you do alone." "The best thing Chairman Jang can do for our party is to step down as soon as possible," said another first-term lawmaker. Rep. Ahn Sang-hoon criticized Jang's nationwide tour, saying it was "nothing more than one of many desperate attempts to preserve power that has already outlived its legitimacy." "A small stream cannot change the course of the mighty Han River," he added. Some within the People Power Party, however, argued that Jang's nationwide tour to attend rallies was appropriate. Yoon Sang-hyun, a five-term lawmaker and chair of the National Assembly's special committee investigating the elections' ballot shortage, said it is only natural for the leader of the main opposition party to travel across the country to listen to the voices of the people and gather public opinion. "The voices of the people gathering in the public squares today are not the voices of any particular political camp," Yoon said. "They are the voices of sovereign citizens who, after experiencing the ballot shortage, have begun asking whether their votes are being properly safeguarded." Yoon also stressed that winning over moderate voters and those in the greater Seoul metropolitan area depends on politicians fulfilling their responsibilities. "The trust of moderates and metropolitan-area voters is a reward that politicians earn by doing their jobs," he said. "The party can win their support when the party leader gathers the public's urgent concerns on the ground while the special committee and the parliamentary leadership work in tandem to produce institutional reforms based on evidence and facts." "The important thing is to build party-wide consensus around that shared task," he added. 2026-07-09 17:33:11
Türkiye's NATO moment arrives, but the price of trust remains unpaid SEOUL, July 09 (AJP) - For years, Türkiye occupied an uncomfortable place inside NATO: too important to expel, too difficult to embrace. It was the ally that bought a Russian air defense system over Washington’s objections. The country that refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The state that could sell drones to Kyiv while keeping open channels to the Kremlin. The government whose president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, jailed critics at home while presenting himself abroad as a broker among presidents, generals and strongmen. But at this week’s NATO summit in Ankara, the old language of irritation gave way to the language of necessity. Türkiye was not the problem child standing outside the room. It was the host. That fact alone captured one of the central shifts in the alliance since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022: NATO’s most awkward members can also become some of its most useful. And few countries have turned wartime disorder into strategic leverage as effectively as Türkiye. The summit brought together the leaders of NATO’s 32 member states at a moment when the alliance is trying to rearm at speed, prepare for a diminished American security guarantee, sustain Ukraine, contain Russia and widen defense-industrial cooperation beyond Europe and North America. It was also attended by partner countries, including South Korea, whose president, Lee Jae Myung, used the gathering to pitch Seoul as a reliable supplier and co-producer in NATO’s expanding defense market. Yet the summit’s deeper story belonged to Turkey. More precisely, it belonged to the strange return of Turkish power inside an alliance that had spent much of the past decade wondering whether Ankara was drifting away from the West. The clearest sign came from President Donald Trump, who met Erdogan on the sidelines of the summit and said the United States would move to lift sanctions on Türkiye imposed over its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. Trump also said he would consider allowing Turkey to acquire F-35 fighter jets, though he stopped short of announcing a completed sale. For Ankara, that was not just an arms issue. It was a symbolic reopening of a door that had been slammed shut in 2019, when the United States removed Türkiye from the F-35 program over fears that the Russian system could expose the stealth jet’s vulnerabilities to Moscow. For NATO, it was something larger: a test of whether the alliance’s need for Türkiye has grown strong enough to overcome its mistrust of Türkiye. The return of the indispensable ally Türkiye’s rise has not come from a sudden ideological return to the West. It has come from the opposite: Ankara’s insistence on not fully belonging to any camp. That ambiguity once made Türkiye suspect. Now, in a world of overlapping wars and unstable alliances, it has made Türkiye useful. Türkiye sits at the hinge of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It controls the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, giving it influence over naval access between Russia’s Black Sea fleet and the wider world. It has the second-largest army in NATO after the United States. Its defense industry has become faster, cheaper and more export-oriented. Its drones, ships, armored vehicles and air defense systems are increasingly visible in conflicts from Ukraine to the Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East. And unlike many Western governments, Ankara has kept open channels to Moscow. That has allowed Erdogan to play a role that few other NATO leaders can plausibly attempt: arming one side while talking to the other. “The initial boost to Türkiye’s role was the result of its efforts to mediate between the two sides, despite Ankara being inside NATO and providing TB2 drones to Ukraine to defend itself from Russia in 2022,” said Matteo Fumagalli, director of the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus Studies (MECACS) at the University of St Andrews. “These included high-level meetings in Istanbul, which culminated in the Istanbul Protocol. Nothing came out of it in the end, but the efforts made Turkey an actor regarded as legitimate and acceptable by all parties.” The Istanbul talks did not end the war. But they changed the diplomatic perception of Türkiye. Ankara was not neutral in the strict sense. It was a NATO member. It had sold weapons to Ukraine. It had blocked some naval movements through the Turkish Straits. But it also did not close its door to Russia. That combination — partial alignment, partial distance — has become the core of Türkiye’s post-Ukraine-war influence. Timo Kivimäki, professor of international relations at the University of Bath and a senior non-resident fellow at the Sejong Institute, described Türkiye as part of a new category of states whose value lies not in unquestioned loyalty but in diplomatic independence. “I think Türkiye has earned its peace superpower role by working independently and competently for peace,” he said. “They are a NATO country, yet, in many international conflict they can take distance from their NATO commitments, and that is what makes them valuable.” For decades, Western alliance politics rewarded predictability. The Ukraine war has rewarded a different quality: access. Access to Moscow. Access to Kyiv. Access to Washington. Access to the Middle East. Access to military production capacity. Türkiye has all of them. A war that weakened Russia and strengthened Türkiye The Ukraine war has helped Türkiye in both direct and indirect ways. Directly, it made Türkiye a necessary actor in the Black Sea. Ankara helped broker the Black Sea grain corridor, one of the few diplomatic arrangements that temporarily eased the war’s global economic fallout. It also launched a minesweeping initiative with Romania and Bulgaria to keep parts of the western Black Sea safer for shipping. Rick Fawn, professor of international relations at the University of St Andrews, said Turkey had emerged as one of the clearest beneficiaries of the war’s strategic disruption. “If there is one single conclusion it is that Türkiye is the ‘winner.’ Ankara cleverly does its own thing,” he said. Fawn said Türkiye had become the “lynchpin to Black Sea security and that of NATO’s eastern flank,” but always “on its own terms.” That phrase — on its own terms — is essential. Türkiye’s usefulness to NATO has not made it more obedient. It has made it more demanding. Ankara has used its leverage to seek relief from defense restrictions, access to European security initiatives and the revival of a weapons relationship with Washington. At the summit, Erdogan called for NATO allies to remove defense-industry restrictions against one another, arguing that exclusionary practices, including those linked to European Union membership, risked creating artificial divisions inside Europe. The indirect effects of the Ukraine war may be just as important. Stefanie Ortmann, professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, said Russia’s weakening has opened strategic space for Türkiye beyond Ukraine itself. “Some of this is a direct effect, as Erdogan has been able to maintain and indeed extend good relations with Russia, while also maintaining and extending relations with Ukraine," she observed, while noting the war weakened Russia’s ability to sustain influence in other regions. “Russia has been weakened by the invasion insofar as it has been unable to maintain its engagement in other parts of the world,” she said. “Russia has stopped supporting Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has led to the ethnic cleansing of the enclave in 2023 by Azerbaijan, supported by Türkiye both militarily and diplomatically.” She also pointed to Syria, where Russia’s reduced capacity to support Bashar al-Assad has created room for Türkiye to shape outcomes more directly. In other words, the Ukraine war did not merely increase Türkiye’s value inside NATO. It weakened Türkiye’s rivals in regions where Ankara had already been competing for influence. Trump and Erdogan, two transactional leaders Erdogan’s fortunes have also been helped by the return of Trump, a president who often treats alliances less as institutions than as negotiations among leaders. Trump’s relationship with Erdogan has long been unusually warm compared with Washington’s broader view of Türkiye. In his first term, Trump sometimes expressed sympathy for Ankara’s frustration over the F-35 dispute, even as U.S. officials warned that Türkiye’s S-400 system posed unacceptable risks to the stealth fighter program. Now, in his second term, Trump appears more willing to reopen the issue. Michael Plouffe, professor of international political economy at University College London, said the potential F-35 sale should be understood within Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. “Trump’s well-known affinity for strongman leaders put Erdogan in a rather favorable position when Russia invaded Ukraine, and he’s managed to leverage this affinity quite well to increase Türkiye’s regional influence,” he said. He added that Türkiye’s outsider status in Europe may have become an advantage. “Türkiye’s outsider status when it comes to Europe was something he was able to use to great effect when acting as an intermediary between Trump, Zelenskyy and Putin, as something of a less hawkish and more moderate voice in comparison to European members of NATO, and perhaps more closely attuned to Trump’s and Putin’s desires.” The relationship is not built on shared democratic values. It is built on a shared preference for leader-to-leader bargaining, visible strength and short-term deals. Plouffe was blunt about the F-35 question. “I would view the F-35 sale as a reward for Türkiye’s support for the Trump administration over the past couple of years, and as a warning to Netanyahu over Israel’s repeated sabotaging of the U.S.-Iranian efforts to de-escalate conflict,” he said. That interpretation highlights the complexity of the issue. A possible F-35 sale to Türkiye is not only about Türkiye and NATO. It is also about Israel, Iran, Syria, the balance of air power in the Middle East and Trump’s shifting relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Israel has long enjoyed a qualitative military edge in the region, and the spread of F-35s to other Middle Eastern powers would raise difficult questions in Washington. Türkiye is a NATO ally, but it is also a regional competitor whose relations with Israel have deteriorated sharply under Erdogan. That is why the F-35 issue remains a signal rather than a settlement. Andrew Scott, lecturer in the department of political science at University College London, cautioned against treating Trump’s comments as a done deal. “I’m also not entirely sure about the F-35 part,” he said. “He’s said he would ‘certainly consider’ selling them but nothing was actually approved yet. It was a signal, rather than a deal and I’m not sure how much you can trust Trump here." The F-35 as a measure of trust The F-35 is not merely another aircraft. It is a flying intelligence platform, a stealth strike system and a symbol of the most sensitive tier of American defense cooperation. That is why Türkiye’s removal from the program was so damaging. Ankara had been a partner in the F-35’s international development network and had invested heavily in the program. Turkish companies had expected a role in the jet’s supply chain. Türkiye had expected to modernize its air force around the aircraft. Instead, the S-400 purchase triggered sanctions and exclusion. The American concern was straightforward: If Türkiye operated both the Russian S-400 system and the F-35, Moscow might gain insight into how to detect or defeat the jet’s stealth capabilities. Ankara argued that the punishment was unjust. Washington insisted the risk was intolerable. The dispute became one of the clearest signs that Türkiye’s relationship with the United States had moved from alliance tension to strategic mistrust. Now, Trump’s willingness to revisit the issue suggests that the balance of pressure has shifted. Türkiye is no longer asking from a position of isolation. It is asking while hosting NATO, contributing to Black Sea security, expanding defense production and positioning itself as a mediator in multiple conflicts. But legal and political obstacles remain. Congress could resist any F-35 transfer. Israel could lobby against it. U.S. defense officials could insist that the S-400 system be removed, dismantled or transferred before any sale proceeds. That means Türkiye’s NATO comeback is real, but incomplete. Scott noted that Türkiye still faces major constraints. “It’s not all good though,” he said. “Israel still has air dominance over Syria, the economic situation is still very fragile and even in spite of their leverage in certain areas their EU accession has been frozen for years and shows no sign of being revived.” Türkiye may be more powerful than it was in 2022. But power has not erased vulnerability. South Korea enters the NATO market While Türkiye used the Ankara summit to demonstrate geopolitical leverage, South Korea used it to demonstrate industrial relevance. President Lee Jae Myung arrived in Ankara on July 7 as the leader of a NATO partner country at the invitation of Secretary General Mark Rutte. His schedule reflected Seoul’s ambitions: a meeting with Rutte, participation in talks with the Indo-Pacific Four partners — South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — and a keynote speech at a NATO defense industry forum titled “Shared Values, Stronger Industrial Base.” In his meeting with Rutte, South Korea and NATO agreed to launch negotiations on a basic procurement agreement that Seoul officials said would create an institutional foundation for Korean companies to participate in NATO’s joint defense procurement market. At the defense forum, Lee proposed what he called a “South Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0,” calling for cooperation to move beyond weapons sales toward joint research, production and operation of weapons systems. The timing was important. NATO is no longer focused only on military readiness in the abstract. It is trying to solve a production problem. Ukraine’s war has exposed the limits of Western stockpiles, ammunition output and industrial mobilization. NATO countries are spending more, but they also need suppliers that can produce quickly and reliably. That has opened space for countries like South Korea, whose defense industry has already expanded rapidly in Europe through major arms deals with Poland and other partners. Lee’s presence in Ankara therefore fit into the summit’s larger theme: the globalization of NATO’s defense-industrial base. Türkiye and South Korea represent two different answers to the same problem. Türkiye offers geography, wartime access and an increasingly capable domestic arms industry. South Korea offers scale, manufacturing discipline and a record of rapid delivery. Both are outside the traditional core of NATO power. Both are increasingly difficult for NATO to ignore. A summit about weapons, not only values The Ankara summit revealed a hard truth about the alliance: NATO still speaks the language of democracy, freedom and shared values, but its immediate needs are increasingly industrial and strategic. It needs ammunition. It needs drones. It needs air defense systems. It needs shipyards, missiles, armored vehicles and production lines that can expand faster than Russia’s. It needs partners that can help fill gaps. That reality has given Türkiye new bargaining power despite concerns over Erdogan’s domestic record. For years, European leaders criticized Türkiye’s democratic backsliding, its crackdown on opposition politicians, its pressure on the press and its expansive use of state power against critics. Those concerns have not disappeared. But at the Ankara summit, they were overshadowed by defense spending, Ukraine, weapons production and the search for new security arrangements. This is one of the uncomfortable lessons of the Ukraine war. Strategic utility can soften democratic criticism. Not erase it, but push it to the margins. Albert Weale, emeritus professor of political science at University College London, said Trump was unlikely to be troubled by Erdogan’s domestic authoritarianism. “Erdogan’s crackdown on the Turkish opposition will not be a problem for Trump,” he said. “Trump is so volatile and transactional that seeking a strategic rationale for his foreign policy may be fruitless.” Weale also warned that Türkiye’s rise should not be seen only through the Ukraine lens. “Türkiye’s rise to prominence in Trump’s eyes not unlikely to be connected with Ukraine,” he said. “Rather Türkiye has been vying with Israel to be the regional hegemon.” That competition with Israel adds another layer to the F-35 debate. If Washington allows Türkiye back into the program, it may strengthen NATO cohesion in one theater while complicating American relationships in another. The appeal of strategic ambiguity Türkiye’s foreign policy is sometimes described as hedging, though that word does not fully capture Ankara’s posture. Hedging implies cautious balancing. Türkiye’s approach is often more assertive: it pushes, bargains, delays, obstructs and mediates, depending on the issue. It blocked Sweden’s NATO accession for months before extracting concessions. It challenged Greece and Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. It maintained ties with Russia while selling drones to Ukraine. It presented itself as a Muslim-majority NATO power, a Black Sea gatekeeper, a Middle Eastern actor, a Caucasus power and a Eurasian bridge. To critics, this is opportunism. To supporters, it is strategic autonomy. To many middle powers watching from outside Europe, it may look like a model. Fumagalli said Türkiye’s ability to maintain relations with the United States, Russia, China and regional actors may appeal to countries facing similar pressure to choose sides. “The fact that Ankara has been able to navigate very choppy waters geopolitically, maintaining decent relations with all parties, from the U.S. to Russia, China, and others is perhaps a lesson that other countries in its immediate neighborhood — South Caucasus? Central Asia? — might be interested in, since they face similar constraints,” he said. “It is difficult not to choose in today’s geopolitically fraught world, but hedging remains an appealing, and for the time being, feasible foreign policy strategy for a number of countries. Although Ankara does not quite hedge as such, its foreign policy conduct reminds of us of some of the aspects of this foreign policy strategy,” he added. This may be Türkiye’s most important export: not drones or armored vehicles, but a method. It is a method built on refusing permanent alignment, cultivating personal ties with powerful leaders, developing domestic defense capacity and using geography as leverage. It is risky, but in Türkiye’s case it has produced results. The limits of Türkiye’s comeback Still, Türkiye’s rise has boundaries. Its economy remains fragile, with inflation, currency weakness and investor concerns limiting Erdogan’s room for maneuver. Its EU accession process is frozen and shows little sign of revival. Its relations with several European governments remain strained. Its domestic politics continue to raise concerns among allies that define NATO as a democratic alliance, not merely a military one. Its relationship with Russia is also a source of both leverage and suspicion. The very channels that make Türkiye useful as a mediator also make some allies question Ankara’s reliability. The F-35 issue captures all of these contradictions. If the United States restores Türkiye’s access to the fighter, Erdogan can claim a major victory. It would show that Ankara endured years of pressure and emerged with its strategic importance recognized. It would also strengthen Türkiye’s hand against Greece and reassure its defense establishment that Türkiye has not been permanently downgraded in the American security hierarchy. But if the deal stalls in Congress, or if Washington demands unacceptable conditions on the S-400, the episode could deepen Turkish grievances and reinforce Ankara’s belief that the West will never fully trust it. Either outcome carries risks. For NATO, the dilemma is familiar but sharper than before: Türkiye is often difficult when it is weak, but it may be even more difficult when it is strong. What Ankara showed The Ankara summit did not resolve NATO’s Turkey problem. It reframed it. Türkiye is no longer just a source of friction. It is a source of capacity. It can shape Black Sea access, influence talks over Ukraine, complicate Russia’s naval posture, expand defense production and act as a bridge to regions where many Western governments have limited reach. That makes Türkiye valuable. It does not necessarily make it trusted. The same independence that allows Ankara to talk to Moscow makes allies nervous. The same defense industry that strengthens NATO’s capacity also gives Turkey more autonomy. The same personal diplomacy that appeals to Trump may weaken the institutional predictability on which alliances depend. Kivimäki argued that Trump’s “deal-orientation” has a positive side because it focuses on relationships between countries rather than dividing the world into democracies and autocracies. “There is research that show that such relation-orientation does help foster peace,” he said. But he also warned that Trump’s disregard for supranational institutions creates long-term risks. “At the same time, Trump does not have any respect for supranational realities such as the international law and the UN,” he said. “The development of supranational governance is the long-term hope for world peace, and thus Trump’s attitude that does not respect the UN or the law is problematic.” That tension — between deal-making and rules, between usefulness and values, between power and trust — ran through the summit. Türkiye has learned to thrive in that space. A new NATO, whether Europe likes it or not The image of NATO as a tidy club of like-minded democracies has always been partly myth. During the Cold War, the alliance included authoritarian members when strategic necessity demanded it. Today, the return of large-scale war to Europe has again made necessity more powerful than discomfort. Türkiye understands this. So does South Korea, though in a different way. Ankara is selling NATO its geography, its access and its ambiguity. Seoul is selling NATO its factories, its technology and its reliability. Both are beneficiaries of a new defense era in which production capacity has become a form of geopolitical power. 2026-07-09 13:52:08
Aju Media launches AI-focused business channel as Korea pushes AI ambitions SEOUL, July 08 (AJP) - South Korean media company Aju Media Group launched what it described as the country's first television channel dedicated exclusively to artificial intelligence on Wednesday, seeking to establish a platform covering AI policy, business, investment and technology as competition in the sector intensifies. The company officially launched ABC (AI Business Channel) at an opening ceremony in Seoul, kicking off a two-day series of events bringing together government officials, business leaders, investors and academics to discuss the future of South Korea's AI ecosystem. The launch comes as South Korea steps up efforts to strengthen its competitiveness in artificial intelligence, which the government has identified as a strategic growth engine and a key driver of future industrial development. Aju Media said the new channel will provide specialized coverage of AI-related policies, technological advances, investment trends and industry developments. Wednesday's opening ceremony featured a joint presentation by a human anchor and an AI-powered robotic anchor, followed by opening remarks from Aju Media Group Chairman Kwak Young-gil and a congratulatory video message from President Lee Jae Myung. Guests also participated in a ceremonial launch marking the start of the channel's broadcasts. On Thursday, the company is scheduled to host an AI Innovation Forum under the theme, "A New Media Era: Industrial Transformation Driven by the AI Ecosystem." The forum will bring together policymakers, technology executives, investors and researchers to discuss South Korea's AI competitiveness and industrial strategy. Vice Minister of Science and ICT Ryu Je-myung is scheduled to deliver a keynote address outlining the government's ambition to make South Korea one of the world's three leading AI powers. Former professional Go player Lee Sedol, whose 2016 matches against Google's AlphaGo drew global attention, is also expected to speak about the impact of artificial intelligence a decade after the landmark contest. NVIDIA Korea Country Manager Jeong So-young is scheduled to present her outlook on AI-driven industrial transformation. Aju Media said it plans to expand its operations beyond newspapers, newswire services and digital platforms into television broadcasting through the new AI-focused channel. 2026-07-08 16:28:35